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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
F R E D  H .   C AT E  A N D  J A M E S  X .  D E M P S E Y
The tensions between privacy and security seem sharper than ever. Concerns 
about terrorism are driving many governments to adopt more expansive surveil-
lance powers, while human rights courts, at least in Europe, continue to cite pri-
vacy rights to strike down overbroad measures. The digital services woven into 
our personal and professional lives generate more and more information reveal-
ing our movements, actions, and intentions, while encryption that shields com-
munications from interception and blocks access to data stored on mobile devices 
is becoming widespread. Big data techniques make it easier for governments to 
ingest large amounts of data and mine it to discern patterns and make decisions, 
but governments simultaneously complain they are “going dark” in the face of 
technological change, unable to obtain evidence crucial to criminal and national 
security investigations. Regulators seek to promote enhanced cybersecurity, yet 
fairly simple phishing techniques expose huge volumes of email and documents 
to hackers, undermining not only privacy but the democratic process.
This volume represents the culmination of a nearly six- year project examin-
ing this tension. It began as an effort to obtain a snapshot of what seemed to be 
growing government demands for bulk access to data held by the private sector. 
After leaks and authorized disclosures lifted the shroud of secrecy around the 
bulk collection activities of some governments, it turned into something much 
more ambitious: an effort to explore what should be the rules for government 
access to data and what should be the responses of private sector companies to 
those demands.
Throughout, the project unfolded in the context of the vast changes wrought 
by the ongoing revolution in information and communications technology. As a 
part of daily life, individuals around the world use services that collect and store 
data in digital form. The expansive aggregation of personal data in the hands 
of private- sector companies is true equally of businesses firmly rooted in the 
physical world— retailers, health care providers, financial institutions, utilities, 
airlines, hotels— and of those based online. The emergence of the Internet of 





Within this ocean of data is information of value to governments pursuing 
legitimate interests and, of course, to those seeking to suppress and control. 
Governments understandably want access to this data. At the top of their list is 
communications data— the content of communications and also records of who 
is calling whom, mobile phone location data, and Internet connection records. 
Also of interest are bank records, travel records, and potentially any kind of data 
that could reveal a person’s activities. Essentially every government in the world 
claims the power to compel disclosure of this data by the companies that hold 
it. The rules surrounding such disclosures— how much can be obtained, under 
what standard, and upon the approval of what authority— remain an urgent con-
cern of both citizens and the companies holding their data.
Our project was premised on the view that there is a fundamental distinction 
between situations where government agents demand from third parties data 
regarding a particular target and, on the other hand, situations where the gov-
ernment is collecting large quantities of data without discrimination. For the 
former, which traditionally characterized law enforcement investigations, prac-
tices and rules have for some time been relatively clear (even as the variety of 
information available has expanded): when seeking data about an individual in a 
criminal investigation, government agents must have some threshold of particu-
larized suspicion linking that person to a specific crime, they must obtain inde-
pendent authorization for the surveillance or data acquisition, and the intrusion 
on privacy must be limited in time and scope to the acquisition of evidence rele-
vant to the crime being investigated.
However, it is now clear, governments have also been collecting informa-
tion without particularized suspicion, often for intelligence or national 
security purposes but also, almost unnoticed, for regulatory purposes. These non- 
particularized, bulk demands pose unique questions that our project explored. 
Four issues in particular are salient. The first concerns transparency: What pow-
ers are governments exercising? When we began this work, bulk collection pro-
grams conducted in the name of national security had not been publicly avowed. 
The second question is about legality: Does a publicly- available statute authorize 
and define the government’s power in clear terms? The third issue is norma-
tive: What standards should limit government access, and what structure of con-
trol and oversight can assure against abuse? Finally, even if publicly avowed and 
even if statutorily authorized, can a system of safeguards and oversight ever be 
robust enough to legitimize mass surveillance, or are bulk programs incompati-
ble with human rights principles of necessity and proportionality?
OUR PROCESS
In 2011, under the auspices of The Privacy Projects, we began exploring what 
we called at the time “systematic government access to data held by the private 
sector.” By “systematic access,” we meant both direct access by the government 
to private- sector databases, without the mediation or interaction of an employee 
or agent of the entity holding the data; and government access, whether or not 
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mediated by a company, to large volumes of private- sector data. It seemed to us 
at the time that there had been an increase worldwide in government demands 
for data held by the private sector, driven by a variety of factors, and that this 
had included an expansion in government requests for direct access or bulk 
disclosures.
Two years before the Snowden leaks, we commissioned papers from leading 
experts in nine countries (Australia, Canada, China, Germany, India, Israel, 
Japan, the UK, and the United States), asking them to explore what, if anything, 
was publicly known about bulk collection in their countries and to describe the 
laws regarding broad government access to private- sector data. In April 2012, we 
convened a meeting in Washington of academics, privacy advocates, and private- 
sector leaders to review those papers and chart a course for further research.2 
Among other things, we decided to expand the geographic scope of the study 
and commissioned four additional papers (covering Brazil, France, Italy, and the 
Republic of Korea),3 which were the subject of another multi- stakeholder round-
table, held in London in May 2013.
These initial papers confirmed our thesis, identifying various examples of 
“systematic access” in a wide range of countries. The research also found a gen-
eral lack of transparency about the nature and scope of data collection prac-
tices carried out in the name of national security or foreign intelligence. Many 
were not publicly acknowledged by the governments, and the companies subject 
to the demands were prohibited from disclosing them. Moreover, laws on the 
books did not expressly authorize bulk collection. Even the experts we enlisted 
admitted that they were uncertain of what the law permitted or how it was being 
interpreted. Oversight mechanisms, our authors found, were limited and, if they 
existed, were themselves often shrouded in secrecy.
In June 2013, weeks after our London roundtable, the Snowden leaks began. 
Unauthorized and authorized disclosures of intelligence programs in the United 
States, the UK, and some other European countries partly lifted the shroud of 
secrecy, at least with respect to some countries. The disclosures gave detailed 
substance to our core concerns about expansive and lightly regulated govern-
ment demands for access to data held (or transmitted) by the private sector. 
“Bulk surveillance” came to be featured prominently in national and interna-
tional debates over governmental power, corporate responsibility, and individ-
ual privacy. Policymakers around the world professed shock and concern about 
the intrusiveness of government (usually other governments’) programs of bulk 
collection.
In the immediate wake of the Snowden leaks, however, much of the com-
mentary was misleading, especially in suggesting that bulk collection was 
2. The first nine country reports were published in November 2012 in Volume 2, Issue No. 4 of 
International Data Privacy Law, https:// academic.oup.com/ idpl/ issue/ 2/ 4.
3. These papers were published in February 2014 in Volume 4, Issue No. 1 of International 
Data Privacy Law, https:// academic.oup.com/ idpl/ issue/ 4/ 1.
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predominantly a US and UK practice. Our earlier research had shown that the 
practice was much more widespread. To highlight our findings and to seek to 
drive a more accurate discussion of the legal and policy issues, The Privacy 
Projects organized a public workshop in Brussels in November 2013 for private- 
sector and civil society representatives to meet with data protection authorities 
and other government officials. The Privacy Projects also commissioned a major 
article summarizing the project’s findings to date.4 We also turned our attention 
to the questions of oversight and accountability, hosting additional workshops 
in 2014 in Montreal and London focused on means of achieving accountability 
when the government accesses private- sector records.
Finally, in an effort to pull together these various threads, we commissioned a 
series of essays from prominent industry leaders, activists, and academics from 
around the world. These papers addressed in practical terms the elements of over-
sight that should be applied to any government program seeking broad access to 
personal data held by the private sector. Other papers address the question of 
how industry should respond to such requests or demands and how the diver-
gent interests of government, companies, and individuals can be understood. 
Last, we commissioned papers that assessed bulk or indiscriminate collection 
against the evolving framework of international law and human rights law.
OUR FINDINGS
This volume contains the fruits of our project. Twelve country reports have been 
complied here. Most of them have been updated to account for new revelations, 
laws, and court decisions. They are accompanied by the comparative analysis of 
Ira Rubinstein, Greg Nojeim, and Ron Lee, also updated. They provide exten-
sive evidence that governments around the world have been collecting data on a 
very large scale. These collection programs are often conducted in the name of 
national security, but some are also available for ordinary law enforcement, and 
there are many broad collection programs conducted for regulatory purposes, 
such as tax compliance.
The country reports show that, despite some reforms, the worldwide trend 
continues in the direction of ever larger collections. Indeed, the only country 
that has conclusively terminated a bulk collection program in recent years is the 
United States. Counter to its Snowden- induced reputation as a voracious collec-
tor of data, in 2015, the United States ended the bulk collection of metadata on 
domestic and international calls. Congress enacted the USA FREEDOM Act, 
which amended all potentially applicable statutes to make it clear that they could 
not be used as the basis for bulk domestic collection in national security mat-
ters. Meanwhile, the UK, France, Germany and other countries have ratified or 
expanded collection programs.
4. Ira Rubinstein, Greg Nojeim, and Ronald Lee, “Systematic Government Access to Personal 
Data:  A  Comparative Analysis,” 4 International Data Privacy Law 96 (2014), http:// idpl.
oxfordjournals.org/ content/ 4/ 2.toc.
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Many of the country reports discuss not only programs of bulk or mass 
surveillance— surveillance that involves, for example, all telephone calls or all 
Internet service— but also programs that are targeted (focused on specific indi-
viduals or accounts) but that nevertheless collect very large amounts of data on 
large numbers of individuals. Given modern technology, even targeted collection 
programs can be very broad. The intake of such programs, if stored for extended 
periods of time, can constitute quite a comprehensive database on quite a large 
swath of the public. How such data is searched, for example, may be as important 
as the rules for how it was collected in the first place. Even though our baseline 
distinction between targeted and indiscriminate collection remains valid, the 
country reports remind us that it is probably best to view government collec-
tion activities as arrayed across a spectrum from the tightly targeted and rarely 
applied to the targeted but broadly applied to the comprehensive. Especially 
where companies are required to maintain databases of records (data retention 
mandates) and to install filtering or retrieval capabilities on their networks for 
use by the government at will (as France and the UK now seem to require), the 
distinction between targeted and bulk collection may disappear. Systematic 
access (our initial focus) may no longer require bulk collection.
The country reports and the papers in the second half of the volume also 
reveal that there have been some positive developments since we began this proj-
ect. Although powers of bulk surveillance had, until recently in all the countries 
surveyed, been exercised in the dark, lately there has been a move toward greater 
transparency. In response to the Snowden leaks, the United States and the UK 
officially acknowledged a number of practices. In other countries, bulk collec-
tion programs continue to be shrouded in secrecy, but there has been “progress” 
in the sense that a number of countries have amended their laws to more explic-
itly describe the powers exercised by their governments. This at least theoreti-
cally subjects the programs to the democratic process.
Another positive development is that these new laws, while generally ratifying 
or even extending bulk collection powers, have included new oversight or account-
ability measures. The UK’s new Investigatory Powers Act includes a “double- lock” 
for the most intrusive powers, so that warrants issued by a Secretary of State will 
also require the approval of a senior judge. The Act creates a new Investigatory 
Powers Commissioner to oversee how the new powers are used, establishes 
limits on government access to journalistic and legally privileged material, and 
creates new criminal offenses for misusing the powers. France, in its 2015 law, 
created a new, independent Commission for Oversight of Intelligence Gathering 
Techniques. Under the law, intelligence gathering measures can be implemented 
only when a specific authorization is given by the prime minister or his or her 
designee, and the prime minister’s authorization can be granted only after the 
Commission has rendered an opinion, albeit one that is not binding, on the com-
patibility of the measure with the principles set forth in the law.5
5.  Winston Maxwell, “French Surveillance Law Permits Data Mining, Drawing Criticism 
from Privacy Advocates” (August 6, 2015), http:// www.hldataprotection.com/ 2015/ 08/ 
Introduction and Backgroundxxx
x
Several chapters in this volume explore the development of oversight mecha-
nisms. With Marty Abrams, we have a chapter showing how the principle of 
accountability, now woven into data protection law in the commercial con-
text, has direct application to government surveillance. Eduardo Bertoni and 
Collin Kurre describe still- evolving oversight mechanisms in Latin America. 
Nico van Eijk, drawing on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights, fleshes out the multiple elements needed for a truly effective oversight 
program.
As van Eijk explains, effective oversight must encompass prior authorization, 
after- the- fact review, and redress of complaints. No one body or structure can 
be relied on to provide adequate control of government surveillance. Courts, no 
matter how independent, can secretly approve programs that seem unreasona-
ble in the light of day. Parliamentary bodies may grant broad powers. Effective 
oversight can be achieved only with a web of checks and balances, implemented 
by multiple bodies of varying competencies, reinforcing each other. Overall, the 
principles of oversight and accountability seem to be gaining wide credence in 
democratic countries, if only because governments recognize that they must 
maintain some level of trust if they are to retain their expansive powers.
But the most remarkable development of the past six years, second only to the 
startling revelations of bulk collection, has been the insistence of human rights 
courts and other institutions on the principles of privacy and the willingness of 
those bodies to strike down or criticize surveillance measures even when justified 
in the name of fighting terrorism. Especially assertive have been the two human 
rights courts in Europe: the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In the Schrems case, the CJEU 
invalidated the EU- US Safe Harbor for failing to address standards for US gov-
ernment access to data that global companies transfer from Europe to the United 
States for storage and other processing. In Digital Rights Ireland, it overturned 
the EU directive that had required service providers to retain metadata on cus-
tomer communications. The ECtHR invalidated surveillance laws in Russia (the 
Zakharov case) and Hungary (the Szabó and Vissy case) on the ground that the 
laws were insufficiently discriminate in their targeting standards. At the national 
level, the French Constitutional Council in October 2016 declared a provision of 
the 2015 French law unconstitutional. Also in October 2016, the UK’s investigatory 
powers tribunal ruled that British intelligence agencies had been unlawfully col-
lecting massive volumes of confidential personal data without proper oversight for 
17 years.6 Nonjudicial independent oversight bodies also proved their value. In the 
articles/ international- eu- privacy/ french- surveillance- law- permits- data- mining- drawing- 
criticism- from- privacy- advocates/ .
6. “UK Security Agencies Unlawfully Collected Data for 17 Years, Court Rules,” The 
Guardian (October 17, 2016), https:// www.theguardian.com/ world/ 2016/ oct/ 17/ uk- security-  
agencies- unlawfully- collected- data- for- decade.
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United States, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board played an important 
role in ending the program that collected telephone calling records in bulk.7
As the chapters by Ashley Deeks and Sarah St.Vincent, as well as the compar-
ative analysis of Rubinstein, Nojeim, and Lee, show, there is remarkable consist-
ency in defining the components of an effective system of checks and balances. 
The elements of the framework of oversight and accountability are drawn from 
long- accepted principles of the rule of law, human rights, and democratic gov-
ernance. Most important for our project, the conclusion that bulk or indiscrimi-
nate collection is fundamentally incompatible with human rights principles may 
be gaining hold.
Two actions taken after most of the chapters in this book were written— 
the UK’s November 2016 adoption of a new investigatory powers act and the 
December 2016 decision of the CJEU striking down national data retention laws 
of Sweden and the UK— illustrate both the assertion of bulk powers by govern-
ments and the application of human rights principles to reject those claims.
The UK’s Investigatory Powers Act lays out a breathtaking array of surveil-
lance powers. It authorizes the issuance of notices to communications service 
providers requiring them to retain data on the activities of all users. Government 
authorities will be able to access this data using a process called the “request fil-
ter.” Described by the Act’s proponents as a safeguard intended to ensure that the 
government obtains only relevant data, the request filter also serves as a feder-
ated search engine, allowing searches across multiple corporate databases with-
out the need to ingest them into government coffers. On top of that, the Act 
unabashedly embraces the concept of bulk collection, explicitly authorizing the 
issuance of “bulk interception warrants” for the interception of communications 
between persons in the UK and persons overseas; “bulk acquisition warrants,” 
which require telecommunications operators to disclose communications data 
(metadata); “bulk equipment interference warrants,” which allow hacking to 
obtain “overseas- related” communications or information; and “bulk personal 
dataset warrants,” authorizing intelligence services to retain and examine data-
sets where most of the information pertains to persons not, and who are unlikely 
to become, of interest to the intelligence service in the exercise of its functions.
Five weeks after the UK adopted its Investigatory Powers Act, the CJEU handed 
down its decision in the Tele2 and Watson cases, ruling invalid under EU law the 
Swedish data retention mandate and a similar mandate under the UK law that 
had preceded the Investigatory Powers Act. The Court found that even the objec-
tive of fighting serious crime cannot in itself justify national legislation provid-
ing for the general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data. 
National legislation that covers, in a generalized manner, all subscribers and all 
means of electronic communication as well as all traffic data “exceeds the limits 
7. One of the authors of this volume, James X. Dempsey, served as a member of the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. The views in this chapter and other chapters he coau-




of what is strictly necessary and cannot be considered to be justified, within a 
democratic society.”8 The Court held that the EU directive on communications 
data and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU “must be interpreted as 
precluding national legislation which, for the purpose of fighting crime, provides 
for the general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data of 
all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic commu-
nication.”9 The Directive and the Charter, the Court stated, “do not prevent a 
Member State from adopting legislation permitting, as a preventive measure, the 
targeted retention of traffic and location data, for the purpose of fighting serious 
crime, provided that the retention of data is limited, with respect to the catego-
ries of data to be retained, the means of communication affected, the persons 
concerned and the retention period adopted, to what is strictly necessary.”10 The 
Court seemed to be saying, in essence, that generalized retention (and it would 
seem even more so, the generalized collection) of traffic data is never permitted, 
since by definition it is not limited as to “the persons concerned.”
Separately, the CJEU considered the question of access to the retained data. 
General access to retained data cannot be regarded as limited to what is strictly 
necessary, it said. Instead, the national legislation concerned must be based on 
objective criteria in order to define the circumstances and conditions under 
which the national authorities are to be granted access to the data. In that regard, 
the Court said, “access can, as a general rule, be granted, in relation to the objec-
tive of fighting crime, only to the data of individuals suspected of planning, com-
mitting or having committed a serious crime or of being implicated in one way 
or another in such a crime.”11 Moreover, the Court ruled, “in order to ensure, in 
practice, that those conditions are fully respected, it is essential that access of the 
competent national authorities to retained data should, as a general rule, except 
in cases of validly established urgency, be subject to a prior review carried out 
either by a court or by an independent administrative body.”12
So, at the end of nearly six years, we are left with movement simultaneously 
in the direction of both more government powers and an expanded assertion 
of human rights principles to curtail government powers. In the digital age it 
is increasingly clear that governments have legitimate reasons to collect data 
from the private- sector entities that provide communications and other serv-
ices. At the same time, the power to compel disclosure must be subject to robust 
checks and balances, defined by a growing international consensus around the 
8.  Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen and 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Tom Watson and Others (December 21, 2016), 
para. 107, http:// curia.europa.eu/ juris/ liste.jsf?num=C- 203/ 15.
9. Ibid. para. 112.
10. Ibid. para. 108 (emphasis added).
11. Ibid. para. 119.
12. Ibid. para. 120.
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principles of legality, proportionality, and accountability. Even when those criti-
cal protections are present, however, it is an increasingly important and difficult 
question whether bulk or indiscriminate collection by the government of per-
sonal data from the private sector can ever be compatible with those principles. 
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Systematic Government Access  
to Private-Sector Data  
A Comparative Analysis
I R A  S .  R U B I N S T E I N,  G R E G O R Y  T.  N O J E I M ,  
A N D  R O N A L D  D.   L E E *
I.  ABSTR ACT
There has been an increase worldwide in government demands for data held by 
the private sector. In most, if not all countries studied, the publicly accessible law 
provides an inadequate foundation for systematic access, both from a human 
rights perspective and at a practical level. Transparency about systematic access 
remains weak. Access for national security purposes is more sparingly regulated 
than is access for criminal investigation purposes.
Relying on the country reports prepared for this project, this chapter develops 
both a descriptive framework for comparing national laws on surveillance and 
government access to data held by the private sector, and a normative framework 
based on factors derived from constitutional and human rights law.
A robust, global debate is needed on the standards for government surveil-
lance, premised on greater transparency about current practices. International 
human rights law provides a useful framework for that debate.
II.  INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been an increase worldwide in government demands 
for data held by the private sector, driven by a variety of factors. This increase 
* The authors wish to thank Jake Laperruque and Christine Galvagna for their assistance in 
preparing this chapter for publication. Mr. Lee took no part in the preparation of any portions 
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includes an expansion in government requests for what we call “systematic 
access”: direct access by the government to private- sector databases or networks, 
or government access, whether direct or mediated by the company that main-
tains the database or network, to large volumes of data. The June 2013 disclosures 
by edward Snowden about systematic access programs conducted by the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and other countries dramatically illustrated the 
issue and brought it to the forefront of international debates.
Although it seems that systematic access is growing, there are also cases— in 
Germany and Canada— where government proposals for expanded access have 
been rejected due to public and corporate concerns about privacy, cost, and the 
impact on innovation.
Systematic access raises hard questions for companies that face demands for 
government access to data they hold. They must decide whether the demand or 
request is lawful, though the law may be vague. Companies must also decide 
what information about their responses to these demands they may disclose to 
their customers and to the public— the “transparency” issue that has received 
increased attention since June 2013 as discussed below.
This chapter identifies a number of common themes in the national laws on 
government surveillance and access to data held by the private sector of the 13 
countries surveyed at the behest of The privacy projects. It presents a descriptive 
framework for analyzing and comparing these national laws. We also develop 
a normative framework based on a series of factors that can be derived from 
the concept of “rule of law,” from constitutional principles, and from existing 
(although still evolving) international human rights jurisprudence.
Among our key findings are the following: First, we found that in most, if not 
all countries studied, existing legal structures provide an inadequate foundation 
for the conduct of systematic access, both from a human rights perspective and 
at a practical level. Transparency about systematic surveillance programs is weak, 
so we lack an accurate or comprehensive understanding of systematic access. 
nevertheless, we found that the relevant laws are at best vague and ambiguous, 
and government interpretations of them are often hidden or even classified; that 
practices are often opaque (because it is sometimes in the interests of both govern-
ments and companies to proceed quietly, and the companies are often prohibited 
from public comment); and that oversight and reporting mechanisms are either 
absent or limited in scope when they exist, and generally do not reach voluntary 
data sharing. Transparency remained weak even after information about some 
systematic surveillance activity appeared in the press as a result of leaks of clas-
sified information by former nSA contractor edward Snowden in June 2013 and 
even after changes in US law permitted companies to provide a limited amount of 
information about US law enforcement and national security processes.
Second, in every country we studied, even those nations with otherwise com-
prehensive data protection laws, access for regulatory, law enforcement, and 
national security purposes is often excluded from such laws; alternatively, they 
are treated as accepted purposes for which access is authorized under separate 
laws that may or may not provide adequate safeguards against possible abuses. 
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Moreover, almost everywhere, when it comes to data protection, access for 
national security purposes is more sparingly regulated than is access for law 
enforcement purposes.
Third, it seems overall there had been, until recently, relatively little discussion 
of the complex legal and political issues associated with asserting jurisdiction 
over data stored in other countries or relating to citizens of other countries. Also, 
until the Snowden revelations, discussion of the complex questions regarding 
extraterritorial application of human rights raised by trans- border surveillance 
had been lacking.
Fourth, although standards for real- time interception of communications for 
law enforcement purposes are high in most of the countries we surveyed (but 
not in India and China), standards for access to stored communications held by 
third parties are less consistent. When it comes to transactional data regarding 
communications, standards are even weaker.
Fifth, with respect to the standards for government access to communications 
in national security investigations, the overall picture is very complex. Almost 
half the countries studied do not have provisions requiring court orders for sur-
veillance undertaken in the name of national security or for foreign intelligence 
gathering.
Finally, most countries handle travel and financial data under laws requiring 
routine, bulk reporting for specified classes of data.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section III describes “systematic access” to 
data, highlighting evolving practices by governments across the globe. Section 
IV briefly describes the Snowden revelations. Section V considers the common 
themes emerging from an analysis of the law and practice of systematic access in 
the 13 countries the project surveyed.1 Section VI sets forth a descriptive frame-
work that can be used to analyze national laws that set standards for govern-
mental access to privately- held data, whereas Section VII lays out a normative 
framework, based on human rights principles, and offers some comparative 
observations. Finally, Section VIII offers preliminary recommendations and 
next steps in responding to the challenges of systematic government access to 
private- sector data.
Here is our basic conclusion: in most if not all countries, existing legal struc-
tures provide an inadequate foundation for the conduct of systematic access, 
both from a human rights perspective and at a practical level. At the practical 
level, the law provides little guidance, leaving companies to fill the gaps with 
their own judgments. From the human rights perspective, the systematic access 
that many governments obtain is not foreseeable from the text of the law, calling 
into question whether the laws in those countries meet evolving human rights 
standards.
1. over its lifetime, the project surveyed 13 countries. Twelve of those surveys are published 
in this volume, most of them updated to reflect recent developments. Because the UK law was 
completely rewritten late in 2016, there was insufficient time to update the UK chapter, and 
therefore there is no UK report in this volume.
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III.  WHAT IS SYSTEMATIC ACCESS?
Governments around the world have always demanded that commercial entities 
disclose data about their customers in connection with criminal investigations, 
enforcement of regulatory systems, and national security matters. Companies 
have always felt an obligation— and oftentimes are under legal compulsion— to 
cooperate, but they have also felt a business need and sense of responsibility to 
protect their customers’ personal data and, in most cases, have diligently sought 
to balance those interests.2 In recent years, there has been an increase worldwide 
in government demands for data held by the private sector, driven by a variety 
of factors. This has included an expansion in government requests for what we 
call “systematic access.” We use this term to encompass both direct access by the 
government to private- sector databases, without the mediation or interaction 
of an employee or agent of the entity holding the data, and government access, 
whether or not mediated by a company, to large volumes of private- sector data.
Here are some examples of what we mean by systematic access to stored data, 
covering a very wide range of data and justifications:
• In the United States, a special court ordered certain telecommunications 
service providers to disclose to the national Security Agency (nSA), 
on a daily basis, metadata (number making the call, number called, 
time, duration) for all telephone calls handled by the carriers to, from, 
and within the country. The bulk disclosure orders were renewed every 
90 days from 2006 to 2015, when Congress adopted legislation ending it.
• Although most countries have long- standing systematic reporting 
requirements of a regulatory or administrative nature, especially in 
the area of financial services and employment, mandatory reporting 
of income data and other data related to the administration of taxes 
has expanded in recent years.3 In other countries, there is systematic 
reporting of hotel registrations or airline travel itineraries.
• In Germany, as paul Schwartz outlines in his chapter in this volume, 
telecommunication providers are required to collect certain data 
about their customers, such as name, address, and telephone number, 
before the service is established. This information, termed “inventory 
information,” is sent to a databank of the Federal network Agency, 
and other governmental agencies can make automated requests for this 
information from the databank.
• The Chinese government maintains almost unlimited and unfettered 
access to private sector data, through a variety of regulatory 
requirements. As Zhizheng Wang observes in his chapter on China 
2. “personal data” generally refers to any data that relates or is linkable to an identifiable indi-
vidual, and may include aggregations of data.
3. See, for example, Giorgio Resta’s chapter on Italy in this volume.
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in this volume, “the government’s systematic access to data held 
by anyone will become possible and realistic with the evolution of 
the e- government strategy, in accordance with its vital interest of 
maintaining the state’s control on information and ‘preserving the 
stability’ of the society.”
• The Brazilian Communications Agency (AnATeL) can request 
metadata from service providers and also maintains the technical 
ability to directly access metadata.4
• In India, as Sunil Abraham explains in his chapter in this volume, the 
government is building a Central Monitoring System (CMS) that is 
intended to allow the government to engage in real- time interception 
of email, chats, voice calls, texting, without intervention of the service 
providers.5
• A 2015 French statute expanded the government’s authority to 
obtain user data. Among other things, the government may demand 
that a provider automatically analyze all metadata it processes with 
algorithms to identify suspicious activity.6
• In the United Kingdom, the Investigatory powers Act of 2016 mandates 
data retention by telecommunications service providers and expressly 
authorized the issuance of “bulk personal dataset warrants.”7
We also found examples where, although the government requested records one 
at a time regarding particular individuals, devices, facilities, or accounts, the 
volume of requests was quite large. For example, in the UK, government agencies 
4. Dennys Antonialli and Jacqueline de Souza Abreu, “State Surveillance of Communications in 
Brazil and the protection of Fundamental Rights,” Electronic Frontier Foundation (March 
2016), at p.  37, https:// necessaryandproportionate.org/ files/ brazil- en- march2016.pdf (“In 
performing its supervisory duties (article 8, Law no. 9472/ 97), AnATeL may access billing 
documents, which contain account information and call records, by requesting them from 
service providers. At present, there is infrastructure in place allowing direct and unlimited 
online access, pursuant to article 38, Resolução no. 596/ 12.”); ibid., at 10.
5.  Sneha Johari, “Govt’s Central Monitoring System Already Live in Delhi & Mumbai,” 
Medianama (May 11, 2016), http:// www.medianama.com/ 2016/ 05/ 223- india- central- 
monitoring- system- live- in- delhi- mumbai/ . See also Shalini Singh, “India’s Surveillance 
project May Be as Lethal as pRISM,” The Hindu (June 21, 2013); Bharti Jain, “Govt Tightens 
Control for phone Tapping,” The Times of India (June 18, 2013); Anjani Trivedi, “In India, 
prism- Like Surveillance Slips Under the Radar,” Time (June 30, 2013), http:// world.time.com/ 
2013/ 06/ 30/ in- india- prism- like- surveillance- slips- under- the- radar/ .
6. olivier Le Bot, “France under Mass- Surveillance? The French Constitutional Council and 
the Limits on the Intelligence Service’s powers,” ConstitutionNet (Sept. 29, 2015), http:// www.
constitutionnet.org/ news/ france- under- mass- surveillance- french- constitutional- council- 
and- limits- intelligence- services.
7.  Investigatory powers Act, parts  4 and 7, http:// www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/ 2016/ 25/ 
 contents/ enacted.
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made 500,000 requests for telephony metadata in one year.8 paul Schwartz notes 
that, in Germany, where local police departments can request cell tower data 
about any person located in a given area during a specific time period, a Berlin 
newspaper reported in 2012 that the Berlin police since 2008 had made 410 “radio 
cell inquiries” that collected information pertaining to 4.2  million cell phone 
connections. In the United States, government agencies issued over 1.3 million 
demands to mobile carriers in 2011, covering information ranging from basic 
subscriber identifying data to call detail records to cell site location informa-
tion to call content.9 Directly comparable information for years since 2011 is not 
available, because the figure of 1.3 million demands was released by US Senator 
edward Markey based on data several carriers reported to him. However, the 
transparency reports of just three of the largest US wireless carriers for recent 
years indicate that the volume remains substantial. Verizon reported 289,378 law 
enforcement demands for customer data, and AT&T reported 287,980 US crimi-
nal and civil demands for customer data in 2015. T- Mobile reported 339,270 fed-
eral, state, and local law enforcement requests in 2014.10 The volume of requests 
can lead governments and private-sector entities to develop automated interfaces 
or other arrangements that facilitate high volume access.11
8.  Ian Brown, “Government Access to private- Sector Data in the United Kingdom” (2012) 
2/ 4 International Data Privacy Law 230– 38. For statistics on the volume of requests for 
retained transactional data in other european countries, see european Commission, Report 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Evaluation Report on the 
Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/ 24/ EC) (2011), http:// eur- lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=CoM:2011:0225:FIn:en:pDF.
9. eric Lichtblau, “More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance,” New York Times (July 8, 
2012) (the figure of 1.3 million understated the volume as one major carrier did not disclose 
the number of requests it had received).
10. See AT&T Transparency Report (2016), http:// about.att.com/ content/ dam/ csr/ 
Transparency%20Reports/ ATT_ Transparency%20Report_ Jan%202016.pdf; Verizon United 
States Report (last visited April 27, 2017), http:// www.verizon.com/ about/ portal/ 
 transparency- report/ us- report/ ; T- Mobile Transparency Report for 2013 and 2014, https:// 
newsroom.t- mobile.com/ content/ 1020/ files/ newTransparencyReport.pdf.
11. For example, it has been reported that one mobile operator in the United States estab-
lished an online interface to allow law enforcement agencies to “ping” cell phones for loca-
tion data. Kim Zetter, “Feds ‘pinged’Sprint GpS Data 8 Million Times over a year,” Wired 
(December 1, 2009). As Stephanie pell notes in her chapter in this volume, the Department 
of Justice Inspector General reported several years ago that major telephone companies had 
placed their employees, with access to phone company databases, inside FBI offices in order 
to respond more quickly to FBI requests for metadata records. In 2013, the New York Times 
reported that AT&T was placing its employees “in drug- fighting units around the country. 
Those employees sit alongside Drug enforcement Administration agents and local detec-
tives and supply them with the phone data from as far back as 1987.” See Scott Shane and 
Colin Moynihan, “Drug Agents Use Vast phone Trove, eclipsing n.S.A.’s,” New York Times 
(September 1, 2013), http:// www.nytimes.com/ 2013/ 09/ 02/ us/ drug- agents- use- vast- phone- 
trove- eclipsing- nsas.html?_ r=0.
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Although it seems that systematic access is growing, we also found cases 
where proposals for expanded access had been rejected. In Germany, in 2011, 
the federal government abandoned the proposed eLenA project, which was 
intended to streamline the collection of a wide variety of employee data into a 
central databank run by a government agency, containing name, date of birth, 
insurance number, home address, time missing work, and “possible misbehav-
ior.” In Canada in 2013 the government abandoned Bill C- 30, which would have 
imposed various intercept capability and reporting requirements on communi-
cations service providers.
When this project began, it focused primarily on access to stored data held by 
businesses, distinct from real- time interception of communications. However, 
Snowden revealed information about systematic access to communications 
in transit such as the US government’s MySTIC program, which is capable of 
intercepting and storing for 30 days all phone calls made nationwide in certain 
countries.12 A  study for the european parliament concluded that the practice 
of “upstreaming” (governmental surveillance accomplished by tapping into 
an entire communication stream, as opposed to receiving only particularized 
disclosures from communications service providers) appears to be a relatively 
widespread feature of surveillance by several eU Member States.13 Just as most 
governments have long asserted the power to demand access to stored data held 
by businesses about their customers, so they have also asserted the power to 
intercept in real- time communications passing over networks of telecommuni-
cations service providers. Sometimes such interception is conducted with the 
cooperation of the service provider, sometimes without. The rules and practices 
surrounding real- time collection can be very complex, but in certain circum-
stances the electronic surveillance activities of governments have long entailed 
large scale or systematic collection of communications for later analysis, espe-
cially for national security purposes and especially when conducted outside— or 
targeted at persons outside— the intercepting nation’s territory. As we discuss 
further below, the Snowden revelations suggest that the digital revolution has 
been accompanied by a growth in large- scale real- time interception. In addi-
tion, it appears that there is a growing overlap between access to stored data and 
real- time interception: it has been reported that the United States intercepts huge 
volumes of stored data in real time as it is shifted globally from server to server.14
12. Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, “nSA Surveillance program Reaches Into the past to 
Retrieve, Replay phone Calls,” Washington Post (March 18, 2014), https:// www.washington-
post.com/ world/ national- security/ nsa- surveillance- programme- reaches- into- the- past- to- 
retrieve- replay- phone- calls/ 2014/ 03/ 18/ 226d2646- ade9- 11e3- a49e- 76adc9210f19_ story.html.
13. european parliament Study, National Programmes for Mass Surveillance of Personal Data 
in EU Member States and Their Compatibility with EU Law (october 2013), http:// www.statewatch.
org/ news/ 2013/ oct/ ep- study- national- law- on- surveillance.pdf.
14.  Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, “nSA Infiltrates Links to yahoo, Google Data 
Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say,” Washington Post (october 30, 2013), 
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Systematic access as we define it also relates to concerns over data retention and 
design mandates. Data retention refers to legal requirements that certain service 
providers collect and retain specific categories of information about the users 
and usages of their systems for a specified period of time (often ranging from 
six months to two years), so that the data is available to the government upon 
demand. Most recently, debates over data retention have focused on government 
proposals that telecommunications service providers (both traditional telephone 
and wireless operators and ISps) maintain subscriber identifying information 
or connection data (such as customer billing information and dialed number 
information) for a set period of time.15 Design mandates include requirements 
that service providers design their systems to be “wiretap ready,” that is, to be 
capable of facilitating real- time or near real- time interception upon request.16
our research into actual practices, although hampered by a lack of transpar-
ency, confirmed that governments are in fact increasingly turning to the private 
sector for information that they see as critical in countering criminal activity, 
terrorism, and other threats. The Snowden revelations dramatically reinforce 
this conclusion, augmenting it with new information regarding extraordinary 
programs of systematic collection in real time. The reasons for these trends are 
simple enough:  to begin with, private sector firms hold an increasingly large 
amount of data about individuals collected in the course of ordinary commercial 
transactions or created by users and stored on cloud platforms, supplemented 
in some countries by data retention mandates. The volume of digital data rou-
tinely generated, collected, and stored about individuals’ purchases, commu-
nications, relationships, movements, finances, and tastes is staggering. At least 
three developments have fed the growing government appetite for this informa-
tion: First are concerns about new and dangerous threats to national security, 
demonstrated by terrorist attacks in new york, Washington, Madrid, London, 
Mumbai, Boston, paris, San Bernardino, Brussels, Istanbul, nice, and elsewhere, 
and compounded by the rise in militant Islamic fundamentalism. Second are 
more mundane interests in tax collection and other regulatory or administrative 
goals. The third major factor is the steadily growing ability of businesses and 
https:// www.washingtonpost.com/ world/ national- security/ nsa- infiltrates- links- to- yahoo- 
google- data- centers- worldwide- snowden- documents- say/ 2013/ 10/ 30/ e51d661e- 4166- 11e3- 
8b74- d89d714ca4dd_ story.html.
15. Center for Democracy and Technology, Data Retention Mandates: A Threat to Privacy, 
Free Expression and Business Development (october 2011), https:// www.cdt.org/ files/ pdfs/ 
CDT_ Data_ Retention_ Long_ paper.pdf.
16. In the United States, see Communications Assistance for Law enforcement Act (CALeA), 
pub L no 103- 404, 108 Stat 4279, 4280– 81, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000); in the UK, 
see Investigatory powers Act 2016, § 253; see also Andrei Solatov, “Lawful Interception: The 
Russian Approach,” Privacy International (March 5, 2013), https:// www.privacyinternational.
org/ blog/ lawful- interception- the- russian- approach (describing “SoRM,” Russia’s nation-
wide system of automated and remote legal interception).
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governments to analyze large data sets in search of useful insights, a develop-
ment often summed up with the phrase “big data.”17
other commentators have observed that governments in the post- 9/ 11 era are 
increasingly dependent on the private sector to assist them in collecting and ana-
lyzing data for national security purposes, and have applied various theories in 
analyzing these modes of cooperation.18 our focus on systematic access was, until 
recently, almost unique. So too was our effort to explore the issue not only from 
the perspective of the governments’ needs or the countervailing civil liberties and 
human rights values but also from that of companies that are responding to gov-
ernmental demands in numerous countries and are, therefore, caught in the mid-
dle between competing interests.19 They must often make judgments about how to 
respond to demands for systematic access when the law governing access is vague 
and susceptible to many interpretations. Legal requirements, business concerns, 
licensing schemes, the views of their customers, and the need to be perceived as 
cooperative in matters involving public safety or national security all play a role.
IV.  REVELATIONS OF SYSTEMATIC  
SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES
on June 5, 2013, The Guardian began publishing information regarding surveil-
lance activities of the US national Security Agency, based upon the leaking of 
classified documents by former contract employee edward Snowden. Further 
disclosures by The Guardian and other major news outlets followed, along with 
official US government releases of previously classified documents in response to 
FoIA litigation and public demands for transparency.
one of the surveillance programs described in these disclosures involved 
systematic access of exactly the kind this project has been concerned with: the 
ongoing, bulk collection by the nSA of metadata on a large percentage of tele-
phone calls to, from, and within the United States. The program operated under 
Section 215 of the USA pATRIoT Act, which authorized the government to 
seek a court order for the production of records relevant to a foreign intelligence 
investigation.20 Such orders required major telecommunications companies to 
17.  See Fred H. Cate, James X. Dempsey, and Ira S. Rubinstein, “Systematic Government 
Access to private- Sector Data” (2012) 2 International Data Privacy Law 195.
18. See, for example, Michael D. Birnhack and niva elkin- Koren, “The Invisible Handshake: 
The Reemergence of the State in the Digital environment,” 8 Virginia Journal of Law & 
Technology 6 (2003); Jack M. Balkin, “The Constitution in the national Surveillance State,” 
93 Minnesota Law Review 1 (2008); Jon D. Michaels, “All the president’s Spies: private- public 
Intelligence partnerships in the War on Terror,” 96 California Law Review 901 (2008); Jon D 
Michaels, “Deputizing Homeland Security,” 88 Texas Law Review 1435 (2010).
19. See Albert Gidari, Jr., “Companies Caught in the Middle: Legal Responses to Government 
Requests for Customer Information,” 41 Univ. of San Francisco L. Rev. 535 (2007).
20. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2010).
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disclose to the nSA call detail records on all calls by all of their customers and 
included originating and terminating telephone number and time and duration 
of call but not the substantive content of any communications.21 In 2015, the 
US Congress outlawed the program in the USA FReeDoM Act.22 It did this 
by requiring that all collection of call detail records under Section 215 of the 
USA pATRIoT Act be based on a “specific selection term” such as a phone num-
ber. It established a procedure for intelligence authorities to provide those terms 
to major telecommunications companies, which then search their customer 
information for “hits” on those terms.
It was also revealed that the nSA conducted for many years a program of sys-
tematic collection of Internet metadata. That program was discontinued in 2011 
due to an assessment by the nSA that it was ineffective as a counterterrorism 
tool.23 The USA FReeDoM Act outlawed such programs by extending a specific 
selection term requirement to all of the authorities in which metadata can be 
collected for intelligence purposes in the United States, rendering illegal the bulk 
collection of communications metadata in domestic intelligence surveillance.
Snowden also disclosed documents describing activities of the US gov-
ernment, conducted under Section 702 of FISA, as adopted by the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), involving the collection of the contents 
of communications.24 Section 702 authorizes the collection from serv-
ice providers inside the United States of foreign intelligence about persons 
reasonably believed to be outside the United States. Initial reports about a 
program referred to as pRISM cited a government powerpoint presentation 
saying that the government was collecting “direct from the servers” of lead-
ing communications service providers.25 The government and the compa-
nies involved have denied that there is any direct access to service provider 
21.  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Primary Order (July 19, 2013), http:// www.
uscourts.gov/ uscourts/ courts/ fisc/ br13- 09- primary- order.pdf. See also office of the Director 
of national Intelligence, DNI Statement on Recent Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified 
Information (June 6, 2013), http:// www.dni.gov/ index.php/ newsroom/ press- releases/ 191- 
press- releases- 2013/ 868- dni- statement- on- recent- unauthorized- disclosures- of- classified- 
information [hereinafter “DnI June 2013 Statement”].
22. USA FReeDoM Act of 2015, pub. L. no. 114- 23, June 2, 2015, Title I.
23. See Siobhan Gorman and Jennifer Valentino- Devries, “Details emerge on nSA’s now- 
ended Internet program,” Wall Street Journal (June 27, 2013), http:// online.wsj.com/ article/ 
SB10001424127887323689204578572063855498882.html.
24.  Barton Gellman and Laura poitras, “US, British Intelligence Mining Data from nine 
US Internet Companies in Broad Secret program,” Washington Post (June 6, 2013), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/ investigations/ us- intelligence- mining- data- from- nine- us- 
internet- companies- in- broad- secret- programme/ 2013/ 06/ 06/ 3a0c0da8- cebf- 11e2- 8845- 
d970ccb04497_ story.html. See “nSA Slides explain the pRISM Data- Collection program,” 
Washington Post (June 6, 2013), http:// www.washingtonpost.com/ wp- srv/ special/ politics/ 
prism- collection- documents/ .
25. See “nSA Slides” above note 24.
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computers.26 However, another program conducted under Section 702 has 
some elements of systematic access, in real time. According to a report by 
the US privacy and Civil Liberties oversight Board, the nSA’s UpSTReAM 
program acquires communications as they transit circuits that facilitate com-
munications over the “Internet backbone.”27 Communications that contain a 
selector such as an email address and that are not domestic communications 
are ingested into government databases.28
Snowden also leaked documents disclosing systematic surveillance programs in 
the UK, including one called “Mastering the Internet” and another called “Global 
Telecoms exploitation.” According to The Guardian, Britain’s “GCHQ [the UK’s 
signals intelligence agency] has secretly gained access to the network of cables 
which carry the world’s phone calls and internet traffic and has started to pro-
cess vast streams of sensitive personal information.”29 In an operation code named 
TeMpoRA, GCHQ stores large volumes of data drawn from fiber optic cables for 
up to 30 days so that it can be sifted and analyzed.30 According to The Guardian, 
GCHQ is able to “survey about 1,500 of the 1,600 or so high- capacity cables in 
and out of the UK at any one time” and was capable of extracting and collect-
ing information (both content and metadata) from 200 of those cables at a time.31 
According to The Guardian, citing official documents, as of 2011 GCHQ recorded 
39 billion separate pieces of information during a single day. According to another 
document cited by The Guardian, GCHQ “produces larger amounts of metadata 
collection than the nSA.” The tapping operations within Britain were done under 
agreements with the commercial companies that own the fiber optic cables.
The controversy surrounding the Snowden leaks prompted journalists and 
activists to write about similar programs in a number of countries. press reports 
have revealed the following:
• Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, the BnD, was monitoring 
communications at a Frankfurt communications hub that handles 
26.  Declan McCullagh, “no evidence of nSA’s ‘Direct Access’ to Tech Companies,” CNet 
(June 7, 2013), http:// news.cnet.com/ 8301- 13578_ 3- 57588337- 38/ no- evidence- of- nsas- direct- 
access- to- tech- companies/ .
27.  privacy and Civil Liberties oversight Board [hereinafter “pCLoB”], Report on the 
Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (July 2, 2014), p. 37, https:// www.pclob.gov/ library/ 702- Report.pdf.
28. Ibid., at pp. 36– 37.
29.  ewen MacAskill, “GCHQ Taps Fibre- optic Cables for Secret Access to World’s 
Communications,” The Guardian (June 21, 2013), http:// www.theguardian.com/ uk/ 2013/ jun/ 
21/ gchq- cables- secret- world- communications- nsa.
30.  ewen MacAskill, “Mastering the Internet:  How CGHQ Set out to Spy on the World 
Wide Web,” The Guardian (June 21, 2013), http:// www.theguardian.com/ uk/ 2013/ jun/ 21/ 
gchq- mastering- the- internet.
31.  ewen MacAskill, “How Does GCHQ’s Internet Surveillance Work,” The Guardian 
(June 21, 2013), http:// www.theguardian.com/ uk/ 2013/ jun/ 21/ how- does- gchq- internet- 
 surveillance- work.
C o U n T R y  R e p o R T S16
16
international traffic to, from, and through Germany, presumably 
using the strategic monitoring authority described by paul Schwartz 
in his chapter, and the BnD is seeking to significantly extend its  
capabilities.32
• France runs a vast electronic spying operation using nSA- style 
methods, reportedly with even fewer legal controls.33 A 2015 statute 
expanded the government’s surveillance powers. Among other 
things, it authorizes the government to require service providers to 
apply algorithms to all metadata they process in order to identify 
suspicious activity, and also to make that data available to the 
government.34
V.  COMMON THEMES FROM THE COUNTRY REPORTS
The 13 countries surveyed for this project were chosen based on a variety of fac-
tors that included availability of english language materials, scholars, and prac-
titioners to analyze national law, and the size of the country in terms of economy 
and population. But caution should be exercised in extrapolating from this sur-
vey: among other limitations, the survey included not a single country in Africa 
or the Middle east (apart from Israel). Moreover, by being heavily weighted to 
democracies and to european democracies in general, with India and China as 
outliers, it may suggest more commonality of legal norms than would be found 
in a broader survey. With those significant caveats, the country reports analyzing 
32.  Staff, “The German prism:  Berlin Wants to Spy Too,” Spiegel Online (June 17, 2013), 
http:// www.spiegel.de/ international/ germany/ berlin- profits- from- us- spying- programme- 
and- is- planning- its- own- a- 906129- 2.html; “German Intelligence Admits to Frankfurt 
e- Mail Tap,” Wall Street Journal (october 9, 2013), http:// blogs.wsj.com/ digits/ 2013/ 10/ 09/ 
german- intelligence- admits- to- frankfurt- e- mail- tap/ (“the German weekly Der Spiegel 
reported in this week’s issue that the German intelligence service … has been tapping the 
giant De- Cix exchange point in order to spy on foreign targets for at least two years”). The 
program was ended after the Snowden revelations become public. Von D. Liedtke, W. Löer, 
U. Rauss, and o. Schröm, “BnD- Chef verschwieg lange operation Monkeyshoulder,” Stern 
(June 2, 2015), http:// www.stern.de/ investigativ/ operation- monkeyshoulder— bnd- chef- 
verschwieg- umstrittenes- ausspaehprojekt- vor- kanzleramt- 6206512.html.
33. Jacques Follorou and Franck Johannès, “Révélations sur le Big Brother français,” Le Monde 
(July 4, 2013), http:// www.lemonde.fr/ societe/ article/ 2013/ 07/ 04/ revelations- sur- le- big- 
brother- francais_ 3441973_ 3224.html; Angelique Chrisafis, “France ‘Runs Vast electronic 
Spying operation Using nSA- Style Methods,’ ” The Guardian (July 4, 2013), http:// www.
guardian.co.uk/ world/ 2013/ jul/ 04/ france- electronic- spying- operation- nsa.
34. Amar Toor, “France’s Sweeping Surveillance Law Goes into effect,” The Verge 
(July 24, 2015), http:// www.theverge.com/ 2015/ 7/ 24/ 9030851/ france- surveillance- law- 
 charlie- hebdo- constitutional- court.
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the law and practice of systematic access identified a number of common themes 
about the countries examined:
• Lack of Transparency: even after the Snowden leaks, systematic access is 
difficult to assess.
• The relevant laws are at best vague and ambiguous, and government 
interpretations of them are often hidden or even classified.
• practices are often opaque; it is sometimes in the interests of both 
governments and companies to proceed quietly, and the companies 
are often prohibited from public comment.
• oversight and reporting mechanisms are either absent or limited 
in scope when they exist, and generally do not reach voluntary data 
sharing.
In the United States, the Snowden revelations altered this 
imbalance in a profound way by publicizing the legal and technical 
details of several highly classified surveillance programs. The same is 
true to a lesser extent in the UK. The Snowden leaks also led to some 
further revelations about surveillance programs in other countries.
But leaking is by its nature episodic and incomplete; even the most 
extensive leaks of classified documents can be misleading and are 
no substitute for structural and ongoing transparency mechanisms 
rooted in constitutional, legal, and political norms and supporting 
vigorous democratic oversight and debate. outside the United States 
and the UK, the picture still remains very murky, although it is clear 
that systematic access occurs in many countries.35
The shock expressed not only by civil society but also by 
government officials at the scope of systematic access as revealed by 
the Snowden revelations demonstrates how deeply these programs 
and legal interpretations were hidden from public scrutiny and 
democratic debate.36 In the United States at least, the revelations 
accelerated an already growing corporate movement to demand 
transparency, that is, greater legal authority to disclose at least the 
number and type of government demands received and complied 
35.  european parliament Study, National Programmes for Mass Surveillance of Personal 
Data in EU Member States and Their Compatibility with EU Law (october 2013), http:// www. 
statewatch.org/ news/ 2013/ oct/ ep- study- national- law- on- surveillance.pdf.
36.  Justin Sink, “patriot Act author “extremely troubled” by nSA phone tracking,” The Hill 
(June 6, 2013), http:// thehill.com/ blogs/ hillicon- valley/ technology/ 303937- patriot- act- author- 
extremely- troubled- by- nsa- phone- tracking; Letter from Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner 
to Attorney General eric H. Holder, Jr. (June 6, 2013), http:// www.scribd.com/ doc/ 146169288/ 
Sensenbrenner- Letter- to- Attorney- General- eric- Holder- Re- nSA- and- Verizon.
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with, and companies also started taking steps to make surveillance 
without their consent more difficult.37
• Significant Commonality across Laws: Although differences abound, 
and can be significant, there is some commonality across most of the 
countries we surveyed:
• Almost all have privatized their telecoms and thus recognize some 
arm’s length relationship between the government and the network 
operators.
• Almost all recognize the right to privacy.
• However, most of the countries surveyed either exempt data 
collection for law enforcement and national security purposes 
from general data protection laws or treat government access as a 
permissible use, subject to separate, varying restrictions.38
• Most countries impose a variety of limits and controls on 
government access and surveillance requests, whether by courts, 
senior government officials, or committees or oversight bodies 
established for this purpose.
A major question, of course, is whether those control and review 
mechanisms are strong enough in the face of technological change, 
the continuing trend of individuals storing more and more of 
their digital persona in cloud- based computing models, and more 
aggressive government demands.
Finally, with the exception of mandatory reporting laws, the 
applicable laws and regulations in the countries surveyed generally 
focus on defining standards for requests for data regarding 
specific persons, and they seem to presume a world of limited and 
particularized access rather than systematic government access. (The 
UK’s Investigatory powers Act and Germany’s G- 10 law specifically 
37. Claire Cain Miller, “Angry over US Surveillance, Tech Giants Bolster Defenses,” New York 
Times (october 31, 2013), http:// www.nytimes.com/ 2013/ 11/ 01/ technology/ angry- over- us- 
surveillance- tech- giants- bolster- defenses.html.
38.  The sole binding international treaty on data protection is the Council of europe 
Convention for the protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic processing of 
personal Data, CeTS no. 108 (1981), http:// conventions.coe.int/ Treaty/ en/ Treaties/ Html/ 
108.htm. Convention 108 also permits states to enact laws that derogate from data protec-
tion responsibilities the Convention would otherwise impose. According to Article 9 of the 
Convention, such laws must be both necessary in a democratic society and be in the interest of 
protecting national security, public safety, the monetary interests of the state, or for suppress-
ing crime. Accordingly, the european Court of Human Rights has used the Data protection 
Convention to address criminal matters including collection and use of biometric identifiers 
of arrestees (S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom, Application nos. 30562/ 04 and 30566/ 
04, Judgment of 4 December 2008)), and retention and disclosure of records of crime (Gardel 
v. France, Application no. 16428/ 05, Judgment of 17 December 2009, and M.M. v. The United 
Kingdom, Application no. 24029/ 07, Judgment of 13 november 2012).
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authorize non- particularized interception of communications to or 
from persons abroad.) The Snowden revelations show how one of 
these laws (Section 215) had been interpreted in secret to authorize 
bulk, ongoing disclosures.
China and India stand out due to almost total lack of protection 
and oversight in both law enforcement and national security. At the 
opposite extreme, Japan and Brazil are notable for the severe limits 
they impose on interceptions undertaken for foreign intelligence 
security purposes.
• Inconsistency between Published Law and Practice: In many countries, 
the published law appears to say something different from what 
governments are reportedly doing. even after the Snowden revelations, 
we lack an accurate or comprehensive understanding of systematic 
access because both its legal basis and actual practice are hidden from 
public view.
As the disclosures about the US government’s telephony metadata 
program show, governments may be operating under secret 
interpretations of the applicable laws. In other cases, they may be 
operating “in the interstices of national regulation,” obtaining access 
that is not specifically authorized but also not specifically prohibited.39 
In the United States and in other democracies (especially Israel), the 
inconsistencies between publicly available laws and reported practice 
suggest areas of struggle or tension between legal requirements and 
perceived national security necessities. In light of these responsibilities 
to protect the nation against external and internal threats, the executive 
branch does not so much ignore existing law as rely on executive orders, 
secret court opinions, and other nontransparent means to interpret the 
law in the pursuit of the executive branch’s objectives.40 Additionally, 
after 9/ 11, several countries— notably Canada, Germany, the United 
States, and the UK— modified their antiterrorist statutes, hereby 
granting intelligence agencies more expansive surveillance powers.
Again, China and India are different: the former explicitly carves out 
broad exceptions for national security from both the constitution and 
relevant security and surveillance laws, whereas privacy protections 
under Indian law are weak, ambiguous, or non- existent.
• National Security and Law Enforcement: In every country we studied, 
even those nations with otherwise comprehensive data protection laws, 
39. See Cate, Dempsey, and Rubinstein, above note 17, at 198.
40. one of the documents leaked by Snowden indicates that, starting in 2004, the executive 
branch in the United States began to seek and obtain court approval for its bulk collection 
programs, bringing them under statutory authority, but based entirely on secret interpreta-
tions of those statutes. See “Draft nSA Inspector General Report on email and Internet Data 
Collection, Dated 24 Mar. 2009,” The Guardian (June 27, 2013), http:// www.theguardian.com/ 
world/ interactive/ 2013/ jun/ 27/ nsa- inspector- general- report- document- data- collection.
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regulatory, law enforcement, and national security access are often 
excluded from such laws, or treated as accepted purposes for which 
such access is authorized under separate laws that may or may not 
provide adequate safeguards against possible abuses.41 Moreover, almost 
everywhere, national security access is more sparingly regulated for 
data protection purposes than requests for law enforcement purposes.
• The Declining “Wall” between National Security and Other 
Uses: prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/ 11, many of the countries 
we studied maintained a “wall” that prevented law enforcement 
and other government agencies from obtaining and using data 
collected by intelligence or national security agencies under relaxed 
data protection standards. In many countries, this wall has been 
dismantled, with the result that intelligence agencies may now, at least 
as a matter of legal authority, pass information to law enforcement 
officials, while data collected for law enforcement and other purposes 
may be shared with intelligence agencies. This is certainly the case 
in the United States post- 9/ 11; in Canada, where antiterrorism policy 
explicitly calls out the importance of information sharing among law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies;42 and (more surprisingly) in 
Germany, where, as paul Schwartz notes, recent laws have eroded the 
wall somewhat, thereby permitting the creation of an “anti- terrorist 
database.”
• “Systematic Volunteerism:” In some of the countries studied, the 
government obtains systematic access to private sector information 
through voluntary arrangements. In Brazil, for example, as Bruno 
Magrani notes in his chapter in this volume, many companies such 
as Mercado Livre include in their terms of service permission to 
voluntarily disclose information to law enforcement. Companies 
establishing such arrangements appear motivated by a variety of factors, 
Magrani states, including “patriotism, a desire for good relations with 
government agencies (both for regulatory and sales purposes), a lack 
of understanding that national law does not require compliance with 
such requests, fear of reprisals if they do not cooperate, and the ability 
to generate revenue by selling the government access to the data they 
possess.” In China, notes Zhizheng Wang, “private- sector entities might 
provide government officials with voluntary broad access to data in 
seeking favorable policy or government investment.” An additional 
41.  Although national law often excludes national security and law enforcement from the 
scope of data protection laws, regional human rights instruments such as the european 
Convention on Human Rights do cover, and constrain, such activities. Adequate standards 
based on human rights instruments are discussed below in Section VI(B).
42. See Jane Bailey and Sara Shayan’s chapter in this volume.
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motivating factor for bulk disclosure may be efficiency (easing the 
administrative burden of processing many individualized requests). 
In the United States, by contrast, it seems that concerns about liability 
discourage voluntary cooperation.
• Importance of Trans- border Access and Sharing: Although most of the 
countries appear to consider multinational access and sharing essential 
to national security and law enforcement activities, these arrangements 
received relatively little attention in the chapters commissioned. 
Difficult jurisdictional issues cut across a wide spectrum of areas in the 
globalized information society. The Snowden leaks have drawn major 
attention to the fact that, with the emergence of globalized services, 
access in one country can easily affect large numbers of people outside 
that country. Increasingly, governments are exploring mechanisms 
that would permit law enforcement officials in one country to gain 
access in some circumstances to data stored in another country without 
triggering the host country’s legal processes. For example, the United 
States and the UK are negotiating an agreement that would permit 
such access, with limitations,43 and the US Department of Justice has 
proposed legislation that would clear the way for such agreements.44 
Separately, even before the Snowden leaks, several authors duly noted 
the existence of the UK- US agreement (which also extends to Australia, 
Canada, and new Zealand) to share information obtained by electronic 
surveillance, and recent leaks have exposed further details about this 
and other sharing and cooperation agreements.45
43. See ellen nakashima and Andrea peterson, “The British Want to Come to America— with 
Wiretap orders and Search Warrants,” Washington Post (February 4, 2016), https:// www.
washingtonpost.com/ world/ national- security/ the- british- want- to- come- to- america— with- 
wiretap- orders- and- search- warrants/ 2016/ 02/ 04/ b351ce9e- ca86- 11e5- a7b2- 5a2f824b02c9_ 
story.html.
44.  See letter from peter J.  Kadzik, Assistant Attorney General, to Hon. Joseph R.  Biden, 
president of the US Senate, conveying proposed legislation that would amend US law to permit 
foreign governments to make surveillance demands directly on US providers for communi-
cations content (July 15, 2016), https:// www.documentcloud.org/ documents/ 2994379- 2016- 7- 
15- US- UK- Biden- With- enclosures.html#document/ p11.
45. See peter Beaumont, “nSA Leaks: US and Britain Team Up on Mass Surveillance,” The 
Guardian (June 22, 2013), http:// www.theguardian.com/ world/ 2013/ jun/ 22/ nsa- leaks- 
britain- us- surveillance; Linton Besser, “Telstra Storing Data on Behalf of US Government,” 
Sydney Morning Herald (July 16, 2013), http:// www.smh.com.au/ it- pro/ security- it/ telstra- 
storing- data- on- behalf- of- us- government- 20130716- hv0w4.html; Glenn Greenwald, Laura 
poitras, and ewen MacAskill, “nSA Shares Raw Intelligence including Americans’ Data with 
Israel,” The Guardian (September 11, 2013), http:// www.theguardian.com/ world/ 2013/ sep/ 11/ 
nsa- americans- personal- data- israel- documents.
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VI.  COMPAR ATIVE ANALYSIS: THE DESCRIPTIVE 
FR AMEWORK
This chapter now presents a more detailed comparative analysis, proposing a 
set of descriptive and normative frameworks that might help governments, the 
private sector, privacy advocates, and other stakeholders confront the issues 
associated with government access to privately- held data in general and the 
issue of systematic access in particular. We approach this assessment with 
considerable humility. Comparative legal analysis is always difficult without 
an in- depth knowledge of the systems at issue, and in the context of system-
atic government access the task is made more difficult by the ambiguity in 
laws and lack of transparency in practices that we have repeatedly mentioned. 
nevertheless, in the spirit of contributing to a more nuanced international dia-
logue around standards for systematic government access, we offer some com-
parative observations.
We first offer a descriptive framework for government access laws. Using this 
framework, we have attempted to summarize the laws of the 12 of the 13 coun-
tries surveyed by Tpp.
In Section VII, we offer a normative framework, drawing on widely- accepted 
understandings of “the rule of law” and on the case law of the european Court of 
Human Rights, which represents a comprehensive transnational body of law on 
government surveillance.
A.  The Descriptive Framework
In researching governmental access rules and practices, we found that most 
legal systems had addressed separately the questions of government access to 
communications and metadata associated with communications, and to busi-
ness records of various types. The laws relating to access to communications 
and communications metadata seem to have grown out of an almost universal 
recognition of two competing propositions: that communications privacy is an 
essential right, and that the ability to intercept communications in real time or 
to access communications and associated data in storage is an important inves-
tigative technique for both criminal investigations and the protection of national 
security interests. Accordingly, most countries seem to have laws address-
ing communications privacy and governmental access to communications. 
Whether those laws have kept pace with technological development is another 
question. However, we found that certain basic issues presented themselves time 
and again across different legal systems. For example: Are there separate rules 
for law enforcement and national security access? Is judicial or senior level exec-
utive approval required for access? Are companies subject to data retention or 
network design mandates?
As a framework for cross- border comparisons of government laws regulating 
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factors. Table 1.1 outlines nine factors to consider in describing a country’s legal 
system for government access to private- sector data:
of course, as we noted above, government demands for access to data, includ-
ing for systematic access, are directed at many other sectors, particularly financial 
services and travel. Accordingly, we sought to analyze laws and practices in the 13 
countries we surveyed in terms of standards for government access to other types 
of business records. This task proved much more difficult, because in many coun-
tries, even those with otherwise comprehensive privacy laws, rules on government 
access to data and on systematic reporting may differ sector by sector. Table 1.2 
lists 14 factors that constitute a normative framework for assessing national laws 
and practices concerning access to personal data held by the private sector.
Table 1.1. The Descriptive Framework
1. Source of authority, standards and limits
a. Constitutional— Does the national constitution include a protection of privacy 
or other limits on governmental power to obtain communications or other cus-
tomer data from private-sector entities?
b. Statutory— Are standards for governmental access established in statute?
c. Law enforcement versus national security— Does the legal system set separate 
rules for law enforcement access as compared to national security access?
2. Distinction between content and non- content— Does the legal framework draw 
a distinction between the content of communications and transactional data 
(addressing or routing data, subscriber identifying data, financial data, data about 
commercial transactions)?
3. Technology neutrality (same standards for different media)— Do legal standards 
apply consistently to data collected online and offline? To data in transit and data 
in storage?
4. Targeted versus bulk access— Does the legal framework (outside of the regulatory 
context) expressly draw a distinction between targeted collection and systematic 
or bulk collection? Is there express authorization for bulk collection?
5. Third party doctrine— Does the legal system treat data stored with a third party 
(for example, a cloud provider) differently from data stored locally?
6. Use, retention, disclosure limits— Does the law impose limits on the government’s 
use, retention, and disclosure of data after the data is lawfully acquired?
7. oversight mechanisms— What are the executive, judicial, legislative oversight, 
public transparency, and redress mechanisms?
8. Design mandates— Does the law require service providers to design their net-
works or activities to facilitate government access? Does the government regulate 
encryption?
9. Retention mandate— Does the law require entities to store certain data about cus-
tomers for specified periods of time?
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We summarize laws and practices considering the following factors:
B.  The Descriptive Analysis: Comparative Observations
The following section highlights the similarities and differences in the govern-
ment access rules in the countries studied. The discussion touches on both stan-
dards for real- time access and standards for access to stored data, and focuses 
mostly on communications content and metadata, in part because of the ongo-
ing intensive governmental, public, civil society, and media focus on these mat-
ters, rather than on other forms of business records, where the issues are also 
important and inherently transnational. Unless otherwise noted, the descrip-
tions of each country’s law are drawn from the country reports that follow in 
subsequent chapters of this volume.
1.  Source of Authority, Standards and Limits
a. Constitutional Authority
The majority of countries surveyed recognize the right to privacy in their national 
constitutions, with the exception of Australia and the UK. Whereas the constitutions 
of some countries include an explicit privacy provision, in other countries, courts 
have inferred a right to privacy from other constitutional provisions. Both the United 
States and Canada apply a “reasonable expectation of privacy” test to define the scope 
of that right vis- à- vis the government. In Germany and Israel, the constitutional 
basis of information privacy is especially strong. Germany recognizes a constitution-
ally based “right of informational self- determination,” and a highly engaged German 
public and press ensure that such rights are taken very seriously. In Germany, for 
example, intrusions on privacy require a valid basis in law and must satisfy a princi-
ple of proportionality. Similarly, privacy in Israel is a constitutional right subject to a 
“limitation clause,” with the result that government access must be expressly author-
ized and pass constitutional muster, including a proportionality test.
Table 1.2. Government Access to Business Records





2. Systematic disclosure demands
3. Use, retention, disclosure limits
4. oversight mechanisms
5. Redress/ due process mechanisms
6. Transparency
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However, in all of the countries studied, the application of constitutional stan-
dards is by no means an absolute bar against government access to private sector 
data. To the contrary, governments enjoy substantial powers to collect or inter-
cept data, under a variety of laws and programs. In the United States, a major 
exception to the right to privacy is the third- party doctrine (discussed below), 
which leaves business records outside the Constitution’s protection. In Germany 
and Israel, access laws have been upheld even after the courts applied balancing 
tests that heavily weigh the fundamental right to privacy. As noted above, article 
8 of the european Convention tolerates secret surveillance in signatory states 
(Germany, the UK, France, and Italy) provided that national laws provide ade-
quate safeguards against potential abuse. In Brazil, however, at least one judicial 
decision suggests, as Magrani explains, that article 5, item XII of the Constitution 
(secrecy of correspondence, telegraphic data, and telephone communications) 
protects the flow of data even against judicially authorized wiretapping.
In sharp contrast, China stands out among the 13 countries surveyed in 
two fundamental respects: first, it is the only non- democratic country; second, 
its constitution (and laws) grant extensive surveillance powers to the state for 
purposes of national and public security. Thus, the government has extensive 
authorities and “generous room for flexibility” in accessing private data in the 
name of maintaining state security and the social order.46 In India, too, although 
India is a democracy, the constitution imposes few meaningful limits on the 
government’s broad surveillance powers.
b. Statutory Authority
Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and all of the european counties 
have comprehensive national privacy statutes. The United States has no omni-
bus privacy law, but rather follows a sector- specific approach, with separate laws 
protecting communications data, financial data, health data, and other catego-
ries. In addition, international treaties can also be an overlapping source of legal 
authority for privacy, including Article 8 of the european Convention on Human 
Rights and Article 11 of the Inter- American Convention on Human Rights.
However, in all the countries surveyed, whether the nation has a comprehen-
sive privacy statute or sectoral laws, those statutes have exceptions permitting 
government surveillance of communications and government access to stored 
records. Real- time surveillance is addressed in the majority of countries (other 
than China and India) in surveillance laws whose principles and concepts gener-
ally fit within the descriptive and normative frameworks outlined above.
Against this commonality of approach, China and India stand out among the 
13 countries surveyed. In China, it is very easy to override existing statutory 
restrictions on national security or public order grounds. Thus, Chinese law explic-
itly authorizes governmental access to privately held data and/ or lacks explicit 
46. As Zhizheng Wang explains, in his chapter in this volume, Chinese government access 
to private sector data is further strengthened by the Chinese Communist party’s “absolute 
control over the law” and the absence of an independent judiciary.
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limitations on such access. Indeed, Chinese national security law allows for the 
inspection of electronic communication instruments belonging to “any organisa-
tion or individual” for purposes of state security with few if any limitations.47
Indian surveillance laws also have very limited or very weak restrictions on gov-
ernment access. Although a 1997 decision established certain safeguards under 
India’s long- standing Telegraph Act of 1885 governing telephone interception, the 
Information Technology Act of 2008 substantially weakened existing standards. It 
permits interception of electronic communications to prevent “incitement” of any 
cognizable offense related to public emergency, public safety, and public order, or 
for investigation of any offense as well as for a range of cyber security purposes. 
Under the relevant rules, intermediaries must provide a high degree of assistance 
to law enforcement, agencies can freely share data, and the rules relating to the col-
lection of traffic data also permit extensive monitoring for cyber security matters. 
India’s ISp licensing system also permits extremely broad government access rights 
while neglecting well- established international safeguards such as requiring a court 
order, internal agency restrictions on access to intercepted materials, and individual 
redress.
Among the countries we studied, Israel faces unique national security 
concerns.48 Both the courts and the attorney general (which in Israel is a non- 
political and highly autonomous function) play a key role in interpreting a set of 
laws that deal with surveillance by both the police and by the various intelligence 
services (military intelligence, internal security (GSS), and foreign intelligence 
(Mossad). The Israeli intelligence services enjoy far more leeway than the police 
in conducting surveillance. For example, as omer Tene explains, the Wiretap 
Act allows military intelligence and GSS to obtain wiretap permission from a 
very senior official without judicial oversight. The Communications Data Act 
regulates access to traffic data by the police under multiple tracks, some of which 
require judicial oversight and some of which do not. In contrast, GSS (which 
is regulated by a separate law) has much broader access without judicial scru-
tiny. This includes a requirement that fixed line and cell operators must transfer 
to GSS certain categories of communications data as determined by the prime 
minister.49 Although concerns about law enforcement access have sometimes 
47. Although security officials must follow their own internal procedures, these procedures 
are largely secret and give rise to no due process rights.
48. We agree with omer Tene, who notes in his chapter in this volume that his account must 
be qualified by two distinctions: first, it concerns only “Israel proper” and not the occupied 
territories, which are subject to a military regime; second, Israel has been in a near constant 
state of war or armed conflict since its beginnings as an independent state, and therefore 
national security considerations “have a profound impact on Israeli constitutional and legal 
discourse.”
49. These transfers to the GSS are subject to certain “secret annexes” setting out detailed pro-
cedures and protocols. omer Tene notes in his chapter in this volume that, after examining 
the secret annexes in camera, a court denied a public records request seeking their release on 
the grounds that they “do not provide the GSS with surveillance powers, but rather set forth 
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spawned government inquires and public outcry, the press and the public seem 
more acquiescent with regard to access for internal security purposes. on the 
other hand, Tene notes, the law regulating GSS imposes certain accountability 
and transparency requirements.
c. Law Enforcement versus National Security
The majority of countries have enacted separate laws or separate procedures 
addressing access in the domestic law enforcement context as opposed to 
national security (or foreign intelligence) activity. In the UK and other coun-
tries, the rules for both arenas are set out in a single law (now the Investigatory 
powers Act of 2016), whereas the United States applies quite different standards 
in the two arenas through separate statutes— the Wiretap Act and the Stored 
Communications Act for law enforcement and FISA for foreign intelligence. In 
India, there is no clear distinction between law enforcement and national secu-
rity access, whereas China distinguishes them but imposes few if any restrictions 
on the latter. Although Australia,50 Canada, and the United States apply special, 
arguably more lenient rules to national security access, these rules remain sub-
ject to constitutional limitations.
At the opposite extreme is Japan, where the government’s statutory authority 
to engage in surveillance either for law enforcement or intelligence purposes is 
very limited as compared with all of the other countries studied. Although Japan 
enacted its first wiretap law in 1999, Japanese society strongly disfavors the use of 
wiretaps and the number of communications intercepts is miniscule. Moreover, 
Japanese law lacks any statutory basis for authorizing wiretaps for counterterror-
ism purposes. Similarly, the Brazilian constitution only authorizes interception 
of communications for criminal investigations, and although Brazil maintains 
an intelligence apparatus, the lead intelligence agency lacks both investigative 
and surveillance powers.
2.  Content/ Non- content Distinction
A number of countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Italy, Israel, South 
Korea, the UK, and the US) draw a legal distinction between the content of 
communications and various types of non- content,51 establishing higher stan-
dards for government access to the former and lower standards for access to the 
technical specifications for operating the ‘pipe’ through which the data are channeled strictly 
where access to data is authorised by law.”
50. For example, federal police are entitled to obtain documents that are “relevant to, and 
will assist in, investigations of serious terrorism offenses,” without any court order. Similarly, 
the Australian Security Intelligence organization (ASIo) may obtain computer access by 
requesting the Minister to issue a warrant.
51.  “non- content” data, also referred to as “transactional,” “connection,” or “envelope” 
data, includes both (a) communications attributes such as the time, duration, and medium 
of communication; the technical parameters of the relevant transmission devices and 
software; and the identities and physical locations of the parties, and their electronic 
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latter. For example, Brazilian courts have ruled that “judicial authorisation is 
not required for the police or the public prosecutor’s office to have access to 
subscriber- identifying data from companies,” on the grounds that anonymous 
speech is constitutionally prohibited. British law imposes very few controls on 
access to non- content data (both communications attributes and subscriber 
data), which are easily accessible by a very large number of central and local 
officials, simply requiring that a senior official make a request. There were over 
half a million such requests in 2010.52 Similarly, non- content requests are subject 
to lower standards in Australia, Brazil, Israel, Italy, South Korea, and the United 
States. on the other hand, it appears that neither India nor Japan distinguishes 
between content and non- content requests.
3.  Technology/ Business Model Neutrality
Most of the countries studied apply the same standards for real- time interception 
of content (voice communications, text messages, email, and so on) regardless of 
the technology on which the content is transmitted or the business model of the 
service provider, with three exceptions. China has enacted multiple, Internet- 
related laws regulating very specific services (e.g., traditional ISps, telecoms, con-
tent providers, data centers, messaging services, news services, etc.). Germany 
follows a “layer model” that draws complex distinctions between the content of 
online communication, the services provided on the Internet, and the “levels” at 
which data transfer takes place, all of which are regulated under different laws. 
Finally, the United States distinguishes between communications in real time 
and in storage and protects them differently.53
4.  Third Party Doctrine
In the United States, there is long- standing precedent that the Constitution’s 
Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
does not apply to records held by third parties.54 Accordingly, in the United 
States, privacy protection for business records mainly flows from statute.55 The 
addresses; and (b) subscriber data such as name, address, phone number, and/ or credit card 
information.
52. Brown, above note 8, at 235.
53. A campaign is underway in the United States to reform eCpA by extending to stored com-
munications content many of the protections that apply to content in transit. See Dustin Volz, 
“U.S. House passes Bill Requiring Warrant to Search old emails,” Reuters (February 6, 2017), 
http:// www.reuters.com/ article/ us- usa- congress- emails- idUSKBn15L2n3.
54.  Fourth Amendment protections are unavailable both for financial records, see United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and transactional information held by third parties that is 
associated with either phone calls or email, see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
55. In 2010, a federal appeals court (covering four states) held that the Constitution does in 
fact protect the content of stored communications. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F. 3d 
266 (6th Cir. 2010). In 2013, the US Department of Justice stated to Congress that it followed 
the Warshak rule nationwide, obtaining a warrant under the Constitution in order to compel 
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United States is more or less unique in affording no constitutional protection to 
third- party data, although a few other countries also handle third- party data 
somewhat differently. For example, in Canada, a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy does not attach to information held by a third party with no obligation to 
maintain confidentiality.56 China, on the other hand, seems to accord higher pro-
tection to data stored in the cloud, apparently in an effort to attract international 
investors who might otherwise be wary of the “golden shield” projects (discussed 
below).
5.  Use, Retention, Disclosure Limits
The european countries in the survey have all implemented the 1995 eU Data 
protection Directive,57 which limits collection, retention, and disclosure of per-
sonal data by the public and private sectors. However, the Directive expressly 
does not apply to processing of data for law enforcement or national security 
purposes. Israel also has a comprehensive privacy law but it too does not apply 
to the activities of the police or internal or external security services. Canada 
and the United States have privacy Acts that regulate the collection, use, and 
retention of personal data by federal governmental entities; those Acts apply to 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies, but the US law allows many excep-
tions for law enforcement and intelligence databases. Key provisions of South 
Korea’s comprehensive data protection law do not apply to data collected for 
national security purposes. In 2014, Brazil enacted the Marco Civil law, which 
allows the government to require companies to retain connection records for 
Internet applications for one year, and other Internet connection records for six 
months.58 A  draft data protection law has been under consideration in India, 
a service provider to disclose the contents of stored communications. In a 2011 decision, the 
US Supreme Court rejected the absolute claim that a person loses all constitutional interest in 
whatever is disclosed to a third party, see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); however, 
the majority’s holding was much narrower and the third party doctrine is still being applied 
in full force to non- content data.
56. See the chapter by Jane Bailey and Sara Shayan in this volume, n. 55 at 209.
57.  Available at http:// eur- lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=CeLeX:31995L0
046:en:noT. on January 25, 2012, the european Commission proposed a comprehensive 
reform of the data protection rules, to account for globalization, cloud computing, and other 
advances in communications technology. After four years of drafting and negotiation, the 
european parliament voted to adopt the new General Data protection Regulation [hereinaf-
ter “GDpR”] on April 14, 2016, http:// eur- lex.europa.eu/ legal- content/ en/ TXT/ pDF/ ?uri=oJ
:L:2016:119:FULL&from=en. The GDpR entered into force on May 25, 2016, and will become 
directly applicable in all eU Member States two years after this date, on May 25, 2018.
58.  Marco Civil da Internet (Law no. 12.965), Articles 13 and 15 (April 23, 2014); 
Diego Spinola, “Brazil Leads the efforts in Internet Governance with Its Recently 
enacted ‘Marco Civil da Internet’. What’s in It for Intermediary Liability?,” The Center 
for Internet and Society (April 30, 2014), http:// cyberlaw.stanford.edu/ blog/ 2014/ 04/ 
brazil- leads- efforts- internet- governance- its- recently- enacted- marco- civil- da- internet.
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whereas the Chinese legislature in 2013 passed a data protection resolution. 
Although that Chinese law contains “significant and far- reaching requirements 
applicable to the collection and processing of electronic personal information via 
the Internet,”59 it obviously does not impose any meaningful limits on govern-
ment access for security purposes.
6.  Oversight Mechanisms
each country except China has some process of independent oversight of surveil-
lance and government access. However, standards vary widely. In India, courts 
play a very limited role. Although older laws required a court order for access to 
letters and telegrams, Sunil Abraham finds that these safeguards are “no longer 
relevant in today’s information society.” More recent enactments in India offer 
much weaker protections and seem to minimize the role of courts in authorizing 
wiretaps, access to non- content data, and access for national security reasons. 
In particular, the Information Technology Act of 2008 dispenses with case- by- 
case authorizations for access to data in favor of blanket authorizations, and per-
mits the use of such data for broad and generic purposes. India also suffers from 
problems with corruption, and there are reports that “law enforcement officials 
abuse their positions to dilute data access safeguards.” In Germany, prior judicial 
approval is required for wiretapping by the police in criminal cases, but inter-
ception for intelligence purposes is conducted upon the approval of the Interior 
Minister and a commission appointed by parliament.60 Germany’s Constitutional 
Court has played a key role in overseeing the surveillance activities of Germany’s 
foreign intelligence agency, the BnD, forcing several amendments to the G- 10 
statute that regulates so- called “strategic surveillance” for intelligence purposes. 
In the United States, prior court approval is required for both law enforcement 
and foreign intelligence surveillance conducted inside the United States, with 
one exception that has loomed large after the Snowden leaks: when surveillance 
conducted inside the United States targets noncitizens who are believed to be 
outside the United States at the time of the access, the courts approve only the 
broad outlines of the surveillance program, and individual targeting decisions 
are made by the nSA.
7.  Design Mandates
As far as we know based on the country chapters and additional research, only 
a few of the countries studied have explicit design mandates. For example, 
Israel, Australia, Germany, and the United States have enacted laws authorizing 
59. See “Chinese Legislature passes Data privacy Resolution,” (January 2, 2013), Privacy and 
Information Security Law Blog, http:// www.huntonprivacyblog.com/ ?s=china (also noting 
that “one provision … could actually erode the protection of personal privacy:  ISps must 
require that customers provide their real names on agreements for the provision of access- or 
information- related services”).
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government officials to seek changes to the design of telecom equipment, facili-
ties, and services to ensure that they have built- in surveillance capabilities. In 
the UK, the government may impose obligations on public telecom services to 
ensure that they maintain interception capability.61 China and India have sought 
to control network design without explicit statutory authority. Although China 
has undoubtedly succeeded, the results in India are more ambiguous.62 In other 
countries, the issue has not surfaced in public debate, perhaps due to the close 
relationship between government authorities and service providers, with the lat-
ter voluntarily taking steps to ensure that their facilities are wiretap- ready.
8.  Retention Mandates
A few of the countries studied have imposed data retention mandates on tele-
phone companies, ISps and other service providers. The UK, France, Italy, and 
Germany enacted data retention laws as required by the eU Data Retention 
Directive, but in 2014 the Court of Justice of the european Union invali-
dated the Data Retention Directive, finding it inconsistent with the european 
Charter of Fundamental Rights.63 In 2016, the Court invalidated the specific 
data retention laws of the UK and Sweden. The German statute required tele-
communication providers to store specific kinds of traffic and location data 
for a period of six months. In 2010, the German Constitutional Court struck 
down the statute. However, Germany in 2015 enacted a new law that requires 
the retention of phone and Internet metadata for 10 weeks.64 China imposes 
extensive mandatory data retention on telecoms, ISps, and content provid-
ers. In Brazil, companies must retain connection records for Internet applica-
tions for one year, and other Internet connection records for six months.65 our 
research indicated that Canada, Japan, and the United States lack generalized 
data retention mandates.
61. The British design mandates are part of the Investigatory powers Act 2016, which has broad 
surveillance provisions, a design mandate akin to CALeA, and a data retention requirement.
62.  India, as well as the United Arab emirates and Saudi Arabia, threatened to block 
Blackberry enterprise service because the service uses encryption that thwarts communi-
cations monitoring. Barry Meier and Robert F. Worth, “emirates to Cut Data Services of 
BlackBerry,” New  York Times (August 1, 2010), http:// www.nytimes.com/ 2010/ 08/ 02/ 
 business/ global/ 02berry.html?pagewanted=all&_ r=0. In response, BlackBerry (then operat-
ing as Research In Motion, or RIM) established a facility in Mumbai to coordinate with the 
government on surveillance demands relating to BlackBerry devices. Amol Sharma, “RIM 
Facility Helps India in Surveillance efforts,” Wall Street Journal (october 28, 2011), http:// 
online.wsj.com/ news/ articles/ SB10001424052970204505304577001592335138870.
63. Digital Rights Ireland v. Minister for Communications, Joined Cases C- 293/ 12 and C- 594/ 
12, Judgment of 8 Apr. 2014, http:// curia.europa.eu/ juris/ document/ document.jsf?docid=15
0642&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=en&cid=593504.
64.  “German parliament Votes for new Data Retention Law,” Deutsche Welle (october 16, 
2015), http:// dw.com/ p/ 1GpBZ.
65. Marco Civil da Internet (Law no. 12.965), Articles 13 and 15 (April 23, 2014).
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VII.  COMPAR ATIVE ANALYSIS: THE NOR MATIVE 
FR AMEWORK
A.  The Normative Framework
In this section, we turn from a description of government access rules to the 
normative question of how national rules measure up against the standards for 
surveillance identified by the european Court of Human Rights.
Government surveillance demands, whether for access to one account at a 
time or for systematic access, and whether for regulatory, law enforcement, or 
national security purposes, do not arise in a normative vacuum. A series of fac-
tors for assessing governmental demands can be derived from the concept of 
“rule of law” and from existing (although still evolving) international human 
rights jurisprudence.
The “rule of law” is an internationally recognized concept encompassing, at 
a minimum, principles of transparency, limits on the discretion of government 
officials, and accountability.66 A leading legal philosopher, Joseph Raz, identified 
eight key principles of the rule of law, of which six are especially relevant to ques-
tions of government surveillance and access to data held by the private sector:
1. Laws should be prospective, open, and clear;
2. Laws should be relatively stable;
3. The rules for making particular laws should be open, stable, clear, and 
general;
4. The judiciary should be independent;
5. Courts shall have review power over all other principles; and
6. “The discretion of the crime- preventing agencies should not be allowed 
to pervert the law.”67
These principles have been embodied in major international human rights 
instruments. In addition, major human rights instruments protect the right 
to privacy.68 of greatest relevance, because it has generated the largest body of 
66. For a classic statement of these principles, see Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised 
edition (1969).
67. Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and Its Virtue,’ in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and 
Morality (1979). Raz’s other two principles address the need for making courts easily acces-
sible to all and the necessity of observing principles of natural justice.
68. In 2013, the Un General Assembly passed a resolution reaffirming the human right to 
privacy as provided in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and political Rights, 
and requesting the Un High Commissioner for Human Rights to present a report on the pro-
tection of privacy regarding “domestic and extraterritorial surveillance and/ or interception 
of digital communications and collection of personal data, including on a mass scale.” The 
right to privacy in the digital age, G.A. Res. 68/ 167, U.n. Doc. A/ ReS/ 68/ 167 (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http:// www.un.org/ en/ ga/ search/ view_ doc.asp?symbol=A/ ReS/ 68/ 167. Data protection 
officials meeting at a major conference in Warsaw, poland, adopted a resolution calling for 
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interpretative case law setting out standards of global relevance, is Article 8 of 
the european Convention on Human Rights (1950), which states in relevant part:
1. everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well- being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.69
The Convention is in effect binding on eU Member States, as Article 6(3) of 
the  Treaty on european Union states, “Fundamental rights, as guaranteed 
by the  european Convention for the protection of Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms … shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.”70 The 
european Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg Court), whose decisions are 
binding on the 47 Member States of the Council of europe, has issued multi-
ple rulings on the applicability of Article 8 to secret systems of surveillance.71 
Although the Convention preceded the Internet by many years and does not 
explicitly contemplate modern means of communication, the Strasbourg Court 
has successively applied Article 8- 1 to telephone conversations,72 telephone num-
bers,73 computers,74 and the Internet and email.75 The Court has held that the 
existence of legislation that allows a system of secret monitoring entails a threat 
governments to adopt an additional protocol to Article 17 to create global standards for 
data protection. See https:// privacyconference2013.org/ web/ pageFiles/ kcfinder/ files/ 5%20
International%20law%20resolution%20en%281%29.pdf.
69.  Article 8, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms [hereinafter the “Convention”], http:// conventions.coe.int/ Treaty/ en/ Treaties/ 
Html/ 005.htm. Article 7 of the eU Charter reproduces but slightly updates the wording of 
article 8(1): “everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications.” See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of the European 
Parliament, Dec. 7, 2000, O.J., no. C 364, 20000, p. 1 et seq.
70. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 6(3), october 26, 2012, 2012 
o.J. (C 326) 19.
71.  For an overview, see R. White and C. ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey:  The European 
Convention on Human Rights 365– 71 (2010).
72. Klass and others v. Germany, Application no. 5029/ 71, Judgment of 6 Sept. 1978, § 41.
73.  Malone v.  United Kingdom, Application no.  8691/ 79, Judgment of 2 Aug., 1984, § 84; 
Copland v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 62617/ 00, Judgment of 3 Apr., 2007, § 43.
74.  Leander v.  Sweden, Application no.  9248/ 81, Judgment of 26 Mar., 1987, § 48; Rotaru 
v. Romania, Application no. 28341/ 95, Judgment of 4 May, 2000, § 42– 43.
75. Copland, above note 73, § 41.
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of surveillance for all those to whom the legislation may be applied, and that 
this threat itself amounts to an interference with rights under Article 8, allow-
ing persons to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction even if they cannot prove that 
they themselves have been subjected to surveillance.76 In addition, the Court has 
held that the sharing of data with other government agencies, which enlarges the 
group of persons with knowledge of the personal data intercepted and can lead 
to investigations being instituted against the persons concerned, constitutes a 
further separate interference with Article 8 rights.77
once it is determined that surveillance of a given form of communication 
constitutes interference with the rights guaranteed by Article 8- 1, the Court next 
considers whether the interference is justified under Article 8- 2 by assessing it in 
light of three tests: First, is it “in accordance with the law”? Second, is it pursued 
with one or more legitimate aims (including national security) in mind? And, 
third, is it “necessary in a democratic society”? The Court’s decisions have enu-
merated specific criteria for applying these standards.
A very clear statement of these criteria is found in the Weber and Saravia 
case,78 which examined “strategic surveillance” under Germany’s G- 10 Act.79 In 
deciding that the G- 10 Act did not violate Article 8, the Strasbourg Court first 
reiterated that the expression “in accordance with the law” has two elements: It 
requires (1) “that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law.” 
It also refers, the Court said, to (2) “the quality of the law in question, requiring 
that it should be accessible to the person concerned, who must, moreover, be able 
to foresee its consequences for him, and compatible with the rule of law.”80
In Weber and Saravia, the Court found that the German law readily satisfied 
the “basis in law” requirement. As to the foreseeability requirement, the Court 
said that, in the context of surveillance, this does not require any self- defeating 
form of notification that would allow an individual to adapt his conduct accord-
ingly to avoid interception of his communications. Rather, the Court said, in 
view of the risks of the arbitrary exercise of secret powers, it is essential to have 
detailed rules that are clear enough to give citizens “an adequate indication” as to 
76. Roman Zakharov v. Russia, Application no. 47143/ 06, Judgment of 4 Dec., 2015, § 171. 
Such interference is conditioned on an individual being able to show that, due to his personal 
situation, he is potentially at risk of being subjected to such measures and that no effective 
remedies are available at the national level. See also Association for European Integration and 
Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev) v. Bulgaria, Application no. 62540/ 00, Judgment of 27 June, 
2007 (examining the adequacy of Bulgaria’s “Special Surveillance Means Act” (SSMA) and 
concluding that it violated Article 8 because it provided neither sufficient guarantees against 
the risk of abuse inherent in any system of secret surveillance nor effective remedies against 
the use of such special means).
77. See Weber and Saravia v. Germany, Application no. 54934/ 00, Judgment of 29 June 2006, 
§§ 78– 79.
78. Weber and Saravia, Ibid.
79. See paul Schwartz’s chapter in this volume, at 66–68, 79–80.
80. Weber and Saravia, above note 77, § 83.
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the circumstances and conditions under which government agencies are allowed 
to resort to surveillance measures.81 The Court went on to specify certain mini-
mum safeguards that must be set out by statute for surveillance laws such as 
the G- 10 Act to avoid abuses of power and satisfy the “in accordance with law” 
standard. Specifically, a statute must specify:
… the nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception order; a 
definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped; a 
limit on the duration of telephone tapping; the procedure to be followed for 
examining, using and storing the data obtained; the precautions to be taken 
when communicating the data to other parties; and the circumstances in 
which recordings may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed.82
In another case, the Court made it clear that the requirement that conduct be pre-
scribed by law also applies to the treatment of material after it has been obtained, 
meaning that the law must specify the “procedure to be followed for selecting for 
examination, sharing, storing and destroying intercepted material.”83
next in Weber and Saravia, the Court turned to the purpose and necessity tests. 
As the aim of the G- 10 Act is to safeguard national security and/ or prevent crime, 
its purposes squarely fit within the terms of Article 8(2). As to whether the interfer-
ences permitted by the G- 10 Act are “necessary in a democratic society,” the Court 
relied on a balancing test that weighs “all the circumstances of the case, such as 
the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for 
ordering them, the authorities competent to authorise, carry out and supervise 
them, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law.”84 Under this balancing 
test, the Court concluded that although national authorities retain a degree of dis-
cretion over how best to structure a system of surveillance in response to terrorism 
and related threats, domestic surveillance laws may not grant unfettered power to 
law enforcement or intelligence agencies.
Based on the tests developed in earlier cases and reiterated in the Weber and 
Saravia case, the Strasbourg Court has developed fairly detailed guidelines for 
assessing national surveillance law.85 For example, in Weber and Saravia itself, 
81. Ibid., § 93.
82. Ibid., § 95.
83. Liberty and others v. U,K, Application no. 58243/ 00, Judgment of 1 Jul. 2008, § 69.
84. Weber and Saravia, above note 77, §106.
85. These guidelines have also influenced Council of europe recommendations regarding law 
enforcement, including Guidelines for the Cooperation between Law Enforcement and Internet 
Service Providers against Cybercrime (2008), http:// www.coe.int/ t/ dg1/ legalcooperation/ 
 economiccrime/ cybercrime/ cy_  act iv ity_ interface2008/ 567_ prov- d- guidel ines_ 
provisional2_ 3april2008_ en.pdf and the European Code of Police Ethics (2001), http:// polis.
osce.org/ library/ f/ 2687/ 500/ Coe- FRA- RpT- 2687- en- 500. For example, paragraph 41 of the 
Code of police ethics permits the police to interfere with privacy only when strictly necessary 
to obtain a legitimate objective, and paragraph 42 advises that collection, storage, and use of 
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the Court found that an amended version of the G- 10 Act authorizing strate-
gic interception of international communications was consistent with Article 8 
because the statute contained the following elements: The search terms had to be 
listed in the monitoring order, which also had to set out detailed rules on storing 
and destroying any data obtained using these search terms, and the authorities 
storing the data had to verify every six months whether the data was still neces-
sary to achieve the purpose for which they had been obtained by or transmitted 
to them. If that was not the case, they had to be destroyed or deleted from the 
files, or access to them had to be blocked, and all of these steps had to be recorded 
and, in some cases, supervised by a senior official.86
In the Klass case, which concerned the targeted surveillance provisions of the 
German G- 10 Act (distinct from those at issue in Weber and Saravia), the Court 
identified a series of limiting factors in the Act that led it to find those targeted 
surveillance provisions also to be in conformity with Article 8: the Act required a 
factual indication of suspicion; exhaustion of less intrusive means; particularity 
as to a specific suspect and his presumed contacts (hence “exploratory or gen-
eral surveillance” is not permitted); a written application for a surveillance order 
from a senior official; decision by a senior official; limited duration of no more 
than three months; implementation by a an official qualified for judicial office; 
and oversight by an independent entity.87
More recently, in a unanimous Grand Chamber decision, the Court in 
Zakharov found serious and widespread faults with the Russian legislation 
regulating the surveillance of mobile communications. Among the more glar-
ing defects in the Russian law were the fact that although the law requires prior 
judicial authorization for interception measures, Russian judges in practice only 
apply purely formal criteria in deciding whether to grant an authorization and 
“do not verify whether there is a ‘reasonable suspicion’ against the person con-
cerned and do not apply the ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ test”;88 and that 
Russian “courts sometimes grant interception authorisations which do not men-
tion a specific person or telephone number to be tapped, but authorise inter-
ception of all telephone communications in the area where a criminal offence 
has been committed.”89 Additionally, the Court observed the security services 
and the police had the technical means to circumvent the authorization pro-
cedure and to intercept any communications without obtaining prior judicial 
authorization.90
personal data by the police must be limited to the extent necessary for the performance of 
lawful, legitimate, and specific purposes.
86. Weber and Saravia, above note 77, §§ 97– 100.
87. Klass, above note 72, §§ 51– 60.
88. Zakharov, above note 76, § 263.
89. Ibid., § 265.
90. Ibid., § 270.
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Based on these cases assessing surveillance laws under Article 8, we have iden-
tified 14 normative factors that should be considered in evaluating laws for sys-
tematic assess:
Table 1.3. The normative Framework
 1.  “In accordance with law”— Are surveillance standards spelled out in a public 
law or regulation precisely enough to protect against arbitrary application and 
to inform the public of which entities can conduct surveillance and under what 
criteria? Does the law specify the procedures to be followed for examining, using, 
and storing the data obtained?
 2.  Court order— Does surveillance (data acquisition) require authorization by an inde-
pendent judicial officer (with possible exception for emergency circumstances)?
 3.  Approval of senior official— For surveillance in criminal investigations, is 
approval of a senior police or ministry official required? For national security 
matters, is approval of a senior intelligence official required, and is approval 
required from a senior official outside the security service (for example, the attor-
ney general or a legislative body)?
 4.  Limited to serious crimes or serious threats— Is surveillance limited to the investiga-
tion of specified serious crimes? In the national security context, are the topics of sur-
veillance narrowly defined and/ or limited to specified serious threats or subjects, or 
is surveillance permitted, for example, for all matters affecting the national security?
 5.  particularity as to target— Must each surveillance be limited to a specifically desig-
nated person or account, or is “strategic” or generalized monitoring permitted? (This 
question gets to the core of whether systematic access is clearly authorized or not.)
 6.  Showing of suspicion— In the criminal investigative context, does application 
and approval require a showing of a strong factual basis for believing that the tar-
get is engaged in criminal conduct? In the national security context, does applica-
tion and approval require a showing of a strong factual basis for believing that the 
target is a foreign power, is engaged in terrorism or other activities that threaten 
the national security, or is otherwise suspected of being engaged in activities or 
having information of national security significance?
 7.  exhaustion of less intrusive means— Does approval require a showing that other less 
intrusive means will not suffice or are unlikely to obtain the needed information?
 8.  Limit on duration— Is the duration of the surveillance limited (e.g., to 30 days, 
subject to renewal)?
 9.  Limit on scope (“minimization” of irrelevant data)— Is the government required 
to ensure that irrelevant data is not recorded or, if collected, is destroyed or is not 
searched or used?
10.  Limit on use and disclosure— Are there limits on the use and disclosure of data 
that is collected? For example, in the criminal investigative context, does the rel-
evant law specify that data collected can be used only for investigation of the 
crimes that justified the surveillance? Does the law prohibit disclosure to other 
entities? In the national security context, does the relevant law specify that data 
collected cannot be used for investigation or prosecution of crimes, or does the 
law prohibit disclosure to other entities?
(Continued)
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B.  The Normative Analysis: Comparative Observations
With respect to the standards for real- time surveillance in criminal investiga-
tions, the laws in all of the countries we surveyed (except China and India) are 
broadly consistent with the normative factors set forth in Table 1.3. That is, the 
countries generally have statutes expressly authorizing (“in accordance with 
law”) real- time interception of communications content only for the investiga-
tion of serious offenses and only upon the approval of both a senior executive 
branch official and an independent judicial officer. Such statutes generally place 
limits on the duration of the surveillance and the use of information obtained. 
The statutes seem to be premised on the principle of particularity— that is, they 
only authorize surveillance targeted at a specified person, device, or account. 
Also, almost half the countries studied do not have provisions expressly limit-
ing the scope of the content that can be recorded (by requiring that government 
agencies not record irrelevant data or, if they do, that they do not retain such 
data) and almost the same number lack laws requiring notice of surveillance 
to the target of surveillance or other persons whose communications are inter-
cepted. China meets none of the 14 standards identified in our normative frame-
work, and India meets only one of the 14 (approval of a senior officer required) 
and somewhat addresses another standard (loosely tying surveillance to sus-
picion of criminal conduct by requiring that the surveillance be “necessary or 
expedient” for the investigation of an offense).
Although standards for real- time interception of communications are uni-
formly high, standards for access to stored communications held by third parties 
are less consistent. In France, for example, stored documents can be accessed 
in some circumstances by the judicial police or customs authorities and in 
other cases upon the approval of the public prosecutor. In the United States, the 
electronic Communications privacy Act (eCpA) provides that service providers 
can be forced to disclose stored content with a subpoena, issued without judicial 
approval, although an appellate court has held that process to be in violation of 
the Constitution, and service providers and the Justice Department now seem 
to agree that a judicial warrant is needed to compel third- party disclosure of 
11.  Retention limit/ limit on storage— Is there a time limit set on how long the govern-
ment can retain intercepted communications?
12.  notice to target— Must the target of the surveillance, or other persons whose 
communications are intercepted, be provided notice of the surveillance (nor-
mally after the investigation is concluded)?
13.  oversight by independent entity— Does an independent body (judicial, executive, 
legislative) oversee the actual implementation of surveillance procedures to pro-
tect against abuse?
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content. To the extent that any laws expressly address stored content, it is not 
clear whether any of them give attention to the questions of scope or minimi-
zation; that is, although real- time interception is normally approved for periods 
of limited duration and some laws limit the recording of irrelevant information, 
it is not clear whether orders for disclosure of stored communications contain 
any temporal scoping limitations, and it is not clear how rules on minimization 
of irrelevant data would be applied in the case of disclosure of stored data.91 In 
europe, however, under Article 8 of the Convention, acquisition of stored content 
might be subject to a requirement that the law authorizing the collection must 
specify the procedure to be followed for selecting the material to be collected.92
When it comes to transactional data regarding communications, standards 
are even weaker. In the UK, traffic data can be obtained upon the demand of a 
very wide range of government officials, including in non- criminal matters. In the 
United States, stored telephone metadata is available without a court order (but not 
cell site location information), whereas access to Internet metadata and real- time 
interception of telephone or Internet metadata require a court order. In Australia, 
the law permits voluntary disclosure of communications metadata to law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies while also providing for mandatory disclosure 
upon request. In South Korea, although it is clear that the government must obtain 
a court order to require a telecommunications service provider to disclose transac-
tional data (“communications confirmation data”), the vagueness of the provisions 
seemed to allow ISps to voluntarily disclose such data to the government without 
a court order and such voluntary disclosures used to be customary. However, a 
major court ruling in 2012 cast doubt on the legitimacy of voluntary disclosures.
With respect to the standards for government access to communications in 
national security investigations, the overall picture is very complex. For exam-
ple, whereas most countries surveyed (again, leaving aside China and India) 
require a court order for surveillance in criminal investigations, almost half the 
countries studied do not have provisions requiring court orders for surveillance 
undertaken in the name of national security or for foreign intelligence gather-
ing. Likewise, at least half do not pose limits on the scope of national security 
requests, or require notice to targets.
Although laws setting standards for interception in criminal cases generally 
require targeted surveillance, the rules for national security are much less con-
sistent in imposing a particularity requirement. The statutes in Germany and 
the UK expressly allow large- scale, untargeted collection of communications 
with one leg originating outside the country. The US and French laws distin-
guish between communications carried by wire (including fiber) and communi-
cations transmitted over radio waves (including satellite transmission); in both 
91.  See orin Kerr, “The next Generation Communications privacy Act,” 162 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 373 (2013) (noting the absence of any scoping or minimization 
limits in eCpA, the US law regulating access to stored communications).
92. See Liberty and others, above note 83, at § 69.
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countries, the relevant statutes permit non- targeted surveillance of radio com-
munications where one end of the communication originates abroad. Canada 
and Australia have long collaborated with the United States and the UK in bulk 
collection programs.
In addition, it is worth noting the diversity of oversight mechanisms in both 
criminal and national security investigations. They include annual reports on the 
number of intercepts and other information, which are delivered either to sen-
ior government officials or to legislative committees; reviews by appointed over-
sight commissions; audits; and legislative investigations. The United States has 
multiple oversight mechanisms. even warrantless surveillance under the now 
notorious pRISM program is overseen by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, which approves the targeting and minimization procedures and moni-
tors implementation of the program. The privacy and Civil Liberties oversight 
Board is an independent agency established by Congress to review and analyze 
executive branch antiterrorism efforts and ensure both that they are balanced 
with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties and that liberty concerns are 
considered in the formulation of related law and policies.93 As paul Schwartz has 
suggested, however, many such formal oversight mechanisms are quite ineffec-
tive and amount to little more than what he calls “privacy theater.”94 In countries 
with an independent press and/ or strong laws protecting the freedom of speech, 
informal oversight mechanisms, though raising their own complications under 
criminal and national security laws, also play an oversight role. The efforts of the 
press, advocacy groups, government watchdog groups, and various dissenters 
encourage public debate and enhance government accountability.95
In terms of location data, most of the countries studied permit location track-
ing subject to a weak standard. For example, location data may be tracked without 
a warrant in Australia, China, Germany, India, Israel, and the United Kingdom. 
In the United States, however, the relevant doctrine is more complex thanks to 
a recent Supreme Court decision, United States v Jones,96 announcing a new, 
93. For an overview of the privacy and Civil Liberties oversight Board (pCLoB), see http:// 
www.pclob.gov/ . on January 23, 2014, the Board released a comprehensive report assessing 
government bulk collection activities pursuant to Section 215 of the pATRIoT Act and the 
operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Report. See pCLoB Report, n.  35. The 
Board released a report focused on global surveillance and the US government’s use of Section 
702 of FISA, on July 2, 2014, https:// www.pclob.gov/ library/ 702- Report.pdf.
94.  paul M. Schwartz, “Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance Law,” 75 University of 
Chicago Law Review 287, 310–12 (2008).
95. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency after 9/ 11 205– 
43 (2012) (arguing that the executive branch is forced to account for its actions by the constant 
gaze of “courts, Members of Congress and their staff, human rights activists, journalists and 
their collaborators, and lawyers and watchdogs inside and outside the executive branch” who 
together constitute a highly effective “presidential synopticon”). The Snowden revelations 
would seem to confirm this insight yet it remains highly debatable whether such informal 
mechanisms suffice.
96. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
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trespass- based test for what counts as a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
Although Jones applied the trespass test to find that the installation of a GpS 
device on a vehicle with the intent to use it was a search, the exact circumstances 
under which the use of such a device requires a warrant are not yet clear. The 
standards under which government agencies can compel disclosure of cell site 
location information are less settled. eCpA requires, at a minimum, a court 
order, and a majority of courts have held that a warrant is needed for real- time 
tracking, whereas a majority of courts have held that a full warrant is not neces-
sary to compel disclosure of stored location records.
Most countries handle travel and financial data under laws requiring routine, 
bulk reporting for specified classes of data. For example, most countries require 
passenger data reporting for air travel (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Israel, 
South Korea, the UK, and the United States). International arrangements for 
sharing passenger data are more controversial.97 All 13 countries also require 
anti- money- laundering reporting under generally similar national laws (under 
which large financial transactions must be reported). Italy and others require 
certain entities to notify the tax authorities of various other transactions; in Italy, 
this is a direct response to the high level of tax fraud and evasion.98
With respect to the normative standards for government access to business 
records, the results are more difficult to summarize. In Australia, for example, a 
police officer seeking documents (including in electronic form) may make an appli-
cation to a federal magistrate for a “notice to produce” order. To grant such an order, 
the magistrate must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, by information on 
oath or by affirmation, that: (1) the person has documents (including in electronic 
form) that are relevant to, and will assist, the investigation of a serious offense; 
and (2) giving the person a notice under this section is reasonably necessary, and 
97. In 2012, the european parliament approved a passenger name record (pnR) agreement 
with the United States, under which US authorities are permitted access to eU citizens’ 
airline records. See Kirsten Fieldler, “eU parliament Agrees to eU- US pnR Agreement,” 
EDRI (April 25, 2012), http:// www.edri.org/ edrigram/ number10.8/ ep- agrees- us- eu- pnr. 
A  year later, the european parliament rejected a proposal to create a pan- european sys-
tem for sharing and storing passengers’ phone numbers, addresses, and credit card details 
whenever they entered or departed the 27- country european Union, on the grounds that 
it breached citizens’ fundamental rights; see Tedd nykiel, “european Lawmakers Reject 
passenger- Data Scheme,” Reuters (April 24, 2013), http:// uk.reuters.com/ article/ 2013/ 
04/ 24/ uk- eu- data- idUKBRe93n0U020130424. However, in April 2016, following gun 
and bomb attacks by the Islamic State in paris in 2015 and in Brussels in March 2016, the 
european parliament and the european Council enacted a similar pnR directive, estab-
lishing detailed rules for eU national authorities to access pnR data collected by airlines 
for passengers on all flights to, from, and within the european Union. estefania narrillos, 
“eU passenger name Record (pnR) Directive:  An overview,” European Parliament News 
(January 6, 2016), http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/ news/ cs/ news- room/ 20150123BKG12902/ 
eU- passenger- name- Record- (pnR)- directive- an- overview.
98.  Additionally, Italian hotels automatically report the identity of all hotel clients to the 
police.
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reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of investigating the offense. 
However, if an authorized police officer considers on reasonable grounds that a 
person has documents (including in electronic form) that are relevant to, and will 
assist, the investigation of a serious terrorism offense, no prior court approval is 
required. Similarly, in the UK, Section 19 of the Counter- Terrorism Act provides 
that “A person may disclose information to any of the intelligence services for the 
purposes of the exercise by that service of any of its functions.”99 Most countries, 
with the exception of China and India, observe some limits on use, retention, and 
disclosure; provide oversight and redress mechanisms (ranging from complaints 
to a privacy Commissioner to civil actions), and must satisfy various reporting 
requirements. However, limits on use and disclosure often have many exceptions. 
In Australia, for example, information obtained by one agency for a specific pur-
pose may be available to a range of other agencies for quite different purposes. In 
europe, the european Court of Human Rights has explicitly held that a transmis-
sion of data to and their use by other authorities constitutes “a further separate 
interference” with the right to privacy under Article 8 of the Convention. Such 
disclosures are not flatly prohibited but must be subject to the same principles of 
legality and necessity; in Association for European Integration and Human Rights 
and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria, the Court expressly declared Bulgaria’s intelligence 
surveillance law to be inconsistent with the Convention because it did not place 
adequate limits on disclosure and use.
of all the countries surveyed, Germany has most expressly addressed the 
issues associated with systematic access to business records and the application 
to those records of analytic techniques for law enforcement purposes. on the 
one hand, as paul Schwartz noted, data mining is an established law enforcement 
technique in Germany. (The German term for the practice is “screening search.”) 
on the other hand, the German Constitutional Court has set limits on the use 
of the technique. In Germany, laws at the federal and state levels distinguish 
between the use of “data screening” to (1) investigate past crimes, or (2) permit a 
preventive response to potential crimes. Data screening to investigate past crimes 
is regulated by various state laws and at the federal level by Section 98a of the 
Criminal procedural Code. The federal statute permits screening searches only 
where there are “sufficient factual indications to show that a criminal offense 
of significant importance has been committed.” However, there are state stat-
utes that permit a preventive use of data screening. In 2006, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court established significant limits on such law enforcement use 
of this practice. In its Data Screening opinion, the Constitutional Court used a 
proportionality standard to find that data screening for preventative purposes 
was constitutionally permissible only when the police had concrete facts indicat-
ing that a serious crime was being planned. Further study of the use of screening 
searches in Germany since the Constitutional Court’s decision may yield useful 
lessons.
99. Brown, above note 8, at 235.
Systematic Government Access to private-Sector Data 43
43
VIII.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
our research into systematic access, augmented by the Snowden revelations, 
suggests at least four conclusions, each posing unresolved challenges.
First, technological developments associated with the digital revolution make 
it easier than ever for governments to collect, store, and process information 
on massive scale, and governments seem to be exploiting those developments— 
and responding to pressing threats such as terrorism— by demanding more and 
more information. At the same time, ongoing developments in the ability to 
analyze large data sets are leading governments to assert that they can extract 
crucial but otherwise unobtainable insights from big data. For example, in the 
context of defending its telephony metadata program, the US government has 
expressly argued that, in order to find “the needle in the haystack,” it needs to 
acquire the entire haystack. Though governments have long required corporate 
entities to systematically report certain data, such as currency transactions over 
certain thresholds, that information used to remain “stovepiped.” Government 
agencies today are under information- sharing imperatives, and modern analytic 
techniques are seen as offering increasingly powerful abilities to draw from data 
meanings that are unrelated to the purposes for which it was initially collected.
• policy implications: The trend toward systematic collection poses 
challenges to the existing legal frameworks because many of the 
statutes regulating government access and data usage were premised on 
particularized or targeted collection, minimization, and prohibitions 
on information sharing and secondary use.100
Second, as Internet- based services have become globalized, trans- border 
surveillance— surveillance in one country affecting persons in another— has 
flourished. Gone are the days when intelligence agencies had to acquire data 
from a point within the country where the data originated (or with an antenna 
aimed at the targeted country). now, in many instances, communications to 
or from people in one country pass through or are stored in other countries, 
where they are available to those governments. The United States is perceived 
as having unique advantages in this respect, both because a large percentage of 
the world’s communications pass through or are stored in the United States and 
100. A cornerstone of the privacy framework that has guided privacy laws globally for the 
past 30  years is the principle that data collected for one purpose should not be used for 
another purpose, yet big data analytics explicitly promises to find unanticipated mean-
ings in data. Big data equally challenges other core privacy principles. Ira Rubinstein, “Big 
Data: The end of privacy or a new Beginning?,” International Data Privacy Law (2013) vol. 
3, no. 2 pp. 74– 87 (“when this advancing wave arrives, it will … overwhelm the core privacy 
principles of informed choice and data minimization”). See generally Christopher Kuner, 
Fred H. Cate, Christopher Millard, and Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, “The Challenge of ‘Big 
Data”’ for Data protection,” International Data Privacy Law (2012) vol. 2, no. 2 pp. 47– 49.
 
C o U n T R y  R e p o R T S44
4
because the United States has invested vast resources in collection capabilities, 
but the United States is not alone in exploiting global data flows. Moreover, the 
global flow of data and the popularity of US- based services not only means that 
the United States has access, inside the United States, to the communications of 
those living and working outside the United States, but it also means that the 
United States has access outside the United States to communications of persons 
living and working inside the United States, for those communications to and 
from people in the United States can be captured as they move among servers 
outside the United States.
• policy implications: The rise in trans- border surveillance raises  
complex questions. To begin with, statutory frameworks for surveillance 
tend to be geographically focused and draw distinctions between 
communications that are wholly domestic and communications with one 
or both communicants on foreign soil. Moreover, statutory frameworks, 
as far as we can tell, often draw a distinction between the collection 
activities that an intelligence service performs on its own soil and the 
activities that it conducts extraterritorially. This is certainly true of the 
United States: the Wiretap Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act do not regulate the conduct of the United States outside US territory 
(with a minor exception for intelligence surveillance outside the 
United States targeting US persons outside the United States). Lowered 
standards for trans- border surveillance have a substantial impact on 
companies that offer global communications services and want to be 
able to assure their customers worldwide that their communications are 
secure. It also raises human rights questions about the existence  
and scope of state duties to protect and respect privacy and free 
expression of people outside the state’s territorial boundaries; although 
privacy is universally recognized as a human right, some governments 
(including the US) assert that their human rights obligations have a 
territorial limit.101
Third, national security legal authorities such as Section 12 of the Counter- 
Terrorism Act of 2008 have become increasingly powerful since 9/ 11 in the UK 
and some european countries, the United States, and globally. It has long been 
101. As Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the Right to 
Freedom of expression, noted, there is “serious concern with regard to the extraterritorial 
commission of human rights violations and the inability of individuals to know they might 
be subject to foreign surveillance, challenge decisions with respect to foreign surveillance 
or seek remedies.” Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank LaRue, to the Human Rights Council, at 64 
(April 17, 2013), http:// www.ohchr.org/ Documents/ HRBodies/ HRCouncil/ RegularSession/ 
Session23/ A.HRC.23.40_ en.pdf.
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the case that governments have claimed greater powers to collect data in the 
name of national security than in ordinary criminal law enforcement cases.
• policy implications: In the post 9/ 11 world, at precisely the time that 
technological capabilities are increasing, and at precisely the same time 
that global data flows are expanding exponentially, national security 
powers have been getting stronger, raising new questions relating to 
the trust that citizens, customers, and users vest in governments and 
corporations alike.
Fourth, this expansion in powers has been supported by extreme secrecy. In 
the United States, for example, a provision in the pATRIoT Act that seemed to 
authorize particularized disclosures had been interpreted by secret court order 
to authorize ongoing bulk collection. Moreover, judicial doctrines in the United 
States (and probably elsewhere) make it very difficult to obtain an effective rem-
edy for possible violations of privacy, speech, and association rights.102
• policy implications: The lack of transparency makes it very difficult 
to have a rational debate about governmental powers and concordant 
checks and balances. And the lack of openness is leading to proposals 
such as requiring local storage of data that could fragment the Internet, 
harming both innovation and access to information.
What we need, globally, is a robust debate about what the standards should be 
for government surveillance. That debate should be premised on much greater 
transparency about current practices and about the legal underpinnings of those 
practices. (Ironically, as a result of the Snowden leaks and of changes in the law, 
the United States may now have more transparency on its practices and rules 
than any other country in the world.)
perhaps a useful framework for making progress on these issues can be found 
within the context of international human rights law.103 As we explain above, the 
most fully developed body of international law on government surveillance and 
privacy is that of the european Court of Human Rights, which over the years has 
issued multiple decisions on wiretapping, including national security surveil-
lance. The court has never suggested that secret surveillance is per se a violation 
of human rights. Instead, it has identified a set of checks and balances that could 
offer sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse.
102. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 185 L. ed. 2d 264 (2013).
103. See, for example, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, Report of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.n. Doc. A/ HRC/ 27/ 37 (June 30, 2014), http:// 
www.ohchr.org/ en/ HRBodies/ HRC/ RegularSessions/ Session27/ Documents/ A.HRC.27.37_ 
en.pdf (The High Commissioner discusses the principles of legality, necessity, and propor-
tionality, as well as procedural safeguards and remedies).
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Among the questions to explore:
• How can we give meaning to privacy in an era of systematic collection 
and trans- border surveillance?
• If bulk collection is an inevitable reality of the digital age, how can we 
apply human rights principles such as necessity and proportionality 
to claims that it is necessary to collect all the data to serve certain 
compelling governmental needs?
• Given the widely held view that privacy is a universal right and the 
equally universal rule that governments have broad powers to protect 
themselves and their peoples from foreign threats, how should we 
regulate trans- border surveillance?
In a networked word, the standards for government access may be judged not so 
much in the context of a debate between eU and US laws but rather on the basis 
of international human rights standards. To at least some extent, there is under-
way today a movement toward global standards of digital privacy based on inter-
national human rights standards. The US government may argue that the pRISM 
standards actually comport with international law, but that will be an illuminat-
ing debate, in which europeans must explain and defend their own laws by the 
same standards. If they can have this debate, then government officials in europe 
and the United States can work with human rights institutions, civil society, and 
the Internet industry at large to move the rest of the world toward a set of princi-
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Systematic Government Access  
to Private- Sector Data in France
W I N S T O N  J.  M A X W E L L
I.  ABSTR ACT
In regulating access to data by law enforcement and the intelligence services, 
France distinguishes between different levels of government intrusions into pri-
vacy. As is the case in most countries, real- time interception of private corre-
spondence requires a higher level of safeguards than the disclosure of metadata.
post- 9/ 11 France enacted provisions to require providers of telecommunica-
tions and hosting services to retain significant amounts of traffic data and so- 
called “identification data,” a requirement that went beyond the scope of the 
now- invalidated eU directive on data retention. even though the eU directive 
on data retention was invalidated by the Court of Justice of the european Union 
(CJeU) and similar laws in the UK and Sweden have been held to violate the eU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, the French data retention laws remain on the 
books today.
France’s intelligence agencies have wide- ranging powers to collect data and 
conduct interceptions with no prior judicial approval. Those rights include the 
ability to analyze metadata of all French Internet users to detect suspicious pat-
terns of behavior. In 2015 French lawmakers created an oversight committee, 
the CnCTR, to supervise data- collection activities by intelligence agencies, but 
privacy advocates argue that institutional safeguards are still insufficient.
II.  INTRODUCTION
The French data protection authority, the Commission Nationale de l’Informatique 
et des Libertés (CnIL), is one of the world’s most outspoken privacy advocates. 
yet France’s own laws give intelligence agencies far- reaching surveillance 
powers, including the power to collect and analyze massive amounts of meta-
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Constitutional Court, these provisions contribute to what some have called a 
“downward spiral”1 in the protection of privacy rights of european citizens 
against government surveillance.
France’s supreme courts (the Conseil d’Etat and the Conseil Constitutionnel) 
appear to accord flexibility to the French government and legislature when it 
comes to government surveillance laws, whereas the CJeU applies a strict pro-
portionality test. Decisions by the CJeU and the european Court of Human 
Rights (eCtHR) will analyze in detail whether the surveillance measure results 
from a clearly drafted law, and is necessary in a democratic society. The “neces-
sity” test generally requires a showing that the government measure is effective 
for its intended purpose, and is the least intrusive measure available to get the 
job done. By contrast, French decisions seem to limit their enquiry to whether 
the surveillance measures are limited in scope, and whether they are surrounded 
by procedural safeguards. The French decisions do not attempt to determine 
whether the relevant surveillance measure represents the least intrusive means 
available to achieve the desired objective. When reading French court decisions 
on government surveillance, one cannot help but think that French courts apply 
a lighter version of the proportionality test than do the CJeU or the eCtHR. This 
may only be an impression, as in theory French courts are required to apply the 
same test as their european counterparts. The difference may be attributable to 
the French courts’ concise style of drafting— the analysis of proportionality may 
occur behind the scenes.
The remainder of this chapter will describe how French government access 
to private- sector data is regulated. Much of the discussion will concentrate on 
France’s intelligence- gathering practices, which have significantly expanded as 
a result of the 2015 terrorist attacks in paris. Like most democratic countries, 
France has two different legal frameworks for government surveillance. The first 
applies to criminal investigations by prosecutors and police authorities; the sec-
ond applies to collection of data by intelligence agencies to protect the “funda-
mental interests” of France. As one would expect, fewer safeguards surround 
data collection in the context of intelligence activities. For example, intelligence 
authorities do not need a judge’s permission to conduct data gathering, whereas 
similar data gathering by judicial police would require the authorization of 
a judge.
The sections below will describe the investigatory powers and countervailing 
safeguards that apply to data gathering by French authorities, both in the con-
text of criminal investigations and in the context of intelligence- gathering for 
defense of the fundamental interests of France.
1.  european parliament resolution of october 29, 2015 on the follow- up to the european 
parliament resolution of March 12, 2014 on the electronic mass surveillance of eU citi-
zens (2015/ 2635(RSp)); see also, n. Muiznieks, “europe Is Spying on you,” New York Times 
(oct. 27, 2015).
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III.  DATA COLLECTION IN THE CONTEXT  
OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
The rules applicable to police investigations are contained in the French Code 
of Criminal procedure. Those rules are similar to those in the United States and 
other democratic countries, requiring the prior authorization of a judge for the 
most intrusive forms of data searches. For example, any kind of real- time inter-
ceptions of private correspondence, whether a telephone conversation, email, or 
instant message, requires the prior authorization of an independent judge.2 The 
independent judge is either the investigating magistrate (juge d’instruction) or the 
judge of liberty and detention (juge des libertés et de la détention). When police 
clone a computer terminal and monitor it at a distance, a practice referred to in 
France as “capturing of computer data,” police must also seek authorization by a 
judge, and can only seek authorization for purposes of fighting serious crimes.3 
“Capturing of computer data” is particularly intrusive because it permits police 
authorities to hack into a computer system, access the stored data, monitor in 
real time every keystroke of the terminal, and see what is displayed on the screen.
other forms of access to computer data are deemed less intrusive of privacy 
and therefore are surrounded by fewer safeguards. police authorities can require 
disclosure of stored computer data with varying levels of approval, depending 
on the stage of the investigation. If police authorities have reason to believe that 
a crime is in the course of being committed (flagrance), then an officer from the 
judicial police can require disclosure of computer data immediately, as long as 
the officer informs simultaneously the public prosecutor.4 If the request for com-
puter data is made in the context of a preliminary investigation (enquête prélimi-
naire), the public prosecutor must grant specific authority to the judicial police 
to proceed with the request.5 The public prosecutor is trained as a magistrate but 
he or she is not a judge when acting in his or her capacity as public prosecutor. 
Finally, if the investigation has advanced to the stage where a juge d’instruction 
is appointed, then the investigating judge must authorize all measures to compel 
disclosure of computer data.6
All of these requests for data, whether ordered by the judicial police, the pros-
ecutor, or investigating judge, are known under French law as réquisitions. The 
French Code of Criminal procedure provides that a réquisition ordering access 
to computer data can permit access to data that is stored in servers outside of 
France as long as the réquisition involves a terminal that is located in France with 
authorized access to the relevant data located abroad, and as long as the access 
2. Articles 100 and 706- 95, Code of Criminal procedure.
3. Article 706- 102- 1, Code of Criminal procedure.
4. Articles 57- 1, 60- 1, 60- 2, Code of Criminal procedure.
5. Articles 77- 1- 1 and 77- 1- 2, Code of Criminal procedure.
6. Articles 94 and 97, Code of Criminal procedure.
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is permitted under international law.7 The location of the data itself is irrelevant. 
All forms of réquisition also permit access to so- called connection data and iden-
tification data stored by telecom operators and hosting providers under French 
law. These data storage obligations are described in Section VI below.
IV.  DATA ACCESS BY CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES
Customs authorities have separate authority to issue requests for computer data 
in connection with investigation of potential customs or tax violations.8 These 
réquisitions may be issued by a customs official having the rank of at least “con-
troller,” and do not need to be approved by a judge. Telecom operators, trans-
port companies, and airlines are among the kinds of companies that can receive 
orders from customs authorities for the communication of data.
V.  DATA ACCESS BY INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES
A.  New Surveillance Law Creates Oversight Committee
The access to data by intelligence agencies is governed by the French Internal 
Security Code. The rules in the Internal Security Code provide less protection of 
individual rights than do the rules in the Code of Criminal procedure. In the after-
math of the paris terrorist attacks of January 11, 2015, France reformed its rules 
for intelligence gathering.9 The main accomplishment of the reform was to cre-
ate a single coherent framework for intelligence- gathering techniques. previously, 
the provisions were scattered throughout different parts of the Internal Security 
Code, creating confusion and incoherence in how different kinds of data were col-
lected.10 Moreover, the previous oversight body for intelligence gathering activi-
ties, the CnCIS, lacked authority with regard to certain data- gathering activities, 
leaving those activities unsupervised by any independent body.
The July 24, 2015 Surveillance Law11 (the “2015 Law”) cures that defect by cre-
ating a new independent oversight body called the Commission for oversight of 
Intelligence Gathering Techniques, the “CnCTR,” which stands for Commission 
Nationale de Contrôle des Techniques de Renseignement. Under the 2015 Law, data 
collection for intelligence purposes can be implemented only when a specific autho-
rization is given by the prime minister.12 The prime minister’s authorization may be 
granted only after the CnCTR has rendered an opinion on the compatibility of the 
7. Article 57- 1, Code of Criminal procedure.
8. Article 65, Customs Code.
9. Law n° 2015- 912 of July 24, 2015, o.J. July 26, 2015, p. 12735.
10. For a description of the previous rules, see W. Maxwell, “Systematic Government Access 
to private- Sector Data in France,” 4 Int’l Data Privacy Law 4 (2014).
11. Law n° 2015- 912 of July 24, 2015, o.J. July 26, 2015, p. 12735.
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measure with the principles set forth in the Internal Security Code. The CnCTR’s 
opinion must be rendered within 24 to 72 hours, and is not binding on the prime 
minister.13 nevertheless, if the prime minister decides to ignore the recommenda-
tions of the CnCTR, the prime minister must give reasons for his or her decision.14 
Moreover, the CnCTR can file an appeal with the Conseil d’Etat to challenge the 
prime minister’s decision if the prime minister disregards the CnCTR opinion.15
There are three situations where the CnCTR’s opinion is not required. The 
first is where a terrorist or national defense threat requires urgent action. In 
that case, the prime minister can issue an authorization without waiting for the 
CnCTR’s opinion.16 Second, the CnCTR’s opinion is not required for so- called 
“international” data collection, examined in Section IV(G) below. Finally, the 
opinion is not required for the general monitoring of radio transmissions, exam-
ined in Section IV(C) below.
The CnCTR has nine members:  two are members of the French national 
Assembly, two are members of the Senate, two are members of the Conseil 
d’Etat, two are members of the Court of Cassation, and one is a person with 
expertise in telecommunications nominated by the French telecommunications 
regulatory authority, the ARCep.17 each of the members of the CnCTR must 
receive security clearance. The CnCTR’s decisions themselves are considered 
defense secrets.18 Individuals who think they might be spied on by French intel-
ligence agencies can ask the CnCTR to verify. The CnCTR will then check 
whether appropriate legal procedures have been followed, but will not reveal to 
the individual whether he or she is indeed the target of surveillance.19 (This is 
similar to the role of the ombudsperson in the US- eU privacy Shield arrange-
ment.20) The CnCTR has authority to access surveillance records, except for 
data that has been transmitted to the French authorities by their foreign coun-
terparts.21 Civil liberties groups complain that this opens a loophole, because 
French agencies can sidestep internal oversight mechanisms simply by asking 
foreign intelligence agencies to collect data for them.22
13. Article L821- 3, Internal Security Code.
14. Article L821- 4, Internal Security Code.
15. Article L833- 8, Internal Security Code.
16. Article L821- 5, Internal Security Code.
17. Article L831- 1, Internal Security Code.
18. Article L832- 5, Internal Security Code.
19. Article L833- 4, Internal Security Code.
20. Letter from U.S. Secretary of State Kerry to eU Commissioner Jourova dated July 7, 2016, 
Annex A: eU- U.S. privacy Shield ombudsperson Mechanism, Section 4(e).
21. Article L833- 2, Internal Security Code.
22.  See, Brief filed by La Quadrature du net and French Data network on May 10, 2016 
before the Conseil d’etat challenging the government decree n° 2016- 67 adopted to implement 
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B.  French Definition of “Fundamental Interests of the Nation”
The 2015 Law allows intelligence agencies to gather data when necessary 
for the “defense and promotion of the fundamental interests of the nation.” 
“Fundamental interests of the nation” include national defense; major foreign 
policy interests; major economic, industrial, and scientific interests; the preven-
tion of terrorism; immediate threats to public order; organized crime; and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.23 France’s “major economic, indus-
trial and scientific interests” are recognized as part of the fundamental interests 
of the nation, thereby permitting data gathering for purposes of economic espio-
nage. Civil liberties groups have argued that the concept of “fundamental inter-
ests of the nation” is so broad as to violate european principles of proportionality, 
which require among other things that laws interfering with fundamental rights 
be clear, understandable, and predictable.24 Many drug investigations could 
be considered as part of “organized crime,” making it difficult to distinguish 
between matters that should be subject to criminal investigations governed by 
the Code of Criminal procedure, and matters that relate to intelligence activities 
governed by the less- stringent Internal Security Code.
C.  General Monitoring of Radio Transmissions
The 2015 Law maintains a 25- year- old provision in the Internal Security Code 
that allowed the general monitoring of over- the- air radio transmissions with-
out any oversight.25 Under these provisions, intelligence authorities may con-
duct untargeted surveillance of radio transmissions without prior authorization 
or any other form of supervision, as long as the reasons for doing so relate to 
“defending national interests.” At the request of French civil liberties groups, the 
Conseil d’Etat recently sent a question to the French Constitutional Court, ask-
ing about this provision’s constitutionality.26 The Constitutional Court found the 
provision unconstitutional because of the lack of guidance given by lawmakers 
on what “general monitoring of radio transmissions” consists of, and the total 
lack of institutional oversight for the practice.27 The Court nevertheless allowed 
the law to stay in effect until December 31, 2017.
the July 24, 2015 law, available at https:// exegetes.eu.org/ recours/ renseignement/ Cetat/ 2016- 
05- 06-Quadrature%20du%20net_ %20FDn%20et%20FDnn%20%28Renseignement%20- % 
20Decret%202016- 67%29%20- %20MC.pdf [hereinafter, the “Quadrature du net Brief”].
23. Article L811- 3, Internal Security Code.
24. Quadrature du net Brief, above note 22.
25. Article L811- 5, Internal Security Code.
26. Conseil d’etat decision of July 22, 2016, case n° 394922.
27. Constitutional Court decision n° 2016- 590 QpC of october 21, 2016.
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D.  Access to Metadata
The Internal Security Code permits intelligence agencies to obtain access to 
metadata retained by telecom operators and hosting providers. As explained in 
Section VI, both telecom operators and hosting providers must retain broad cat-
egories of metadata for 12 months. The 2015 Law permits intelligence agencies 
not only to require telecom operators and hosting providers to deliver access to 
stored metadata,28 but also to allow collection of metadata, including location 
data, in real time. The real- time collection of data must be preceded by a non- 
binding opinion of the CnCTR, and is only permitted for the prevention of ter-
rorism, not for the defense of France’s other “fundamental interests.”29
E.  Interception of the Content of Communications
The 2015 Law maintains the ability for intelligence agencies to intercept the con-
tent of private communications for purposes of defending France’s fundamen-
tal interests, after an authorization by the prime minister and a non- binding 
opinion of the CnCTR.30 These so- called “security interceptions” can be imple-
mented using otherwise illegal interception equipment, such as “IMSI catch-
ers” that pretend to be a mobile phone base station. A recent amendment to the 
2015 Law allows intelligence agencies not only to listen to communications of 
the targets themselves, but also to the communications of anyone in the target’s 
circle of contacts if those persons may provide information in connection with 
the intelligence objective identified in the authorization.31 After consulting the 
CnCTR, the prime minister must fix the maximum number of security inter-
ceptions that intelligence agencies can conduct during a given year.
F.  Untargeted Analysis of Metadata
one of the most controversial provisions in the 2015 Law relates to the so- called 
black boxes (boîtes noires) that intelligence agencies can require telecommunica-
tions operators and hosting providers to install on their networks. After author-
ization from the prime minister, intelligence agencies may deploy algorithms to 
analyze all metadata from users of French telecommunications or hosting services 
in order to identify suspicious patterns revealing potential terrorist threats. When 
it originally presented the black box provision, the French government argued that 
the metadata was anonymous and that its analysis therefore presented no threat to 
privacy. The French data protection authority disagreed, stating that the analysis 
of metadata involves the processing of personal data and therefore presents a risk 
28. Article L851- 1, Internal Security Code.
29. Article L851- 2, Internal Security Code.
30. Article L852- 1, Internal Security Code.
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for privacy that had to be justified under strict rules on proportionality.32 The 
provision seemed to contradict the CJeU’s Digital Rights Ireland decision, which 
states that the retention of traffic data involving the entire population of users in 
a country constitutes a disproportionate infringement of privacy.33 Similarly, in 
the Schrems decision,34 the CJeU found that massive surveillance is incompat-
ible with the eU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Consequently, many observers 
thought that France’s black box provision would also be considered dispropor-
tionate because it permits analysis of metadata involving all users of telecom ser-
vices or social media services in France, including persons who are not suspected 
of any illegal activity.
The French Constitutional Court reviewed the provision and affirmed its con-
stitutionality.35 The court pointed out that the algorithm used by intelligence 
authorities only deals with metadata and does not permit the identification of 
individuals (although when suspicious activity is detected, officials can request 
permission to identify the person in order to set up more targeted surveillance). 
Moreover, the court said that the procedure can only be implemented after an 
authorization from the prime minister and an opinion from the CnCTR. The 
authorization is only granted for a period of two months and its renewal is sub-
ject to certain conditions to ensure that the algorithm does not create too many 
false positives. Finally, the court pointed out that the black box measure is only 
allowed in connection with antiterrorism activities. on balance, the court found 
that the black box provision did not represent a disproportionate interference 
with the right to privacy.
For an outside observer it is frustrating that the French Constitutional Court 
provided no guidance on why it considered the French black box provision com-
patible with the principles set down by the CJeU in its Digital Rights Ireland 
decision. The court did not even mention the existence of the CJeU decision. 
The French court’s lack of analysis of the CJeU’s Digital Rights Ireland deci-
sion contrasts with the UK High Court decision dated July 17, 2015, in which 
the High Court directly confronted the UK Data Retention and Investigatory 
powers Act 2014 (DRIpA) with the principles set forth in the Digital Rights 
Ireland decision.36 In the UK decision, the High Court found that DRIpA cre-
ated a disproportionate infringement of citizens’ rights to privacy.
32. CnIL deliberation n° 2015- 078 of March 5, 2015.
33.  CJeU decision of April 8, 2014, Case C-293/ 12, Digital Rights Ireland v.  Ministry for 
Communications et al.
34.  CJeU decision of november 13, 2015, Case C- 362/ 14, Schrems v.  Data Protection 
Commissioner.
35. Constitutional Court decision of July 23, 2015 n° 2015- 713 DC.
36. UK High Court decision of July 17, 2015, Cases n° Co/ 3665/ 2014, Co/ 3667/ 2014 and Co/ 
3794/ 2014.
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Several French civil liberties groups are challenging the French decree imple-
menting the black box provision. They argue that the provision is incompatible 
with the case law of the CJeU and of the eCtHR.37
G.  Collection of Data Relating to “International 
Communications”
previously, collection of data outside of France by French intelligence agencies 
fell into a legal no man’s land. French intelligence agencies took the position that 
French law did not apply to their data- gathering activities outside France. The 
2015 Law originally contained a provision on so- called international data collec-
tion, but the Constitutional Court annulled the provision because it contained 
insufficient institutional safeguards.38 A new law was passed on november 30, 
2015, which corrected the defects identified by the Constitutional Court. The 
november 30, 2015 law39 expressly authorizes the collection of data relating to 
communications received or sent outside of France, including the collection and 
analysis of both metadata and content. These international data collection mea-
sures must be authorized by the prime minister, although he or she does not need 
to seek the prior opinion of the CnCTR. The CnCTR is nevertheless informed 
and is allowed to have access to interception records.
A curious aspect of the law is that it creates different levels of protection based 
on whether the communication involves a person located in France. Intelligence 
authorities may collect and analyze metadata and content data involving 
communications by persons outside France with minimal supervision. But if the 
authorities stumble upon a French telephone number, or a French Ip address, 
then the data must be destroyed and a domestic procedure involving more safe-
guards must be followed. The purpose of the law is to allow monitoring of com-
munications not involving French residents. French civil liberties groups argue 
that the provision allows mass surveillance incompatible with the CJeU’s Schrems 
decision, and that the measure illegally discriminates against non- French resi-
dents (including residents of other eU Member States). Under the eU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, the protection of privacy accrues to “everyone,”40 which 
makes the difference in treatment in the november 30, 2015 law surprising. one 
of the complaints of european authorities with regard to US surveillance laws was 
that europeans did not benefit from the same institutional protections as US citi-
zens and residents.41 The French law appears to suffer from exactly the same defect.
37. Quadrature du net Brief, above note 22.
38. Constitutional Court decision of July 23, 2015 n° 2015- 713 DC.
39. Law n° 2015- 1556 of november 30, 2015.
40. Article 8, eU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
41. Communication from the european Commission on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour 
from the perspective of eU Citizens and Companies established in the eU, november 27, 
2013, CoM(2013) 847 final, paragraph 7.2.
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H.  Hacking into Computer Systems
Where “the information cannot be collected through other legal means,” the prime 
minister can authorize, after the CnCTR’s opinion, use of equipment to access data 
stored in computer systems, as well as to install clone spyware that permits agents 
to see the screen and follow keystrokes of a computer.42 Unlike Article 57- 1 of the 
French Code of Criminal procedure, this provision of the Internal Security Code 
does not state expressly that the “computer systems” involved may be located inside 
or outside France.
I.  Encryption
Any provider of encryption technology must provide to intelligence authorities the 
keys for decrypting messages. Alternatively, intelligence authorities can order the 
provider to decrypt the message within 72 hours, “unless the provider demonstrates 
that it is unable to comply with these orders.”43 When making these orders, intelli-
gence authorities must be acting in the context of a data- gathering mission author-
ized by the prime minister.
VI.  RETENTION OF TR AFFIC DATA  
AND IDENTIFICATION DATA
France transposed the now- invalidated european directive on retention of 
traffic data,44 but went beyond the minimum required by the directive. French 
law not only requires telecommunications operators to retain for one year traf-
fic data (including location data and Internet logs45), but also requires hosting 
providers to retain similar logs relating to persons who create or store data using 
their hosting service.46 The definition of hosting provider is similar to that in the 
european e- Commerce Directive,47 and broad enough to include many cloud 
providers, social media services, blogs, and video sharing platforms. Under the 
French data retention decree, a hosting provider must retain all the information 
provided by the user when he or she registers for the service, including the user’s 
name, pseudonym, address, telephone number, email address, password, infor-
mation permitting the user to change the password, and payment information.48  
42. Article L853- 2, Internal Security Code.
43. Article L871- 1, Internal Security Code.
44. Directive 2006/ 24/ eC of March 15, 2006.
45. Decree n° 2006- 358 of March 24, 2006.
46. Decree n° 2011- 2019 of February 25, 2011.
47. Directive 2000/ 31/ eC of June 8, 2000.
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When a user uploads content, the hosting provider must keep logs regarding 
the user’s connection to the service. All the foregoing data are considered “iden-
tification data” and are subject to government access, either through a requisi-
tion under the French Code of Criminal procedure, or through requests made 
by intelligence agencies under the Internal Security Code. France’s data reten-
tion law goes beyond the requirements of the now- invalidated eU data reten-
tion directive by including hosting providers within its scope. France has not 
attempted to modify its laws since the CJeU’s Digital Rights Ireland decision, 
which led a parliamentary commission to assert that France’s laws on data 
retention violate Articles 7 and 8 of the eU Charter of Fundamental Rights.49 As 
noted above, the Constitutional Court decision relating to the 2015 Law50 made 
no mention of the Digital Rights Ireland decision. And on February 12, 2016, the 
Conseil d’Etat found that the provisions relating to access to metadata as they 
existed before the 2015 Law were surrounded by sufficient safeguards to satisfy 
european and French proportionality tests.51
The February 12, 2016 Conseil d’etat decision suggests that the French data 
retention rules would be considered, at least by the French Conseil d’Etat, as sat-
isfying the european proportionality test. yet for this author, it is unclear that 
the CJeU and the eCtHR would agree, particularly after the recent CJeU deci-
sion finding UK and Swedish laws on data retention incompatible with the eU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights.52
VII.  CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown that French procedures permitting government access 
to data in the context of criminal investigations are similar to those in other 
countries. The level of judicial oversight increases with the level of intrusion into 
privacy. Real- time interceptions of content require a prior judicial authorization 
whereas access to stored metadata can often be achieved without a prior author-
ization. one interesting aspect of the French Code of Criminal procedure is that 
it expressly permits French authorities to obtain access to data stored in servers 
outside of France, as long as an authorized access point exists in France.
The French regime for intelligence data gathering was modified in 2015 in 
reaction to the heightened terrorist threat in France. The reform permitted a long 
overdue cleanup of the provisions applicable to intelligence data gathering. The 
previous provisions dated from early 1990s and related to traditional wiretaps. 
49. French national Assembly, Commission de réflexion et de propositions sur le droit et le 
libertés à l’âge numérique, Rapport n° 3119 (2014), p. 166.
50. Constitutional Court decision of July 23, 2015 n° 2015- 713 DC.
51. Conseil d’etat decision of February 12, 2016, case n° 388134.
52. CJeU, Cases C- 203/ 15 and C- 698/ 15, Tele2 Sverige v. Post- och telestyrelsen and Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v. Tom Watson and others, December 21, 2016.
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The new regime has the merit of creating a single coherent framework for data 
collection by intelligence authorities, including the creation of a single independ-
ent oversight body, the CnCTR. The new reform also makes certain intelligence- 
gathering techniques more explicit, such as the interception of communications 
of persons outside of France. previously those practices existed, but had no legal 
framework. Among the new provisions is one permitting intelligence authorities 
to use algorithms to analyze large volumes of metadata in order to detect suspi-
cious patterns of activity.
The French Conseil d’Etat and Constitutional Court have reviewed, or are in 
the course of reviewing, the constitutionality of most of these provisions. The 
25- year- old provision allowing general monitoring of radio transmissions was 
recently declared unconstitutional by the French Constitutional Court, but other 
provisions have so far survived constitutional challenge. The French court deci-
sions analyzing these provisions do not appear to apply the same kind of propor-
tionality test as european courts do with regard to similar measures. It is unclear 
whether this is simply because the French courts provide less explicit reasoning 
in the text of their decisions, or whether French courts in fact apply a lighter ver-
sion of the proportionality test. The recent CJeU decision invalidating UK and 
Swedish laws on data retention suggests that certain aspects of the French laws 
may violate the eU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
61
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Systematic Government Access  
to Private- Sector Data in Germany
PAU L  M .  S C H WA R T Z
I.  ABSTR ACT
German law has long been strongly committed to information privacy. Its pro-
tections are found at the constitutional and statutory levels. At the same time, 
legislation over the last two decades has expanded the ability of the government, 
including police and intelligence agencies, to process, store, and share per-
sonal information. The resulting databanks create elements of systematic data 
access for government to personal data in Germany. The leading examples of 
such access concern “strategic searches” by intelligence agencies, data mining 
by the police, the structured statutory system for access to the contents of the 
“Anti- Terror File,” and the police’s “radio- cell inquiries” pursuant to the Code of 
Criminal procedure, § 100g. At the same time, German unease with systematic 
data access is shown by the ongoing controversies with data retention and the 
abandoned eLenA process. Complex questions have also been raised by private 
sector attempts to create a Germany- only “Cloud” as well as the significant and 
ongoing collaboration between German and US intelligence agencies.
II.  NATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT AND FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES
Germany has a strong commitment to the rule of law and to information privacy. 
Its concept of the “rule of law” is best summed up in the idea of the Rechtsstaat. 
The Rechtsstaat is a “legal state” that is based on civil liberties as well as the 
expression and protection of constitutional rights. For example, Article 1(1) of 
the German Constitution, the Basic Law, states that human dignity is inviolable, 
and that the duty of all state authority is to respect and protect it.1 Article 2(1) 
1. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Basic Law for the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Basic Law], Bundesgesetzblatt III. [BGBl. III.] 100- 1 (1949) (most recently 
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guarantees the right of free development of the personality. Article 20(3) of the 
Basic Law, the German Constitution, explicitly binds all three branches of gov-
ernment to the constitutional order and to law and justice.
As for information privacy, it has constitutional status in Germany. The con-
stitutional protections derive both from specific and more general constitutional 
provisions. These are Article 10 (privacy of communications), Article 13 (invi-
olability of the home), and Articles 1(1) and 2(1) (the basis for a judicially cre-
ated “right of informational self- determination” and “right of trust and integrity 
in information systems”). Many decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court 
interpret and develop these provisions.
Federal and state data protection commissioners also play an important role 
in privacy policymaking in Germany. These officials are established under 
the Federal Data protection Law (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, or BDSG). They 
monitor the data use of the government and of the private sector, and they direct 
public attention to violations of privacy. The law of the european Union and 
German law provide strong protections for the independence of data protection 
commissioners.
Great public attention in Germany is directed to privacy issues. The con-
stitutional complaint against a data retention law set a record in Germany for 
public participation in constitutional litigation; it was brought by 35,000 citi-
zens. As another indication of this public interest, over 244,000 Germans opted 
out from Google Street View before it went live in 2010.2 By 2011, Google had 
stopped updating Street View because of the cost of blurring images of build-
ings whose inhabitants objected to their residence appearing in this service. 
Finally, the media covers privacy and surveillance issues heavily, and there have 
been numerous popular general audience books on these topics, such as Sie ken-
nen dich! Sie haben dich! Sie steuern dich! (2014) (They Know you! They Have 
you! They Control you!), Finger Weg von Unseren Daten! (2014) (Hands off our 
Data!), Digitale Diktatur (2014) (Digital Dictator), Die Datenfresser (2011) (The 
Data eaters), and Die Facebook Falle (2011) (The Facebook Trap).
In reaction to terrorist attacks in the United States on 9/ 11 and subsequent 
terrorist actions throughout europe, the Federal parliament, or Bundestag, has 
enacted a wide- reaching series of laws that modified the structure under which 
German law enforcement agencies and intelligence organizations gather and 
share information. The trend of increased legislation about national security and 
crime had already started before 9/ 11; an initial round of legislation was driven 
by post- Cold War concerns about new threats to Germany in a europe without 
traditional borders and the traditional postwar power blocs.
Although many in Germany emphasize the protection of informational self- 
determination and data protection, other views exist on how much to emphasize 
2. For the statistics from Google, see “How Many German Households Have opted- out of 
Street View?,” Google Europe Blog (oct. 21, 2010), http:// googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.com/ 
2010/ 10/ how- many- german- households- have- opted.html.
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information privacy. The founders of the Federal Republic structured it as a 
“militant democracy” (wehrhafte Demokratie). This idea meant that the liberal 
democratic order would be capable of protecting itself against those who would 
destroy it. From this idea, a core one in modern German politics, a series of inte-
rior ministers have stressed the importance of the state’s protection of security 
and provided strong policy leadership for greater data sharing among govern-
ment agencies and, under certain circumstances, between the private sector and 
government.
It was a small step after 9/ 11 to build on this idea of “militant democracy” and 
to advocate a “right to security.” one of the leading advocates of this idea has 
been Manfred Baldus, a German law professor. In 2008, he warned, “A mini-
mum of State leads not in the least to a maximum of freedom.”3 He argued that 
“real freedom depended as well on the exclusion of private violence” and “that 
the security function of the state, that is, the security of freedom from private 
violence that the state provides, counts as one of the essential and indispens-
able components of a state centered on freedom and based on the rule of law.”4 
Less controversially, the historian eckart Conze argues that the long- standing 
mission of the Federal Republic is a “search for security” for the German people 
after the destruction of World War II. Conze observes, moreover, that the ter-
rorist threat post- 9/ 11 served as a kind of “legal, political and moral ‘unlocking 
action’ ” that acted to “strengthen the imperative of security.”5
Thus, there has been a division in German politics and public policy dis-
cussions between the supporters of privacy and those more concerned about 
security. The revelations of edward Snowden further heightened this divi-
sion. Beginning in June 2013, Snowden leaked classified information from the 
national Security Agency about the global surveillance activities of the United 
States as well as european government agencies. In Germany, the matter was 
brought home by news that the nSA had monitored the cell phone of Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, the leader of the country. At this juncture, even some politicians 
from the CDU and CSU, the two conservative parties, joined in anti- American 
rhetoric. The widespread uproar was reflected by the cover of Stern magazine, 
a popular weekly, showing Uncle Sam with his fingers crossed behind his back 
with the headline: “The False Friend.”
For some in Germany, Snowden is a folk hero. one pro- Snowden book, pub-
lished in 2014, is titled: “111 Reasons to Support edward Snowden.”6 others are 
far from fans of Snowden. As an example of the latter view, Hans- Georg Maaßen, 
head of the Federal Bureau for protection of the Constitution, sees Snowden as 
serving the interests of Vladimir putin’s Russia by driving “a wedge between the 
3. Manfred Baldus, “Freiheitssicherung durch den Rechtsstaat des Grundgesetzes,” in Vom 
Rechtsstaat zum Präventionsstaat 107, 109 (Stefan Huster & Karsten Rudolph, eds., 2008).
4. Ibid. at 109.
5. eckart Conze, Die Suche nach Sicherheit 906 (München: Siedler, 2009).
6. Marc Halupczok, 111 Gründe Edward Snowden zu Unterstützen (Berlin: Schwarzkopf, 2014).
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US and its closest european ally, the Federal Republic.”7 The Snowden revela-
tions and subsequent investigations have inspired political and public pressure 
in Germany to limit or restructure shared US- Germany intelligence activities. 
A goal upon which a majority of German politicians likely agree would be to 
place these activities on a stronger legal basis and to institute additional proce-
dural safeguards. This task is proving to be a highly complex one. one difficulty 
has been the intertwined nature of the activities of US and German intelligence 
agencies, which will be explored below.
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND REGULATORY 
OVERVIEW
A.  Law
1.  Constitutional Provisions
There is a significant body of constitutional law in Germany concerning informa-
tion privacy. The specific constitutional protections for privacy include the Basic 
Law’s Article 10, which creates constitutional norms regarding the government’s 
ability to carry out the surveillance of communications, including letters and tele-
communications. In addition, Article 13 protects the inviolability of the home and 
creates constitutional norms for the government’s ability to carry out wiretaps 
within a residence. As Francesca Bignami observes regarding telecommunications 
privacy law, “At the constitutional level [in europe] … only in Germany is the pri-
vacy of communications and data related to communications afforded protection 
under a separate article of the Constitution and a separate line of cases.”8
The Basic Law’s general provisions that safeguard privacy are Article 2(1) in 
conjunction with Article 1(1). The German Constitutional Court has read these 
provisions as protecting a general right of personality. In its Data Screening opin-
ion of 2006, the Federal Constitutional Court observed that the general right of 
personality “is a gap- filling guarantee” that “is especially required against the 
background of novel dangers for the development of personality that appear in 
accompaniment to the progress of science and technology.”9 From this general 
right, the Constitutional Court has identified other important individual pri-
vacy rights. These are the right to a private sphere in which one is to be free 
to shape her life, a right to one’s spoken word, and a right to informational 
7.  Hans- Georg Maaßen, 102. Meeting of Committee of Inquiry (102. Sitzung des 
Untersuchungsausschusses) (June 9, 2016). For media coverage, see Andre Meister, Live- Blog 
aus dem Geheimdienst- Untersuchungsausschuss: “ob Snowden russischer Agent ist, kann 
ich nicht beurteilen,” netzpolitik.org (June 9, 2016), at https:// netzpolitik.org/ 2016/ live- blog- 
aus- dem- geheimdienst- untersuchungsausschuss- verfassungsschutz- praesident- maassen- 
und- vorgaenger- fromm/ #zeuge2.
8. Francesca Bignami, “european versus American Liberty: A Comparative privacy Analysis 
of Antiterrorism Data Mining,” 48 B.C. L. Rev. 609, 639 (2007).
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self- determination. In 2008, the Court identified a new related interest, which 
was the right to “trust and integrity in information systems.”10
As a general matter, the German constitutional law of information privacy, 
as established in the Census decision of 1983, permits a public sector entity to 
collect, process, and transfer personal information subject to a limited set of 
conditions.11 one of the most important of these is the requirement that there be 
a statutory basis for this informational activity. Such a legal basis requires that 
all personal data processing have a valid legislative basis, clearness of norms, and 
observance of the “principle of proportionality” (Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip). 
The principle of proportionality consists of a three- prong test for evaluating the 
constitutionality of legislation. First, the Court asks whether the means chosen 
are suitable (geeignet). Second, it inquires whether the means chosen are neces-
sary (erforderlich). Finally, the Court examines whether the means chosen are 
reasonable (zumutbar).
Building on the existing constitutional framework, the right to trust and 
integrity in information systems safeguards the right of citizens to trust their 
digital networks. The Constitutional Court has termed this interest “a guarantee 
of confidentiality and integrity in information systems.” Invasions of this right 
are permitted only within narrow borders. Thus, an invasion of it for a “preven-
tive governmental purpose” requires actual indications of a concrete danger to a 
predominately important legal interest.12
Due to these important provisions of the Basic Law, and the extensive case law 
of the Constitutional Court, this Court plays a central role in deciding questions 
relating to the boundaries of governmental access to private- sector data. The 
Constitutional Court’s significant involvement in these matters is one of the most 
visible manifestations in the context of data protection of the German commit-
ment to the rule of law. Regarding the topic of systematic government access to 
data, there are important constitutional decisions concerning strategic searches 
(the G- 10 opinion) (1999), data screening (2006), automated number plate recog-
nition (2008), data retention (2010), the counterterrorism database (2013), and the 
counterterrorism role of the Federal Criminal police (the BKA opinion).13
In addition, decisions of the Constitutional Court concern the protection of a 
“core area of life formation.”14 These opinions examine acoustic wiretaps within 
10. 120 BVerfGe 274, 302 (2008) (Online Search).
11. 65 BVerfGe 1 (1983) (Census).
12. 1 BvR 370/ 07, ¶ 242 (2008) (Right to Trust and Integrity in Information Systems).
13. 100 BVerfGe 313, (1999) (G- 10); 115 BVerfGe 320, (2006) (Data Screening); 125 BVerfGe 
260 (2010) (Data Retention), subsequently BGH, Decision July 3, 2014 (III ZR 391/ 13) (Data 
retention constitutional for seven days, because retention is not meant for law enforcement 
purposes).
14.  109 BVerfGe 279 (2004) (Great Eavesdropping); 113 BVerfGe 348 (2005) (Preventive 
Telecommunications Surveillance); Case 1 BvR 1215/ 07 (2013) [Bundesverfassungsgericht]
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residences (2004), preventive telecommunications surveillance (2005), the 
counterterrorism database (2013), and the counterterrorism role of the Federal 
Criminal police (the BKA opinion). The Constitutional Court of Germany has 
been involved in a profound effort to draw on the nation’s constitutional norms 
to develop standards for systemic data use.
a. The G- 10 Opinion (1999)
The Bundesnachrichtendienst, or BnD, and other German intelligence agencies 
are permitted to engage in surveillance of letters, conversations, or telecommu-
nications through two kinds of legal processes. First, the surveillance can take 
place as an “individual investigation,” which involves the collection of personal 
data to investigate criminal behavior that threatens the survival of Germany or 
its democratic order. Second, the surveillance can take place as “strategic sur-
veillance.” Later in this chapter, I  discuss the current statutory requirements 
regarding strategic surveillance for the BnD and the other institutions that are 
part of the German intelligence community. This section will examine the con-
stitutional requirements before such activity can occur. These standards must 
then be reflected in the applicable statutory framework.
In the Constitutional Court’s G- 10 opinion, the strategic surveillance in ques-
tion involved observation of telegram, fax, and, to a lesser extent, telephone traf-
fic transmitted via satellite.15 The government admitted during oral argument 
that the BnD had plans for surveillance of emails, but the Court did not provide 
further details in its opinion about this activity. Today, such searches extend to 
emails as well as to web fora.16
In its G- 10 opinion, the Constitutional Court found that the protections of 
the Basic Law’s Article 10 were not limited exclusively to communications that 
took place entirely within the national borders of Germany. As long as enough 
of a nexus existed between the surveillance and German territory, the protec-
tions of Article 10 were applicable.17 The Court identified such a nexus in the 
G- 10 case, where the governmental surveillance activity occurred from within 
Germany and at least part of the communications ended or originated from 
within Germany.
The Constitutional Court also found that the dangers of such surveillance 
were considerable. Most important, it pointed to the risk that such surveillance 
would lead to “a nervousness in communication, to disturbances in communi-
cation, and to behavioral accommodation, in particular to avoidance of certain 
(Counter- Terrorism Database); Case 1 BvR 966/ 09 (2016) [Bundesverfassungsgericht] 
(BKA- Opinion).
15. 100 BVerfGe 313 (1999) (G- 10).
16. Unterrichtung durch das parlamentarische Kontrollgremium, Deutscher Bundestag, 17. 
Wahlperiode, Drucksache 17/ 4278, p. 7 (2010).
17. 100 BVerfGe 313, 363– 64 (1999) (G- 10).
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content of conversations or terms.” For the German Court, the threat was to 
social communication. In American terms, this idea is similar to that of a chill-
ing impact on speech.
After noting the dangers posed by the data collected in the G- 10 case, the 
Constitutional Court nevertheless found the surveillance to have a strong jus-
tification. The activity to be placed under observation “affected the foreign and 
security politics of the Federal Republic … to a significant extent.”18 Moreover, 
the law permitted the collection of information necessary to detect dangers to 
Germany. As a result, the Constitutional Court declared that the G- 10 statute 
was generally “not improper.”
Although the Court did not declare the entire statute to be void, it did find 
several aspects of it to be unconstitutional.19 Among the elements of the law that 
it struck down were certain provisions concerning the BnD’s transfer of personal 
data to other agencies. These transfers were only permissible when the controlling 
legislation was consistent with the principle of proportionality. Judicial review 
pursuant to a proportionality analysis is one of the Constitutional Court’s most 
important tools when confronted with statutes that infringe upon privacy. In the 
G- 10 case, in a demonstration of this technique, the Constitutional Court decided 
the applicable statute did not limit these data transfers in a permissible fashion.
To be sure, the Court found, as a general matter, that it was constitutional for 
the BnD to share with other agencies information gained from its surveillance of 
telecommunications traffic to the extent that the data in question revealed crimi-
nal behavior. The failing of the statute was, however, that it did not restrict data 
sharing to instances in which serious crimes had been committed, as opposed to 
more minor delicts. This lowered threshold did not meet the proportionality test. 
The Court also found that the statute allowed a sharing of the BnD’s information 
in a manner that was too widespread. The Court required the enactment of new 
statutory standards for the BnD and other intelligence agencies that restricted 
transfer of information in a manner similar to limits placed on domestic law 
enforcement agencies when engaged in the “individual investigation path.”20
These new requirements do not present major obstacles to strategic searches, 
which are regulated in the G- 10 Statute, Sections §§ 5– 8. I  discuss this statute 
later in this chapter; here, however, one might briefly consider the recent statistics 
concerning use of this technique by the German intelligence services. According 
to the 2014 statistics from the parliamentary Control panel (Parlamentarische 
18. Ibid. at 382.
19.  For example, the statute’s § 3(1) no.5 permitted international surveillance for investi-
gations of the counterfeiting of currency. The Constitutional Court found that the statutes 
allowing surveillance to prevent this crime did not follow the principle of “proportionality.” 
Ibid. at 385. It noted, however, that such surveillance would be constitutionally permissible if 
the strategic surveillance was limited to cases that threatened “the stability of the value of the 
currency of Germany and thereby the economic power of the country.” Ibid.
20. 100 BVerfGe 313, 385– 386 (1999) (G- 10).
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Kontrollgremium) on the use of relevant statutory authorities, German intelligence 
agencies relied upon the statutory justification regarding “international terrorism” 
in searching 14,604 examples of “telecommunications traffic.”21 The official report 
explained that this number resulted in the capturing of one fax, four telexes, one 
email, 197 voice communications, and 13,329 text messages. In regard to “prolifer-
ation and conventional armaments,” 11,670 searches were ordered. These searches 
were made of 10,588 examples of telecommunications traffic.
b. The Data Screening Opinion (2006)
Data mining is an established technique of law enforcement authorities. Its use 
in Germany dates back to the 1970s and the country’s struggle against the Red 
Army Faction (RAF). The German term for this practice is “Rasterfahndung,” or 
a “screening search.”22
In its Data Screening opinion of 2006, the German Constitutional Court found 
that data screening posed a significant infringement of the right of informational 
self- determination. In this opinion, the Court used its existing proportionality 
test as a constitutional yardstick for evaluating the permissibility of data screen-
ing. The Data Screening opinion involved a search carried out after the terrorist 
attacks in the United States on 9/ 11. The German data mining search was made 
in hopes of discovering “sleeper terrorists” in Germany.
The criminal police collected personal data from universities, the Registration 
office for Inhabitants, and the Central Register for Foreigners. According to 
the Constitutional Court, the different police headquarters received “data 
batches” with information on 5.2  million persons. The information collected 
at the state level was then transferred to the Federal Criminal police office 
(Bundeskriminalamt, or BKA), where it was incorporated into a federal database 
termed “Sleepers.” The data screening was notably unsuccessful, and the govern-
ment erased all information in the “results file” by 2004.
In Germany, laws at the federal and state levels distinguish between the use 
of “data screening” to (1)  investigate past crimes, or (2)  permit a preventive 
response to potential crimes. Data screening to investigate past crimes is regu-
lated by various state laws and at the federal level by Section 98a of the Criminal 
procedural Code (Strafprozeβordnung).23 The federal statute applies when the 
BKA takes a lead role in investigating crimes considered to be a federal matter.24 
21. Unterrichtung durch das parlamentarische Kontrollgremium, Drucksache 18/ 7423, p. 7 
(2016).
22.  In this discussion of the Data Screening opinion, I  draw on my article, “Regulating 
Governmental Data Mining in the United States and Germany,” 53 William & Mary Law 
Review 351 (2011).
23. Strafprozeβordnung [Stpo] [Criminal procedure Code], Bundesgesetzblatt I. [BGBl. I.] 
1074, 1319 (1987) (most recently amended by Law of Dec. 22, 2011, BGBl. I., 3044), § 98a.
24. The Criminal procedure Code’s basic approach reflects the approach the different state 
laws take, and our discussion will, therefore, concentrate on the federal statute.
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In Section 98a, the Criminal procedure Code regulates the “automatic compar-
ison and transfer of personal data.” It requires “sufficient factual indications to 
show that a criminal offense of significant importance has been committed.” 
Thus, this statute squarely requires proof of the existence of a crime.
In contrast to this federal law, there are state statutes in Germany that per-
mit a preventive use of this practice.25 In 2006, in its Data Screening opinion, 
the German Federal Constitutional Court established significant limits on such 
law enforcement use of data screening.26 The Court found that the state’s activ-
ity raised issues concerning the threat of modern means of surveillance to an 
individual’s underlying communicative ability. It also acknowledged that indi-
viduals were obligated to accept limitations on their right of informational 
self- determination that were justified by weightier public interests. In its use 
of proportionality review, the Constitutional Court found that data screening 
statutes are constitutionally permissible only when there was “a concrete dan-
ger” to a legal interest. Through this aspect of the Data Screening opinion, the 
Constitutional Court did more than invalidate the state law before it. It also 
raised significant questions about the majority of the other state laws that per-
mitted preventive data searches.27
At the same time, however, the Constitutional Court did not declare data 
screening to be per se disproportionate and, hence, facially unconstitutional. 
Its decision was that law enforcement officials had to demonstrate the exist-
ence of a certain risk of danger before using this technique. At this juncture, 
the Court placed a significant limit on preventative use of data screening. As 
the Constitutional Court stated, a concrete danger was “a prognosis of proba-
bility” based on facts that the predicted harm would occur. The Constitutional 
Court added, “Vague clues or bare suppositions are not sufficient.”28 Rather, 
data screening required proof of actual preparations for a terrorist attack. Such 
evidence showing a concrete danger would include, for example, “factual clues 
for the preparation of terrorist attacks or the presence in Germany of persons 
who are preparing terrorist attacks that in the near future will be perpetrated in 
Germany or elsewhere.”
c. Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) Opinion (2008)
Beyond the use of data screening by the intelligence agencies in Germany, 
another type of systemic data use concerns automatic number plate recognition 
25.  See, for example, polizeigesetz des Landes nordrhein- Westfalen [polG nW] [north 
Rhine- Westphalia police Statute], Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für das Land nordrhein- 
Westfalen [GV nRW] 410 (2003), § 31.
26. 115 BVerfGe 320 (2006) (Data Screening).
27.  Winfried Bausback, “Fesseln für die wehrhafte Demokratie?,” 59 NJW 1922 (2006), 
p. 1922, 1924.
28. 115 BVerfGe 320, 339 (2006) [Data Screening].
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(AnpR) systems.29 Indeed, law enforcement agencies throughout europe use 
these systems to detect and track criminals and terrorists. In 2008, the German 
Constitutional Court invalidated two state AnpR laws and identified con-
stitutional norms for statutes authorizing the collection and storage of such 
information.
For the Constitutional Court, there was a threshold question of when the 
police’s automatic detection of motor vehicle license plates implicated the right 
of informational self- determination. Such constitutional protection was com-
promised whenever law enforcement did not make its comparison of a plate 
number immediately and did not at once erase non- matching information. For 
the Court, the protections of the Basic Law extended to the collection and stor-
age of AnpR data in databanks. As the Constitutional Court stated, “even if the 
acquisition of a larger dataset is ultimately only a means to the end for a further 
reduction of the number of hits, the collection of information can be invasive 
in making the information available to the authorities and in creating the basis 
for the subsequent comparison with search terms.”30 The Court also found that 
constitutional protections attach to information that is publicly viewable— such 
as the license plate number of a vehicle that is being driven. The right of informa-
tion self- determination protects such information from “automated information 
collection for storage with a possibility of further use.”
The ANPR opinion then turned to the established constitutional test regard-
ing proportionality. It found that the nature and intensity of the invasion of a 
constitutional interest depended on the specific context of the use of the AnpR 
system. A heightened interest was present where the AnpR system was used for 
further purposes beyond finding a specific motor vehicle or when it collected a 
“movement profile.” The Constitutional Court found that the state legislation 
under review failed to create sufficient limited and clear norms for constitutional 
use of AnpR.
d. The Data Retention Opinion (2010)
pursuant to its obligations under the european Union’s Data Retention 
Directive, Germany enacted a data storage obligation in its “Act for the new 
Regulation of Telecommunications Surveillance” (Gesetz zur Neuregelung der 
Telekommunikationsüberwachung) on December 21, 2007. This statute amended 
the Telecommunications Act, or TKG. on March 11, 2008, the Constitutional 
Court issued a temporary injunction that suspended certain parts of the statute. 
In 2010, the Court issued an opinion that struck down the statute.
29. For a legal discussion of online services such as Google Street View, see Thomas Dreier and 
Indra Spiecker genannt Döhmann, Die systematische Aufnahme des Straßenbildes: Zur rechtli-
chen Zulässigkeit von Online- Diensten wie “Google Street View” (Baden- Baden: nomos, 2010).
30.  Case 1 BvR 2074/ 05 (2008) [Bundesverfassungsgericht] (Automatic Number Plate 
Recognition).
 
Systematic Government Access to private-Sector Data in Germany 71
71
The German data retention statute required suppliers of telecommunica-
tion services to store specific kinds of traffic and location data for a period of 
six months. By choosing this term of a half year, the Bundestag opted for the 
minimum retention period then required by the european Data Retention 
Directive. The newly drafted statutory provisions were inserted into the 
Telecommunications Act at §§ 113 a, 113 b TKG. The first provision, § 113 a, 
TKG, contained the obligation for a six- month retention period and specified the 
kinds of data that were to be stored. The second, § 113 b TKG, set out the condi-
tions under which law enforcement officials could gain access to the stored data.
In its 2010 opinion, the Constitutional Court declared that storage of telecom-
munications data, including traffic data, constituted a serious encroachment on 
individual rights. even though the storage was not of content, it was still possible 
to use the data to make “content- related conclusions that extend into the users’ 
private sphere.”31 The result might even permit the drawing of “personality pro-
files of virtually all citizens.” nonetheless, the Constitutional Court found that 
data retention could be made compatible with Article 10(1) of the Basic Law. 
Despite the potential dangers of data retention, access to information about tele-
communications connections was of particular importance for “effective crimi-
nal prosecutions and prevention of danger.”
Despite the potential of this information to assist law enforcement and intelli-
gence agencies, the Constitutional Court decided that the data retention statute 
had fatal flaws. To be constitutional, such a statute needed well- defined provisions 
for data security, limits on the use of data to investigations of particularly serious 
crimes, sufficient transparency about its use for the public, and judicial control 
of transmission and use of the stored data.32 In addition, statutory prohibitions 
were required on obtaining access to certain kinds of privileged professional 
data, such as communications with religious officials or lawyers.33 Interestingly 
enough, the Constitutional Court explicitly declared that Ip addresses were sub-
ject to less stringent constitutional standards. Although the question of accessing 
Ip addresses would impact on the extent to which anonymous communication 
could take place, the Court nonetheless found that such information could be 
disclosed based on “a sufficient initial suspicion or a concrete danger,” or even for 
a significant regulatory offense, that is, a non- criminal matter.
Subsequent to the Data Retention opinion, the Bundestag enacted another 
data retention directive, which the Bundesgerichtshof upheld in 2014.34 Further 
muddying the waters, the european Court of Justice (eCJ) in its Digital Rights 
Ireland decision (2014) found the european Data Retention Directive to violate 
31. 125 BVerfGe 260 (2010) (Data Retention).
32. See ibid. at 260– 61.
33. See, for example, German criminal procedure provision Stpo § 160a.
34. Federal Court of Justice, Case III ZR 391/ 13 (2014) [Bundesgerichtshof].
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the european Charter of Rights.35 The eCJ struck down this Directive as viola-
tive of the Charter’s Article 7 (privacy), Article 8 (data protection), and Article 
52 (proportionality). The european Commission announced in September 2015 
that it would not develop any further data retention measures, but would permit 
Member States to establish their own rules.36 In 2015, the Bundestag enacted 
another data retention bill, which, among other provisions, requires telecommu-
nications providers to store all data required by the law within Germany.
e. Counter- Terrorism Database Opinion (2013)
The Constitutional Court returned to the issue of the constitutional require-
ments for data mining in its Counter- Terrorism Database opinion.37 This decision 
found that the Counter- Terrorism Database Act was “in its fundamental design 
compatible with the right to informational self- determination.”38 The counter-
terrorism database itself had a legitimate aim and the challenged provisions of 
the Act were “suitable and necessary” to achieve its goal “of a limited facilitation 
of information transfer” among security agencies and law enforcement authori-
ties.39 yet, the Constitutional Court also found that the challenged provisions 
were subject to heightened constitutional requirements because they involved 
a sharing of information between the police and intelligence services. The legal 
order in Germany distinguished between the function of the police and the intel-
ligence services, and held that they necessarily must limit their sharing of per-
sonal information with each other. Since the end of World War II and the creation 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, this idea has been a fundamental one in 
German law; the doctrine is called the “Trennungsgebot,” or “Separation Rule.”
As part of the right of informational self- determination, German constitu-
tional law creates a related concept to the “Separation Rule,” which is that of 
a “principle of separation of information” (informationelles Trennungsprinzip). 
Due to this principle, the exchange of information between intelligence serv-
ices and the police is generally forbidden and permitted only by exception. 
The Constitutional Court found numerous aspects of the Counter- Terrorism 
Database Act that did not meet its heightened scrutiny. These pertained to the 
range of persons included in the database as “affiliated with terrorism,” the way 
35.  Joined Cases C– 293/ 12 and C– 594/ 12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v.  Minister for 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and others, and Seitlinger and others [2014] 
eCLI:eU:C:2014:238.
36. european Commission Statement on national Data Retention Laws (Sept. 16, 2015), at 
http:// europa.eu/ rapid/ press- release_ STATeMenT- 15- 5654_ en.htm. For an overview of the 
data retention laws of Member States, see eU Agency for Fundamental Rights, Data Retention 
across the eU, at http:// fra.europa.eu/ en/ theme/ information- society- privacy- and- data- 
protection/ data- retention.
37. Case 1 BvR 1215/ 07 (2013) [Bundesverfassungsgericht] (Counter- Terrorism Database).
38. Ibid. at ¶ 105.
39. Ibid. at ¶¶ 106– 107.
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in which “contact persons” were included, the way in which “extended basic 
data” were included, and the lack of a guarantee of effective supervision by data 
protection commissioners. The law also interfered with constitutional guaran-
tees for the privacy of correspondence and telecommunications (Article 10, Basic 
Law) and the right to the inviolability of the home (Article 13, Basic Law).40
f. Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) Opinion (2016)
In 2009, the Bundestag assigned a significant role combatting international ter-
rorism to the BKA. The legislation authorized the BKA to carry out covert sur-
veillance in the context of protecting against threats from international terrorism 
and the prevention of criminal offenses and to transfer data to other authorities 
both inside and outside of Germany. In 2016, the Constitutional Court found 
that the legislation was unconstitutional in part.41 For the Constitutional Court, 
the resulting powers were not objectionable “in principle,” but these powers 
were “to be restricted to the protection of sufficiently weighty legally protected 
interests”42 and to be used “only in those cases in which there is a sufficiently 
specific foreseeable danger to these interests.”43
The BKA opinion provided highly detailed requirements for the BKA’s covert 
surveillance. For example, the Court found that the requirements for the use of 
data beyond the original investigatory purpose were not entirely sufficient. There 
were also flaws in the protection of professional confidentiality, in particular 
regarding the communications of defense counsel and other lawyers. The Court 
also identified shortcomings in the statute’s provisions on transparency, on trans-
fer of data to other domestic authorities, and on transfers to other countries.
In separate dissents to the BKA opinion, Justice Michael eichberger and 
Justice Wilhelm Schluckebier argued that the majority of the Constitutional 
Court was interfering with the legislative role by articulating excessively detailed 
requirements.44 Justice eichberger also drew a distinction between investigations 
that were targeted and those that collected data more broadly. In his view, many of 
the challenged statutory provisions did not “authorize a general collection of data 
affecting a wide range of persons.”45 He felt that individuals affected by instances 
of more specific targeting could constitutionally be expected to sacrifice some 
of their privacy as part of “a citizen’s duty for the public guarantee of security.”46
40. Ibid. at ¶ 224.
41. Case 1 BvR 966/ 09 (2016) [Bundesverfassungsgericht] (BKA- opinion).
42. Ibid. at ¶ 156.
43. Ibid. at ¶ 109.
44.  Dissenting opinion Justice Schluckebier, Case, 1 BvR 966/ 09 (5, 7)  (2016) 
[Bundesverfassungsgericht] (BKA opinion).
45. Dissenting opinion Justice eichberger, Case 1 BvR 966/ 09 (4, 5) (2016)
46. Ibid.
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g. Protecting the Home: the Great Eavesdropping Opinion (2004), the 
Preventive Telecommunications Surveillance Opinion (2005), the Counter- 
Terrorism Database Opinion (2013), and the BKA Opinion (2016)
In four important decisions, the Constitutional Court assessed the nature of 
Article 13’s protection of the home and the “core area of life formation.” These 
opinions followed amendments to the Basic Law in 1998 that explicitly permit 
acoustic and visual surveillance of the home. Until then, there had been some 
open questions about the extent of Article 13’s protection of the privacy of pri-
vate residences. Article 13(1), which dates to the enactment of the Basic Law in 
1949, states, “The home is inviolable.” yet, the Basic Law’s Article 13(2), also 
found in its original text, permits judges to order searches. The debate had been 
about whether surveillance was permissible within the home and whether such 
surveillance could occur in bedrooms and other areas associated with intimate 
activities.
The 1998 amendment to the Basic Law resolved certain but not all aspects of 
this debate. This constitutional amendment added new subsections to Article 13 
of the Basic Law. of these, the critical new section, Article 13(4), states, “To avert 
acute dangers to public safety, especially dangers to life or to the public, techni-
cal means of surveillance of the home may be employed only pursuant to judicial 
order.” Thus, the Basic Law after 1998 explicitly permits at least some surveil-
lance within the home while also continuing to protect “the inviolability of the 
home.” In a series of subsequent decisions, the Constitutional Court assessed 
the extent to which such surveillance could occur consistent with the Basic Law.
First, in its Great Eavesdropping opinion (2004), the German Constitutional 
Court upheld the 1998 amendments as constitutional.47 In its view, the Basic Law 
does not provide absolute protection for the space of private residences. Rather, 
its absolute protection was provided to behavior in this space that “depicts indi-
vidual development in the core domain of private life formation.”48 In the Court’s 
view, the constitution’s protection of physical spaces turned on how people used 
these areas. In particular, its ruling held that “the greater the probability of cap-
ture of highly personal content, the stricter the requirements for lawfulness of 
surveillance of living quarters.”49
Second, the Constitutional Court elaborated on the nature of these require-
ments in its Preventive Telecommunications Surveillance opinion (2005). It stated 
that preventative surveillance would be constitutionally acceptable only when 
“there was an especially high ranking endangered legal interest and a desig-
nated situation with concrete stopping points and a connection through direct 
references to the future carrying out of a criminal offense.”50 Moreover, it was 
47. 109 BVerfGe 279 (2004) (Great eavesdropping).
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid. at 328.
50. 113 BVerfGe 348, 392 (2005) (preventive Telecommunications Surveillance).
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sometimes not possible to know when a conversation might touch on the core 
domain of private life formation.51 As a result of law enforcement not being able 
to predict the content of conversations in advance, the Constitutional Court 
required these officials to actively monitor their surveillance and to stop it imme-
diately if the private domain of life formation was implicated. As an additional 
safeguard, there was a need for specific protections to guarantee that communi-
cations from the “highly personal domain” would not be stored and subject to 
further use. As an example of such protection, if such material was collected, it 
was to be immediately erased.52
Third, in the Counter- Terrorism Database opinion (2013), the Constitutional 
Court noted that personal information to be included in the database could be 
obtained in ways that impinge on the inviolability of the home. Such informa-
tion, as well as that data which interferes with telecommunications privacy, were 
to be labeled as such in the database. The Court observed, “The recognisability 
of such data is intended to ensure that the specific limits on data use are obeyed 
even after the data may have been forwarded to other agencies.”53 The law must 
then “ensure specific thresholds” for any transfers and use of this information. 
Without such metadata labeling on this sensitive information, its collection 
would not be constitutional. Moreover, the data were only to be collected subject 
to strict standards and an elevated showing of need, “such as an especially dan-
gerous situation or a specific suspicion of an offence, a threat to especially signif-
icant legally protected interests, or the prosecution of especially serious criminal 
offences.”54
Fourth, the BKA opinion, also discussed above, evaluated the statutory pow-
ers of the Federal Criminal police office to covertly collect personal data from 
private homes. The Court noted that the surveillance of private homes repre-
sented a “particularly serious interference with privacy” and could, therefore, be 
justified only when it focused “exclusively on the communications of the target 
person from whom the threat emanates.”55 The Court found that the legislation 
51. Some information would fall on one side of the constitutional dividing line— other, on the 
constitutionally- protected side. As an example of kind of information that could be collected 
without concerns about the “core domain of private life formation,” the Court pointed to con-
tent that made “direct reference to concrete criminal actions, such as statements about the 
planning of approaching criminal offenses, or reports about perpetrated criminal offenses.” 
Ibid. at 391.
52. Ibid. at 392; see also Case 2 BvR 1513/ 14 (2014) [Bundesverfassungsgericht] (unconstitu-
tional to broadly interfere with a custodian’s direct and unrestricted communication with 
third parties, without balancing on a case- to- case basis the individual’s right to privacy 
against such limitations).
53.  Case 1 BvR 1215/ 07 (¶ 225)  (2013) [Bundesverfassungsgericht] (Counter- Terrorism 
Database).
54. Ibid. at (¶ 226) (2013).
55. Case 1 BvR 966/ 09 at (¶ 151) [2016] [Bundesverfassungsgericht] (BKA opinion).
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expanding the BKA’s authority failed to take such a step, as well as neglected to 
assign an independent person, one not charged with security tasks, to screen 
access to the BKA’s “information technology systems.”56
2.  Statutory Law
German privacy law regulates information privacy through an omnibus law, the 
BDSG,57 and sectoral laws.58 As a general matter, the BDSG controls as far as 
there is not a more specific sectoral statute that is applicable. For online com-
munications and other forms of telecommunications, there is the added legal 
wrinkle of the “Schichtenmodel,” or “Layer Model.”
The “Layer Model” functions through different legal requirements for con-
tent, services, and the technical level of transmission. As for the content of an 
online communication, it is regulated either by the BDSG or any applicable leg-
islation. As for services that are provided on the Internet, these are regulated 
by the Telemediengesetz, or Telemedia Law.59 Concerning the level at which 
the transfer takes place, it is regulated by the Telekommunikationsgesetz, or 
Telecommunication Law.60 As a further matter, the law uses a different range of 
statutory authorities to govern the access to communications by domestic law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies (see below).
not surprisingly, it can be quite difficult to determine which statute applies to 
a given dimension of an online service or communication. As Thomas Hoeren 
notes, “Due to the acceleration of legislative activity in recent years, more and 
more special laws have been added to data protection law, without careful coor-
dination of the application areas of the resulting statutes.”61 Voice over Internet 
protocol (VoIp) and other aspects of technical convergence have only added to 
the difficulty in maintaining a distinction, for legal purposes, among the layers.
56. Ibid. at ¶ 30.
57.  Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data protection Statute], Bundesgesetzblatt 
I. [BGBl. I.] 66 (2003) (most recently amended by Law of August 14, 2009, BGBl. I., 2814).
58.  For example, there are special data protection provisions for prisoners. See 
Strafvollzugsgesetz [StVollzG] [Criminal penalty enforcement Statute], Bundesgesetzblatt 
I. [BGBl. I.] 581, 2088 (1976) (most recently amended by Law of July 29, 2009, BGBl. I., 2274), 
§§ 179– 187.
59.  Telemediengesetz [TMG] [Telemedia Law], Bundesgesetzblatt I.  [BGBl. I.] 179 (2007) 
(most recently amended by Law of May 31, 2010, BGBl. I., 692). For a discussion of the “Layer 
Model,” see Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestags, Die Verletzung daten-
schutzrechtlicher Bestimmungen durch sogenannte Facebook Fanpages und Social- Plugins 
(october 7, 2011), p. 10, https:// www.datenschutzzentrum.de/ facebook/ material/ WissDienst- 
BT- Facebook- ULD.pdf.
60. Telekommunikationsgesetz [TKG] [Telecommunication Law], Bundesgesetzblatt I. [BGBl. 
I.] 1190 (2004) (most recently amended by Law of December 22, 2011, BGBl. I., 2958).
61. Thomas Hoeren, Wenn Sterne kollabieren, entsteht ein schwarzes Loch— Gedanken zum 
ende des Datenschutzes, ZD 145– 46 (2011).
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An evaluation of German statutory law regarding the government’s systematic 
data access is, therefore, quite complex. As a basic matter, however, German data 
protection law itself represents a considerable hurdle to systematic data access. 
The use of and access to personal data generally requires a legal basis. German 
law expresses this concept as a “Verbot mit Erlaubnisvorbehalt,” or a “prohibition 
with conditional permission.” German law starts by forbidding the collection, 
processing, or use of personal data. This prohibition is lifted, however, once a 
statute authorizes the data collection, processing, or use in question. This statute 
must, of course, also fulfill the proportionality requirement of German law.
Under the BDSG, moreover, data can be processed, shared, and transferred 
only under a limited set of circumstances. BDSG, § 14(1) provides one of the most 
important of these restrictions for public entities. It limits the “storage, alteration, 
or use of personal data” by private bodies to circumstances when it is “necessary to 
carry out the tasks for which the controller is responsible and for the purpose for 
which the data were collected” (emphasis added). Thus, this passage sets a standard 
of necessity as well as a requirement of “original purpose specification.” BDSG, 
§ 15(1) places similar kinds of restrictions on data transfers to public bodies.
B.  Law Enforcement, Regulatory, and National Security Access
1.  Basic Organizational Concepts and the “Anti- Terror File”
As in US law, German law distinguishes between law enforcement and intel-
ligence agencies. The two countries also share a distinction between domestic 
intelligence and foreign intelligence agencies. Law enforcement agencies are 
generally tasked with enforcing the criminal code and policing violations of it. 
Intelligence agencies gather and analyze information that is needed to protect 
national security.
The Bundesnachrichtendienst, or BnD, is the German agency for foreign intel-
ligence. Unlike the United States, however, Germany has a separate domestic 
intelligence agency: the Federal office for the protection of the Constitution, or 
the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. This agency is dedicated to threats against 
the democratic order of Germany; it also has counterparts in each German state. 
The federal and state offices for the protection of the constitution have tradi-
tionally lacked police powers, such as the ability to perform arrests. Finally, the 
federal investigative police authority is the Federal Criminal police office, the 
Bundeskriminalamt, or BKA.62
The development of the federal police, the BKA, and its role in Germany have 
long been controversial issues. The Gestapo, the centrally- organized police force 
of the nazis, casts a long dark shadow. In addition, east Germany’s Ministerium 
für Staatssicherheit, or Stasi, provided a later negative example from German 
62. An important organizational distinction can be made with the United States, where the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has traditionally functioned as both the federal police 
authority, like Germany’s BKA, and as a domestic intelligence agency, such as Germany’s 
Federal office for the protection of the Constitution.
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history of a centrally-organized agency for domestic security. Another factor in 
the debate about the proper role of a federal police force has been the desire of 
the German states to keep their own independent authorities for policing and 
gathering intelligence.
As a result of these factors, since the end of World War II and the creation 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, a fundamental legal concept has been the 
“Trennungsgebot,” or “Separation Rule.” The Trennungsgebot expresses a legal 
norm for organizational and informational divisions between intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies. For example, this legal concept would prevent the cre-
ation of a single German agency with borderless law enforcement and intelligence 
capacities, or the limitless sharing of information between law enforcement agen-
cies and intelligence agencies. The rough analogy would be with the concept of 
“the wall” in the US regulation of the intelligence community. In both countries, 
legal limits on information sharing between intelligence agencies and law enforce-
ment organizations are viewed as necessary for the protection of civil liberties.
nonetheless, German law does not require a total ban on law enforcement 
agencies and intelligence agencies working together and sharing information. 
Indeed, a significant development in Germany, and one pre- dating 9/ 11, has been 
a stream of legislation that expands the powers of the BKA, BnD, and Federal 
office for the protection of the Constitution, as well as related agencies, and 
increases their ability to work together and to share information.
one of the best examples of this trend is provided by the creation of an “Anti- 
Terrordatei,” or “Anti- Terror Database.” Through enactment of federal legisla-
tion in 2006, Germany established this databank, which consists of a common 
data source with an extended index. Already by 2011, the information in the 
Anti- Terror Database was collected from 38 different security authorities and 
concerned approximately 18,000 individuals considered to require scrutiny.63 
Although a number of different agencies can search the databank, and do so 
electronically, the database is constructed to distinguish information in “open” 
and “concealed storage.”
If information in the database is in “open storage,” a match to a suspect’s name 
will reveal information about him. If information is in “concealed storage,” the 
inquiring agency will receive a negative result to its search for data about a per-
son. At the same time, however, the agency that has stored the information in 
“concealed storage” will receive data about the inquiry. That agency is then to 
decide whether the applicable legal rules permit it to share further information 
with the inquiring agency. In 2006, German civil libertarians awarded a Big 
Brother Award to the Conference of Interior Ministers for their role in establish-
ing the Anti- Terror database.64
63. Drucksache 17/ 6233, Deutscher Bundestag, 17. Wahlperiode 8 (2011), http:// dipbt.bundestag.
de/ dip21/ btd/ 17/ 062/ 1706223.pdf.
64.  Big Brother Awards, politics II:  Interior Ministers, http:// www.bigbrotherawards.de/ 
2006/ .pol/ pol- 02.
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As noted above, the Constitutional Court has identified flaws in legislation 
assigning the BKA a role opposing terrorism and in the statute establishing the 
Anti- Terror Database. Most critically, and as part of the right of informational 
self- determination, the Court identified the concept, that of a “principle of sepa-
ration of information” (informationelles Trennungsprinzip). This principle serves 
to create strict limits on the exchange of information between intelligence serv-
ices and the police.
2.  Intelligence Agencies
a. Strategic Surveillance: The Basic Structure
German constitutional law permits the BnD to engage in so- called strate-
gic surveillance. Subsequent to the Constitutional Court’s G- 10 decision, the 
Federal parliament, the Bundestag, amended the applicable statutory authori-
ties to make the law conform with the Basic Law. In 2009, the Bundestag again 
amended the relevant statute, the “G- 10 Statute,” or, more formally, the “Gesetz 
zur Beschränkung des Brief- , Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses,” to provide addi-
tional surveillance powers to the BnD. In addition, as noted above, federal and 
state intelligence agencies, as well as police authorities, can also gain access to 
electronic data in the Anti- Terror Databank.
The G- 10 Statute is, however, the main statute regulating the BnD’s access to 
letters and telecommunications. This law’s §§ 5– 8 contain the provisions appli-
cable to strategic surveillance. Its § 5(1) lists the nature of the dangers that justify 
the use of strategic surveillance. These include the risk of an armed attack on 
Germany, the committing of international terrorist attacks with a direct relation 
to Germany, international trafficking in weapons of war, drug trafficking, or a 
limited set of other significant dangers. The statute also sets obligations for the 
BnD to check whether the collected personal data are “necessary” to one of the 
Article 5(1) purposes. If not, such data are to be immediately erased.
Following the enactment of statutory amendments in 2009, the G- 10 Statute 
contains a specific section that protects a “core area of private life formation” 
in the context of both individual surveillance and preventive surveillance. The 
2009 amendments to the G- 10 Statute reflect the constitutional safeguards that 
the Constitutional Court identified in its Great Eavesdropping opinion (2004) 
and Preventive Telecommunications Surveillance opinion (2005). In particular, 
the G- 10 Statute, § 5 a contains an absolute prohibition on capture of commun-
ications from the core area of private life formation.65 Should such information, 
nonetheless, be collected, authorities may not use them and these data are to be 
erased at once.66 A protocol for the erasure is to be maintained for purposes of 
65.  Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief- , post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses, Artikel 10- 
Gesetz [G- 10] [G- 10 Statute], Bundesgesetzblatt I. [BGBl. I.] 1254, 2298 (2001) (most recently 
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“the oversight of data protection.”67 Finally, strategic surveillance may not use 
“search terms” (Suchbegriffe) that contain “identifying features” that (1) will lead 
to a “targeted acquisition of determined telecommunication connections,” or 
(2) that “concern the core area of private life.”68
The G- 10 Statute also contains mechanisms for oversight of the intelligence 
agencies. It establishes the parliamentary Control panel as well as the G- 
10 Commission. Most important, the G- 10 Commission has a central role in 
deciding on the permissibility of surveillance by intelligence agencies. It plays 
an analogous role to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court of 
the United States. To begin, however, with the parliamentary Control panel, 
it consists of members of the Bundestag, the German parliament. The govern-
ment (Bundesregierung) is required by law to “inform the parliamentary Control 
panel extensively” about “general activities” of the intelligence agencies and 
about “events of particular importance.”69 The parliamentary Control panel may 
also request files and other papers of intelligence agencies. It publishes an annual 
report about its oversight activities, which includes highly useful statistics about 
the use by intelligence agencies of surveillance powers. A 2009 law heightened 
the parliamentary Control panel’s constitutional status and its powers to gather 
information from the government and intelligence agencies.70
As for the G- 10 Commission, the parliamentary Control panel names the 
members of this entity. The G- 10 Commission decides on the “permissibility 
and necessity” of surveillance carried out by intelligence agencies pursuant to 
the G- 10 Statute.71 As the parliamentary Control panel explains, “the super-
visory power of the Commission extends to the entire collection, processing 
and use of personal data by federal intelligence agencies pursuant to the G- 10 
Statute.”72
b. The Role of Telecommunication Providers
Telecommunications Law §§ 110– 113 provide a particularly important statutory 
example of systematic data access. These sections require that telecommunica-
tion providers collect certain data about their customers, such as name, address, 
and telephone number, before the service is established. This information is 
termed Bestandsdaten, or “inventory information,” and is sent to an automated 
databank of the Bundesnetzagentur, or Federal network Agency.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid. at § 5(2).
69. Kontrollgremiumgesetz vom 29. Juli 2009 (BGbl. I S. 2346), § 4(1).
70. Bertold Huber, “Die Reform der parlamentarischen Kontrolle der nachrichtendienste und 
des Gesetzes nach Art. 10 GG,” 28 NVwZ 1321 (2009).
71. G- 10 Statute, § 15(5).
72. Unterrichtung durch das parlamentarische Kontrollgremium, Drucksache 17/ 4278, p. 3.
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pursuant to Telecommunications Law § 112, governmental agencies can make 
automated requests for this information from the databank. The legal standard 
for justifying such access to “inventory information” is quite low. Law enforce-
ment and intelligence officials can request the information when it is required for 
discharge of their “legal functions.”73
3.  Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies
The Code of Criminal procedure § 100g(2) contains important legal provisions 
for systematic data access. It allows law enforcement agencies to gain information 
about “a sufficiently specific spatial and temporal description of telecommunica-
tions” in cases of a serious criminal offense, and when the investigation of the 
matter would otherwise be made significantly more difficult. Under this author-
ity, the police in Berlin, Dresden, and many other locations have made massive 
requests for cell tower data about any person located in a given area during a 
specific time period. one attorney has called this action “the equivalent of data 
mining through the cell phone.”74 There are no national statistics regarding this 
activity, but only occasional requests for information made within state parlia-
ments. Thus, a Berlin newspaper, the taz, reported in 2012 that the Berlin police 
since 2008 had made 410 “Funkzellenabfragen,” or “radio- cell inquiries” and, 
thereby, collected information pertaining to 4.2 million cell phone connections.75 
These requests had been made to combat an epidemic of vandals setting automo-
biles on fire. In 2011, the same newspaper revealed that the police had gathered 
similar kinds of information after an anti- nazi protest in Dresden.76 Another 
report states that 11,474 radio cell inquiries had been made in the state of north 
Rhein- Westphalia from December 2010 to March 2014.77 In Berlin there were 
1,408 inquiries between 2009 and 2012.78 In 2013 alone, at least 50 million sets 
of data were acquired in Berlin, of which 36 million sets originated from a single 
73.  Already in 2003, I  had observed about the previous statutory provision creating this 
process for access to inventory information: “In Germany, it is quite easy to obtain ‘inven-
tory information.’ Law enforcement officials can request it when required for discharge of 
‘their legal functions,’ and judicial review of this request does not occur.” paul M. Schwartz, 
“German and US Telecommunications privacy Law,” 54 Hastings L.J. 751, 781 (2003).
74. paul Wrusch, “Mal eben ausgespäht,” taz (June 19, 2011), http:// taz.de/ Demo- berwachung- 
per- Mobilfunk/ !72708/ .
75. Konrad Litschko, “polizei sammelte Handydaten,” taz (January 23, 2012), http:// www.taz.
de/ Autobrandstiftung- in- Berlin/ !86239/ .
76. paul Wrusch, “Mal eben ausgespäht,” taz (June 19, 2011), http:// taz.de/ Demo- berwachung- 
per- Mobilfunk/ !72708/ .
77. Constanze Kurz, “erneut steigende Zahl von Funkzellenabfragen,” netzpolitik.org (July 8, 
2015), https:// netzpolitik.org/ 2015/ erneut- steigende- zahl- von- funkzellenabfragen/ .
78.  “Funkzellenabfrage in Berlin:  Vielleicht werden Sie gerade überwacht,” netzpolitik.org 
(September 14, 2015), at https:// netzpolitik.org/ 2015/ funkzellenabfrage- in- berlin- vielleicht- 
werden- sie- gerade- ueberwacht/ .
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proceeding.79 A report from the state of Schleswig- Holstein in 2016 found that 
the number of “radio- cell inquiries” had gone up more than five times since 
2009.80
C.  Rejection of the ELENA Project
A controversy concerning systematic data access involved the government’s 
termination of the eLenA project, which was a planned database of employee 
data. eLenA stands for the “Elektronische Entgeltnachweis- Verfahren,” or 
“electronic payment Verification process,” and had its basis in a statute enacted 
in March 2009.81 It was intended to afford German companies significant savings 
in their human resource departments by streamlining the collection of a wide 
variety of employee data. A government agency was to maintain the resulting 
centralized database of information, which consisted of name, data of birth, 
insurance number, home address, time missing work, and “possible misbehav-
ior.” The information was to be shared for purposes of unemployment insur-
ance, housing benefits, parental benefits, and other kinds of social insurance. 
According to the Spiegel magazine, eLenA, was to be “the largest official collec-
tion of data in Germany.”82
In July 2011, the German government abandoned the eLenA project. The 
project failed because of the lack of an adequate electronic signature for use 
within the eLenA process and a series of contested data protection issues. In 
addition, local political authorities and small and medium- sized businesses, an 
economic sector termed the “Mittelstand,” had complained about their costs 
under the project.
D.  Voluntary Access to Data
As noted above, German data protection law permits a private or public sector 
entity to collect, process, and transfer personal information only subject to a lim-
ited set of conditions. As a fundamental matter, there must be a statutory basis 
for such informational activity. There are also strong and numerous protections 
in place in the relevant constitutional law. As a result, informal or cooperative 
agreements are permissible under German law only if they comport with consti-
tutional and statutory requirements.
79. Ibid.
80. Markus Reuter, “Zwei Funkzellenabfragen am Tag alleine im Schleswig- Holstein,” netz-
politik.org (April 13, 2016), at https:// netzpolitik.org/ 2016/ zwei- funkzellenabfragen- am- tag- 
alleine- in- schleswig- holstein/ .
81.  “Das ende von eLenA:  Arbeitnehmer- Datenbank wird ‘schnellstmöglich’ eingestellt,” 
MMR- Aktuell 321105 (2011).
82. “Abschied von “elena”: Regierung stoppt umstrittene Arbeitnehmer- Datenbank,” Spiegel 
(July 18, 2011), http:// www.spiegel.de/ netzwelt/ netzpolitik/ 0,1518,775145,00.html.
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E.  Role of the Courts
As the discussion above of constitutional law has already indicated, German 
courts have a central role interpreting the relevant legal norms when personal 
information is processed, collected, and transferred. Indeed, this area of German 
law functions as a textbook illustration of Alec Stone Sweet’s idea of “constitu-
tional politics” in europe. Drawing on “the “privileged status” of fundamental 
rights in the Basic Law, the Federal Constitutional Court in the area of informa-
tion privacy can be seen as constructing “a discourse, a set of dialogues and col-
lective conversations, about the capacities and limits of the use of state power.”83 
The resulting rules then draw a variety of state officials into discourse around 
constitutional concepts as developed by the Court in a reconfigured policymak-
ing environment.
There have been general complaints, to be sure, about an “overconstitutional-
izing” of constitutional law as well as objections to a “Karlsruhe Republic,” that 
is, a Germany run from the Constitutional Court’s headquarters in Karlsruhe, 
Germany.84 nonetheless, among both elites and the general public, there is a 
high level of acceptance of the role of the Constitutional Court— and one that it 
has exercised in numerous cases by limiting systemic data access.
F.  Data Retention
Following the Constitutional Court’s decision in 2010 voiding the data retention 
statute and the eCJ’s decision invalidating of the Data Retention Directive in 
2014, Germany enacted a new law, which came into force in 2015 and requires 
full compliance by 2017 at the latest.85
one rejected policy proposal was to replace mass data retention with a “Quick 
Freeze” process.86 Under it, law enforcement and intelligence agencies would 
obtain an order for targeted data preservation relating only to a person under sus-
picion. If a crime was, in fact, committed, there would then be a “thawing” of the 
data, that is, access provided to it, to aid in the prosecution of the party. The cur-
rent data retention requirement does not, however, take this approach. It requires 
storage of location data (Standortdaten) for mobile telephones for 4 weeks, stor-
age of location data for mobile Internet use for 4 weeks, and the storage of call 
83. Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (oxford: oxford 
University press, 2000), 22.
84. For a discussion of the over- constitutionalizing of German politics and law, see Michael 
Zürn, “Ist die Karlsruher Republik demokratisch?,” in Herzkammern der Republik 258 
(Michael Stolleis, ed., 2011).
85.  Gesetz zur einführung einer Speicherpflicht und einer Höchstspeicherfrist für 
Verkehrsdaten 10.12.2015 BGBl. I S. 2218.
86.  Quick Freeze/ Datensicherung, Bundesministerium der Justiz, http:// www.bmj.de/ De/ 
Buerger/ digitaleWelt/ QuickFreeze/ quickfreeze_ node.html.
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numbers and the time and duration of all calls for 10 weeks. The Data Retention 
statute also requires storage of “assigned Ip addresses” of Internet users and the 
time and duration of Internet use for 10 weeks. This information can be released 
without a judicial order for purposes of criminal prosecution and prevention of 
significant concrete danger. Finally, this statute mandates telecommunication 
providers to store mandated data in Germany. The european Commission has 
criticized these data residency requirements as violating european Union prin-
ciples concerning freedom of services.87
As another example of the ongoing controversy around the topic of data reten-
tion, the Max planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law pub-
lished an expert opinion in January 2012 finding the absence of a negative impact 
on the solving of crimes due to the lack of stored data since 2010.88 The Justice 
Ministry had authorized this report and welcomed it as proof that data storage 
was unnecessary.89 In contrast, the Interior Ministry and the BKA criticized the 
methodology of the report.90
G.  Cross- Border and Multi- Jurisdictional Issues
In its G- 10 opinion, the Constitutional Court found that the protections of the 
Basic Law’s Article 10 were not limited exclusively to communications that took 
place only within the national borders of Germany. As long as enough of a nexus 
existed between the surveillance and German territory, the protections of Article 
10 were applicable.91
There is an open question, however, regarding the regulation of surveillance of 
satellite communications. According to the BnD, its capture of information from 
satellite connections is limited neither by statutory nor constitutional law. This idea 
is termed the “space theory” (Weltraumtheorie). Distinguished legal experts have 
disagreed with it, but the matter remains unresolved.92
87.  For a discussion, see Lothar Determann and Michaela Weigl, “Data Residency 
Requirements Creeping into German Law,” 15 PVLR 529 (March 14, 2016).
88. Max- planck- Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht, Schutzlücken durch 
Wegfall der Vorratsdatenspeicherung, p.  219 (2d ed. 2011), https:// www.mpg.de/ 5000721/ 
 vorratsdatenspeicherung.pdf.
89.  “Studie bestreitet Sinn von Vorratsdatenspeicherung,” Focus (January 27, 2012), http:// 
www.focus.de/ politik/ deutschland/ aufklaerungsquote- nicht- beeinflusst- studie- bestreitet- 
sinn- von- vorratsdatenspeicherung_ aid_ 707398.html.
90.  “Vorratsdatenspeicherung:  Friedrich stellt Studie infrage,” Focus (January. 27, 2012), 
http:// www.focus.de/ politik/ deutschland/ vorratsdatenspeicherung- friedrich- stellt- studie- 
infrage_ aid_ 707678.html.
91. 100 BVerfGe 313, 363– 64 (1999) (G- 10).
92.  See Baldus, Beck’scher Online- Kommentar Grundgesetz, Territorialer Schutzgehalt, 
Article 10, ¶¶ 20– 21 (epping, Hillgrubered ed. 29, 2015) (constitutional protection does not 
differentiate between where the German government acts or where the effects of the action 
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IV.  RECENT CONTROVERSIES
Two controversies of current relevance have already been discussed, namely the 
abandonment of the eLenA database of employment data and the ongoing debate 
about data retention. Further controversies concern the proposal for Germany- 
based cloud services and the collaboration between the national Security Agency 
and the Bundesnachrichtendienst.
There has been considerable discussion in Germany about privacy and secur-
ity issues relating to data processing in the cloud. In the judgment of the Federal 
Data protection Commissioner, for example, cloud computing represents a form 
of “contract data processing” (Auftragsdatenverarbeitung).93 Such activity requires 
that the party carrying out the processing in the cloud “comply with technical and 
organisational measures to ensure privacy.”94
The policy debate in Germany about the cloud has also considered the potential 
for US government access to German data stored in this fashion. The introduc-
tion of Microsoft’s office 365 in Germany marked an early moment in which such 
concerns were raised. In response to a question, a Microsoft executive discussed 
the obligation of his company to share data from european data centers with 
US officials if requested pursuant to appropriate legal authorities.95 According 
to an analysis in a German law review, however, such a transfer, even if pursu-
ant to statutory authorities in the United States, would violate the Federal Data 
protection Law of Germany.96 In that article, Benno Barnitzke observes that “a 
transfer to US authorities is not covered by an authorization in the German fed-
eral data protection statute (BDSG).” As a consequence, “the release represents 
an improper and illegal data processing in the sense of the BDSG.” Moreover, 
BDSG § 43 would provide sanctions against it.97
Another window into German attitudes about cloud services and storage 
is offered by a White paper from the Conference of Federal and State Data 
occur, provided that the act represents the power of the German government); Hans- Jürgen 
papier, opinion on 1. Committee on Inquiry of the parliament of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 18. Legislative period, p. 7 (May 24, 2014), https:// www.bundestag.de/ blob/ 280842/ 
9f755b0c53866c7a95c38428e262ae98/ mat_ a_ sv- 2- 2- pdf- data.pdf (“an act of intervention 
has to be attributed to German authorities whenever it is conducted from German soil or 
with the approval and tolerance of German authorities”). For media coverage of the issue, see 
Thorsten Denkler, “nSA Untersuchungsausschuss:  Juristen werfen BnD Verfassungsbruch 
vor,” Süddeutschen Zeitung (February 5, 2015) at http:// www.sueddeutsche.de/ politik/ 
nsa- untersuchungsausschuss- juristen- werfen- bnd- verfassungsbruch- vor- 1.1972477.
93. Bundesbeauftragten für den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit, Tätigkeitsbericht 
2009 und 2010, Drucksache 17/ 5200, pp. 63– 64.
94. Ibid.
95.  Benno Barnitzke, “Microsoft:  Zugriff auf personenbezogene Daten in eU- Cloud auf 
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protection  Commissioners of Germany. The White paper raises concerns 
regarding the lack of transparency for individuals regarding data processing in 
the cloud. 98 In reference to non- eU nations, or so- called “Third Countries,” the 
White paper also warns that “when a public cloud is used in Third Countries, 
access to the data of the company using the cloud is possible and cannot be 
controlled.”99 Finally, a law review article in Germany has warned, “The solution 
to this problem should certainly not be that european clouds are moved to the 
United States … [and] lawfully subject to the access of US authorities.”100
one specialized German concern about cloud services run by US compa-
nies relates to the storage of governmental information in them. Already in 
2012, the Minister of the Interior, Hans- peter Friedrich, called for development 
of “a Federal cloud” as part of a plan to consolidate the IT infrastructure of 
the German government. The “Bundes- Cloud” is intended to keep “sensitive 
governmental and enterprise data from landing with US officials.”101 In 2015, 
the Federal office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik) published a resolution with criteria for the procurement 
and use of cloud services by the federal German administration.102 Among the 
Resolution’s key requirements is that information such as business secrets and 
sensitive data about the federal IT infrastructure were to be processed exclu-
sively in Germany. Cloud providers were to implement appropriate technical 
and organizational measures to keep data subject to secrecy provision from dis-
closure to unauthorized third parties.
Beyond the public sector’s effort to build the Bundes- Cloud, the private sec-
tor has also responded to these German concerns. one major step has involved 
data localization. Tech companies are now building cloud centers through-
out Germany and developing technical solutions to keep information local-
ized within that country. Microsoft has developed an innovative “data trustee” 
approach for the German market.103 First, it opened data centers in Frankfurt- 
am- Main and Magdeburg and offered business clients the option of storing 
data exclusively in these German centers. Second, it partnered with Deutsche 
Telekom’s independent subsidiary T- Systems, which will act as data trustee for 
98.  Arbeitskreise Technik und Medien der Konferenz der Datenschutzbeauftragten des 
Bundes und der Länder, Orientungshilfe— Cloud Computing 16 (Sept. 26, 2011).
99. Ibid.
100. Christian Schröder and nils Christian Haag, “neue Anforderungen an Cloud Computing 
für die praxis,” 1 ZD 147, 150 (2011).
101. Jürgen Berke, “Innenminister Friedrich will Bundes- Cloud aufbauen,” Wirtschaftswoche 
(January 20, 2012).
102.  IT Board Resolution, no 2015/ 5 (2015) (Beschluss des Rates der IT- Beauftragten der 
Ressorts, July 29, 2015).
103. Michael Rath et al., “Die neue Microsoft Cloud in Deutschland mit Datentreuhand als 
Schutzschild gegen nSA & Co.?,” Computerrecht 98, p. 100 (2016).
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information in these centers. Although Microsoft operates the data centers, T- 
System controls access to all stored information. Through a web of contracts and 
trusts, Microsoft limits its access to data on the German servers and assigns T- 
Systems exclusive legal authority to release information stored on them.104 This 
service is available only to business customers of Microsoft and not private ones.
The trustee model is intended to bolster Microsoft’s legal arguments against 
disclosure when faced with data demands from US courts, whether in criminal, 
intelligence, or civil settings. The idea is that Microsoft cannot share the German 
cloud data of its customers because to do so would violate the applicable law of 
German trusts and contracts.105 This legal theory is untested before US courts; 
use of Deutsche Telekom as a data trustee may or may not shelter information 
from US legal processes. At any rate, Microsoft has demonstrated its willing-
ness to litigate these kinds of issues in the United States. In 2016, for example, it 
won a victory in the Second Circuit against a US government request for infor-
mation stored in an Irish data center. The Second Circuit ruled that the Stored 
Communications Act lacked extraterritorial reach.106
other companies are exploring the use of encryption in their eU data centers. 
In this model, customers are given keys to their information and have the sole 
ability to decrypt stored data.107 This approach is analogous to the San Bernadino 
iphone case where Apple argued that it lacked the ability, at least not without 
considerable additional effort, to unlock information stored on the phone seized 
by US authorities.108
As for the collaboration between the nSA and BnD, a single location perhaps 
best symbolizes this work: Bad Aibling, a small town in Bavaria, in the south of 
Germany. Bad Aibling is best known today in Germany not as a luxury health 
resort, but for its satellite tracking station. Until the early years of the twenty- first 
century, the nSA ran this listening post. After its official departure date, the nSA 
continued to have a physical presence at the station and worked in close collab-
oration with the BnD by supplying it with so- called “selectors” (“Selektoren”). 
104. Ibid. at p. 101. For an analysis of this legal model, see paul M. Schwartz & Karl- nikolaus 
peifer, “Datentreuhändermodelle— Sicherheit vor Herausgabeverlangen US- amerikanischer 
Behörden und Gerichte?,” Computer und Recht 165 (3/ 2017).
105. Ibid. at p. 103.
106.  Microsoft Corporation v.  United States, 2016 US App. LeXIS 12926 (2d Cir. 2016). 
extraterritorial requests for information are possible, of course, under other legal authorities 
other than the SCA. paul M. Schwartz, “Microsoft, Ireland and a Level playing Field for US 
Cloud Companies,” 15 PVLR 1549 (August 1, 2016).
107.  peter Maushagen, “erfolg mit der Wolke:  Deutsche Cloud- Dienste werden bei US- 
Konzernen immer beliebter,” Businessinsider.de (March 17, 2015), at http:// www.businessin-
sider.de/ cebit- us- konzerne- schuetzen- daten- in- deutschen- cloud- diensten- 4785413?IR=T.
108. Matter of Search of an Apple iphone Seized during execution of a Search Warrant on a 
Black Lexus IS300, California License plate 35KGD203, no. eD 15- 0451M, 2016 WL 618401 
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016).
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As the Zeit magazine explains, these are “something like search terms.”109 The 
nSA sent the BnD Ip addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, MAC- 
Addresses, URLs, and geo- coordinates.
over the years, the nSA provided the BnD with some 14 million “selectors.” 
The process took place automatically with a BnD server downloading the terms 
several times a day from an nSA server. The BnD turned over the results of 
these searches to the nSA for storage in its own databanks. In carrying out data 
searches for the nSA, the BnD in many cases engaged in activities forbidden 
by German law. For example, although it was supposed to filter out forbidden 
searches according to a so- called G- 10 Filter, this process did not function com-
pletely or accurately. In 2015, a Big Brother Award went to the BnD and its then 
president Gerhard Schindler for its involvement in “a whole range of scandals 
and violations of privacy and civil rights.”110
A special committee of the Bundestag is investigating nSA- BnD activities. 
In october 2015, the expert’s report to the committee found that the activities 
at Bad Aibling violated bilateral agreements between Germany and the United 
States as well as German law.111 According to the Zeit magazine, moreover, there 
are secret agreements in place among the nSA, BnD, and the Federal office 
for the protection of the Constitution, under which the nSA provides technol-
ogies and goals for data gathering and analysis, and the German intelligence 
agencies collect the information.112 one fear, as expressed by the then Federal 
Data protection commissioner, peter Schaar, is that the intelligence agencies will 
engage in “competence hopping” (Befugnis- Hopping).113 Schaar was concerned 
109.  See Kai Biermann and patrick Beuth, “Was sind eigentlich Selektoren?,” Zeit (April 
24, 2015), http:// www.zeit.de/ digital/ datenschutz/ 2015- 04/ bundesnachrichtendienst- 
 bnd- nsa- selektoren- eikonal.
110. Big Brother Awards 2015 (bigbrotherawards.de 2015), at https:// bigbrotherawards.de/ en/ 
2015/ authorities- administration- federal- intelligence- agency- bundesnachrichtendienst- bnd.
111. The German government had refused to share the “selectors” with the German parlia-
ment; the compromise reached was to share them with an expert, Kurt Graulich, a former 
federal judge. The resulting report by Graulich also found evidence of economic espionage 
against european as well as German companies. The expert report was, in turn, widely criti-
cized as placing too much blame on the nSA, the Americans, and too little on the BnD, 
the Germans. See, for example, Kai Bermann, “ein Versuch, den BnD freizusprechen,” Die 
Zeit (october 30, 2015), at http:// www.zeit.de/ digital/ datenschutz/ 2015- 10/ selektoren- nsa- 
bericht- graulich- bnd/ komplettansicht; BnD/ nSA- Affäre, Heiseonline (october 30, 2015), 
at http:// www.heise.de/ newsticker/ meldung/ BnD- nSA- Affaere- Sonderermittler- deckt- 
erhebliche- Maengel- und- Rechtsbruch- auf- 2866243.html.
112. See Kai Biermann and patrick Beuth, “Was sind eigentlich Selektoren?,” zeit.de (April 
24, 2015), http:// www.zeit.de/ digital/ datenschutz/ 2015- 04/ bundesnachrichtendienst- 
 bnd- nsa- selektoren- eikonal.
113.  Unterrichtung durch den Bundesbeauftragten für den Datenschutz und die 
Informationsfreiheit, Deutscher Bundestag, 18. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 18/ 59 (15.11.2013).
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that the German and other foreign intelligence services, such as the nSA, will 
engage in a division of labor to strategically evade legal and constitutional 
restrictions on their work.
In addition to the investigation by the special Bundestag Commissioner, the 
Federal Data protection Commissioner carried out its own investigation of 
the BnD. This effort was started by peter Schaar and continued by the current 
Commissioner, Andrea Voβhoff. Netzpolitik, a German blog, has now leaked the 
Commissioner’s full report. The Data protection Commissioner identified 18 
violations of law by the BnD and filed 12 complaints.114 According to Netzpolitik, 
this number represented the largest amount of complaints ever directed at a single 
time against a German authority by the Federal Data protection Commissioner. 
perhaps most critically, the Commissioner found, “Contrary to its explicit legal 
obligation, the BnD had created databases without an establishing order and 
used them (for many years), thus disregarding fundamental principles of legal-
ity.” The report also found that the BnD had “collected personal data without 
a legal basis and has processed it systematically.” Finally, the Commissioner 
objected to the BnD’s illegal and massive restrictions of her supervisory author-
ity. As Netzpolitik’s noted, the Bad Aibling station was only one of five BnD 
listening stations in Germany. The Commissioner demanded that the BnD take 
into account her power under federal data protection law to carry out on- site 
investigations not only in Bad Aibling but at other BnD sites.
The United States historically has shared a special intelligence relation-
ship with the so- called Five eyes: the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia, and new Zealand. As the Snowden revelations and subsequent inves-
tigations have shown, beyond the Five eyes, Germany and the United States have 
negotiated the terms for their own intelligence cooperation. The final report of 
the special investigatory committee, the report of the Federal Data protection 
Commissioners, as well as attempts by the Bundestag to introduce new legis-
lation to reform the BnD are unlikely to change the basic elements of this US- 
German arrangement, or to make all aspects of the relationship transparent to 
the public.
The relationship between these intelligence agencies also has importance 
for efforts to create German clouds. one reason for such data localization is to 
put the data beyond the reach of US intelligence agencies. In the assessment of 
114. The report is entitled: Betreff: Datenschutzrechtliche Beratung und Kontrolle gemäβ §24 
und §26 Absatz 3 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz der erhebung und Verwendung personenbezo-
gener Daten in bzw. in Zusammenhang mit der Dienststelle des BnD in Bad Aibling (May 
15, 2016). For the Netzpolitik report on it, see Andre Meister, “Geheimer prüfbericht:  Der 
BnD bricht dutzenfach Gesetz und Verfassung— allein in Bad Aibling,” Netzpolitik.org 
(September 1, 2016), at https:// netzpolitik.org/ 2016/ geheimer- pruefbericht- der- bnd- bricht- 
dutzendfach- gesetz- und- verfassung- allein- in- bad- aibling/ . For an english translation of the 
Netzpolitik reporting, see Andre Meister, “Secret Report: German Federal Intelligence Service 
BnD Violates Laws and Constitution by the Dozen,” Netzpolitiki.org (September 2, 2016), at 
https:// netzpolitik.org/ 2016/ secret- report- german- federal- intelligence- service- bnd- violates- 
laws- by- the- dozen/ .
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Lothar Determann and Karl Guttenberg, the close cooperation between intel-
ligence agencies in the United States and other european countries means that 
“data stored and transmitted exclusively on european territory is not safer 
from US cyberspying than it would be in the United States.”115 Determann and 
Guttenberg also note that the law of the european Union “does not impose any 
meaningful limitations on government surveillance because the eU has limited 
jurisdiction over the foreign intelligence activities of its member states.”116
V.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
German law has devoted significant attention to the regulation of systemic gov-
ernment access to private- sector data. German lawmakers have enacted numer-
ous statutes and amended these laws frequently. The Federal Constitutional 
Court has accompanied every step of this process and developed highly detailed 
constitutional standards to make such access comport with the Basic Law. It has 
sought to protect informational self- determination and to preserve the roles of 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies in enforcing the criminal laws and 
protecting the public from terrorism.
German officials and experts have been skeptical of the standards of US 
information privacy law and, as a result, deeply concerned about systematic data 
access on the other side of the Atlantic. At the same time, German intelligence 
agencies have assisted in some of the efforts of US intelligence services, both 
before and after 9/ 11.
After revelations that the nSA had eavesdropped on her cell phone, Angela 
Merkel, the Federal Chancellor, complained in 2013 about Americans: “Spying 
among friends— that just is not done.” (“Ausspähen unter Freunden— das geht 
gar nicht”). By 2015, however, Chancellor Merkel was praising the cooperation 
between German and American intelligence services in defending against ter-
rorism. Chancellor Merkel called for identification of mistakes and deficiencies 
in this collaborative work. At the same time, her bottom line was clear: “[W] e 
need the cooperation with the American services.”117 German law will con-
tinue to develop constitutional and legal standards for systemic data access. An 
important part of this task will be to establish appropriate procedures and legal 
norms for the collaboration by German intelligence agencies with allied services, 
including their American counterparts.
115. Lothar Determann and Karl T. Guttenberg, “on War and peace in Cyberspace: Security, 
privacy, Jurisdiction,” 41 Hastings Const. L.Q. 878, 886 (2014). Karl Guttenberg is the former 
Minister of Defense of Germany.
116. Ibid. at 885.
117.  “Wir brauchen die amerikanischen Geheimdienste,” Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung 
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Systematic Government Access  
to Private- Sector Data in Israel
Balancing Security Needs with Democratic Accountability
O M E R   T E N E
I.  ABSTR ACT
Israel is a democracy committed to the protection of human rights while at the 
same time trying to contain uniquely difficult national security concerns. one 
area where this tension is manifest is government access to communications data. 
on the one hand, subscriber privacy is a constitutional right protected by legis-
lation and Supreme Court jurisprudence; on the other hand, communications 
data are a powerful tool in the hands of national security and law enforcement 
agencies. In this chapter I examine Israel’s attempt to balance these competing 
interests by empowering national security agencies while at the same time creat-
ing mechanisms of accountability. In particular, Israel utilizes the special inde-
pendent status of the attorney general as a check on government power.
II.  NATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT AND FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES
Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a system of checks and balances between 
the legislative branch (the “Knesset,” or parliament); the executive branch (the 
“Memshala,” or government); and a strong judiciary. Its constitution is compiled 
of a series of “Basic Laws” setting forth the structure of and relations among the 
institutions of power as well as the fundamental human rights. Under a 1995 
Supreme Court decision, these Basic Laws enjoy constitutional status, enabling 
the judiciary to strike down inconsistent legislation.1 Also sharing constitutional 
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status are a number of fundamental human rights not enumerated in the Basic 
Laws, including equality, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion.2
When analyzing human rights in Israel, two important preliminary observa-
tions must be made: first, a distinction must be drawn between “Israel proper” 
and the territories that it occupies since 1967. Although Israel proper is a democ-
racy strongly committed to human rights, the occupied territories are in a state 
of belligerent occupation and subject to a military regime. In this chapter, I ana-
lyze the legal situation strictly in Israel proper, an analysis that has no bearing 
on the situation in the occupied territories. It is important to note that although 
described as a Jewish state in its Declaration of Independence, Israel includes 
large religious and ethnic minorities, namely Muslims (approximately 20 per-
cent of the population and 80 percent of non- Jews), Christians, and Druze, some 
of which claim de facto discrimination.3
Second, since its inception in 1948, Israel has been in a state of war with 
some or all of its neighbors, and has undergone waves of fierce terrorism target-
ing civilian population. This means that more than most Western democra-
cies, Israel had to balance its pursuit of human rights with a need to defend 
national security, fight terrorism, and occasionally engage in full- scale war. 
Accordingly, national security considerations have had a profound impact on 
Israeli constitutional and legal discourse; at the same time, they have neither 
upended the rule of law nor completely displaced fundamental rights. on more 
than one occasion, the Israeli Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to the 
rule of law even in cases pitting strong national security interests: for example, 
outlawing torture in interrogations,4 or displacing the military erected secur-
ity barrier.5 In one landmark case, Supreme Court Chief Justice Aharon Barak 
wrote: “there is no security without law, and the rule of law is a component of 
national security.”6
2. See for example HCJ 721/ 94 El- Al Israel Airlines v. Danielowitz, 48 p.D. 749 (1994) (equal-
ity); HCJ. 73/ 53 and 87/ 53 Kol Ha’am v. Minister of The Interior, 7 p.D. 871 (1953) (freedom 
of speech); HCJ 5016/ 96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation, 51(4) p.D. 1 (1997) (freedom of 
religion).
3. For resources see, for example, Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Arab Minority Rights, 
http:// www.acri.org.il/en/category/arab-citizens-of-israel/arab-minority-rights/ .
4. HCJ 5100/ 94 Public Committee Against Torture v. The State of Israel.
5. HCL 7957/04 Zaharan Yunis Muhammad Mara’abe et al. v. Prime Minister of Israel et al. 
(Supreme Court, Sept. 15, 2005), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/caseLaw.
xsp?documentId=FF996DAFB177F6eCC12575BC004899A5&action=openDocument.
6.  HCJ 428/ 86 Barzilai v.  Government of Israel, 40(3) p.D. 505 (1986), available in english 
at http:// elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/86/280/004/z01/86004280.z01.pdf (petitioner attacked 
a decision by the president of Israel to pardon before trial officers of the General Security 
Service, who allegedly executed two terrorists who hijacked a bus and took hostages).
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III.  CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY OVERVIEW
A.  The Constitutional Right to Privacy
Section 7 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom (1992) (Basic Law) states:
 (a) All persons have the right to privacy and to intimacy.
 (b) There shall be no entry into the private premises of a person who has 
not consented thereto.
 (c) no search shall be conducted on the private premises or body of a 
person, nor in the body or belongings of a person.
 (d) There shall be no violation of the confidentiality of the spoken 
utterances, writings or records of a person.7
In several key decisions, the Israeli Supreme Court stressed that the right of pri-
vacy is a basic constitutional right.8
Like all fundamental rights, the right to privacy is not absolute. It is sub-
ject to the so- called “limitation clause” in Section 8 of the Basic Law, which 
states: “There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law 
befitting the values of the State of Israel; enacted for a proper purpose; and to an 
extent no greater than is required.” Any legislative or executive action is subject 
to this constitutional instruction; if it restricts the right to privacy, it will survive 
only if it passes scrutiny under the limitation clause.
For example, in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior (2004), 
the Israeli Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional public sector data- 
sharing practices although such data sharing had been authorized by statute.9 The 
Supreme Court ruled that data transfers were overly broad and had dispropor-
tionate effect on individuals’ privacy rights. It ruled that data transfers must be 
restricted by regulations specifying the precise recipients of data, data uses, and 
data security measures. It provided that transfers of data from government to 
private- sector financial institutions must be expressly authorized by primary legis-
lation; anti- money laundering provisions in secondary regulations did not suffice.
In Plonit v. National Rabbinical Court (2006), the Israeli Supreme Court held 
that “the right to privacy is one of our most important fundamental rights. It is 
7. The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom (5752- 1992), passed by the Knesset on the 21st 
Adar, 5754, March 9, 1994, http:// www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00hi0.
8.  Civ. App.  1697/ 11 A. Guttsman Architects v.  Vardi (Sup. Ct. January 23, , HCJ 6650/ 04 
Plonit v.  National Rabbinical Court (Sup. Ct., May 14, 2006); HCJ 8070/ 98 Association of 
Human Rights v.  Ministry of Interior, 58(4) S.CT. 842 (2004); see also omer Tene, “Israeli 
Data protection Law:  Constitutional, Statutory and Regulatory Reform,” 8(1) Privacy and 
Data Protection 6 (2007); Alon Kaplan & paul ogden eds., “Israeli Business Law: An essential 
Guide” (1997), at 30.01.
9. HCJ 8070/ 98 ACRI v. Ministry of Interior, 58(4) S.CT. 842 (2004).
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one of the freedoms shaping the democratic character of Israel’s legal system. 
Its roots run deep in our Jewish heritage. It is mandated by Israel’s values as 
a Jewish and democratic state.”10 These holdings were reiterated in Rami Mor 
v. Barak ETC (2010), a case in which the Supreme Court refused to order an ISp 
to unmask a John Doe defendant, holding that the constitutional right to privacy 
entails a right to anonymity.11 Justice eliezer Rivlin stated:
The shattering of the “illusion of anonymity” in a reality where a user’s sense 
of privacy is a myth may raise associations of a “big brother.” Such an infringe-
ment of privacy must be minimised. Anonymity shelters must be preserved 
within reasonable boundaries as they constitute an important aspect of Internet 
culture. To a great extent, anonymity makes the Internet what it is, and without 
it freedom in the virtual space would be mitigated. The prospect of tracking 
those in the virtual space would have a stifling effect on their behavior.
In Issakov Inbar v. State of Israel (2011), the Israeli national Labor Court severely 
restricted employers’ ability to monitor their employees’ email correspondence, 
holding that given the constitutional status of the right to privacy, exemptions to 
the privacy protection Act, 1981 (ppA), must be interpreted narrowly.12 In its opin-
ion, the Court made clear statements concerning the suspect nature of employee 
consent and mandated implementation of principles of legitimacy, transparency, 
proportionality, purpose limitation, access, accuracy, confidentiality, and secu-
rity. This decision has recently been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court.13
B.  The Statutory Right to Privacy
Israel has not only constitutional protections for the right of privacy but also 
an omnibus privacy protection statute, the ppA. The ppA applies to both the 
private and public sector and confers civil, administrative, and criminal rights 
and obligations. Section 1 of the ppA prohibits infringement of an individual’s 
privacy without that individual’s consent. Chapter A of the ppA deals with gen-
eral privacy protection, listing 11 alternative causes of action for infringement 
of privacy.14 especially pertinent in the context of communications data are 
Section 2(1) of the ppA, which refers to “spying on or trailing a person in a manner 
likely to harass him (…); ” Section 2(2): “listening- in prohibited under any law;” 
Section 2(5): “copying or using, without permission from the addressee or writer, 
the contents of a letter or any other writing not intended for publication (…); ” and 
10. HCJ 6650/ 04 Plonit v. National Rabbinical Court (Sup. Ct., May 14, 2006).
11. RCA 4447/ 07 Rami Mor v. Barak ETC (Sup. Ct., March 25, 2010).
12. Lab. App. 90/ 08 Issakov Inbar v. State of Israel (nt’l Lab. Ct. February 8. 2011).
13.  Civ. App.  3661/ 16 Remet Ltd. v.  Rami Shamir Civil Engineering Ltd. (Sup. Ct. August 
23. 2016).
14. privacy protection Act, § 2(1)– (11) (1981).
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Section 2(9): “using, or passing on to another, information on a person’s private 
affairs otherwise than for the purpose for which it was given.” An infringement of 
privacy constitutes a civil tort and, if intentional, a criminal offense.
Section 19 of the ppA provides an exemption from liability under Section 2 for 
“security services,” defined to include the police, military intelligence (known 
according to its Hebrew acronym “Aman”), the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) 
(known according to its Hebrew acronym as “Shin Bet” or “Sahabak”),15 and the 
Institute for Intelligence and Special operations (known according to a shorthand 
version of its Hebrew name, “Mossad”).16 It states:
 (a) no person shall bear responsibility under this Act for an act which he is 
empowered to do by law.
 (b) A security authority or a person employed by it or acting on its behalf shall 
bear no responsibility under this Act for an infringement reasonably 
committed within the scope of their functions and for the purpose of 
carrying them out.
nongovernment entities cooperating with a security service while compromising 
the privacy interests of their customers can rely for a defense on Section 19(a) above 
as well as on Section 18(2)(b) of the ppA, which states that “[i] n any criminal or civil 
proceeding for infringement of privacy, it shall be a good defence if (…) (2)  the 
defendant or accused committed the infringement in good faith and in any of the 
following circumstances: (b) the infringement was committed in circumstances in 
which the infringer was under a legal, moral, social or professional obligation to 
commit it.”
Informational privacy is further regulated by Chapter B of the ppA, 
Israel’s data protection statute. Recognized by the european Commission 
in 2011 as providing “adequate” protection under eU data protection law,17 
Chapter B of the ppA establishes a procedure for database registration18 and 
sets forth informational privacy principles including transparency,19 purpose 
15. The ISA is responsible for internal security, domestic intelligence and counter- intelligence, 
and the fight against terrorism.
16.  The Mossad is responsible for foreign intelligence and covert missions beyond Israel’s 
borders.
17. Commission Decision of 31 January 2011 pursuant to Directive 95/ 46/ eC of the european 
parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data by the State of Israel 
with regard to automated processing of personal data, http:// eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=oJ:L:2011:027:0039:0042:en:pDF. It is interesting to note in this context 
that Ireland attempted to undermine Israel’s adequacy decision, arguing that Israeli security 
services are likely to access personal data shipped from the eU to Israel. See Laurence peter, 
“Ireland Delays eU Deal with Israel on Data Transfers,” BBC, September 3, 2010, http:// www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11176926.
18. §§ 8– 10 of the ppA.
19. § 11 of the ppA.
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limitation,20 security,21 confidentiality,22 access and rectification,23 and restric-
tions on transborder data flows.24
Significantly, Section 32 of the ppA provides an exclusionary rule pursuant to 
which (subject to certain narrow exceptions) “material obtained by the commis-
sion of an infringement of privacy shall not be used as evidence in court without 
the consent of the injured party.” This provision was used to quash evidence 
obtained from a suspect by use of force,25 by a party illicitly copying the coun-
terparty’s computer hard disk,26 and by a husband covertly photographing his 
wife having intercourse with another man.27 A separate provision is used to dis-
qualify evidence obtained through an illicit or improperly authorized wiretap.28
IV.  GOVERNMENT ACCESS
A.  Facilitating Government Surveillance
Similar to the Communications Assistance for Law enforcement Act (CALeA) 
in the United States, Section 13 of the Israeli Telecommunications Act (Telephone 
and Broadcast), 1982 (Telecommunications Act) empowers government officials 
to provide instructions to telecommunications operators to modify and design 
their equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that they have built- in surveil-
lance capabilities.
Under Section 13 of the Telecommunications Act, the prime minister, after 
consulting with the Minister of Communications and based on a request by the 
Minister of Defence, Minister of Domestic Security, the ISA, or the Mossad, can 
issue instructions to a telecommunications licensee with respect to “the instal-
lation of equipment, performance of a telecommunications service, or ensuring 
technological compatibility to telecommunications equipment (…) including 
the provision of access to equipment, as much as necessary to perform the roles 
of the security services or exercise their legal authority.”29 Section 13(a) of the 
Telecommunications Act defines a “security service” to include the Israel Defence 
20. § 8(b) of the ppA.
21. § 17 of the ppA; as well as the privacy protection Regulations (Conditions for Data Storage 
and Security and public Sector Data Sharing), 1986.
22. § 16 of the ppA.
23. §§ 13– 15 of the ppA.
24. The privacy protection Regulations (Transfer of Data to Databases outside of Israel), 2001.
25. Add. Hear. 9/ 83 Oiknine v. Military Court of Appeals, 42(3) p.D. 837 (1988).
26. BSe (TA) 1614/ 02 Multilock v. Rav Bariach (Tel Aviv Dist. Ct. February 7, 2002).
27. Plonit case, above note 10.
28. See analysis in Crim. App. 1302/ 92 State of Israel v. Nachmias, 49(3) p.D. 309 (1995).
29. Telecommunications Act (Telephone and Broadcast), 1982, § 13(b)(2).
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Forces, ISA, Mossad, police, and prison service. A  licensee is defined broadly 
through a complex set of definitions in Section 1 of the Telecommunications 
Act30 to include any fixed line or cellular operator, and ISps, as well as broadcast 
licensees (cable and satellite operators).
Under Section 13(d) of the Telecommunications Act, the prime minis-
ter’s instructions under Section 13(b) must remain secret. Section 13(e) of the 
Telecommunications Act provides immunity from civil or criminal liability (for 
example, for infringement of privacy) to a licensee and its employees for comply-
ing with an obligation under the same section. The payment by the government 
to the licensee for services rendered in accordance with Section 13(b), always a 
contentious issue, is regulated by Section 13(c) of the Telecommunications Act, 
which provides:
The payment for services rendered or actions taken according to subsection 
(b)  … will be determined in an agreement between the relevant security 
service and the licensee based on reasonable expense reimbursement and tak-
ing into account the existing price for the services rendered; in the absence of 
an agreement, the payment will be determined by a person appointed by the 
Attorney General…
B.  Wiretapping
Wiretapping, or lawful intercept, is regulated in Israel under the Wiretap Act, 
1979 (Wiretap Act). The Wiretap Act generally prohibits wiretapping and sets 
rules for lawful intercept by law enforcement and national security agencies. It 
defines a “conversation” as including not only voice communication but also 
communications between computers. It defines a wiretap as listening in to a con-
versation using a device without the consent of either party to the conversation.
A series of court decisions and instructions by the attorney general weighed 
whether the capture or interception by the police of certain synchronous or asyn-
chronous communications such as email messages, text messages, and voice-
mails constitute a “wiretap” or rather a “search,” which is subject in Israel to less 
legal process. The general thrust of these cases is that the capture of voicemail,31 
text messages32 or emails on a suspect’s device constitutes a search, whereas the 
interception of messages in transit, for example on the servers of an ISp, consti-
tutes a wiretap.33 nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not yet confronted these 
30. The nuances of the definition of a licensee are beyond the scope of this chapter, given the 
complexity of the Israeli licensing system, which comprises of “general” and “special” licenses 
as well as “general permits” under Section 4A1 of the Telecommunications Act.
31. Crim. App. 10343/ 01 Badir v. State of Israel (Supreme Court April 30, 2003).
32. BSp 3544/ 07 Adar v. Israel Police (Tel Aviv District Court September 18, 2007).
33. Crim. 40206/ 05 State of Israel v. Philosoph (Tel Aviv Dist. Ct. February 5, 2007).
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issues and the attorney general continues to view the capture of any asynchro-
nous communications, even on an ISp’s servers, as a search.
Lawful intercept by the police is allowed pursuant to a warrant issued by a 
president of a District Court.34 A broader mandate is provided to security ser-
vices, defined as military intelligence or the ISA. A security service may obtain a 
permit for a wiretap from the prime minister or the Minister of Defence (in this 
Act, the “Minister”) without judicial oversight. Under Section 4 of the Wiretap 
Act, “the Minister may authorise a wiretap in writing if requested to do so in 
writing by the head of a security service and if he is convinced, after giving due 
weight to the infringement of privacy, that it is necessary for national security.” 
Sections 4(b)– (c) of the Wiretap Act describe the specifics that must be found 
in a Minister’s permit, including the identity of the individual or device whose 
communications will be intercepted, the location of the conversations, and the 
duration of the monitoring (not to exceed three months, subject to periodic 
extension). However, the requirement to specify such details is qualified by the 
phrase “all if they are known in advance.” This implies that the Minister may 
well issue general wiretapping permits. In urgent cases, the head of a security 
service may himself authorize a wiretap for a period no longer than 48 hours; 
immediate notice must be sent to the Minister who is authorized to revoke such 
a wiretap.35
Although not subject to judicial oversight, national security wiretap permits 
are reported quarterly to the attorney general;36 and the number of such permits 
is reported annually to a special parliamentary committee convening behind 
closed doors.37 Additional issues regulated by the Wiretap Act include the manu-
facturing, import, and possession of wiretapping equipment;38 data retention and 
deletion requirements;39 the wiretapping of communications subject to eviden-
tiary privileges;40 and the admissibility of evidence obtained through an illegal 
or improperly authorized wiretap.41 Generally, such evidence is inadmissible; yet 
certain exemptions apply, namely “in a criminal proceeding for a serious felony, 
if a court decided to admit the evidence after having been convinced … that the 
interest in reaching the truth outweighs the interest in privacy.”42 An additional 
34. A president of a District Court in Israel is a senior judge who ranks junior to only Supreme 
Court justices.
35. The Wiretap Act, § 5.
36. The Wiretap Act, § 4(d).
37. The Wiretap Act, § 4(e).
38. The Wiretap Act, § 11.
39. The Wiretap Act, § 9B.
40. The Wiretap Act, §§ 9- 9A.
41. The Wiretap Act, § 13.
42. The Wiretap Act, § 13(a)(2).
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requirement for admissibility in these cases is that “an improperly authorised 
wiretap performed by a person who is in place to obtain legal authorisation 
will be inadmissible, except if performed in good faith due to an error based on 
apparent legal authorisation.”43 A 1995 amendment to the Wiretap Act provides 
that “evidence obtained by a lawful wiretap will be admissible in a criminal pro-
ceeding to prove any offense,” meaning not just the offense for which the permit 
was sought but any other offense discovered in the process.44
In the past few years, two high level inquiries were conducted into police (but 
not national security) use of wiretapping, one by a parliamentary committee and 
the other by the State Comptroller. These investigations were motivated, among 
other reasons, by high profile irregularities in the police use of wiretapping, 
including in the case of a government minister suspected of sexual misconduct. 
The parliamentary committee issued a public report in January 2009, proposing 
legislative amendments as well as putting in place internal rules and regulations 
on quality control, data deletion, incidental capture of a call subject to eviden-
tiary privilege, transparency, and more.45 Some of the proposed amendments 
were included in a government- sponsored bill submitted to parliament in 2009 
and still making its way through the legislative process.46 The State Comptroller 
issued its report in June 2010, sharply criticizing the police for their lack of suf-
ficient guidelines and violations of those guidelines that do exist.47 The State 
Comptroller’s report included detailed information about the volume of wire-
tapping permits issued to the police (but not the security services). For example, 
in 2004, the police petitioned the courts 962 times for wiretap permits, only 3 of 
which petitions were rejected; similar numbers were revealed for the next four 
years.48 These figures appear high compared to those in other Western democ-
racies such as the United States, which has a population 50 times larger than 
Israel’s yet had only 1,773 wiretap permits in 2005; or the UK, with a population 
10 times larger than Israel’s, and 1,983 wiretap permits.49 In addition, the State 
Comptroller expressed concern with the common police practice of obtaining 
43. The Wiretap Act, § 13(a)(2).
44. The Wiretap Act, § 13(c1).
45.  Summary of parliamentary Committee Hearings for Investigation of Wiretapping, 
26 Jan. 2009, http:// bit.ly/GAmJrs.
46.  Wiretap Act Bill (Amendment no. 6), 2009, http:// www.justice.gov.il/nR/rdonlyres/
BD69535B-eC59-45AA-Ae63-6DB0C65112F4/16891/455.pdf.
47.  State Comptroller opinion, Wiretapping in Criminal Investigations, June 2010, http://
www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/pages/156.aspx.
48.  2005:  996 petitions, 14 rejected; 2006:  1255 petitions, 7 rejected; 2007:  1484 petitions, 
11 rejected; 2008: 1797 petitions, 16 rejected.
49.  These figures are derived from the State Comptroller’s report, at p.  62. other Western 
democracies had a much higher instance of wiretapping authorizations. For example, Italy 
had 100,000 and Germany 42,000.
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authorization for a wiretap based on investigation of a serious felony, only to use 
the evidence to prosecute a lesser offense.
C.  Communications Data
In 2007 the Knesset enacted a new statute regulating the authority of law enforce-
ment agencies to access communications data, the Criminal procedure Act 
(enforcement powers— Communications Traffic Data), 2007 (Communications 
Data Act). Until then, law enforcement access to communications (non- content) 
data was moderated by an arcane provision of a criminal procedure statute dat-
ing back to the 1930s titled “seizure of an object.”50
notice, however, that access by the ISA to communications data is regulated 
by a specific provision in the General Security Service Act, 2002 (ISAA). The 
passage of the Communications Data Act was accompanied by intense public 
debate, including more than a dozen multi- stakeholder parliamentary hear-
ings. In the process, the new statute was dubbed the “Big Brother Law” in the 
press and its validity is currently being challenged on constitutional grounds 
in the Supreme Court. This stands in stark contrast to the ISAA, which confers 
far broader powers to the ISA and does so without any judicial scrutiny. Several 
reasons could potentially help explain the relative public acquiescence with the 
ISAA: First, in 2002 the mobile age was just dawning; the public was unaware of 
the magnitude of the privacy impact of communications data, which up to that 
point were perceived as a simple “pen register” of calls.51 Second, the ISAA was 
enacted in the midst of the second Intifada; Israel was awash with horrifying ter-
rorism and the public sought a strong ISA. Third, the ISA, like the Mossad and 
Aman, have always enjoyed special status in Israeli society and are less prone to 
public criticism than the police.
1.  Law Enforcement Access
The Communications Data Act defines “communications data” as “location 
data, subscriber data, and traffic data; as long as these do not include contents 
data.”52 As discussed above, access to contents data is regulated by the Wiretap 
Act. The Communications Data Act sets forth three tracks for law enforcement 
access to communications data. First, under Section 3 of the Communications 
Data Act, the police, as well as a list of enumerated law enforcement agencies, can 
petition a Magistrates Court for authorization to obtain communications data 
in order to save or protect the life of an individual; to uncover, investigate, or 
50. Criminal procedure ordinance (Arrest and Search), 1969, § 43.
51. This is the hypothesis of Avi Dichter, the Head of the ISA at the time of legislation, in 
a conference on “A Decade for the ISAA,” College of Management School of Law, March 
20, 2012.
52. Communications Data Act, § 1. each of the terms “location data,” “subscriber data,” and 
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prevent a crime; to apprehend and prosecute a criminal; or to confiscate property 
under the law.53 The term “crime” is defined broadly to include “a felony or a mis-
demeanor”— drawing sharp criticism from privacy and human rights activists. 
Section 3(g) of the Communications Data Act provides that “in its decision and 
in determining the period of time for access to communications data, the court 
will bring into consideration … the degree of infringement of individual pri-
vacy, the severity of the crime, whether the individual is a professional benefiting 
from an evidentiary privilege, and the type of communications data sought.”
The second track allows for access in urgent cases without a court order. Under 
Section 4 of the Communications Data Act, a senior police officer may issue an 
urgent order effective for 24 hours “if such an order is necessary to prevent a 
felony or apprehend a felon or to save the life of an individual and there is insuf-
ficient time to petition a court for a Section 3 order.”54 The Communications 
Data Act requires the police to report periodically to the attorney general and 
to a parliamentary committee about the number of Section 4 orders issued.55 
Both Section 3 court orders and Section 4 urgent orders are addressed at telecom 
operators and telecom operators must comply with them promptly. Section 3(i) 
provides that the reasons specified by a court for a Section 3 order will not be 
disclosed to the telecom operator. Telecom operators are bound to secrecy under 
Section 5 of the Communications Data Act, which provides that “[a] telecom 
provider or its employee will not disclose to a subscriber or any other person the 
transfer of communications data to the police or any other enforcement agency, 
except if ordered to do so by a court.”56 Section 15 of the Communications Data 
Act amended the Wiretap Act, authorizing the court or an officer issuing a wire-
tap permit to also authorize access to communications data.57
The third track, which sparked fierce public controversy, authorizes the police 
to require a telecom operator, defined for the purposes of this section as strictly 
a fixed line or cellular operator (i.e., not an ISp), to turn over an updated file 
containing (1) the identifying details of all of its subscribers58 including unique 
device identifiers for their phones or parts thereof, and (2) information concern-
ing the mapping of its cellular antennas, including identifying details for each 
antenna and its area of coverage.59 Under Section 7 of the Communications Data 
Act, the police must maintain the security and confidentiality of the database 
53. Communications Data Act, § 3(a).
54. Communications Data Act, § 4(a).
55. Communications Data Act, §§ 4(e) and 14(a)(2).
56. Communications Data Act, § 5.
57. Communications Data Act, § 15, adding § 9C of the Wiretap Act.
58.  “Identifying details” is defined as name, ID number, address, and telephone number. 
Communications Data Act, § 1.
59. Communications Data Act, § 6.
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established under Section 6, including logging access and not using the data for 
any purpose except those authorized under Section 3.
The Communications Data Act authorizes the Minister of Domestic Security 
to issue regulations governing the maintenance of the Section 6 database. Such 
regulations must be approved by the parliamentary Constitution, Law and 
Justice Committee. In August 2008, the Minister of Domestic Security presented 
the draft regulations to the parliamentary committee; yet his proposal was met 
by stiff resistance when the hearing surfaced apparent abuses of power by the 
police. For example, Cellcom, Israel’s largest cellular operator, revealed that as a 
matter of practice the police required access to data items not explicitly enumer-
ated in the Communications Data Act and generously exercised its authority to 
issue urgent Section 4 orders.60
In April 2008, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) petitioned the 
Supreme Court to invalidate parts of the Communications Data Act, arguing 
they constituted a disproportionate infringement of the fundamental right to 
privacy. The Supreme Court heard the case, ACRI v. Israeli Police, in an expanded 
panel, usually reserved for weighty constitutional issues.61
In its petition, ACRI focused its criticism on three aspects of the law: First, it 
argued that permitting access to communications data in the context of misde-
meanors is overly broad; it requested that the court limit access to cases involv-
ing serious felonies. Second, ACRI argued that the test for providing a judicial 
order under Section 3 is too loose, enabling the police to obtain orders for the 
purpose of intelligence gathering without probable cause for a specific crime. 
Third, ACRI argued that a police officer’s power to issue an urgent order under 
Section 4 must not extend to cases involving a professional benefiting from an 
evidentiary privilege (e.g., a lawyer or physician). Finally, ACRI argued that the 
database established under Section 6 of the Communications Data Act must 
exclude details of individuals who opted- out of caller ID.
pursuant to the submission of the ACRI’s petition, the Israeli press Council 
and the Israeli Bar, which enjoys the membership of more than 50,000 lawyers, 
asked to join ACRI as petitioners. In its petition, the Israeli Bar emphasized the 
need to craft a specific solution for urgent orders addressed at professionals sub-
ject to evidentiary privileges. In addition, it argued that unlike the ppA and the 
60.  See protocol no. 639 from meeting of the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice 
Committee, August 13, 2008. Cellcom’s representative said: “I don’t know if this is the time 
or place to say this, but this statute takes the telecom operators out of the game of data trans-
fers. The police have the authority and ability to cross the data whichever way they want. 
They’ll have the antenna’s area of coverage; they’ll have the subscribers’ database; they can 
do many things with this information.” The regulations were adopted in Dec. 2008. Criminal 
procedure Regulations (enforcement powers— Communications Traffic Data) (Database of 
Identifying Communications Data), 2008.
61. HCJ 3809/ 08 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Israeli Police (Sup. Ct. May 28, 2012).
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Wiretap Act, the Communications Data Act lacks a provision rendering improp-
erly obtained evidence inadmissible at trial.
In May 2012, the Israeli Supreme Court denied the petitions and upheld the 
validity of the Communications Data Act, despite recognizing its infringement 
on privacy. In an 82- page decision, the court analyzed the legislation under the 
constitutional limitation clause, finding that it was enacted for a proper purpose 
and restricted constitutional rights to an extent no greater than is necessary. At 
the same time, the Court set forth strict criteria for implementing law enforce-
ment access to communications data under each of the statutory tracks. The 
court emphasized the accountability of law enforcement authorities to the attor-
ney general and to parliament. In approving the validity of the law, the Court set 
forth guidelines, particularly around access to communications data of profes-
sionals benefitting from an evidentiary privilege.
2.  Security Services Access
As discussed above, the ISA enjoyed broad access to communications data even 
before the enactment of the Communications Data Act. In the 1990s, the gov-
ernment of Israel decided to enact a law regulating the status and powers of the 
ISA, which until then operated based on government decisions and without leg-
islative mandate.62 years of preparatory work by the legal department of the ISA 
and the Ministry of Justice led to the enactment of the ISAA in 2002.63 The ISAA 
treads a middle path between “skeletal” national security agency statutes, such 
as the UK’s,64 and voluminous, detailed statutes, such as Australia’s.65 Although 
not addressing thorny issues such as the use of force in interrogations, the ISAA 
does introduce a specific section for communications data.66 Section 11 of the 
ISAA provides:
 (a) in this section— ’Licensee’— as defined in Section 13 of the 
Telecommunications Act (Telephone and Broadcast), 1982.
  ‘Data’— including communications data, except contents data as 
defined in the Wiretap Act, 1979.
62. The decision to legislate was motivated by a series of public scandals, such as the execution 
without trial of two palestinian terrorists by ISA operatives and later attempt of cover- up (the 
“Line 300 Scandal”); as well as the Supreme Court decision in the Public Committee Against 
Torture case, supra note 4, outlawing the use of force in interrogations.
63. For a thorough review of the legislative process and rationale see Arye Rotter, The General 
Security Service Act— Anatomy of Legislation, Mar. 2010. (Rotter was Legal Counsel for the 
ISA during the legislative process).
64. Security Service Act 1989, c. 5, which has only seven sections.
65. Australian Security Intelligence organisation Act 1979, Act no. 113 of 1979.
66. General Security Service Act, § 11.
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 (b) The prime Minister may set forth rules determining that categories 
of data found in databases of a licensee are required for the ISA for 
performing its roles under this law and that the licensee must transfer 
such categories of data to the ISA.
 (c) Any use of data found in a database according to subsection 
(b) is subject to a permit issued by the Head of the ISA after being 
convinced that the data are required for the ISA for performing its 
roles under this law; the permit will specify, inasmuch as possible, 
details concerning the data sought, the purpose for which they are 
sought, and the database in which they are found; the permit will be 
limited in duration for a period not greater than 6 months; except that 
the Head of the ISA may periodically extend this period.
 (d) The Head of the ISA will report quarterly to the prime Minister and 
the Attorney General, and annually to the parliamentary committee 
for ISA matters, about permits issued and data used under this 
section; reporting details will be set in rules.
 (e) The prime Minister will promulgate rules regarding the retention 
by a licensee of categories of data according to subsection (b) for a 
period that he determines and the transfer of categories of data to 
the ISA; the prime Minister will determine in rules agreed upon by 
the Minister of Justice provisions regarding the storage and security 
of data transferred to the ISA under this section and deletion or 
destruction of data that are no longer necessary.
 (f) Section 13(e) of the Telecommunications Act will apply to the 
performance of obligations under this section.67
The access powers under section 11 of the ISAA apply to data held by “licensees” 
under the Telecommunications Act. As discussed above, a licensee is defined 
broadly in the Telecommunications Act to include any fixed line or cellular oper-
ator, and ISps, as well as broadcast licensees (cable and satellite operators).68
Section 11(b) grants the prime minister almost unfettered authority to pro-
mulgate rules setting forth categories of communications data that a licensee 
must transfer to the ISA. Such rules were in fact put in place by the prime minis-
ter, yet their content remains classified in accordance with Section 19(a)(1) of the 
ISA.69 Under Section 11(c) of the ISAA, the Head of the ISA has broad powers to 
permit ISA access to or use of such categories of communications data that the 
prime minister set forth in his rules. Indeed, the only condition qualifying both 
67. This is the author’s translation and is non- binding.
68. Above note 30.
69. Section 19(a)(1) of the ISA provides that “rules, internal instructions, internal procedures 
and the identity of ISA operatives, in the past or present, as well as additional details con-
cerning the ISA to be determined in regulations, are secret and their disclosure or publishing 
prohibited.”
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the prime minister’s and Head of ISA’s respective authority is that the commu-
nications data “are required for the ISA for performing its roles under this law.” 
The communications data subject to the ISA authority include any data held by a 
licensee with the notable exception of communications contents.70
To counterbalance these broad powers, the ISAA sets forth certain transparency 
requirements. First, under Section 11(c) of the ISAA, the Head of ISA must specify 
in each permit details concerning the data sought, the purpose for which they are 
sought, and the database in which they are found. yet this requirement is tempered 
by the modifier “inasmuch as possible,” effectively allowing for much less detailed 
permits. In addition, each permit is limited in duration for a period no longer than 
six months; yet such a term may be extended time and again indefinitely. More 
significant, under Section 11(d) of the ISAA, the Head of ISA must report period-
ically to the prime minister and the attorney general (quarterly) and to the parlia-
mentary committee for ISA matters (annually) about permits issued and data used 
under Section 11. These reporting requirements, although not public or subject 
to judicial oversight, are significant, as they are made to the highest official in the 
executive branch (the prime minister) and the legal service (the attorney general), 
as well as to the legislative branch (the parliamentary committee).
Although formally part of the executive branch, the attorney general enjoys a 
unique status in Israel’s constitutional and administrative system. He is the only 
legal counsel to the government and the head of the general prosecution. His 
advice to the government is binding. He provides guidance to the government 
ministries’ legal advisors, who are subject to the authority of the attorney general 
even where his position conflicts with that of their responsible minister.
elyakim Rubinstein, a former attorney general and current Supreme Court 
justice, explains:
A written directive by the Attorney General instructs the Government min-
istries to abide by legal opinions; the legal advisor’s opinion binds the minis-
try; the Attorney General’s advice binds the government subject, of course, to 
court decisions.71
In court, the government cannot be represented by outside counsel without the 
agreement of the attorney general, which is very rarely given. The attorney gen-
eral is a non- political, professional appointment selected by a search commit-
tee chaired by a former Supreme Court justice. A candidate for attorney general 
must himself be eligible to become a Supreme Court justice.
To understand the attorney general’s degree of autonomy and isolation from 
political influence, consider that as head of the prosecution, Israel’s last attorney 
70.  See definition of “Data;” General Security Service Act, § 11(a), which stands in stark 
contrast to the highly detailed and nuanced definition of communications data in the 
Communications Data Act.
71. See elyakim Rubinstein, “The Attorney General in Israel: A Delicate Balance of powers 
and Responsibilities in a Jewish and Democratic State,” 11:2 Israel Affairs 417, 422 (2005).
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general Meni Mazzuz indicted an acting president (Moshe Katzav, convicted of 
rape and sentenced to eight years imprisonment), prime minister (ehud olmert, 
forced to resign, convicted of corruption and sentenced to 27 months imprison-
ment), minister of finance (Avraham Hirschzon, convicted of corruption and 
sentenced to 5.5  years imprisonment); and minister of justice (Haim Ramon, 
convicted of sexual misconduct and sentenced to community service).
By imposing strict reporting requirements on the attorney general, the ISAA 
strikes a balance between granting the ISA broad powers and imposing a degree 
of accountability. This balance may not be optimal— given the isolation of the 
process from public or judicial scrutiny. yet this arrangement is not trivial as in 
some other Western democracies where the degree of engagement of the security 
services with the government legal service may not be as strong, and the govern-
ment legal service itself not as independent.
The final provision of Section 11 of the ISAA provides immunity from civil 
or criminal liability to a licensee and its employees for complying with an 
obligation under the same section. A similar provision does not appear in the 
Communications Data Act, meaning that a telecom operator or its employee 
complying with an order under the Communications Data Act must rely on the 
exemptions in Sections 18(2)(b) or 19(a) of the ppA or Section 6 of the Torts 
ordinance (new Version), which provides a blanket immunity from tort liability 
for non- negligent acts or omissions mandated by a legal obligation or based on a 
good faith belief in the existence of such an obligation.
Finally, it is important to note that access to communications data for national 
security purposes under the ISAA is restricted to the ISA; the regime does not 
apply to additional national security organizations such as the Mossad and 
Aman, particularly Unit 8200 responsible for SIGInT (signals intelligence).72 
There is no public information concerning these organizations’ access to domes-
tic communications data, if any.
3.  Data Retention
Unlike the eU,73 Israel does not have a general data retention statute. This 
means that the telecom operators could ostensibly delete communications data 
promptly after using them for their own purposes. Indeed, one interpretation of 
the purpose limitation provisions in the ppA74 is that such deletion is required by 
privacy law. To this end, Section 11(e) of the ISAA authorizes the prime minister 
to promulgate rules “regarding the retention by a licensee of categories of data 
72.  See, for example, Gil Kerbs, “The Unit,” Forbes, February 8, 2007, http:// www.forbes.
com/2007/02/07/israel-military-unit-ventures-biz-cx_gk_0208israel.html.
73. Directive 2006/ 24/ eC of the european parliament and of the Council of 15 Mar. 2006 on 
the Retention of Data Generated or processed in Connection with the provision of publicly 
Available electronic Communications Services or of public Communications networks and 
Amending Directive 2002/ 58/ eC, 2006 o.J. (L 105) 54 (April 13, 2006).
74. privacy protection Act, §§ 2(9) and 8(b).
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according to subsection (b), for a period that he determines.” As discussed, such 
rules, if they have been put in place, remain secret. A similar provision is not 
found in the Communications Data Act, raising doubts whether telecom opera-
tors must retain data if not required to do so by the prime minister’s national 
security rules.
The question of whether telecom providers are required (or, conversely, 
allowed) to retain communications data arose in the Amir Liran v.  Pelephone 
case.75 The plaintiff requested that his two cellular operators delete his commu-
nications data after he settled his bill. To assure the cellular operators he was 
not going to challenge the bills, he was willing to execute a waiver of claims. He 
argued that the retention of his communications data without a specific purpose 
infringes his privacy and violates the ppA. The attorney general, who has author-
ity to intervene in litigation in order to represent the public interest, submitted 
an opinion in the case arguing that the Communications Data Act should be 
interpreted to permit the retention of communications data by telecom opera-
tors “for a reasonable period of time.” The Tel Aviv District Court accepted the 
attorney general’s argument, holding that absent a specific obligation to delete 
communications data, telecom operators were permitted to retain them. This 
decision was criticized by commentators, including the author of this chapter, 
who argued that the court misinterpreted the balance struck by the ppA between 
individual rights and legitimate business interests and failed to take account of 
the constitutional status of the right to privacy.76
4.  The Mechanics of Data Transfers
What are the mechanics of data transfers from telecom operators to law enforce-
ment and security services? Are transfers moderated by an employee of the tele-
com operator, or do data flow at the will of ISA operatives? Is the “switch” to 
the “pipe” in the hands of the telecom company or the security service? Who 
pays for retention and use of stored communications data? Although technical, 
these questions often determine the effective protection provided to subscribers’ 
privacy rights. In practice, human rights are usually protected by detailed proce-
dures and protocols and more easily compromised in their absence.
In Movement for Freedom of Information v. Ministry of Communications, the 
Israeli Movement for Freedom of Information (the Movement), an nGo, peti-
tioned an administrative court under the Freedom of Information Act, 1998 
(FoIA), to order the state to make public the “secret annexes” to the licenses of 
mobile operators and ISps.77 The Movement argued that when the government 
75. Civ. 1994/ 06 Amir Liran v. Pelephone (Tel Aviv District Ct. november 30, 2010).
76.  See omer Tene, “Cellular Customers Have no privacy,” The Marker, January 11, 2011, 
http:// www.themarker.com/ law/ 1.596014; Dan Hay, Communications Data in Israel (Tel 
Aviv: Vital publishing) 2011, 45– 48.
77. Admin. App. 890/ 07 Movement for Freedom of Information v. Ministry of Communications 
(on file with the author).
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awarded mobile operators and ISps licenses, it annexed secret rules regulating 
the access of the ISA to the operators’ databases. The Movement stated that even 
as parliament debates the details of the draft Communications Data Act, the 
ISA enjoys unrestricted access to similar data without judicial oversight or pub-
lic scrutiny. The Movement argued that although specific uses or data catego-
ries may warrant secrecy, there is no reason to conceal from the public the fact 
that government access exists. The government resisted the FoIA request and 
the petition, arguing that the annexes do not provide the ISA with any surveil-
lance powers but rather set forth technical specifications for placing the “pipe” 
through which the data are channeled. Use of the “pipe” is only made in the pres-
ence of a statutory mandate, which is available for public review.78 After having 
reviewed the “secret annexes” and heard the government’s arguments ex parte in 
closed chambers, the court confirmed that the annexes contain strictly technical 
specifications as opposed to legal mandates and suggested that the Movement 
withdraw the appeal, which it did.79
An additional question concerns payment for retention and use of stored com-
munications data. Section 10 of the Communications Data Act provides that “a 
licensee is entitled for reimbursement of expenses related to the transfer of com-
munications data to the police or another investigating authority under Sections 
3, 4, or 9, as well as for the transfer of a file under Section 6, in an amount deter-
mined by the Minister of Communications (…) The amount reimbursed shall be 
based on recovery of reasonable expenses.” Some commentators believe that this 
provision was the motivating force for the enactment of the Communications 
Data Act, as before the legislation came into force the telecom operators charged 
the police high fees to perform similar services.80 During the legislative hearings, 
one Member of parliament suggested intentionally setting a high fee in order to 
temper the police’s zeal to obtain data, thereby protecting individuals’ privacy 
through a prohibitive cost structure.81
5.  Cybersecurity
on August 7, 2011, the government of Israel approved the establishment of 
the Israel national Cyber Bureau (InCB) charged with leading the promot-
ion of cyber- related matters in Israel, coordinating between the various bod-
ies, enhancing the protection of national infrastructure from cyberattack, and 
encouraging the advancement of the subject in industry and academia (Decision 
78. The use of the “pipe” metaphor appears in the government’s response: Response of the 
Government of Israel to Admin. App. 890/ 07, at ¶ 35 (on file with the author).
79. Admin. App. 890/ 07, protocol and decision of november 5, 2007 (on file with the author).
80. See, for example, Hay, above note 76, at p. 206. In the government- sponsored bill leading 
to the enactment of the Communications Data Act, the government explained: “The police 
are required to pay very significant fees to the operators. The rates vary depending on the 
company, and there is no clear relation between the fee and the expenses incurred.”
81. Hay, ibid., at p. 208.
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3611). The InCB reports directly to the prime minister. on February 15, 2015, 
the government approved a comprehensive plan for national readiness in cyber-
space, including the establishment of a national Cyber Defence Authority that 
will have overall national responsibility for cyber defense (Decision 2444).
The Authority, which will be established over a three- year period, will oversee 
cyber defense actions so as to provide a comprehensive response against cyberat-
tacks including dealing with threats and events in real time. It will also operate 
an assistance center, a Cyber event Readiness Team (CeRT), for dealing with 
cyber threats. In connection with the establishment of the Authority, a group 
of Israeli privacy and data security experts, including the country’s former pri-
vacy regulator yoram Hacohen, wrote a letter to the attorney general expressing 
concern about lack of privacy protections and mechanisms for oversight in the 
arrangement.
Under Decision 2444, the Authority was required:  (1)  to conduct, operate, 
and implement, as needed, all the operational defensive efforts in cyberspace at 
the national level, including handling cyber threats and incidents in real time, 
formulating an ongoing situational awareness, consolidating and analyzing 
intelligence, and working with the defense community as detailed in a classi-
fied addendum; (2) to operate the national CeRT, including working to improve 
cyber resilience, providing assistance in handling cyber threats and incidents, 
consolidating and sharing relevant information with all the organizations in the 
market, and serving as a central point of interface between the defense commun-
ity and the organizations in the market; and (3) to build and strengthen the cyber 
resilience of the entire market through preparedness, training, and regulation.
At this point, it remains to be seen what if any voluntary or obligatory data 
sharing requirements will be imposed on businesses vis- à- vis the Authority or 
national CeRT.
6.  Additional Laws
In addition to the laws discussed above, which focus on communications data, 
Israel has launched various legislative initiatives involving collection of personal 
data by government, including a national biometric database (Law on Inclusion 
of Biometric Identifiers in Identification Documents and Database, 2009), a new 
credit reporting database (Credit Information Act, 2016), a connected cities ini-
tiative (City Without Violence), and a government decision to access to pnR and 
ApI (Advance passenger Information) data of airlines flying to and from Israel 
(Government of Israel Decision 2258). These laws and initiatives demonstrate an 
ongoing erosion in privacy protections for individuals’ data, particularly when 
faced with strong state interests.
V.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Israel regulates government access to communications data through four legisla-
tive instruments: the Wiretap Act, which deals with interception of communica-
tions contents; the Telecommunications Act, which deals with compatibility with 
 
 
C o U n T R y  R e p o R T S110
10
surveillance technologies; the ISAA, which deals with ISA access to communica-
tions data; and the Communications Data Act, which deals with such access by 
the police. In all cases, broad powers are conferred on the executive branch in the 
context of national security, reflecting Israel’s unique challenges in this space. At 
the same time, mechanisms for accountability are put in place through periodic 
reporting requirements to parliament and to the attorney general.
11
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Systematic Government Access  
to Private- Sector Data in Italy
G I O R G I O   R E S TA
I.  ABSTR ACT
Italian law contains a variety of different legal provisions relevant to data protection 
and access to private data by law enforcement.
The relevant sources of law can include interpretations of constitutional provi-
sions by the Italian courts, implementation of eU law into Italian law, and statutory 
provisions, in particular the Italian “Data protection Code”; general civil law is also 
relevant.
Special rules apply to data processing in specific sectors, in particular the judicial 
sector, law enforcement, and national security.
Several statutes make a broad reporting of private- sector data mandatory. This 
can include, for example, tax data, data relevant to anti- money- laundering obliga-
tions, data relating to mobile phone usage, data of hotel clients, and insurance data.
Legislation provides individuals with the opportunity to assert their rights either 
by filing a private lawsuit or by filing a complaint with the Italian Data protection 
Authority.
II.  NATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT AND FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES
The Italian Constitution does not explicitly protect the right to data privacy. This 
Constitution was adopted in 1947, when computers and electronic databanks 
were still unknown. It is not surprising, therefore, that no provision comparable 
to Article 13 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation— according 
to which “[e] veryone has the right to be protected against the misuse of their 
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of law and the safeguarding of fundamental rights,1 and several articles of the 
Constitution provide for the protection of a range of interests that are strictly 
related to information privacy. one might mention, for instance, Article 14 (invi-
olability of the home) and Article 15 (privacy of communications). Such pro-
visions have been frequently referred to— together with the general clauses on 
personal liberty and dignity2— as a constitutional basis for the right to privacy.3
More importantly, Articles 11 and 117 of the Constitution, recognizing the 
limitations of sovereignty necessary to achieve international cooperation, have 
opened the Italian legal system to the influence of european Law.4 As a result, 
the right to data protection has acquired— although indirectly— constitutional 
status. Indeed, it should be recalled that, according to Article 8 of the european 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, “everyone has the right to the protection of per-
sonal data concerning him or her” (following the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the Charter has the same legal status as the european Union Treaties). In 
a similar vein, the european Court of Justice and the european Court of Human 
Rights have repeatedly asserted that the right to data protection ranks among 
the fundamental rights guaranteed by european law.5 one can conclude, there-
fore, that information privacy has constitutional (or at least para- constitutional) 
status in Italy, not through explicit guarantees, but as a result of the interaction 
between internal and european law.6
The influence of european law has proven extremely significant on a statutory 
level as well. Indeed, until 1996, Italy had no general regulation on data privacy. 
The only relevant sources were sparse and fragmentary provisions dealing, for 
instance, with the protection of workers’ privacy, or privacy of communications. 
Italy signed the 1981 Strasbourg Convention for the protection of individuals 
with regard to automatic processing of personal data; however, this covenant has 
1. Art. 2 Italian Constitution.
2. Arts. 2, 3, and 13 Italian Constitution.
3. See, for instance, the decisions of the Italian Constitutional Court 34/ 1973; 38/ 1973; 81/ 
1993; 372/ 2006. on the protection of privacy under Italian constitutional law see G.M. 
Salerno, “La protezione della riservatezza e l’inviolabilità della corrispondenza,” in R. nania 
& p. Ridola, eds., I diritti costituzionali, vol. I (Torino: Giappichelli, 2001), 417.
4. See, in particular, art. 117, par. 1: “Legislative power belongs to the state and the regions in 
accordance with the constitution and within the limits set by european Union law and inter-
national obligations.”
5. See, for example, eCJ, Case C- 293/ 12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Communic’s, 
Marine and Natural Res., 2014 e.C.R (2014); eCJ, Case C- 362/ 14, Maximilian Schrems v. Data 
Protection Commissioner [Ireland], 2015; euCtHR, Roman Zacharov v.  Russia, App. no. 
47143/ 06 (2015).
6. G. Resta, “Il diritto alla protezione dei dati personali,” in F. Cardarelli, S. Sica & V. Zeno 
Zencovich, eds., Il Codice dei dati personali: Temi e problemi (Milano: Giuffre, 2004), 31– 39; S. 
niger, Le nuove dimensioni della privacy: dal diritto alla riservatezza alla protezione dei dati 
personali (padova: CeDAM, 2006).
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not been transposed into Italian law until recently. only in 1996 did Italy pass 
a bill on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data, implementing the Directive 95/ 46/ eC.7
In 2003 this act had been repealed and substituted by a “Data protection Code” 
(hereinafter Data protection Code) (d.lgs. 196/ 2003). This statute is conceived 
as a general law on information:  it applies to the processing of personal data 
(defined as “any information relating to natural persons that are or can be identi-
fied, even indirectly, by reference to any other information including a personal 
identification number”) with or without electronic means. Article 2, paragraph 
1 states the purposes of the Data protection Code as follows: “[t] his consolidated 
statute […] shall ensure that personal data are processed by respecting data sub-
jects’ rights, fundamental freedoms and dignity, particularly with regard to con-
fidentiality, personal identity and the right to personal data protection.”
The linkage between the information privacy and the category of fundamen-
tal rights cannot be overlooked.8 on a statutory level, this provision confirms 
the primary status of the right to data protection, conceived as an expression of 
dignity. Consistent with this approach, the second paragraph of Article 2 lays 
down the principle that “[t] he processing of personal data shall be regulated by 
affording a high level of protection for the rights and freedoms referred to in 
paragraph 1 […]”. The Italian Constitutional Court has indirectly confirmed the 
particular relevance of the right to data protection. In a 2005 ruling, for instance, 
the Court decided that, in the event of a conflict between the Data protection 
Code and a regional law (Italy is not a federal state, but regions have the power to 
legislate in several fields), the former shall prevail, as information privacy is part 
of the general civil law framework (ordinamento civile) mentioned by Article 117 
Const.9 The institutional safeguards established by state law cannot therefore be 
infringed by contrasting provisions adopted by the regions.
III.  STATUTORY AND REGULATORY OVERVIEW
The rules on information processing set out in the Data protection Code are 
applicable both to the private and the public sector. Given the wide scope of appli-
cation of the statute, the right to data protection must be constantly balanced 
against conflicting interests. Many of them have constitutional status as well. To 
name a few: freedom of expression (Article. 10 Const.), proper and fair operation 
of public affairs (Article 97 Const.), fair administration of justice (Article 111 
Const.), and protection of health (Article 32 Const.). Striking a balance between 
7.  Law 675/ 1996, Tutela delle persone e di altri soggetti rispetto al trattamento dei dati 
personali.
8. S. Rodotà, “Tra diritti fondamentali ed elasticità della normativa: il nuovo Codice sulla pri-
vacy,” in Eur. Dir. Priv. (2004), 2.
9. See Corte cost., 271/ 2005, in Giur. cost., 2005, 2519, with a comment by A. Celotto, “Una 
additiva di principio ‘inutile’ o ‘ridondante?’ ”.
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such values is never an easy task, and this is even more so in the public sector. 
Two factors play a major role. on the one hand, the greater expansion of the wel-
fare state has enhanced the need for a capillary system of information retrieval 
and processing, not only with the purpose of making social services available, 
but also of preventing fraudulent behaviors. Several databanks have been estab-
lished with this purpose in mind. Suffice it to mention, as a single example, the 
social security benefits database (Casellario dell’assistenza).10
on the other hand, the development of information and communication 
technologies and the increasing computerization of the public administra-
tion have made the setup and interconnection of data sets much easier, giving 
rise to more comprehensive and intrusive collections. It should also be added 
that the financial crisis has strengthened the pressure toward the adoption of 
measures aimed at curtailing tax evasion (Italy is among the top three ranking 
countries of the world for tax evasion)11 and fraudulent behaviors in the field of 
social security benefits. As a result, “systematic” access to private data,12 despite 
its strong impact on fundamental freedoms, is increasingly resorted to by the 
government.13 However, the Data protection Code laid down a detailed set of 
rules and principles aimed at striking an acceptable balance between private and 
public interests involved in the processing of personal data by public bodies.14 
I will stress here only three points.
 (a) First, the whole regime is based on the principle of use limitation. 
The processing of personal data is not allowed for all purposes; 
public bodies are only permitted to process personal data “in order 
to discharge their institutional tasks” (Article 18, paragraph 2). Such 
a requirement is consistent with Article 7 of the Data protection 
Directive, according to which personal data may be processed— 
among other conditions— if the “processing is necessary for the 
performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the 
exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party 
to whom the data are disclosed.”
10. This database has been set up on the basis of Art. 13, Decree- Law 78/ 2010 and Decree 206/ 
2014.
11.  See http:// www.repubblica.it/ economia/ 2012/ 10/ 03/ news/ corte_ conti_ evasione_ italia_ 
primissimi_ posti- 43782971/ (quoting the declaration of the head of the Italian Court of 
Auditors) (last visited April 30, 2017).
12.  on this notion see Fred H. Cate, James X. Dempsey & Ira S. Rubinstein, “Systematic 
Government Access to private- Sector Data,” 2 Int. Data Privacy L. 195 (2012).
13. See infra, par. 4.
14. See A. de Tura, “Le regole ulteriori per i soggetti pubblici,” in V. Cuffaro, R. D’orazio & V. 
Ricciuto, eds., Il codice del trattamento dei dati personali (Torino: Giappichelli, 2007), 163– 91.
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 (b) Second, different standards have been laid down in the Code, 
depending on the features of the data. (i) If the processing concerns 
sensitive data15 and judicial data, it is allowed only if authorized 
by a law “specifying the categories of data that may be processed 
and the categories of operation that may be performed as well as 
the substantial public interest pursued” (Article 20). Lacking such 
a statutory basis, public bodies may request the Data protection 
Authority (Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, hereinafter 
Garante) to determine the activities that pursue a substantial public 
interest among those they are required to discharge under the law. 
However, the Code makes clear that the processing of sensitive 
and judicial data by public bodies should be carried out only in 
exceptional situations; that is, it should be considered as extrema 
ratio. According to Article 22, paragraph 3, public bodies may 
process such sensitive and judicial data as are “indispensable for 
them to discharge institutional tasks that cannot be performed, 
on a case by case basis, by processing anonymous data or else 
personal data of a different nature” (this is frequently referred to as 
the principle of necessity, or data minimisation).16 Also, particular 
technical measures should be adopted, in order to enhance the 
security of processing operations.17 (ii) Data other than sensitive and 
judicial can be processed even in the absence of laws or regulations 
expressly providing for such processing. particular rules apply to 
the communication18 of such data to third parties, including public 
bodies. In this case, the communication is permitted only if it is 
envisaged by laws or regulations. Lacking such laws or regulations, 
the communication is allowed if two conditions are met: a) it is 
necessary in order to discharge institutional tasks; and b) the Garante 
has been notified of the intention to communicate the data and has 
not withheld its approval within 45 days.
 (c) Last, one should note that, according to Article 18 of the Data 
protection Code, public bodies must abide by the rules, requirements, 
and limitations set out in the Code. This means, in particular, that 
15. Sensitive data are defined by the Code as “personal data allowing the disclosure of racial 
or ethnic origin, religious, philosophical or other beliefs, political opinions, membership of 
parties, trade unions, associations or organizations of a religious, philosophical, political or 
trade- unionist character, as well as personal data disclosing health and sex life.”
16. R. D’orazio, “Il principio di necessità nel trattamento dei dati personali,” in V. Cuffaro, 
R. D’orazio & V. Ricciuto, eds., Il codice del trattamento dei dati personali, above note 14, at 
163– 91.
17. Art. 22, par. 6 and 7, Data protection Code.
18. As regards the distinction between the “communication” and the “dissemination” of per-
sonal data, see art. 4, Data protection Code.
C o U n T R y  R e p o R T S116
16
personal data undergoing processing must be “relevant, complete 
and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
collected or subsequently processed”;19 and that “[i] nformation 
systems and software shall be configured by minimizing the use 
of personal data and identification data.”20 Such principles are 
particularly relevant because they work as an indirect limitation of 
the government’s power to indefinitely expand the size and number 
of databases containing personal data. Indeed, when called upon to 
issue recommendations on proposed bills and regulations pursuant 
to Article 154 Data protection Code, the Garante has frequently 
referred to these principles.21 In several cases, the government has 
been required by the Garante to adopt changes on proposed bills, on 
the ground that they did not conform to the principles of “necessity 
and data minimisation.”22 These principles can be regarded, therefore, 
as important parameters to assess the proportionality of statutes 
and regulations providing for the collection and systematic access to 
personal data.
IV.  RULES APPLYING TO SPECIAL SECTORS
Different rules apply to the sectors of the administration of justice, law enforce-
ment, and national security. They are generally characterized by a policy of 
weaker protections for data subjects and stronger support for the interests of 
data controllers. The relevant sources are to be found both in the Data protection 
Code and in special statutes.
19. Art. 11 Data protection Code.
20. Art. 3 Data protection Code.
21.  According to Art. 154, one of the main tasks of the Garante consists in “drawing the 
attention of parliament and Government to the advisability of legislation as required by the 
need to protect the rights referred to in Section 2, also in the light of sectoral developments.” 
paragraph 3 of the same Article 154 provides also that “The prime Minister and each Minister 
shall consult the Garante when drawing up regulations and administrative measures that are 
liable to produce effects on the matters regulated by this Code.”
22. See, for instance, Garante prot. Dati, 7- 7- 2011, Sistema informativo nazionale per la pre-
venzione nei luoghi di lavoro (SINP) e regole per il trattamento dei dati, web doc. n. 1829704; 
Garante prot. dati, 21- 3- 2012, Parere del Garante al Ministro della salute in ordine a uno 
schema di decreto recante “Modifiche al decreto del Ministro del lavoro, della salute e delle 
politiche sociali del 17 dicembre 2008, pubblicato nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 9 del 13 gennaio 
2009, recante “Istituzione del sistema informativo per il monitoraggio delle prestazioni erogate 
nell’ambito dell’assistenza sanitaria in emergenza- urgenza”, web doc. n.  1892560; Garante 
prot. dati, 17- 4- 2012, Parere del Garante su uno schema di decreto del Ministro della salute 
concernente “Modifiche al decreto del Ministro del lavoro, della salute e delle politiche sociali 
recante “Istituzione della banca dati finalizzata alla rilevazione delle prestazioni residenziali e 
semiresidenziali”, web doc. n. 1907937.
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A.  Processing of Personal Data in the Judicial Sector
The processing of personal data in the judicial sector is regulated by Articles 46– 
49. If personal data are collected, stored, or processed for “purposes of justice”— 
that is, if the processing “is directly related to the judicial handling of matters 
and litigations, […] or if it is related to auditing activities carried out in respect 
of judicial offices”23— a series of rules set out in the Code will not apply.24 Among 
them are the provisions concerning a data subject’s right to access (Articles 9– 
10), the duty to inform (Article 13), termination of processing (Article 16), gen-
eral principles concerning processing by public bodies (Articles 18– 22), duty of 
notification to the Garante (Articles 37– 38), trans- border data flows (Articles 
42– 45), and nonjudicial remedies before the Garante (Articles 145– 151).
By contrast, the principles enshrined in Article 11 are applicable also to the 
judicial sector. Therefore, personal data undergoing processing shall be pro-
cessed lawfully and fairly; collected and recorded for specific, explicit, and legiti-
mate purposes, and used in further processing operations in a way that is not 
inconsistent with said purposes; accurate and, when necessary, kept up to date; 
relevant, complete, and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they 
are collected or subsequently processed; and kept in a form that permits identi-
fication of the data subject for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for 
which the data were collected or subsequently processed.
These safeguards are particularly relevant in the judicial sector, as court 
databases— which may have a significant impact on an individual’s rights and 
freedoms— need to be extremely accurate and always kept up to date. As regards 
the access by judicial authorities to data, information, and records from other 
public bodies,25 Article 48 provides that such acquisition “may also take place 
electronically. To that end, judicial offices may avail themselves of the standard 
agreements made by the Minister of Justice with public bodies in order to facili-
tate interrogation by said offices of public registers, lists, filing systems and data 
banks via electronic communication networks, whereby compliance with the 
relevant provisions as well as with the principles laid down in Sections 3 and 11 
of this Code shall have to be ensured.”26
23. Art. 47, par. 2, Data protection Code.
24.  For a detailed analysis see G.  Buonomo, “Il trattamento dei dati personali in ambito 
giudiziario,” in V. Cuffaro, R. D’orazio & V. Ricciuto, eds., Il codice del trattamento dei dati 
personali, above note 14, at 277.
25. See G. Buonomo, “Il trattamento dei dati personali in ambito giudiziario,” above note 24, 
at 293.
26.  The database relating to children suitable for adoption set up in February 2013 by the 
Ministry of Justice (and specifically provided for by Art. 40, law 149/ 2001) is just one example 
of the many databases established for “justice reasons” (see http:// www.giustizia.it/ giustizia/ 
it/ mg_ 2_ 5_ 8.wp).
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B.  Law Enforcement
The processing of personal data by police forces for purposes of law enforcement 
and public security is also subject to a special regime.27 It does not differ too 
much from the one relating to the judicial sector. Indeed, according to Article 53, 
several provisions of the Code shall not apply “to the processing of personal data 
that is carried out either by the Data processing Centre at the public Security 
Department or by the police with regard to the data that are intended to be trans-
ferred to said centre under the law, or by other public bodies or public security 
entities for the purpose of protecting public order and security, or the preven-
tion, detection or suppression of offences as expressly provided for by laws that 
specifically refer to such processing.” As explained above in more detail, among 
the provisions exempted are Articles 9, 10, 12, 13, and 16; 18 to 22; 37, 38(1) to 
(5), and 39 to 45; and Articles. 145– 151. As regards the conditions that have to be 
satisfied in order to gain the exemptions mentioned by Article 53, the processing 
has to be carried out: (1) by police authorities or equivalent public bodies; (2) for 
the purpose of protecting public order and security, or the prevention, detection, 
or suppression of crimes; and (3) pursuant to a statute (not simply a regulation) 
that specifically provides for such processing.
particularly relevant for the issue of systematic access is Article 54. It pro-
vides that, in order to acquire data, records, and documents from other subjects 
(in accordance with the laws and regulations in force), public bodies “may avail 
themselves of agreements aimed at facilitating interrogation by said bodies or 
offices, via electronic communication networks, of public registers, lists, filing 
systems and data banks in pursuance of the relevant provisions as well as of the 
principles laid down in Sections 3 and 11.” 28 It has to be emphasized that, upon a 
favorable opinion given by the Garante, the Minister for Home Affairs shall adopt 
such standard agreements.29 This is an important institutional safeguard, aimed 
at ensuring that information privacy is adequately protected, and that access is 
limited only to the personal data necessary to the purposes mentioned by par-
agraph 1. The Garante has made use of its powers of advice and oversight on 
several occasions.30 Also, prior communication shall be given to the Garante as 
regards the technical measures taken to safeguard data subjects, whenever they 
face higher risks of harm, “having regard, in particular, to genetic or biometric 
27.  I.  Iai, “Il trattamento dei dati personali da parte delle forze di polizia e per la difesa e 
sicurezza dello Stato,” in V. Cuffaro, R. D’orazio & V. Ricciuto, eds., Il codice del trattamento 
dei dati personali, above note 14, at 303.
28. on this see ibid., at 313– 16.
29. Art. 54, par. 1, Data protection Code.
30. See, for instance, Garante prot. dati, 26- 5- 2011, Convenzione fra il Ministero dell’interno- 
Dipartimento della pubblica sicurezza e l’Agenzia delle entrate per l’accesso da parte delle 
forze di polizia alla banca dati dell’Anagrafe tributaria attraverso l’applicativo denominato 
Puntofisco, web doc. n. 1822278.
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data banks, technology based on location data, data banks based on particular 
data processing techniques and the implementation of special technology.”31
Furthermore, it is provided that the Data processing Centre at the public 
Security Department— which is one of the biggest and most important data-
banks in this sector, and probably one of the biggest of all Italian databanks— 
“shall be responsible for ensuring that the personal data undergoing processing 
are regularly updated, relevant and not excessive, also by interrogating— as 
authorised— the register held by the Criminal Records office and the register of 
pending criminal proceedings at the Ministry of Justice pursuant to presidential 
Decree no. 313 of 14 november 2002 as well as other police data banks that are 
required for the purposes referred to in Section 53” (Article 54, paragraph 3).32 
Finally, according to Article 57, “a presidential Decree issued following a res-
olution by the Council of Ministers, acting on a proposal put forward by the 
Minister for Home Affairs in agreement with the Minister of Justice, shall set 
out the provisions implementing the principles referred to in this Code with 
regard to data processing operations performed by the Data processing Centre 
as well as by police bodies, offices and headquarters for the purposes mentioned 
in Section 53.”
We should also mention the much- debated issue of a central DnA database.33 
Italy ratified in 2009 the Treaty of prüm,34 providing for the establishment of a 
national DnA database containing human biological materials and genetic pro-
files of persons convicted of serious crimes or under arrest. Judicial authorities 
and police forces shall only access such data for purposes of personal identifica-
tion, or in order to accomplish tasks required by the cross- border collaboration 
between police forces.35 Given the particular risks involved, the DnA database 
has been put under the oversight of the Garante, which has already issued sev-
eral recommendations concerning safety measures and access to the database.36 
After a long discussion, the DnA database has been set up and made operative 
on the basis of the Decree 7- 4- 2016, n. 87.
31. Art. 55 Data protection Code.
32. See Iai, “Il trattamento dei dati personali da parte delle forze di polizia e per la difesa e 
sicurezza dello Stato,” above note 27, at 318– 19.
33. See L. Scaffardi, “Le banche dati genetiche per fini giudiziari e i diritti della persona,” in 
C. Casonato, C. piciocchi & p. Veronesi, eds., Forum BioDiritto 2008: Percorsi a confronto 
(padova: CeDAM, 2009), 453.
34. Law n. 85/ 2009, Adesione della Repubblica italiana al Trattato concluso il 27 maggio 2005 
tra il Regno del Belgio, la Repubblica federale di Germania, il Regno di Spagna, la Repubblica 
francese, il Granducato di Lussemburgo, il Regno dei Paesi Bassi e la Repubblica d’Austria, 
relativo all’approfondimento della cooperazione transfrontaliera, in particolare allo scopo 
di contrastare il terrorismo, la criminalità transfrontaliera e la migrazione illegale (Trattato 
di Prum).
35. Art. 12 Law n. 85/ 2009.
36. Garante prot. dati, 15- 10- 2007, Banca dati DNA, web doc. n. 1448799.
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particularly relevant are the rules concerning the privacy aspects of the opera-
tions aimed at searching evidence of crimes: telephone and electronic traffic data 
retention, wiretapping, and interception of Internet communications.
1.  Data Retention
The retention of telephonic traffic data for the purposes of detecting and coun-
tering criminal offenses is regulated by Article 132 Data protection Code, as 
amended first by law n.  48/ 2008, implementing the Budapest Convention on 
cybercrime (2001), and then by legislative decree 48/ 2008, implementing the 
Directive 2006/ 24/ eC.37
Article 132, in its original version, adopted different periods of data retention, 
depending on the seriousness of the offenses and the purposes of the investiga-
tion. The amended version has laid down a unitary regime. Traffic data shall be 
retained by the provider for 24 months; electronic communications traffic data 
shall be retained for 12. As regards the data relating to unsuccessful calls, they 
shall be stored for 30 days.38 Within the 24 months, the public prosecutor (also at 
the request of private parties involved in the proceedings) may issue a motivated 
order, acquiring the data from the provider.39
It is worth noting that european Court of Justice annulled the eU Data 
Retention Directive in 2014;40 nonetheless the Italian regulatory framework as of 
today remains unchanged.
2.  Freezing
An important tool for investigations is represented by so- called “freezing” 
orders, that is, a nonjudicial proceeding consisting of the access by the police 
to electronic traffic data (and namely Internet communications data) held by 
IT and Internet service providers (also known as “preservation orders”). Article 
132, paragraph 4- ter Data protection Data, grants the Minister for Home Affairs 
or the heads of the central offices specializing in computer and/ or IT matters 
from the police forces (Polizia di Stato, Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza) the 
power to order IT and/ or Internet service providers to retain and protect Internet 
traffic data (“traffico telematico”) for no longer than 90 days, in order to carry 
out the pretrial investigations referred to by Article 226 Norme di attuazione, 
coordinamento e transitorie del codice di procedura penale, or else with a view to 
the detection and suppression of specific offenses. The term of 90 days may be 
37. on this see A. Cappuccio, “Privacy e comunicazioni elettroniche,” in G.F. Ferrari, ed., La 
legge sulla privacy dieci anni dopo (Milano: eGeA, 2008), 237– 46; Garante prot. dati, 17- 1- 
2008, Sicurezza dei dati di traffico telefonico e telematico, web doc. n. 1482111.
38. Art. 132, par. 1- bis, Data protection Code.
39. Art. 132, par. 3, Data protection Code.
40. See e.g. eCJ, Case C- 293/ 12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Communic’s, Marine 
and Natural Res., 2014 e.C.R (2014).
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extended, on legitimate grounds, up to six months, while specific arrangements 
may be made for keeping the data under control as well as for ensuring that 
such data cannot be disposed of by the IT and/ or Internet service providers and 
operators and/ or third parties.
According to Article 132, paragraph 4- quater, any provider who receives such an 
order shall comply without delay and is required to keep the request confidential. 
The measures taken under paragraph 4- ter shall be notified in writing to the public 
prosecutor, who shall endorse them if the relevant preconditions are fulfilled. If the 
public prosecutor withholds its consent, the measures cease to be enforceable.41
3.  Interceptions
Whereas Article 132 Data protection Code deals with the traffic data, the main 
legal source relating to wiretapping and interception of private communications 
is the Criminal procedure Code.42 Telephone, electronic, and live (“environmen-
tal”) interceptions are among the most important tools for investigations. Indeed, 
they are massively employed in Italy: according to the Minister of Justice, the 
total number of telephonic interceptions carried out in the year 2011 is 135,533. 
out of them, 121,072 were wiretappings, 11,888 live (“environmental”) intercep-
tions, and 2,573 were interceptions of a different kind (in particular electronic 
interceptions).43 However, they are also among the most intrusive tools, as they 
strongly interfere with the liberty and confidentiality of communications, pro-
tected by art. 15 Const., and with the inviolability of the home, protected by art. 
14 Const. personal communications may be intercepted only under the condi-
tions set by Articles 266– 269 Criminal procedure Code. Interceptions have to be 
authorized by judicial authorities and can be carried out exclusively in investiga-
tions of serious offenses.44
C.  National Security
A special regime also applies to the processing operations carried out by the 
Italian intelligence agencies (AISI: Internal Information and Security Agency; 
AISE:  external Information and Security Agency), as well as for classified 
information.45 In accomplishing their tasks, intelligence agencies have to abide 
41. Art. 132, par. 4- quinquies, Data protection Code.
42. For an overview see Intercettazioni di conversazioni e comunicazioni: Un problema cruciale 
per la civiltà e l’efficienza del processo e per le garanzie dei diritti. Atti del Convegno: Milano, 
5– 7 ottobre 2007 (Milano: Giuffrè, 2009).
43. See Relazione del Ministero sull’Amministrazione della Giustizia. Anno 2012 (Roma, 2012), 
249, http:// www.giustizia.it/ giustizia/ protected/ 812055/ 0/ def/ ref/ noL811573/ .
44. offenses with a maximum sentence of up to five years’ imprisonment and other offenses 
specifically mentioned in Article 266.
45. See I. Iai, “Il trattamento dei dati personali da parte delle forze di polizia e per la difesa e 
sicurezza dello Stato,” above note 27, at 320.
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by the principles laid down by Articles 3 and 11 (data minimization, necessity, 
lawfulness, fairness, use limitation, accuracy) and by a series of further provi-
sions, such as the ones concerning the prohibition of profiling (Article 14), the 
liability for damages (Article 15), the security measures (Articles 31 and 33), 
and the relationship with the Garante (Articles 154, 160, and 169). The solutions 
adopted by the Data protection Code seem to be quite innovative and coura-
geous, at least from a comparative law perspective.46 Indeed, a sector tradition-
ally characterized by the priority of public interests over individual rights and 
by the almost complete absence of external checks, consistently with the idea 
that salus rei publicae suprema lex esto, has now been subject to some of the most 
important rules and principles of the Data protection Code.
V.  LAWS REQUIRING BROAD REPORTING OF PERSONAL DATA
Several statutes make a broad reporting of private- sector data mandatory. What 
follows is an overview of some of the most important examples.
A.  Tax Laws
A significant expansion of the hypotheses of systematic access to private- sector 
data can be observed in the fiscal sector. The need to fight against the extremely 
high level of tax fraud and tax evasion— magnified by the economic and financial 
crisis— is clearly the most important factor behind such policy. An emblematic 
example is represented by the new legal regime concerning personal information 
that can be accessed and obtained by the tax registry office. The so- called “Save- 
Italy” Decree, adopted by the emergency government led by professor Monti in 
December 2011,47 imposed on financial operators the obligation to periodically 
notify the tax registry office of activity in all the accounts held with them and any 
other information concerning such accounts needed to carry out tax controls.48 
Transactions of less than €1,500 carried out using a postal current account in- 
payment form are exempted from such notification duties.49
It should be stressed that the duty to communicate is automatic and independ-
ent from any charge or suspicion of tax evasion. Also, the General Manager of the 
Italian Revenue Agency can issue specific regulations, expanding the typology 
46. See generally, G. Romeo, “Il diritto alla privacy e la lotta al terrorismo,” in G.F. Ferrari, 
ed., La legge sulla privacy dieci anni dopo, above note 37, at 181– 201; one of the best compara-
tive analyses on this issue is F. Bignami, “european versus American Liberty: A Comparative 
privacy Analysis of Anti- terrorism Data- Mining,” 48 Boston College Law Review 609 (2007).
47. Decree- law n. 201/ 2011, Disposizioni urgenti per la crescita, l’equità e il consolidamento dei 
conti pubblici, converted into law by law n. 214/ 2011.
48. Art. 11, par. 2, Decree- law n. 201/ 2011.
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and the amount of information that has to be communicated. Furthermore, the 
Italian Revenue Agency and the Guardia di Finanza are to be notified by the 
national Institute of Social Security (Istituto nazionale di previdenza sociale) of 
the records of all beneficiaries of social benefits; such data shall then be matched 
with tax returns in order to prevent tax evasion.50
The Garante has played an important role in the regulatory process; following 
a communication by the General Manager of the Revenue Agency, it required a 
series of changes to the draft decrees relating to access to financial records, with 
the aim of increasing the safety of the system and reducing the risk of leaks in the 
information flow or abusive access to the data.51
Another example of mandatory communication of personal data is offered by 
the Decree- Law n. 78/ 2010, which makes it compulsory for financial operators to 
notify the Italian Revenue Agency of the purchases made by private individuals 
using credit cards and e- money for an amount of more than €3,600.52
B.  Anti- money Laundering Legislation
Money laundering legislation also places obligations on a wide range of subjects 
(financial operators, non- financial enterprises, and various professionals, such 
as accountants, public notaries, lawyers, etc.) to make reports on suspicious 
transactions to the Financial Intelligence Unit.53 Such a Unit was established at 
the Bank of Italy, pursuant to Art. 6 Legislative Decree 231/ 2007. It is charged 
with the task of carrying out financial analysis of the suspicious transactions and 
of examining any other fact that could be related to money laundering or terror-
ist financing. once completed, the results of the analyses have to be transmit-
ted to judicial and police authorities— also foreign authorities— for subsequent 
investigation.54 The Garante has issued several recommendations concerning the 
data privacy aspects of such information exchanges.55
C.  Hotel Clients
Italy differs from many Western countries in that it has long had an intrusive 
system of automatic reporting of the identity of hotel clients to police authorities. 
50. Art. 11, par. 6, Decree- law n. 201/ 2011.
51.  Garante prot. dati, 17- 4- 2012, Comunicazione dei dati contabili all’anagrafe tributaria 
da parte di banche e operatori finanziari:  parere all’Agenzia delle entrate sulle modalità di 
trasmissione e di conservazione dei dati, web doc. n. 1886775; Garante prot. dati, 18- 9- 2008, 
Anagrafe tributaria: sicurezza e accessi, web doc. n. 1549548.
52. Art. 21, Decree- Law n. 78/ 2010, Misure urgenti in materia di stabilizzazione finanziaria e 
di competitività economica, converted into law by law n. 122/ 2010.
53. Arts. 10- 35 Legislative Decree n. 231/ 2007, implementing Directive 2005/ 60/ eC.
54. Art. 9 Legislative Decree n. 231/ 2007.
55. Garante prot. dati, 25- 7- 2007, Nuova disciplina antiriciclaggio, web doc. n. 1431012.
 
 
C o U n T R y  R e p o R T S124
124
originally provided for by Article 109 TULpS (Testo unico leggi di pubblica 
sicurezza), enacted in 1931 under the fascist dictatorship, the duty of hotelkeepers 
and similar subjects to identify their clients (Italians and foreigners), register their 
personal particulars, and notify the police without delay of such information was 
never eliminated during the Republican era and is still effective today. January 
2013 the Minister of Internal Affairs, following a formal consultation with the 
Garante,56 has issued a new decree, regulating the whole matter. It provides that 
the hotelkeepers shall report the personal particulars of their clients within 24 
hours to police authorities.57 Such data may be transmitted by electronic means 
and will be recorded in a central database established at the Ministry for Internal 
Affairs. The data shall be accessed only by judicial and police authorities for the 
purpose of protecting public order and security, or the prevention, detection, or 
suppression of offenses.58 After five years, the data have to be erased.
D.  Cell Phones
Another example of compulsory reporting of private- sector data, particularly rel-
evant in practice, is offered by the electronic Communications Code. According 
to Article 55, paragraph 7, telecommunications companies are required to iden-
tify at the time of the activation of the service all subscribers and buyers of pre-
paid cell phone cards, and notify (also by electronic means) the Ministry of the 
Internal Affairs of the list of these names. Judicial authorities may access these 
data “for justice purposes,”59 that is for purposes “related to the judicial handling 
of matters and litigations.”60
E.  Insurance Frauds
Fraudulent behaviors with regard to compulsory insurance are unfortunately 
quite common. Therefore, art. 135 private Insurance Code establishes a data-
base on car accidents, with the aim of enhancing “prevention and combating of 
fraudulent behaviours in compulsory insurance for motor vehicles registered in 
Italy.”61 pursuant to this provision, insurance companies are required to notify 
56. Garante prot. dati, 18- 10- 2012, Schema di decreto ministeriale sulla comunicazione alle 
autorità di P.S. dell’arrivo di persone alloggiate in strutture ricettive, web doc. n. 2099252.
57. Art. 1 Minister of Internal Affairs Decree 7- 1- 2013, Disposizioni concernenti la comunica-
zione alle autorita’ di pubblica sicurezza dell’arrivo di persone alloggiate in strutture ricettive.
58. Art. 4 Decree 7- 1- 2013.
59. Art. 55, par. 7, Leg. Decree n. 259/ 2003, Codice delle comunicazioni elettroniche.
60. Art. 47, par. 2, Data protection Code.
61. Art. 135, Leg. Decree n. 209/ 2005, Codice delle assicurazioni private. For a detailed analysis 
see A. Longo, “Privacy e assicurazioni,” in V. Cuffaro, R. D’orazio & V. Ricciuto, eds., Il codice 
del trattamento dei dati personali, above note 14, 570– 74.
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the Institution for the supervision of private insurance (ISVAP, now IVASS) of 
the data about the accidents in which their policyholders are involved, on the 
basis of the procedures established by regulation adopted by the same Institution. 
This regulation was issued in 2009, following a consultation procedure with the 
Garante.62 It is provided that such data shall be accessed by judicial authorities, 
public bodies in charge of detecting fraudulent behaviors in the sectors of com-
pulsory insurance, insurance companies, and a series of other subjects, for the 
purpose of preventing and combating frauds. The nominative records will be 
stored for no longer than five years. Most of the principles laid down by the Data 
protection Code shall apply to the processing operations.
VI.  COURTS
According to Article 145 Data protection Code, the data subject’s rights may be 
enforced either by filing a lawsuit or by lodging a complaint with the Garante. 
Given the shorter time and the lesser costs involved in an action before the 
Garante, nonjudicial remedies have frequently been preferred over judicial 
ones. Therefore, the case law of the Garante— easily accessible on the Internet— 
is extremely important to grasp the state of the art in the field of information 
privacy.63 However, the Italian courts have been called upon to decide impor-
tant cases as well. The Italian Court of Cassation ruled that the debits and cred-
its records of condo tenants and owners— although “personal data” according 
to the Data protection Code— may be lawfully communicated by the condo 
manager to other members of the condominium.64 In 2013 the Court of naples 
reviewed the so- called Redditometro regulation (enabling the Revenue Agency 
to analyze household spending patterns and compare these with the house-
hold’s earnings, with the aim of curtailing tax evasion),65 and declared it void 
62. ISVAp Regulation 1- 6- 2009, n. 31, Regolamento recante la disciplina della banca dati sinis-
tri di cui all’articolo 135 del decreto legislativo 7 settembre 2005, n. 209— Codice delle assicura-
zioni private; Garante, 30- 11- 2005, Parere sullo schema di regolamento per il trattamento dei 
dati sensibili e giudiziari dell’Istituto per la vigilanza sulle assicurazioni private e di interesse 
collettivo (Isvap), web doc. n. 1212464.
63.  For an overview see G.F. Ferrari, ed., “La legge sulla privacy dieci anni dopo,” above 
note 37.
64. Court of Cassation, n. 1593/ 2013. on this issue see also Garante prot. dati, Data Protection 
and Management of Condos, provision of 18 May 2006, web doc. n. 1332463.
65.  Minister of Finance Decree 24- 12- 2012, Contenuto induttivo degli elementi indicativi 
di capacità contributiva sulla base dei quali può essere fondata la determinazione sintetica 
del reddito. on this regulation see H. Burggraf, “Italians protest as Redditometro Unveiled 
to pursue Tax Cheats,” International Adviser (January 21, 2013), http:// www.international- 
adviser.com/ news/ tax- regulation/ italians- protest- as- redditometro- unveiled. A. Johnston, 
“Italian Tax Dodgers Uncovered by the Redditometro,” BBC News (January 21, 2013), http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/ news/ business- 21064030.
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as against the right to information privacy, protected by arts. 2 and 13 Const., 
and by arts. 1, 7 and 8 european Charter of Fundamental Rights.66 This decision 
has been much debated and occasionally criticized,67 but is a good example of 
the delicate problems arising from the systematic access by the public bodies to 
private- sector data.
66. Court of naples, ord. 21- 2- 2013, http:// www.lavorofisco.it/ docs/ redditometro- ordinanza- 
giudice- redditometro.pdf.
67. V. onida, “Sbagliato giustificare l’evasione in nome del diritto alla privacy,” Corriere della 
sera (February 26, 2013) 60; but see also, from a different perspective, p. ostellino, “Il reddito-
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Systematic Government Access  
to Private- Sector Data in Brazil
B R U N O  M AG R A N I *
I.  ABSTR ACT
This chapter describes the ways through which the Brazilian government may 
have access to personal data in possession of private- sector organizations with 
a specific focus on identifying the possibility of systematic access. There is no 
comprehensive data protection legislation in Brazil. However, a law from 2014 
together with specific statutes regulate governmental access for cases such as law 
enforcement access to data from the Internet and telecommunications compa-
nies, wiretapping, financial data, money laundering, and national intelligence. 
There have been many conflicting decisions in the judiciary about governmental 
access to personal data, particularly registration data. In an attempt to address 
this issue, a 2012 statute expanded the investigative powers of the police and the 
public prosecutor’s office, granting them access to registration data regardless of 
a court order. Later in 2014, the so called “Marco Civil da Internet” established 
new rules about government access to both registration data and the content of 
digital communications. An evaluation of several statutes revealed the existence 
of at least one potential case of systematic access granted by the law to the tele-
communications regulatory agency.
* This chapter was first drafted around 2011 and at some point after 2014. During that period, 
Brazil was going through very intense legislative debates about data privacy regulation and 
Internet regulation. For this reason, I decided to take out most of the references to legislative 
proposals discussed by Congress and focus instead on the statutes and some of the recent 
decisions rendered by the high courts. Additionally, given the recent approval by Congress of 
the 2014 Internet Bill of Rights— also referred to here as “Marco Civil da Internet”— there was 
still no sufficiently stable or consolidated interpretation of this regulation by Brazilian courts. 
Finally, I would like to thank Marília Monteiro, Giovanna Carloni, Walter Britto, and Rebeca 
Garcia for their invaluable research assistance and comments on this chapter.
 
 
C o U n T R y  R e p o R T S130
130
II.  NATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT AND FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES
Brazil is a federal republic founded on the rule of law. The Brazilian federal sys-
tem comprises the Union (federal government), the states and the municipalities. 
powers at the federal and the state level are divided among the executive, the leg-
islative and the judiciary, whereas the municipalities have no judiciary.
Although states have general authority to legislate in all matters not assigned 
to the federal government, the Constitution has enumerated a substantial list of 
powers preserved for the latter. The federal government has exclusive author-
ity to legislate over civil, commercial, criminal, and procedural law, in addition 
to telecommunications, broadcasting, and computer issues, among others. on 
issues such as finance and consumption, both the federal government and the 
state have concurrent lawmaking authority, but the former has the power to 
enact general rules, whereas the states can only enact supplementary legislation. 
If the federal government has not regulated the issues of this second group, the 
state has full authority until federal legislation is enacted. In short, the compe-
tence for virtually all relevant legislation about governmental access to private- 
sector data belongs to the federal government.
The Brazilian legal regime is based on the civil law tradition, and as such court 
decisions are not generally binding— unless decided by the Brazilian Supreme 
Federal Court (“Supremo Tribunal Federal”—STF) following a specific legal 
procedure. Legal precedent might influence future decisions, but judges are not 
bound by it. Therefore, cases involving issues not extensively regulated by the law 
are often subject to contradictory decision by different judges.
In very general terms, the STF has authority to decide on the constitutionality of 
laws using two main mechanisms: (1) an abstract judicial review— which considers 
the law in abstract without reference to any particular case; and (2) a concrete con-
stitutional review— which reviews constitutionality for particular cases. Decisions 
made through the abstract review are binding and any legislation struck down this 
way is considered to be null for all purposes (erga omnes). In the second case, when 
the STF reviews constitutionality of laws for particular cases, decisions have effect 
only for the case under analysis and not for future cases. There is no stare decisis in 
Brazil. Despite this, a recent change allowed justices to decide whether to extend 
binding effect for decisions involving similar recurrent cases.
It is worth noting that the executive branch does not conduct public pros-
ecution functions. Instead, they are carried out by an autonomous body, the 
public prosecutor’s office (“Ministério público”), which operates at both the 
federal and state levels. prosecutors must pass a rigorous public exam to gain 
admittance. Some constitutional specialists consider the body to be a fourth 
power in terms of separation of powers, given its independence.1 The president 
1.  Alfredo Valladão, Haroldo Valladão, Mário Casasanta and Themístocles Brandão 
Cavalcanti, O Ministério Público, Quarto Poder do Estado e Outros Estudos Jurídicos (Rio de 
Janeiro: Livraria Freitas Bastos, 1973).
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appoints the prosecutor General and his or her nomination must be approved 
by the Senate. Both the federal and the state governments are not represented in 
courts by public prosecutors, but instead this responsibility belongs respectively 
to the Attorney General of the Union and the State Attorney General. Although 
public prosecutors are considered to represent and defend diffuse and collective 
interests of society in general— on cases of murder, for instance— the Attorney 
General of Union and the State Attorney General represent their respective 
federative member in courts in cases where that particular entity is involved.
The Brazilian Constitution2 is quite prolific in enumerating rights and 
liberties.3 As an example, article 5, which deals with most of the individual and 
fundamental rights, contains 78 items, including various more specific rights.4
A recent change to the Constitution gave human rights treaties the status of 
constitutional amendments once they are approved by Congress according to the 
same procedure governing constitutional amendments proposed in the standard 
manner. So far only one treaty has been incorporated into the Constitution as an 
amendment: the Convention on the Rights of persons with Disabilities.5
Brazil has no broad data protection legislation. However, in 2014, Congress 
passed legislation— called “Marco Civil da Internet”— to regulate basic rights for 
citizens online, as well as access by law enforcement to data in possession of tele-
communications and online providers; it also dealt with data retention, interme-
diary liability, network neutrality, open government, and other issues.
III.  STATUTORY AND REGULATORY OVERVIEW
A.  Laws (including Regulations or Other Authorities) Requiring, 
Explicitly Authorizing, or Restricting Governmental Access 
to Private- Sector Data and the Implications That Such Laws 
Have for the Question of Systematic Access
1.  Constitutional Provisions
The Brazilian Constitution protects various aspects of privacy rights in sev-
eral provisions located under the individual rights section of its article 5 as 
follows:  (IV) “the expression of thought is free, and anonymity is forbidden”; 
(X) “the intimacy, private life, honor and image of persons are inviolable, and 
2. http:// bd.camara.gov.br/ bd/ bitstream/ handle/ bdcamara/ 1344/ constituicao_ ingles_ 3ed.
pdf?sequence=7.
3. Marcos nobre, “Indeterminação e estabilidade: os 20 anos da Constituição Federal e as 
tarefas da pesquisa em direito,” Novos Estudos—CEBRAP v. 82, p. 97– 106 (2008).
4. Luiz Costa, A Brief Analysis of Data Protection Law in Brazil (June 2012). 28th plenary meet-
ing of the Consultative Committee of the Convention for the protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic processing of personal Data [eTS no. 108] (T- pD), Council of europe, 
http:// ssrn.com/ abstract=2087726.
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the right to compensation for property or moral damages resulting from their 
violation is ensured”; (XI) “the home is the inviolable refuge of the individual, 
and no one may enter therein without the consent of the dweller, except in the 
event of flagrante delicto or disaster, or to give help, or, during the day, by court 
order”; (XII) “the secrecy of correspondence and of telegraphic, data, and tele-
phone communications is inviolable, except, in the latter case, by court order, 
in the cases and in the manner prescribed by law for the purposes of crimi-
nal investigation or criminal procedural finding of facts”; (LXXII) “habeas data 
shall be granted: (a) to ensure the knowledge of information related to the person 
of the petitioner, contained in records or databanks of government agencies or 
of agencies of a public character; (b) for the correction of data, when the peti-
tioner does not prefer to do so through a confidential process, either judicial or 
administrative.”6
of these items, three are of special interest to understanding governmental 
access to private- sector data in Brazil:  the prohibition of anonymous speech 
(article 5, item IV), the right to the secrecy of communications (article 5, item 
XII), and a generic protection to privacy, private life, honor, and image (article 
5, item X).
Article 5, item X provides for a general privacy right. According to some deci-
sions from the STF, rights such as the secrecy of financial data, professional 
secrecy, and several others have been derived from this general privacy clause.7 
The article is often used as a general privacy umbrella when other more specific 
articles do not provide enough protection.
Unlike in other jurisdictions, anonymous speech is forbidden in Brazil.8 one 
of the main consequences of this provision is that courts have ruled that judicial 
authorization is not required for the police or the public prosecutor’s office to 
have access to subscriber identifying data from companies. This understanding, 
however, is far from being unanimous and a recent decision at a Federal Court 
decided exactly in the opposite direction, stating that the privacy provisions of 
article 5, items X through XII protect a subscriber’s identifying information.9 
In a slightly different case, the STF decided that an email provider had to give 
access to subscriber identifying data when the party requesting that informa-
tion was part of the communication process.10 The court found that there was 
6. Brazil, Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, http:// bd.camara.gov.br/ bd/ handle/ 
bdcamara/ 1344.
7. Supreme Federal Court. HC 87.654. See also AI 655.298- AgR.
8. In the United States, for instance, the First Amendment protects anonymous speech.
9. Federal Regional Court 4. embargos Infringentes n. 0033295- 12.2006.404.7100/ RS, http:// 
www.trf4.jus.br/ trf4/ processos/ visualizar_ documento_ gedpro.php?local=trf4&documento=
4852744&hash=ada05adcfc6834d2f9e5b5d10f66309f.
10. See Brazilian Federal Supreme Court. AI 763133/ Sp. Justice Cármen Lúcia. March 5, 2012.
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no privacy violation in this case, because the communication had been directed 
at the recipient and therefore he not only already had access to the content of 
the message, but the prohibition of anonymous speech in the Constitution 
allowed that party to know the identity of the sender. Given the high level of 
controversy over this issue in the courts, lobby groups have managed to pass 
language in what was supposed to be a minor change to the money laundering 
law that now allows for the police and the public prosecutor’s office to have 
uncontroversial access to a subscriber’s identifying information in possession 
of the electoral courts, Internet service providers, telecommunications compa-
nies, financial institutions and credit card companies. This will be covered in 
more detail below.
Article 5, item XII (see above), on the other hand, protects the secrecy of 
communications. There are four types of communications listed in the arti-
cle:  correspondence, telegraphy, data, and telephone communications. 
Although the clause protects them from access by others, there is an exception 
that allows for communications to be intercepted for the purposes of criminal 
investigation or criminal procedural findings of fact as long as authorized by 
the courts. The controversy involving this article lies in whether the expression 
“except, in the latter case” would refer only to telephone communications, or 
if it would also apply to data. The doctrine and the courts also diverge as to 
whether the expression includes the content of the data or only the transmis-
sion of such data.11 The issue was partly resolved by case Re 418.416- 8/ SC with 
Justice Sepulveda pertence writing the majority opinion. The case involved 
the seizure of computers containing data about fraud on import taxes com-
mitted by a company. The computers were seized according to a court order, 
but the defendant argued that the data was inviolable according to the provi-
sion of article 5, item XII. In the opinion, Justice pertence established a differ-
ence between the content of the data and the transmission of data, stating that 
although the latter was protected the former was not. To be clear, according 
to this opinion courts can authorize seizure of computers and access the data 
stored in them. Although his opinion resolved the matter of access to the con-
tent of static data stored in computers, it also affirmed that the transmission 
of data was inviolable, which raised questions as to whether the monitoring of 
real- time digital communications— even when authorized by the judiciary— 
would be constitutional. We will come back to this issue when discussing some 
of the pending issues in item IV.
11. See Tercio Sampaio Ferraz Jr., “Sigilo de dados: o Direito à privacidade e os limites à fun-
ção fiscalizadora do estado,” Cadernos de Direito Tributário e Finanças Públicas, n° 1, RT 
(São paulo:  1992), pp. 141– 54, http:// www.terciosampaioferrazjr.com.br/ ?q=/ publicacoes- 
cientificas/ 28. See also Fábio Alceu Mertens, “o sigilo de dados no direito constitucional 
brasileiro” for an overview of the major doctrinal and judicial positions about the issue. Available at 
http:// jus.com.br/ revista/ texto/ 10748/ o- sigilo- de- dados- no- direito- constitucional- brasileiro.
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2.  Statutory Law
a. The Brazilian Civil Code
Brazil does not have a data protection law, so general statutory privacy protec-
tions can only be found in the Civil Code— although more detailed protection 
is provided for specific types of data. The general protections are included in the 
broader section of personality rights and provide little specification in addition 
to the constitutional provisions. In this sense, one article is relevant to our analy-
sis: article 21 provides that “the private life of the natural person is inviolable, and 
the judge, attending the applicant’s request, may take the necessary measures to 
prevent or terminate action contrary to this standard.” The article establishes 
some basic general privacy protections, however, its broad and abstract wording 
provides little guidance in determining the limits to systematic governmental 
access to personal data in the private- sector. This is especially true when an indi-
vidual agreed to terms that allow such practices to take place.
B.  Separate Laws That Might Exist for Law Enforcement Access, 
Regulatory Access, and/ or National Security Access (including 
Distinctions, If Any, between Domestic Intelligence and 
Foreign Intelligence) and, If Applicable, How These Laws 
Address Systematic Access
1.  Law Enforcement Access
In 2014, Brazil passed legislation to regulate the use of the Internet.12 The statute 
known as Marco Civil da Internet— from the portuguese expression to describe 
an Internet regulatory framework— created rules addressing access by law 
enforcement to personal data, the content of communications, subscriber identi-
fying information (Ip address), and registration data from telecommunications 
and online providers.
As a general rule, the Marco Civil da Internet requires a court order before law 
enforcement can get access to personal data, to the content of communications, 
and to basic subscriber identification data such as Ip addresses. When it comes 
to registration data related to personal qualification, affiliation and address 
(Art. 10, §3°), the statute simply recognizes that other legislative bodies may 
grant access to such information without a court order. As we will discuss in 
Section B(5) below, the Money Laundering Act grants law enforcement with 
access to this kind of data regardless of court orders.
The law establishes two groups of actors that must retain and make basic 
information available in order to identify Internet users: (1) “Internet connection 
providers” and (b) “Internet application providers.” The first (1) refer to organi-
zations that offer connection services or access to telecommunication infrastruc-
ture. In order to simplify understanding of the regulations we will refer to them 
as telecommunication providers. The second category (2) refers to organizations 
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that offer online services or applications on top of the telecommunication infra-
structure; they will be referred to as online providers.
The Marco Civil statute requires both providers to retain certain basic sub-
scriber information that allow for the identification of users. Telecommunication 
providers must retain for one year records that inform “date and time of the start 
and end of an Internet connection session, its duration and the Ip address used 
by the [computer] terminal to send and receive data packets.” online providers 
must retain for six months “information related to the date and time that a cer-
tain application was used from a given Ip address.”
In order to identify a user, first law enforcement is required to request the 
online provider to inform law enforcement of the Ip address used by that indi-
vidual to access the service on a certain date and time. once in possession of this 
information, authorities can go to the telecommunication providers and request 
them to identify which of their users was assigned to that Ip address on that par-
ticular date and time.
Law enforcement may request telecommunication and online providers to 
preserve data for a longer period of time. However, law enforcement will have 
60 days to file an application for a judicial order of access to data— if no applica-
tion is filed during this period, the request becomes ineffective (Art. 13, §§ 2, 3, 
and 4).
Telecommunication providers are prohibited from storing records of access 
to applications (Art. 14). According to the legislative debate the intent was to 
prohibit telecommunication providers from keeping a sort of browsing history 
obtained from their users. online providers are prohibited from storing access 
data regarding other Internet applications, unless previously authorized by the 
user (Art. 16). Finally the statute also forbids the storage of personal data con-
sidered excessive in relation to the purpose that governed the consent originally 
given (Art. 16). These restrictions combined with the requirement of a court 
order before the government can have access to personal data help prevent sys-
tematic access to private- sector data.
Marco Civil’s implementing regulations (Decree 8,771/ 2016) established fur-
ther requirements for law enforcement to have access to registration data without 
court orders. Accordingly, law enforcement is required to inform the specific 
legal authority that grants access to the registration data, alongside with the 
motivation for the request (Art. 11). This request must also be specific about the 
individuals whose data are requested— collective requests that are generic or 
unspecific are forbidden (Art. 11, §3).
The definition of registration data under the request comprises:  affiliation, 
address, and personal qualification— user’s name, marital status, and profession 
(Art. 11, §2). It also requires law enforcement— or any other authority that may 
have access to registration data— to publish annual transparency reports includ-
ing data about the number of requests for registration data (Art. 12).
It is worth noting, though, that when the article on which this chapter is 
based was finished, both Marco Civil and its regulations had been enacted very 
recently, so not many parts of the law had been tested by higher courts.
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2.  Access for Telecommunications Regulatory  
Enforcement
Since 2010, the Brazilian Communications Agency (AnATeL) has been at the 
epicenter of what is probably one of the main examples of governmental system-
atic access to private- sector data in the country. During that year, a major news-
paper revealed that the Agency planned to build technical infrastructure and 
enact regulation to allow it to connect directly into telecom companies’ systems13 
and obtain information related to customer’s usage of services, such as numbers 
dialed, time, date, amount paid, and duration of all phone calls made.14 To be 
sure, this technical and legal structure would allow AnATeL’s officials to have 
direct and unmediated online access to telecom carriers’ system with the alleged 
purpose of assessing whether companies are providing services with the level of 
quality that is determined by the Agency.
According to the Agency’s general enforcement manager, such access would 
be necessary to validate information that is provided by telecom companies 
without any sort of filtering or meddling with the data. Moreover, it would allow 
the Agency to assess in real time the capacity of the network infrastructure and 
order its expansion before the situation reaches a critical level. The system has 
also been justified by the need to modernize the Agency and the limited avail-
ability of technicians to inspect all companies.15
AnATeL has given assurances that the system will not be used for surveil-
lance. According to the new rules issued by AnATeL, “the data and informa-
tion accessed and obtained by the Agency pursuant to this Regulation are those 
directly related to the obligations of the company under supervision and essen-
tial to the effective exercise of the supervisory function of AnATeL, making 
sure that the content of communications between users remains secret.”16 The 
rule also mandates AnATeL to keep user’s personal data secret and establishes 
both civil and criminal liability for official misconduct.
3.  Wiretapping Act
The Wiretapping Act17 dates back from 1996 and regulates wiretapping of both 
telephone and digital communications. The statute authorizes eavesdropping 
13. See “Anatel terá acesso total a dado sigiloso de telefones,” Folha de São Paulo (January 
19, 2011), http:// www1.folha.uol.com.br/ mercado/ 862698- anatel- tera- acesso- total- a- dado- 
sigiloso- de- telefones.shtml (last visited october 5, 2011).
14.  See Ronaldo Lemos, “Brazilian Communications Agency Moves towards Surveillance 
Superpowers,” Freedom to Tinker (January 31, 2011). Available at https:// freedom- to- 
tinker.com/ blog/ rlemos/ brazilian- communications- agency- moves- towards- surveillance- 
superpowers/ (last visited February 4, 2012).
15.  “Agência diz que não haverá quebra de sigilo,” Folha de São Paulo (January 19, 2011), 
http:// www1.folha.uol.com.br/ fsp/ mercado/ me1901201104.htm (last accessed June 22, 2011).
16. See AnATeL, Regulation 596/ 2012, article 36, http:// legislacao.anatel.gov.br/ resolucoes/ 
34- 2012/ 308- resolucao- 596 (last visited June 23, 2014).
17. Brazilian Federal Act 9296/ 1996.
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on communications only for the purpose of producing evidence to be used 
in criminal investigations (article 1)  and requires that the Court order the 
procedure. Additionally, wiretapping is not allowed if: (1) there is no reason-
able suspicion that the crime has been committed by the person who will be 
investigated, (2)  evidence can be produced through other means available, 
or (3)  if the crime is punishable with “detention”— a less rigorous type of 
imprisonment.
Interception may be ordered ex officio by the judge or can be requested by 
either the public prosecutor’s office or the police (articles 3 and 4). The stat-
ute also requires the request to include a clear description of the purpose of the 
investigation indicating the subjects who will be placed under surveillance— 
unless such indication is not feasible— and the means through which the inter-
ception will be performed. eavesdropping may last for 15 days, but the term may 
be renewed. Courts have allowed for the extension of such term but have not 
established a maximum time limit for the procedure, as long as the judge super-
vising it deems it relevant to the investigation.18
Wiretapping practices of the Federal police and the Brazilian Intelligence 
Agency were the focus of a recent scandal when an agent intercepted calls of 
a justice from the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court. The scandal led to pub-
lic scrutiny over current wiretapping procedures and revealed that there was a 
clear abuse of the practice. The public outcry for more control over wiretapping 
practices led to the promulgation of a resolution by the national Counsel of 
Justice in 2008 establishing specific procedures to enhance the secrecy of the 
interception process and judicial control over them.19 According to the most 
recent data made available (related to the entire year of 2016), the judiciary 
authorized the monitoring of 11,066 email accounts, 18,298 lines using voice 
over Ip, and more than 255,000 telephone lines.20 Although the rationale behind 
the judicial authorization is that the courts will protect citizens from abuse, 
such a high number of interceptions may suggest that when this control is not 
sufficiently exercised by judges, practical results may be very similar to those of 
systematic access.
The statute allows for the police to request that telephone companies provide 
the necessary technical services and personnel to perform the wiretapping. Illegal 
wiretapping is punishable with imprisonment of two to five years and a fine.
18. See Superior Court of Justice (STJ) HC 110644/ RJ. April 16, 2009.
19. The national Counsel of Justice is a body formed by members of the judiciary, the public 
prosecutor’s office, lawyers, and members of civil society tasked with overviewing judicial 
malpractices and improving the management of the judiciary. For information about the con-
trol of wiretapping by the Counsel, see Conselho nacional de Justiça (CnJ). Resolution 59/ 
2008, as amended by Resolution 217/ 2016.
20. See Conselho nacional de Justiça (CnJ), http:// www.cnj.jus.br/ interceptacoes_ tel/ relatorio_ 
quantitativos.php (last visited April 15, 2017).
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4.  Secrecy of Financial Data Act
The secrecy of financial data is protected both by the general privacy provision 
of article 5, item X of the Constitution (above) and by the Secrecy of Financial 
Data Act.21 The statute applies to financial institutions such as banks, credit card 
companies, securities companies, stock exchanges, credit unions, and many 
others. The general rule is that financial data can only be obtained with a war-
rant, when necessary to the investigation of illicit activities. The statute however 
allows for the Brazilian Revenue Service (BRS) to request and obtain financial 
information directly from financial institutions regardless of judicial authoriza-
tion. Although the Act has authorized such access to take place since 2001, it 
faces increasing opposition in the public opinion and the judiciary. For instance, 
an article in a major Brazilian newspaper criticized the system, revealing that 
since the law was enacted, the BRS had requested financial data to be disclosed 
over eighty thousand times.22 Despite the critics, recently the STF, judging five 
actions that called into question provisions of the Secrecy of Financial Data Act, 
decided that the BRS may request and obtain financial information directly from 
financial institutions with no need for a judicial order.23
Violating the secrecy of financial data is punishable with up to four years in 
prison and a fine.
5.  Amendments to the Money Laundering Act
In 2012, the Money Laundering Act was amended to broaden investigative pow-
ers of both the police and the public prosecutor’s office. A new article 17- B was 
included to allow both of them to have access, without a warrant, to a suspect’s 
identifying data in possession of the electoral Courts, telephone companies, 
financial institutions, Internet service providers, and credit card companies.24 
Access to subscriber identifying information has been a long- standing demand 
of the police and the public prosecutor’s office.
Members of the public prosecutor’s office have been arguing that despite the 
fact that the provision was included in the Money Laundering Act its effects 
are not limited to the scope of the statute, but rather apply to all criminal 
21. Brazilian Federal Supplementary Act 105/ 2001.
22. Danilo Fariello, “Leão que Devora Sigilo,” O Globo Economia, p. 15 (September 4, 2012), 
http:// oglobo.globo.com/ economia/ leao- que- devora- sigilo- 6177901.
23. http:// www.stf.jus.br/ portal/ cms/ vernoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=310670 (last visited 
March 10, 2016).
24. Brazilian Federal Law 9.613/ 1998: “Article 17- B. police authorities and public prosecutors 
shall have access, exclusively, to registration data of the suspect that disclose personal qual-
ification, father and mother names and address, independently of judicial approval, kept by 
the electoral Justice, by phone companies, by financial institutions, by Internet providers and 
by credit card companies,” http:// www.planalto.gov.br/ ccivil_ 03/ leis/ l9613.htm and https:// 
www.eff.org/ pages/ mapping- laws- government- access- citizens- data- brazil.
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investigations.25 The inclusion of such an overreaching provision in a statute 
dealing with a subject that is not commonly monitored by digital rights activ-
ists suggests that it was part of a strategy meant not to draw attention until the 
Act had been approved. In the beginning of 2013, the constitutionality of access 
provision was challenged, but it is yet to be decided whether the STF will hear 
the case.
6.  Intelligence
The Brazilian Intelligence System is a collegiate body responsible for planning 
and executing intelligence activities in Brazil. It is coordinated by a central 
agency, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIn), and composed of govern-
mental institutions such as the Central Bank, the Federal police, the Revenue 
Service, and the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Relations, Justice, environment, 
and Finance. The Agency reports to the office of Institutional Security, which in 
turn reports directly to the president.
The ABIn does not have investigative or surveillance powers, which are 
reserved to the police.26 Additionally, the Constitution only authorizes inter-
ception of communications for the purpose of investigating crimes, a provision 
that severely restricts the possibility of these practices being used in intelligence 
activities. These limitations to the Agency powers can probably be explained 
by recent history. During the military regime from the 1960s to the 1980s, the 
national Information Service was responsible for intelligence activities, and as 
such conducted wiretapping and investigation of several political dissidents and 
leaders of social movements. The Agency’s activities during the military regime 
still resonate in the public opinion and create substantial political barriers when-
ever a proposal to expand its powers appears.
In 2008, a scandal revealed the involvement of ABIn’s agents in the wiretap-
ping of telephone calls made by a Supreme Court justice.27 After the scandal, 
a presidential Decree expanded even further the possibilities of cooperation 
between the ABIn and other bodies of the Brazilian Intelligence System— such 
as the Federal police— as a way to fix the alleged illegality.28 Instead of respond-
ing to public criticism with stricter rules, the executive did the opposite. The 
Decree created a Department for the Integration of activities developed by the 
Brazilian Intelligence System (DIBIS), which was tasked with the coordina-
tion and articulation of data flows relevant to intelligence activities. This has 
25. Vladimir Aras, “Requisição de dados cadastrais: o segredo de polichinelo,” Blog do Vlad 
(July 26, 2012), https:// blogdovladimir.wordpress.com/ 2012/ 07/ 26/ requisicao- de- dados- 
cadastrais- o- segredo- de- polichinelo/ (last visited September 8, 2012).
26. Brazil, Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil. Article 144.
27. See High Court of Justice (STJ). Habeas Corpus n.149.250— Sp.
28.  See presidential Decree 6540/ 2008, which modified presidential Decree 4376/ 2002, 
https:// www.planalto.gov.br/ ccivil_ 03/ decreto/ 2002/ d4376.htm.
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significantly expanded the exchange of information between governmental bod-
ies and created unprecedented integration of the police and the ABIn’s data-
bases.29 When reviewing the case many years later, the High Court of Justice 
ruled that the participation of intelligence agents in the wiretapping was illegal. 
However, it is not clear if the decision would be the same in light of the new rules 
introduced by the aforementioned presidential Decree.
In short, given (1) that the Brazilian Intelligence Agency does not have inves-
tigative powers, (2) that only the police and the public prosecutor’s office can 
investigate and request wiretap of communications, and (3) that such requests 
have to be authorized by the courts, in principle, intelligence activities do not 
seem to be a fruitful field for the Brazilian government to gain systematic access 
to private- sector data.
C.  Laws Requiring Broad Reporting of Personal Data (Passenger 
Records, Financial Data) by Private- Sector Entities, Especially 
in the National Security and Law Enforcement Contexts and, 
if Applicable, How These Laws Address Systematic Access
Broad reporting of data in Brazil is usual in the context of financial data. The Secrecy 
of Financial Information Act creates obligations for financial institutions to report 
financial transactions exceeding a certain amount (R$5,000 per month for natural 
persons or approximately $2,500 in 2012 dollars) to the Revenue Service.30 Data 
reported must include only the name of the customer and the total amount of the 
money transacted in a given month. It is forbidden to report information related to 
the origin or the nature of each individual transaction, but such additional informa-
tion can be obtained with a warrant.31
The Money Laundering Act mandates several organizations— such as banks, 
stock markets, insurance companies, credit card companies, jewelers, public reg-
istries, accountants, and others— to report activities that might indicate the exist-
ence of money laundering and related crimes. The information must be reported 
to the Counsel for the Control of Financial Activities (CoAF), a department of the 
Ministry of Finance responsible for monitoring money- laundering activities in the 
country.
In november 2012, the Brazilian national Civil Aviation Agency (AnAC) 
enacted resolution 255/ 2012 mandating the report of passenger data— 
comprising Advance passenger Information32 and passenger name Record— to 
29. Ibid. Art. 6- A, § 4.
30.  Brazil. Federal Supplementary Act n.  105/ 2001. Article 5.  See also presidential Decree 
n. 4489/ 2002. Article 4.
31. Ibid. Article 5, §2.
32.  Advance passenger Information (ApI) include information such as:  travel document 
number and type, passenger full name, nationality, date of birth, gender, visa number, seat, 
residential address, destination, etc. passenger name Record (pnR) information comprise 
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border control authorities.33 The rules create an electronic system through which 
air companies will send passenger records to law enforcement authorities before 
the departure or arrival of flights. The types of data requested and the process 
of automatic communication to law enforcement appears to have been heav-
ily inspired by regulations in place in the United States. The Brazilian Aviation 
Agency has defended the new rules on the grounds that law enforcement would 
be better prepared to act against illicit activities related to drug trafficking and 
terrorism, and that Brazilian regulations needed to be harmonized with inter-
national standards.
D.  Laws Permitting or Restricting Private- Sector Entities 
from Providing Government Officials with Voluntary Broad 
Access to Data, Whether Pursuant to a Formal Order or as a 
Result of More Informal and Cooperative Arrangements
There are no specific laws other than the ones aforementioned dealing with the 
specific issue of voluntary disclosure of data from companies to governmental 
agencies and law enforcement authorities. To be clear, there is specific legisla-
tion determining the secrecy of financial information and communications, but 
there are exceptions for law enforcement access as long as judicial authorization 
is granted. nevertheless, as many companies include in their terms of services 
provisions allowing the disclosure of information to law enforcement officials 
without a warrant, voluntary systematic access would be possible.34
Since the early 2000s, public prosecutors have been pressing companies to 
disclose increasingly more information. In this sense, at least two examples are 
worth noting. First, after the police unveiled a series of cases of child pornogra-
phy in orkut— Google’s first social network, which became extremely popular in 
Brazil— Google was forced to sign an agreement giving authorities a direct com-
munication channel with the company allowing officials to request data reten-
tion, removal of content, and identification of users. Access in this case does not 
seem to be direct or even unmediated.
Second, in a recent Federal Court decision, it became clear that the public 
prosecutor’s office had been trying to compel telecom companies to make 
subscriber identifying data available to law enforcement authorities through 
information such as: full name, telefone number, ApI information, frequente flyer number, 
reservation number, flight dates, payment type, seat, etc.
33. See Resolution 255/ 2012 from Agência nacional de Aviação Civil, http:// www.anac.gov.
br/ assuntos/ legislacao/ legislacao- 1/ resolucoes/ resolucoes- 2012/ resolucao- no- 255- de- 13- 
11- 2012/ @@display- file/ arquivo_ norma/ RA2012- 0255%20consolidado%20at%C3%A9%20
RA2014- 328.pdf. For background and discussion about the Resolution see also http:// www2.
anac.gov.br/ transparencia/ audiencia/ aud22_ 2012/ justificativa.pdf.
34. In this sense, and as an example, see the terms of services of: (1) Mercado Livre, availa-
ble at http:// www.mercadolivre.com.br/ seguro_ privacidad.html; (2) Terra, http:// www.terra.
com.br/ avisolegal/ .
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an online electronic system that would give them unmediated access to such 
information. Despite this attempt, the Federal Court has decided that subscriber 
identifying information is protected under article 5, items X through XII of the 
Constitution, and therefore, can only be accessed with a warrant.35
E.  For Major Categories of Data (Communications Content, 
Communications Metadata, Subscriber Identifying Data, 
and Non- communications Transactional or Business Records), 
the Role of the Courts (When Is Judicial Authorization 
Required and When Can Data Be Compelled upon Executive 
or Administrative Authority?)
The following Table 6.1 summarizes the role of the courts in authorizing access 
to different sorts of data. To avoid repeating what has been addressed on previ-
ous sections, please refer to them for more detailed information.
F.  Standards for Use (e.g., Once the Government Acquires Data, 
What Rules Govern Its Use and Sharing?), Access, Retention, 
and/ or Destruction
Rules dealing with standards for use, access, retention, and destruction of data 
by the government are rather scarce and vague. Brazil’s Internet bill of rights36 
established rules to govern access of the data by the government, but did not 
35. Federal Regional Court 4. embargos Infringentes n. 0033295- 12.2006.404.7100/ RS, http:// 
www.trf4.jus.br/ trf4/ processos/ visualizar_ documento_ gedpro.php?local=trf4&documento=
4852744&hash=ada05adcfc6834d2f9e5b5d10f66309f.
36. See Brazil Federal Act 12.965/ 2014.
Table 6.1. Type of Authorization Required to Access  
Different Sorts of Data
Type of Data/ Type  
of authorization 








Office request  
is sufficient
A Regulatory Agency 
can access the data 
with the strict purpose 








Registration data no yes yes
non- communications 
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establish specific rules concerning how the government should handle such data. 
As there is no general legislation addressing the issue, only the Wiretapping Act 
and the Constitution provide some guidance to the courts. In the case of wire-
tapping, existing provisions related to these standards refer to the physical cau-
tions necessary to handle recordings and transcripts. In this sense: (1) files must 
be kept secret in a separate court record; (2) recordings that are not used as evi-
dence for the case must be destroyed, and (3) blank envelopes should be used to 
transport and communicate files.37 Despite the fact that the Wiretapping Act 
allows for the interception of digital communications, there are no further pro-
visions regulating how the data should be treated.
The absence of substantial standards for using intercepted communications 
was a key factor that influenced the International Human Rights Court to rule 
against Brazil in the case Aso Escher v. Brasil.38 It dealt with illegal wiretapping of 
the phones of an organization connected to the landless movement in the State of 
paraná— the country was condemned for disrespecting due process guarantees 
(8.1) and for failing to adopt internal measures to give effect to human rights 
protections, as put forth by the American Convention on Human Rights.
Finally, intelligence statutes allow for information to be shared between the 
members of the Brazilian Intelligence System, such as from the Central Bank to 
the Federal police, the Revenue Service, and several Ministries of State.
G.  Cross- Border and Multi- jurisdictional Issues (e.g., under What 
Circumstances Does the Government Assert Jurisdiction 
over Data Stored outside Its Borders?)
The Internet bill of rights from 2014 included provisions39 to try and address the 
long- debated issue of Internet jurisdiction.40 The law and these particular provi-
sions were crafted as a strong response to the leaks claiming that the Brazilian 
president at the time, Dilma Rousseff, had been the target of surveillance by the 
United States government. Accordingly, article 11 states that “in any operation 
of collection, storage, retention or processing of personal data or communica-
tions conducted by [telecommunication] or [online providers] in which at least 
one of the aforementioned acts occur in national territory, Brazilian law shall be 
observed along with the protection of personal data and the secrecy of private 
records and communications.” The statute goes on to apply the provision above 
to “activities carried out by a legal person established overseas, as long it provides 
37. See Wiretapping Act, Federal Act n.9296/ 1996. See also national Counsel of Justice (CnJ). 
Resolution 59/ 2008.
38.  Escher v.  Brazil, Judgement (IACtHR, 20 nov. 2009), http:// www.corteidh.or.cr/ docs/ 
casos/ articulos/ seriec_ 200_ por.pdf.
39. See articles 10 through 12 from Law 12.965 /  2014.
40. See comments in Section B(1) above.
 
C o U n T R y  R e p o R T S144
14
services to Brazilian audiences or at least one member of the same economic 
group has an establishment in Brazil.”
In an attempt to fix a complex jurisdiction issue, the Marco Civil statute 
caused additional confusion by potentially creating contradictory obligations 
for global or multinational online providers offering service worldwide and with 
offices in multiple countries. even though there is no precedent at the Supreme 
Court level testing Marco Civil’s jurisdiction provision, lower courts have issued 
diverging decisions.41 The main issue at stake in these cases involve the inter-
pretation of Marco Civil’s jurisdiction clause in accordance with an existing 
mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) in criminal matters between Brazil and 
the United States.42 In other words, given that the data controller entities of many 
multinational online providers are based in the United States, should Brazilian 
law enforcement rely on the legal process established by international coopera-
tion treaties to request data from online providers, or can they request this data 
directly from the Brazilian entity that is part of the same economic group? The 
answer to this question has two practical consequences: (1) the amount of time 
necessary for law enforcement to have access to the data, and (2) the determina-
tion of the law applicable to the case.
Although there is no definitive answer from Brazilian high courts, there are 
diverging court decisions across the country both interpreting Marco Civil so 
as to recognize the need to use existing legal assistance treaties, and dismissing 
such treaties to apply solely the Marco Civil jurisdiction clause. This lack of defi-
nition by courts has generated confusion for online providers and has increased 
the uncertainty of operating in Brazil.
IV.  RECENT CONTROVERSIES AND/ OR PENDING 
UNRESOLVED ISSUES CONCERNING SYSTEMATIC 
GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO PRIVATE- SECTOR DATA
There is still much controversy in the judiciary with regard to the limits of gov-
ernmental access to private- sector data.
41. Just by means of illustration, the lower court of the state of Rio Grande do Sul has recently 
decided that the Federal prosecutor’s office should use the MLAT to request access to pri-
vate messages exchanged via Facebook— the information would be allegedly included in 
an investigation on corruption and extortion (see https:// jota.info/ justica/ mpf- deve- obter- 
por- tratado- dados- de- rede- social- diz- juiz- 02122016, last visited May 7, 2017). on the other 
hand, also as an illustration, the 4th Circuit Federal Court has considered that the MLAT 
was unnecessary if the company at hand was regularly established in Brazil, having a foreign 
shareholder (TRF, 8th panel, Appeal no. 0000310- 03.2013.404.0000, June 12, 2013).
42.  For more information on the treaty between Brazil and the United States on 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters please see https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/106962.pdf.
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one of the key issues relates to whether public prosecutors and the police may 
have access to subscriber identifying data without a warrant.43 For instance, 
although a couple of decisions at the Superior Court of Justice44 (STJ) have found 
that ISps can only provide information about its subscribers when authorized 
by the judiciary,45 the STF has indicated that such information should not be 
protected under the prohibition of anonymous speech.46 As higher courts’ deci-
sions do not bind those of lower courts, there are many conflicting interpreta-
tions, which makes it hard to establish a uniform position. Should the courts 
understand that judicial authorization is required, then systematic access such 
as the one mentioned in Section III(D) above— direct unmediated online access 
by the public prosecutor’s office and the police to identifying data— is likely to be 
considered illegal.
Wiretapping is also far from being uncontroversial, and the law has been 
challenged twice before the STF.47 In one of the cases, the provision allowing 
for the interception of digital communications was brought to the attention of 
the court, but it has yet to be decided.48 There is a clear tension between Justice 
pertence’s interpretation of the secrecy of communications’ constitutional clause 
and the provision that allows for the interception of digital communications. 
As mentioned above when we discussed the constitutional protections to data, 
the Supreme Federal Court has already decided that although data stored on 
a computer might be obtained with a warrant, Justice pertence’s opinion also 
affirmed that the flow of data was protected under article 5, item XII even against 
judicially authorized wiretapping.
V.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
There is at least one clear example of systematic governmental access to private- 
sector data in Brazil: the one established for the purpose of regulatory supervi-
sion of telecommunication companies.
43. See note 31.
44. The Superior Court of Justice is a high instance of the Brazilian judiciary responsible for 
deciding cases involving divergence of interpretation of federal legislation. For more informa-
tion see http:// www.stj.gov.br.
45. See Superior Court of Justice (STJ) AI 1.203.054/ Sp. See also Superior Court of Justice 
(STJ) Resp 1.068.904/ RS.
46. See Section III(A)1. above and note 9.
47. See ADI 4112, http:// www.stf.jus.br/ portal/ processo/ verprocessoAndamento.asp? 
incidente=2630565.
48. See Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF) ADI 1488.
 
C o U n T R y  R e p o R T S146
146
The approval of the Marco Civil da Internet in 2004 made it harder for the gov-
ernment to have access to private- sector data without court orders or in system-
atic form. Although the statute still left many unresolved issues to be interpreted 
by the courts, there are clear improvements when it comes to the protection of 
citizens from government access to their data or that of private organizations. 
These very interpretative gaps left to the courts may prove, however, to create 
uncertainty and increase costs for organizations to operate in Brazil.
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Systematic Government Access  
to Private- Sector Data in Canada
J A N E  B A I L E Y  A N D  S A R A   S H AYA N
I.  INTRODUCTION
In Canada, information privacy is implicitly constitutionally protected by the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter), as well as by provincial, territorial, 
and federal privacy statutes that regulate the collection, use, retention, and dis-
closure of personal information.1 The privacy Act regulates federal government 
institutions’ relationship with personal information,2 whereas private sector 
organizations’ relationship with personal information is regulated by the federal 
personal Information and protection of electronic Documents Act (pIpeDA) 
or by any substantially similar legislation promulgated in the province in which 
the private entity operates.3 These protections, however, are subject to numerous 
exceptions that allow, and even encourage, information sharing between govern-
ment entities and between private- sector and state entities.
Statutes enabling law enforcement access to personal information gener-
ally require prior authorization, subject to numerous exceptions. Domestic 
law enforcement agencies obtain prior authorization under the Criminal Code 
(Code),4 whereas Canada’s primary national security intelligence gathering 
agencies— the Communications Security establishment (CSe)5 and the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)— are subject to more relaxed provisions 
in their respective enabling statutes. national security concerns in relation to 
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being part I of the Constitution Act 1982.
2. privacy Act, RSC 1985, c. p- 21.
3. personal Information and protection of electronics Documents Act, SC 2000, c. 5.
4. Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c. C- 46, as amended.
5. The Communications Security establishment (CSe) is sometimes also referred to as the 
Communications Security establishment of Canada (CSeC).
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large financial transactions and air travel have also led to laws requiring certain 
private- sector entities to gather and disclose personal information about their 
clients to government agencies. Canadian law enforcement agents’ access to data 
outside of the jurisdiction generally arises from formal and informal networks, 
and from requests for assistance from partners under Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaties (MLATs).
Although the CSe’s capacity to intentionally surveil communications in 
Canada without ministerial authorization is limited, the agency continuously 
surveils foreign signals intelligence in cooperation with other signatories to 
the UK- USA Security Agreement (popularly known as the “Five eyes”). The 
Snowden disclosures revealed substantial cooperation between the CSe and its 
international intelligence partners, with leaked documents showing that the 
CSe tracked travelers using wi- fi in a Canadian airport, participated in exten-
sive surveillance operations in Brazil and Mexico, surveilled millions of Internet 
downloads, and helped to set up numerous international spy posts for the United 
States’ national Security Agency.6
The privacy Commissioner of Canada (pCC) and his or her provincial and 
territorial counterparts play an active role in informing Canadians about 
information privacy issues, including transborder flows of Canadians’ per-
sonal information. All privacy commissioners have taken an active role in 
public debate relating to law enforcement demands for greater access to data 
and greater secrecy in investigation. The recently- passed protecting Canadians 
from online Crime Act (Bill C- 13), protection of Canada from Terrorists Act 
(Bill C- 44), and Anti- Terrorism Act, 2015 (Bill C- 51) have made it easier for 
state actors to obtain and share information about Canadians domestically and 
abroad, resulting in what the current pCC has called “a sea change for privacy 
rights in Canada.”7
6. Greg Weston, Glenn Greenwald, and Ryan Gallagher, “CSeC Used Airport Wi- Fi to Track 
Canadian Travellers:  edward Snowden Documents,” CBC News (January 30, 2014), http:// 
www.cbc.ca/ news/ politics/ csec- used- airport- wi- fi- to- track- canadian- travellers- edward- 
snowden- documents- 1.2517881; Greg Weston, Glenn Greenwald, and Ryan Gallagher, 
“Snowden Document Shows Canada Set Up Spy posts for nSA,” CBC News (December 9, 
2013), http:// www.cbc.ca/ news/ politics/ snowden- document- shows- canada- set- up- spy- 
posts- for- nsa- 1.2456886; The Associated press, “Canadian Spies Targeted Brazil’s Mines 
Ministry: Report” (october 7, 2013), http:// www.cbc.ca/ news/ canadian- spies- targeted- brazil- 
s- mines- ministry- report- 1.1927975; Amber Hildebrandt, “CSe Spying in Mexico: espionage 
Aimed at Friends ‘never Looks Good,’ ” CBC News (March 25, 2015), http:// www.cbc.ca/ news/ 
canada/ cse- spying- in- mexico- espionage- aimed- at- friends- never- looks- good- 1.3005887; 
Amber Hildebrandt, Michael pereira, and Dave Seglins, “CSe Tracks Millions of Downloads 
Daily: Snowden Documents,” CBC News (January 27, 2015), http:// www.cbc.ca/ news/ canada/ 
cse- tracks- millions- of- downloads- daily- snowden- documents- 1.2930120.
7.  privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2014– 2015 Privacy Act Annual Report to Parliament: 
Protecting Personal Information and Public Trust (December 2015) at 15, https:// www.priv.
gc.ca/ information/ ar/ 201415/ 201415_ pa_ e.asp; see protecting Canadians from online Crime 
Systematic Government Access to private-Sector Data in Canada 149
149
public debate surrounding the Snowden disclosures and controversial 
national security legislation enacted in subsequent years has highlighted the 
need for improved oversight and accountability mechanisms. The national 
Security and Intelligence Committee of parliamentarians Act (Bill C- 22) would, 
if enacted, address some of these concerns by creating a new committee of par-
liamentarians with the authority to review national security and intelligence 
issues across federal departments, subject to some exceptions.8
II.  NATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT AND FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES
Canada is a parliamentary democracy founded on the rule of law. Canada’s 
Constitution Act specifies the heads of power of the federal and provincial/ ter-
ritorial governments, whereas the Charter guarantees enumerated rights and 
freedoms applicable against all levels of government.9 Any law inconsistent 
with the Constitution is of no force or effect. Information privacy has constitu-
tional status in Canada, not through explicit Charter guarantees, but as a result 
of the interpretation of guarantees relating to the right against unreasonable 
search and seizure (s. 8) and, to a lesser extent, to life, liberty, and security of the 
person (s. 7).10
provincial/ territorial and federal privacy commissioners also play a role in the 
protection of personal information and data privacy, with oversight powers relat-
ing in some cases both to private sector and government operations. Although 
they tend to have only limited direct enforcement powers, privacy commission-
ers play an important role in raising public awareness about privacy rights and 
data security. The limited enforcement powers of the pCC is one issue that, at 
the time of writing, is under consideration by The House of Commons’ Standing 
Committee on Access to Information, privacy and ethics as it conducts a review 
of pIpeDA.
Act, SC 2014, c. 31; protection of Canada from Terrorists Act, SC 2015, c. 9; Anti- terrorism 
Act, 2015, SC 2015, c. 20.
8.  Bill C- 22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of 
Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, 1st Sess, 42nd parl, 
2016 (passed by the House of Commons, April 4, 2017 and passed second reading and referred 
to committee by Senate on May 30, 2017).
9. The Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. B. to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), c. 11.
10. notable exceptions in which privacy has been examined outside the § 8 criminal con-
text include § 7 challenges mounted against provincial laws relating to the confidentiality of 
sperm donor and adoption records: Pratten v. BC (AG) 2011 BCSC 656; Cheskes v. Ontario 
(Attorney General), 2007 CanLII 38387 (on SC).
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III.  CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND REGULATORY 
OVERVIEW
A.  Constitutional Law
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects “reasonable” expecta-
tions of privacy, with reasonableness determined on a “normative rather than 
descriptive” standard.11 As a result, the growth and prevalence of surveillance 
technologies should not per se diminish the objective reasonableness of an 
expectation of privacy.
Section 8 rights are only triggered in relation to information if an individual 
subjectively expected his or her information to be kept private, and if that sub-
jective expectation was reasonable. The reasonableness of an expectation of pri-
vacy depends upon an analysis of the “totality of the circumstances” in which 
an alleged search or seizure takes place.12 “Core biographical information” that 
reveals “intimate details” about a person’s lifestyle and individual choices is one 
kind of information that definitely attracts a reasonable expectation of privacy.13 
Where a reasonable expectation of privacy is found to exist in relation to infor-
mation, authorities generally cannot obtain that information without prior 
authorization. The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has recognized a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in, inter alia, personal computers; work- issued computers; 
cellular phones, regardless of whether they are password- protected; and Internet 
Service provider (ISp) subscriber data, but no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in patterns of heat emanating from a home, or patterns of electricity use mea-
sured by a digital recording ammeter.14 In 2016, a provincial court affirmed a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone records, and held that a “tower 
dump” production order implicating more than 30,000 mobile phone users was 
overly broad and clearly violated section 8.15
As emerging surveillance technologies increasingly permit collection of new 
types of information or bits of data that were previously inaccessible, Canadian 
courts have struggled with the question of whether the bits themselves must con-
stitute “core biographical information” in order to trigger section 8 protection, 
or whether section 8 can be triggered where these bits may combine with other 
information to facilitate an inference about intimate lifestyle choices. Despite 
differences of opinion in lower courts, the SCC held in 2014 that Canadians have 
11. R. v. Tessling, [2004] 3 SCR 432, at 42.
12. R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393, at 286.
13. R. v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC, at 28.
14. R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, at 2– 3 (personal computers); R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53, at 59 (work- 
related computers); R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, at 53 (cell phones); R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, 
at 66 (ISp subscriber data); Tessling, above note 11, at 63 (heat patterns); Gomboc, above note 
13, at 1 (electricity usage).
15. R. v. Rogers Communications, 2016 onSC 70.
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a reasonable expectation of privacy in ISp subscriber information. Section 8 
accordingly protects the “link between [an] identified individual and personal 
information provided anonymously,” and extends to overlapping understand-
ings of privacy as secrecy, control, and anonymity.16
Information held by a third party with no obligation to maintain confidenti-
ality in relation to it may not be subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The SCC has concluded that, although not determinative, contractual waivers 
of confidentiality may be a factor in assessing the reasonableness of any claimed 
expectation of privacy in relation to data disclosed by private- sector entities 
to police.17
Searches and seizures without prior authorization may pass constitutional 
muster if a reasonable law permitted the search and the authorities conducted 
themselves reasonably.18 For example, a cell phone search incident to a lawful 
arrest will not violate section 8 if the search is sufficiently tailored, and if police 
take detailed notes of what they searched and why.19 Statutory provisions allow-
ing for voluntary compliance with police requests for disclosure of particular 
data (such as the one in pIpeDA, discussed below) or mandatory reporting 
to state agencies (such as those relating to financing of terrorist organizations 
discussed below in Section III(D)) may also be constitutionally permissible 
without prior authorization, so long as they are properly tailored to minimize 
intrusions on privacy (e.g., to apply only in exigent circumstances and/ or in 
circumstances where there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe an 
offense is being committed in the place to be searched). Bill C- 13, which came 
into force in March 2015, amended the Criminal Code such that any person 
who voluntarily provides requested information to a public official without a 
warrant or production order will not incur any civil or criminal liability for 
doing so (s. 487.0195(2)).
Canadian courts tend to strain against indiscriminate surveillance premised 
on a “generalized suspicion” even in relation to public spaces and communica-
tions facilities (with notable exceptions in relation to airports, border crossings, 
and intelligence gathering for national security purposes).20 even in the context 
of terrorism investigations, courts have sought to protect the privacy interests 
16. Spencer, above note 14, at 42, 38.
17. Gomboc, above note 13.
18. R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 SCR 265.
19. Fearon, above note 14.
20. R. v. Thompson, [1990] 2 SCR 1111 (public spaces and communications facilities); R. v. AM, 
[2008] 1 SCR 569 (border crossings); Ian Kerr, “Searching for the Right Balance”, (May 1, 
2008), Ian Kerr (blog) (border crossings), http:// iankerr.ca/ content/ 2008/ 05/ 05/ searching- 
for- the- right- balance/ ; Re Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, 2008 FC 301 (CanLII) 
(national security intelligence); Re X, [2010] 1 FCR 460 (national security intelligence).
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of unrelated third parties by including minimization provisions in intercept 
authorization orders.21
B.  Statutory Law
The privacy of personal information is also protected in federal and provincial/ 
territorial legislation. Government collection, use, retention, and disclosure 
of personal information is regulated by applicable legislation in each province 
and territory, and through the privacy Act at the federal level. For private sec-
tor organizations involved in commercial activity, the collection, use, retention, 
and disclosure of personal information is regulated by the federal pIpeDA, 
unless the organization is statutorily exempted or the organization operates 
in a province or territory with legislation declared substantially similar to the 
federal legislation.22 In the latter case, the organization’s information practices 
would be governed by the relevant, substantially similar provincial or territorial 
legislation.23
Both the privacy Act and pIpeDA have been recognized as fundamental 
laws of Canada and therefore enjoy quasi- constitutional status on the basis that 
protection of privacy is an essential component of a democracy.24 For similar 
reasons, although most privacy commissioners’ authority is limited by compari-
son with their european counterparts, their reports and submissions play an 
important role in developments relating to the Canadian information privacy 
framework.
1.  The Privacy Act— Regulation of Federal Government 
Institutions
The purposes of the privacy Act, which came into effect in 1983, are twofold: 
(1)  to protect personal information25 held by federal government institutions, 
21. R. v. Ansari, 2010 onSC 1316, at 31– 32.
22. Whether pIpeDA is ultra vires parliament’s powers under § 91 of the Constitution Act 
has been challenged, but not determined. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
v. Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2010 FC 736 (CanLII).
23. In this regard, British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec have laws recognized as substan-
tially similar to pIpeDA, and ontario has enacted laws relating to health information that 
are also recognized as substantially similar. Canada has 10 provinces and 3 territories. Given 
space constraints and the fact that pIpeDA or statutes substantially similar to pIpeDA regu-
late privacy protection in private- sector entities, this chapter focuses on the federal legislation.
24.  Eastmond v.  Canadian Pacific Railway, 2004 FC 852; Lavigne v.  Canada (Office of the 
Commissioner of Official Languages), 2002 SCC 53 (CanLII).
25. personal information includes inter alia information relating to race, age, religion, marital 
status, education, address, and fingerprints relating to an individual; views or opinions of 
another about an individual; and the individual’s name where it appears with other personal 
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including the Royal Canadian Mounted police (RCMp), CSIS, and CSe; and 
(2) to provide individuals with a right of access to their information (s. 2). The 
privacy Act regulates federal government institutions’ collection, use, retention, 
and disclosure of personal information as follows:
• collection— of personal information only if it “relates directly to an 
operating programme or activity of the institution” (s. 4) and generally 
is to be collected from the individual directly (s. 5(1));
• retention— for a period of time (that may be prescribed by regulation 
or set out in institutional policies) that would ensure the individual to 
whom it relates “has a reasonable opportunity to obtain access” to it 
(s. 6(1));
• disposal— in accordance with regulations, directives, or guidelines of 
the minister designated in relation to that federal institution (s. 6(3)), 
with “federal institutions [being] required to develop retention and 
disposal schedules to manage their records”26 (although they do not 
always do so27);
• use— limited to the original purpose for obtaining the information, 
or a use consistent with that purpose, or a purpose for which the 
information was disclosed to the institution by another institution  
(s. 7); and
• disclosure— from one federal institution to another is prohibited, 
except for a long list of exceptions including disclosure to designated 
investigative bodies for purposes of enforcing Canadian or provincial 
laws or pursuant to arrangements or agreements with other institutions, 
governments of foreign states, etc. for purposes of administering or 
enforcing laws or carrying out investigations (s. 8(2)).
The pCC is appointed under the privacy Act and is empowered to investigate 
complaints and make recommendations (ss. 34– 35) as well as to periodically 
audit government handling of personal information (s. 37).
2.  PIPEDA— Regulation of Private Sector Organizations
pIpeDA was enacted in 2000 for the stated purpose of promoting “electronic 
commerce by protecting personal information28 that is collected, used or 
26. privacy Commissioner of Canada, Privacy and Aviation Security: An Examination of the 
Air Transport Security Authority, Final Report (2011), http:// www.priv.gc.ca/ information/ 
pub/ ar- vr/ ar- vr_ catsa_ 2011_ e.pdf.
27. privacy Commissioner of Canada, Audit of Selected RCMP Operational Databases Final 
Report (2011), http:// www.priv.gc.ca/ information/ pub/ ar- vr/ ar- vr_ rcmp_ 2011_ e.cfm. [here-
inafter pCC RCMP].
28. personal information “means information about an identifiable individual, but does not 
include the name, title or business address or telephone number of an employee of an organ-
ization.” pIpeDA, § 2.
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disclosed in certain circumstances by providing for the use of electronic means 
to communicate or record information or transactions” (s. 3). pIpeDA applies 
to every organization in relation to personal information that it “collects, uses 
or discloses in the course of commercial activities” or is about an employee of a 
federal work, undertaking, or business. It expressly does not apply to any govern-
ment institution governed by the privacy Act (s. 4(2)). All organizations governed 
by pIpeDA must comply with a list of obligations set out in Schedule 1 of the Act, 
which sets out the Model Code for the protection of personal Information. The 
Model Code requires compliance with 10 fair information practices relating to 
accountability, identifying purposes, consent, limiting collection, limiting use, 
disclosure and retention, accuracy, safeguards, openness, and individual access 
(Schedule 1). As noted above, at the time of writing, the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Access to Information, privacy and ethics was holding 
hearings as part of its review of the data protection provisions of pIpeDA, which 
s. 29 of the Act requires to be conducted every five years. eventually, this review 
could yield future amendments to the Act.
Generally, under pIpeDA, private sector organizations that handle personal 
information must obtain consent from individuals before collecting, using, or 
disclosing personal information, and must limit collection, use, and disclosure 
to predefined purposes. personal information can only be retained as long as 
necessary to fulfill the purpose for which it was originally collected. However, 
these restrictions are subject to numerous exceptions. For example, consent to 
collection, use, and disclosure is not required where “inappropriate” because, 
inter alia, the information is being collected for law enforcement purposes and 
seeking consent might defeat the purposes of that investigation. Likewise, per-
sonal information may be used or disclosed for purposes other than its original 
purposes if required by law. Further, an individual’s right to access information 
about the existence, use, and disclosure of personal information may be limited 
for legal or security reasons. These exceptions to the general fair information 
practice rules outlined in the Model Code are reflected in certain exceptions 
within the body of pIpeDA itself.
pIpeDA section 7 allows private sector organizations to collect, use, and dis-
close personal information about an individual without his or her knowledge or 
consent in a variety of circumstances (s. 7(1), 7(2), 7(3)), including for purposes 
relating to law enforcement. Although the frequency with which these excep-
tions are used is not consistently publicly reported, the most prominent pro-
vision publicly discussed is section 7(3), which allows private organizations to, 
inter alia, disclose personal information without knowledge or consent where 
disclosure is made to a government institution that has requested the informa-
tion, identified its lawful authority to obtain the information, and indicated 
that it suspects the information relates to national security; enforcement of a 
Canadian, provincial, or foreign law; or is requested for purposes of administer-
ing a Canadian or provincial law. private-sector organizations may also volun-
tarily collect personal information without notice or consent for similar kinds 
of purposes. Individuals’ general rights relating to disclosure of how private 
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organizations are dealing with their personal information under pIpeDA are 
also subject to exceptions, including with respect to disclosures made under sec-
tion 7(3). In these situations, the government must be notified of the request and 
may effectively veto disclosure to the individual of even the fact that the indi-
vidual’s personal information was disclosed to government (ss. 8 and 9).
The pCC is empowered to investigate individual complaints lodged under 
pIpeDA and to issue reports and recommendations for corrective action in rela-
tion to them (ss. 12 and 13). Although the recommendations themselves are not 
legally enforceable, courts can be called upon to review the pCC’s decisions and 
to issue orders. The pCC may also conduct audits and promote the purposes of 
the Act through information programs and public research, and is empowered to 
share information with other commissioners (s. 24).29
C.  Specific Laws for Law Enforcement Access, Regulatory Access, 
and/ or National Security Access
1.  Basic Organizational Concepts and the  
Antiterrorism File
In 2003, the federal government created a department focused on issues relating 
to national security, which since 2006 has been called public Safety Canada (pSC). 
pSC reports to the Minister of public Safety (MpS) and was created to “ensure coor-
dination across all federal departments and agencies responsible for national secu-
rity and the safety of Canadians.”30 In February 2012, the MpS unveiled Canada’s 
first comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, setting as its first priority to “counter 
domestic and international terrorism in order to protect Canada, Canadians, and 
Canadian interests.”31 one component of the strategy is to detect terrorists, terrorist 
organizations, and their supporters through investigation, intelligence operations, 
and analysis, which the pSC notes will require “extensive collaboration and infor-
mation sharing with domestic and international partners.”32
The strategy identifies three primary federal government intelligence collec-
tion organizations: CSIS, the CSe, and the RCMp. other federal agencies, includ-
ing the Department of national Defence (DnD), the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), 
Transport Canada, and the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre 
(FInTRAC) are also to be involved in information collection “in support of 
29. provincial and territorial privacy commissioners also have investigatory, audit, and edu-
cative functions in relation to violations of their respective pieces of legislation. Virtually all, 
however, have noted that a lack of resources undermines their capacity in these areas.
30.  public Safety Canada, About Public Safety Canada (november 27, 2015), http:// www. 
publicsafety.gc.ca/ cnt/ bt/ index- eng.aspx.
31. public Safety Canada, Building Resilience against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter- Terrorism 
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their primary responsibilities,” which assist with developing “a broader counter- 
terrorism intelligence picture.”33 A  key priority of the strategy appears to be 
ensuring information exchange between and amongst these domestic players, 
as well as with similar agencies acting for international partners. Since the 2015 
enactment of Bill C- 51, over a hundred government departments are authorized 
to share information for national security purposes, facilitating investigation 
into “activities that undermine the security of Canada.”34
2.  Domestic Law Enforcement and the General Requirement 
for Prior Authorization
Canada has federal, provincial, and municipal law enforcement agencies. The 
RCMp is the federal law enforcement agency, and is also intimately involved in 
the terrorism file. Domestic law enforcement agencies’ search and seizure powers 
are generally constrained by the need for prior judicial authorization, subject to 
exceptions such as those outlined below.
Under Code section 184, willful interception of “private communication”35 
is a crime, except in specific circumstances. For example, the general prohibi-
tion on interception does not apply to, inter alia, interceptions with prior judicial 
authorization (s. 184(2)), or non- pre- authorized interceptions made by a peace 
officer in certain urgent situations involving imminent unlawful acts that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe “would cause serious harm to any person or 
property” (s. 184.4). Generally, prior authorization is only to be granted where a 
number of criteria are met, including that alternative methods of investigation 
have been tried and failed, or are unlikely to succeed, or are impractical because 
of urgency (s. 185). However, the alternative methods criteria is not required to be 
satisfied for offenses involving a criminal organization or terrorism (s. 185(1.1)). 
Judicial authorizations must be specific with regard to the type of private com-
munication intercepted, and must include any other terms necessary to protect 
the public interest (s. 186(4)). Targets of interception must generally be notified 
within 90 days of the order, although there are provisions that allow for exten-
sions of this time period, particularly in relation to terrorism offenses.
Following passage of Bill C- 13, a judge issuing an interception order can also 
issue “a search warrant, a general warrant, make a general production order, make 
a specific production order to obtain certain information (such as computer data 
33. Ibid.
34. Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, SC 2015, c. 20, § 2, § 5(1).
35. A “private communication” is “any oral communication, or any telecommunication, that 
is made by an originator who is in Canada or is intended by the originator to be received by a 
person who is in Canada and that is made under circumstances in which it is reasonable for 
the originator to expect that it will not be intercepted by any person other than the person 
intended by the originator to receive it, and includes any radio- based telephone communica-
tion that is treated electronically or otherwise for the purpose of preventing intelligible recep-
tion by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it.” Code, § 183.
 
Systematic Government Access to private-Sector Data in Canada 157
157
or financial information), make an assistance order or issue a warrant to use a 
tracking device or a ‘transmission data recorder.’ ”36 As a result, law enforce-
ment agencies are now authorized to make a demand or obtain a court order to 
preserve electronic evidence if they have reasonable grounds to suspect, among 
other things, that an offense under Canadian or foreign law has been committed 
(s. 487.012) and courts can make ex parte preservation and production orders to 
trace a specified communication, to obtain transmission data, to obtain tracking 
data, and to obtain financial data when requested on similar grounds (s. 487.013; 
487.015; 487.016; 487.017; 487.018). Judges issuing these kinds of preservation and 
production orders are also authorized to issue orders prohibiting disclosure of their 
existence or content in certain circumstances (s. 487.0191). Judges may also issue 
warrants to obtain transmission data in real time and to permit remote activa-
tion of tracking devices in certain types of technologies (s. 492.1; 492.2).37 Finally, 
although C- 13 amendments state that preservation demands, preservation orders, 
and production orders are not necessary in order for law enforcement officers to 
ask a person to preserve or produce a document (s. 487.0195), this provision must 
be read in light of the Spencer decision, which requires prior authorization.
one area that had been controversial is whether certain forms of digital com-
munications ought to be treated as “private communication” and therefore sub-
ject to the prior authorization regime for interception rather than the regular 
warrant provisions relating to searches of persons, places, or things. The regular 
warrant provisions are arguably easier to satisfy than the intercept authorization 
provisions, as the former do not require the issuing justice to be satisfied that 
there are no reasonable alternative investigative methods (s. 487).38 In 2013, the 
SCC held that law enforcement officials must obtain prior authorization under 
the interception regime before accessing text messages held by telecommunica-
tions providers, noting that text messages are private communications, and that 
“[t] echnical differences inherent in new technology should not determine the 
scope of protection afforded to private communications.”39 The SCC also recently 
held that law enforcement officials must obtain a separate warrant before search-
ing the contents of a computer (although officers may, under the general warrant 
regime, seize a computer and take measures to preserve its data until a separate 
search warrant is issued).40
36. Julia nicol & Dominique Valiquet, Legislative Summary of Bill C- 13: An Act to amend the 
Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act, the Competition Act and the Mutual Legal Assistance 
in Criminal Matters Act (Dec. 11, 2013), http:// www.lop.parl.gc.ca/ About/ parliament/ 
LegislativeSummaries/ bills_ ls.asp?ls=C13&parl=41&Ses=2#a27.
37. Ibid.
38.  Craig Forcese, National Security Law:  Canadian Practice in International Perspective 
(2008), at 451.
39. R. v. Telus Communications, 2013 SCC 16, at 5.
40. R. v. Vu, 2013 SCC 60.
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Under section 195 of the Code, the MpS must produce an annual report 
on electronic surveillance in Canada, describing, inter alia, the number of 
pre- authorization applications made and granted, the average time for which 
authorizations are issued, the types of offenses investigated using electronic sur-
veillance, and the general methods of interception used. In 2015, pSC reported 
67 applications for authorization (44 pursuant to ss. 185, 22 pursuant to section 
487.01, and 1 renewal pursuant to s. 186), all of which were granted.41
3.  Intelligence Agencies
Under pSC’s counterterrorism strategy, three agencies are primarily tasked with 
intelligence gathering functions relating to national security:  CSe, CSIS, and 
the RCMp.
CSe is housed under the DnD, which is responsible for Canadian military 
operations. Under provisions added to the national Defence Act (nDA) with 
the passage of the Anti- terrorism Act in 2001, CSe is authorized to: (1) collect 
foreign signals intelligence, (2) assist with protection of Canada’s information 
infrastructures, and (3) provide technical and operational assistance to federal 
law enforcement and security agencies.42 However, section 273.64(2)(a) of the 
nDA limits CSe’s mandates under (1) and (2) by prohibiting it from directing 
its activities at Canadian citizens, permanent residents, or corporations wher-
ever they are, or at anyone in Canada regardless of nationality. Where one- end 
Canadian communications are unintentionally intercepted, CSe is only permit-
ted to retain them if it is “essential to either international affairs, defence or secu-
rity, or to identify, isolate or prevent harm to Government computer systems or 
networks.”43
However, the Minister of national Defence (MnD)  may authorize CSe to 
intercept private communications if satisfied that certain criteria are met (e.g., 
where interception is necessary to CSe’s foreign intelligence mandate) (s. 273.65 
NDA). As a result, unlike domestic law enforcement agencies, CSe need not seek 
prior judicial authorization to intercept private communication of Canadians, 
and the ministerial authorizations it obtains last longer than intercept authoriza-
tions under the Code and need never be disclosed to those whose communica-
tions were intercepted. Although a former CSe Commissioner opined that the 
ministerial authorization process is Charter compliant, others argue that judicial 
oversight is necessary (while recognizing that this weaker form of authorization 
may be found justifiable under the Charter on the basis of “national security”).44 
41.  public Safety Canada, 2015 Annual Report on the Use of Electronic Surveillance, at 
5 (2015), https:// www.publicsafety.gc.ca/ cnt/ rsrcs/ pblctns/ lctrnc- srvllnc- 2015/ lctrnc- 
 srvllnc- 2015- en.pdf.
42. Communications Security establishment Commissioner, Annual Report 2010– 2011, at 3, 
https:// www.ocsec- bccst.gc.ca/ s21/ s46/ s16/ eng/ 2010- 2011- annual- report.
43. Ibid., at 4.
44. Forcese, above note 38, at 456– 58.
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In performing its mandate (3), CSe’s powers are limited in the same ways as 
those of the agencies it is assisting.45 CSe’s operations are subject to review by the 
CSe Commissioner.
CSe gathers foreign intelligence through its participation in the SIGInT net-
work operated by Australia, Canada, new Zealand, the UK, and the United States 
as signatories to the UK- USA Security Agreement. The network, which is popu-
larly referred to as echelon or “Five eyes,” is reportedly capable of intercepting, 
inter alia, phone calls and data traffic globally (including emails) through vari-
ous networks, including the telephone network.46 Documents leaked by edward 
Snowden confirm and expand upon these reports, describing CSe metadata col-
lection programs and extensive assistance afforded to Five eyes partners.47
CSIS, which lies within the authority of the MpS, was created with passage of 
the CSIS Act in 1984 and is mandated to aid in the protection of national secu-
rity. In pursuit of its mandate, CSIS collects, analyzes, and retains intelligence 
relating to activities it has reasonable grounds to suspect threaten the security of 
Canada, and reports and advises the Canadian government with respect to that 
intelligence. Its powers are limited to collecting only that which is “strictly nec-
essary” to its mandate, and it must only undertake investigations with “demon-
strable grounds for suspicion” of a threat to national security.48 CSIS’s operations 
are subject to review by the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC).
CSIS has its own warrant provisions under the CSIS Act, which allow it to 
obtain prior judicial authorization for searches relating to threats to the secur-
ity of Canada or to permit it to assist the MnD or Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to gather intelligence relating to the capability, intention, or activity of foreign 
actors. These authorization provisions (which have withstood constitutional 
scrutiny)49 allow for orders entitling CSIS to search or seize a variety of materials 
and places and to “install, maintain or remove any thing” (in relation to inter-
ception activities). They may last up to 60 days and never require notification 
of the target after the search has been completed. Bill C- 44, the protection of 
Canada from Terrorists Act, amended the CSIS Act in 2015 to explicitly author-
ize CSIS to perform its duties within or outside Canada (CSIS Act §§ 12(2), 15(2)). 
45. CSeC, Annual Report 2010– 2011, above note 42, at 8.
46.  Gerhard Schmid, Report on the Existence of a Global System for the Interception of 
Private and Commercial Communications (ECHELON interception system) (european 
parliament: Temporary Committee on the eCHeLon Interception System, July 11, 2001), 
http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/ sides/ getDoc.do?pubRef=- // ep// nonSGML+RepoRT+ 
A5- 2001- 0264+0+DoC+pDF+V0// en&language=en.
47. Michael Geist, “Why Watching the Watchers Isn’t enough: Canadian Surveillance Law in 
the post- Snowden era” in Michael Geist, ed, Law, Privacy and Surveillance in Canada in the 
Post- Snowden Era (2014) 225– 55.
48. Forcese, above note 38, at 84, 457– 58.
49. Ibid., at 452.
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Further, the Federal Court is now authorized to issue warrants allowing CSIS 
to conduct activities both within and outside of Canada in order to investigate 
threats to national security regardless of “any other law, including that of a for-
eign state” (CSIS Act § 21(3.1)).
The RCMp, in addition to its role as Canada’s national police force, is specifi-
cally vested with exclusive authority to police national- security related crimes. As 
a result, despite the creation of CSIS in 1984, the RCMp continues to be involved 
in intelligence collection relating to crimes involving a “threat to the security of 
Canada” (which is defined in the CSIS Act).50
As intelligence gathering is increasingly centralized through Integrated Security 
Units (ISUs) for particular events such as the olympics and G8 meetings, the 
national security functions of the RCMp and other Canadian police forces have 
become increasingly intermeshed with those of CSIS. The centralization of antiter-
ror and national security intelligence functions in Canada through ISUs and the 
Integrated Threat Assessment Centre formed by CSIS in 2007 has been compared 
to US fusion centers.51 others have suggested a need to formally increase the inte-
gration of CSe, the RCMp, and FInTRAC in order to better protect critical infra-
structure against terrorist attack.52
Review of Canada- wide RCMp activities (ranging from “officer rudeness to alle-
gations of the use of unnecessary force”) is conducted by the Civilian Review and 
Complaints Commission for the RCMp.53 Although the RCMp’s national secu-
rity investigations and investigatory powers have expanded in recent years, there 
has not been a commensurate increase in resources granted to the Commission. 
Furthermore, despite strict secrecy legislation, the Commission may be denied 
access to secret information where the RCMp cites a need to protect operational 
information and foreign intelligence sources.54
4.  Regulatory Agencies
numerous regulatory agencies at the federal and provincial/ territorial level are 
empowered to require disclosure from private sector entities in relation to their 
mandates. This chapter addresses only the two federal agencies that seem most 
pertinent:  the Canadian Radio- television and Telecommunications Commission 
(CRTC) and the Competition Bureau.
50. Ibid. at 88.
51. Jeffrey Monaghan & Kevin Walby, “Making up ‘Terror Identities’: Security Intelligence, 
Canada’s Integrated Threat Assessment Centre and Social Movement Suppression” (2011) 
Policing and Society 1, 3– 4.
52. Kosta Rimsa, “eavesdroppers” in Dwight Hamilton, ed, Inside Canadian Intelligence, at 
141– 42 (2011).
53.  Craig Forcese & Kent Roach, False Security:  The Radicalization of Canadian Anti- 
terrorism, at 434 (Irwin Law, 2015).
54. Ibid., at 434– 35.
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The CRTC regulates broadcasting55 and telecommunications56 in Canada 
pursuant to, respectively, the Broadcasting Act (BA) and the Telecommuni-
cations Act (TA).57 The CRTC has largely chosen to forebear from regulating 
retail mobile and Internet services (including billing, rates, service quality, or 
ISp business practices) because it has concluded there is sufficient competi-
tion in these areas.58 It has also largely exempted from regulating new media 
broadcasting undertakings (nMBU) that deliver broadcasting59 services 
over the Internet and via p2p technology received over mobile devices.60 
nMBUs are, however, subject to an undue preference prohibition.61 However, 
the CRTC does regulate certain aspects of wholesale Internet services, and 
handles complaints about Internet traffic management practices at both the 
retail and wholesale level.62 Complaints about other ISp practices are directed 
to the Commissioner for Complaints for Telecom Services,63 whereas com-
plaints regarding Internet content are directed to the Canadian Association 
of Internet Service providers for examination under its Code of Conduct or to 
the appropriate law enforcement agency where illegal content is in issue.64 The 
CRTC does, however, monitor and report on broadcasting, telecommunica-
tions, and Internet- related developments annually, using survey data obtained 
55. “ ‘[B] roadcasting’ means any transmission of programmes, whether or not encrypted, by 
radio waves or other means of telecommunication for reception by the public by means of 
broadcasting receiving apparatus, but does not include any such transmission of programmes 
that is made solely for performance or display in a public place.” BA, § 2(1).
56. “ ‘[T] elecommunications’ means the emission, transmission or reception of intelligence 
by any wire, cable, radio, optical or other electromagnetic system, or by any similar technical 
system.” TA, § 2(1).
57. Broadcasting Act, SC 1991, c. 11, as amended; Telecommunications Act, SC 1993, c. 38, as 
amended.
58. CRTC, Internet— Our Role (June 28, 2016), http:// www.crtc.gc.ca/ eng/ internet/ role.htm.
59. Conflicting opinions around whether ISps qualify as broadcasters under the BA and con-
cerns around the ways in which convergence is rendering obsolete distinctions such as tele-
com and broadcasting have led, respectively, to a CRTC commitment to refer the broadcaster 
question to the Federal Court and a CRTC call for development of a national digital strategy. 
CRTC, Broadcasting Regulatory Policy, CRTC 2009- 329 (June 4, 2009)
60.  CRTC, Public Notice CRTC 1999- 197 (December 17, 1999), http:// www.crtc.gc.ca/ 
eng/ archive/ 1999/ pb99- 197.htm; CRTC, Broadcasting Regulatory Policy, CRTC 2009- 329  
(June 4, 2009).
61. CRTC, Broadcasting Regulatory Policy, above note 60.
62. CRTC, Internet— Our Role, above note 58.
63. CRTC, How to Make a Complaint about Your Internet Service (May 27, 2015), http:// www.
crtc.gc.ca/ eng/ internet/ plaint.htm.
64.  CRTC, TV and Music Online (April 2, 2014), http:// crtc.gc.ca/ eng/ internet/ musi.
htm#internet.
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from industry providers.65 The Telecommunications Act and Broadcasting 
Act empower the CRTC to issue policies, implement licensing regimes, com-
pel licensees to submit information relating to their operations, and (in rela-
tion to hearings it is empowered to hold) compel production and inspection 
of documents and entry and inspection of property (Broadcasting Act, ss. 9, 
10, 16; Telecommunications Act, ss. 55, 58, 67).
In recent years, the CRTC has begun exercising its authority to issue search 
warrants, in some cases carrying out investigations “in close collaboration with 
its partners, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, europol, Interpol, 
Microsoft Inc., the Royal Canadian Mounted police (RCMp), public Safety 
Canada and the Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre.”66 The CRTC suc-
cessfully carried out a warrant to enter a building associated with an antivi-
rus telemarketing scam in november 2015,67 and used powers conferred under 
Canadian anti- spam legislation to take down a command and control server 
hosting malware one month later.68
The Competition Bureau (Bureau) is an independent law enforcement agency 
responsible for administering and enforcing, inter alia, the Competition Act, 
including in relation to telecommunications undertakings.69 It has a variety of 
powers to compel disclosure of information and its own statutory process to 
obtain warrants to authorize searches and seizures connected with its mandate 
domestically. It can also obtain warrants to assist international agencies involved 
in competition- related matters in respect of which the Mutual Legal Assistance 
in Criminal Matters Act (MLACMA) applies.70 The Bureau has also worked 
closely with domestic law enforcement agencies, such as the RCMp, in relation to 
mass marketing fraud (including online), as well as identity theft.
D.  Laws Requiring Broad Reporting of Personal Data  
by Private Sector Entities
1.  National- Security Related Provisions
A number of federal laws require private-sector entities to report personal data to 
governmental agencies or statutorily created regulatory bodies, often in relation 
65.  CRTC, CRTC Communications Monitoring Report (2011), http:// www.crtc.gc.ca/ eng/ 
 publications/ reports/ policyMonitoring/ 2011/ cmr2.htm#n0.
66. CRTC, “CRTC Serves Its First- ever Warrant under CASL in Botnet Takedown” (December 
3, 2015), http:// news.gc.ca/ web/ article- en.do?nid=1023419.
67. CRTC, “CRTC executes First Inspection Warrant as part of Telemarketing Investigation” 
(november 27, 2015), http:// news.gc.ca/ web/ article- en.do?nid=1022319.
68. CRTC, “CRTC Serves Its First- ever Warrant under CASL in Botnet Takedown,” above 
note 66.
69. Competition Act, RSC 1985, c. C- 34.
70. Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, RSC 1985, c. 30 (4th supp.).
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to matters of public or national security. Since 2000, in what the pCC character-
ized as “precedent setting” legislation, certain private-sector entities have been 
mandated to collect and disclose information to a government agency, without 
prior authorization for or demonstration of reasonable grounds to compel these 
acts.71 The proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act 
requires a wide variety of government agencies, individuals, and business enti-
ties engaged in what might broadly be described as financial services (e.g., banks, 
loan and trust companies, casinos, foreign exchange services) to keep and retain 
records relating to prescribed transactions (e.g., “large cash” transactions in 
excess of $10,000) and to report these transactions within a specified time period 
to FInTRAC.72
The reports include a variety of personal information, including the name, 
address, telephone number, and personal identifier of an individual who has 
conducted a large cash transaction.73 All of these entities are also required to 
report to FInTRAC “every financial transaction that occurs or that is attempted 
in the course of their activities” where there are reasonable grounds to suspect 
that the transaction related to commission or attempted commission of a money 
laundering or “terrorist activity financing offence.”74
Although FInTRAC is at arm’s length from law enforcement agencies, it may 
disclose information it has received to law enforcement officials where it has “rea-
sonable grounds to suspect” the information would be relevant to investigating 
or prosecuting money laundering or terrorism offenses or a threat to Canadian 
security.75 Similarly, financial institutions are required to determine on a con-
tinuing basis whether they are “in possession or control of property owned or 
controlled by or on behalf of” an entity listed in the Regulations Implementing 
the United nations Resolutions on the Suppression of Terrorism and to report to 
71.  privacy Commissioner of Canada, Submission to the Standing Committee on Banking, 
Trade and Commerce re: Bill C- 25, An Act to amend the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) 
and Terrorist Financing Act and the Income Tax Act and to make a consequential amendment 
to another Act (December 31, 2006), http:// www.priv.gc.ca/ parl/ 2006/ sub_ 061213_ e.cfm.
72. proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, § 2000, c. 17.
73.  FInTRAC, Guideline 7A:  Submitting Large Cash Transaction Reports to FINTRAC 
Electronically (December 2016), http:// www.fintrac- canafe.gc.ca/ publications/ guide/  
guide7A/ lctr- eng.asp.
74. “Terrorist activity financing offences” include providing or collecting property for terror-
ist activities (including offenses implementing various international conventions related to 
acts such as hostage taking, unlawful acts of violence in airports, terrorist bombings), provid-
ing or making available property or services for terrorist purposes, and using or possessing 
property for terrorist purposes. Code, §§ 83.01, 83.02, 83.03, 83.04.
75. Senate Canada, Security Freedom and the Complex Terrorist Threat: Positive Steps Ahead, 
Interim Report of the Special Senate Committee on Anti- terrorism, at 36 (March 2011), http:// 
www.parl.gc.ca/ Content/ Sen/ Committee/ 403/ anti/ rep/ rep03mar11- e.pdf.
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their respective regulators monthly either that they are or are not in possession 
or control of such property (Code § 83.11).
Concerns relating to terrorism and threats to national security have also led 
to compelled disclosure of passenger and travel data from commercial carriers 
under the passenger protect program (which was expanded after the Secure Air 
Travel Act came into effect following passage of Bill C- 51). CBSA operates an 
advance passenger information (ApI) and passenger name record (pnR) pro-
gram pursuant to which it requires commercial airlines to provide it with basic 
data relating to travelers’ names, dates of birth, gender, citizenship, travel doc-
ument, type of ticket, travel date, and related flight information prior to their 
arrival in Canada.76 The CBSA also collects a “limited set” of the pnR data col-
lected by air carriers or their agents relating to all passengers seeking entry into 
Canada, which includes “basic identity data,” contact, payment, and billing 
information about their booking agent, as well as the traveler’s check- in status, 
seating, and baggage information.77 CBSA can use pnR to “to identify persons 
who have or may have committed a terrorism offence or a serious transnational 
crime [e.g. narcotics smuggling, human trafficking]” or to develop trend analysis 
or risk indicators for identifying people who have or may commit such offenses 
or crimes.78 CBSA maintains ApI and pnR data in an access- restricted database 
(pAXIS) for a maximum of six years after receipt (CBSA, Guidelines). CBSA is 
authorized to disclose pnR to domestic authorities including CSIS, as well as to 
federal, provincial, and municipal police forces on a case- by- case basis subject to 
certain conditions. It can also disclose pnR to a foreign government authority 
on a case- by- case basis, so long as there is an international agreement in place 
to provide for that disclosure (CBSA, Guidelines). Records of disclosure must 
be kept and individuals have rights to request access to, request correction of, 
and to complain to the pCC about the pnR the CBSA holds about them (CBSA, 
Guidelines).
The MpS maintains a list of people he or she has reasonable grounds to believe 
will, among other things, threaten transportation security or use air travel to 
commit a terrorism offense— commonly referred to as the no- fly list.79 The 
MpS can direct an air carrier, among other things, not to allow persons on the 
list to travel by air or require them to screen listed persons.80 The Ministers of 
Transport and of Citizenship, the RCMp, CSIS, CBSA, and other persons author-
ized by regulation can assist the MpS in collecting and disclosing information 
76.  Canada Border Services Agency, Guidelines for the Access to, Use, and Disclosure of 
Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data, Memorandum 
D- 1- 16- 3 (May 31, 2016), http:// www.cbsa- asfc.gc.ca/ publications/ dm- md/ d1/ d1- 16- 3- eng.
html; Secure Air Travel Act, SC 2015, c. 20, § 11, § 5(2).
77. CBSA Guidelines, above note 76.
78. Ibid.
79. Secure Air Travel Act, above note 76, § 8(1)
80. Ibid., § 9(1).
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and the MpS can also enter into agreements with foreign states to disclose all or 
part of the list to them.81 Individuals whose names appear on the list and have 
been denied travel can apply to the MpS to have their names removed, how-
ever, notwithstanding a report in november 2016 that a federal system of redress 
was under consideration, as of the date of writing no such system was as yet 
available.82 Various prohibitions in the Secure Air Travel Act limit the bodies 
that have access to the list from disclosing it for purposes other than those pro-
vided for in the Act.83
The Immigration and Refugee protection Act also authorizes certain officials 
to request disclosure of passenger information from commercial carriers.84
2.  Other Kinds of Provisions
A variety of provincial legislation also compels disclosure of personal informa-
tion, including with respect to public health. For example, the ontario Health 
protection and promotion Act requires health care practitioners to report to the 
local public health authority the name, address, date of birth, health card num-
ber, gender and telephone number of any person infected or suspected of being 
infected with a listed communicable disease.85
E.  Laws Permitting or Restricting Private Sector Entities 
from Providing Government Officials with Voluntary 
Broad Access to Data
privacy laws in various provinces and territories86 (as well as certain other 
kinds of legislation87) allow private- sector entities to share personal information 
with government officials in certain situations. of these, the pIpeDA section 7 
81. Ibid., §§ 10, 12.
82.  Ibid., § 15(1); Michelle Zilio, “ottawa Tight- Lipped on Delay to Improving no- Fly 
List” (April 10, 2017)  The Globe and Mail http:// www.theglobeandmail.com/ news/ politics/  
ottawa- tight- lipped- on- delay- to- improving- seriously- deficient- no- f ly- list- database/  
article34662667/ .
83. Ibid., §§ 20– 21.
84. Forcese, above note 38, at 472.
85. Health protection and promotion Act, RSo 1990, c. H.7, § 25.
86. The kinds of situations in which provincial and territorial privacy statutes permit private- 
sector entities to provide information to public officials includes those where disclosure is 
required or permitted by law, to minimize imminent health or safety risks, for research or sta-
tistical purposes, or “in the public interest.” M. Lacroix et al., The Reporting and Management 
of Personal Information and Personal Health Information to Control and Combat Infectious 
Disease:  An Analysis of the Canadian Statutory and Regulatory Framework (March 2004), 
http:// www.phac- aspc.gc.ca/ php- psp/ pdf/ privacy_ analysis.pdf.
87. See, for example, § 10(3) of the Code of Conduct Regulation (Alta Reg 160/ 2003) enacted 
pursuant to Alberta’s electric Utilities Act, SA 2003, c. e- 5.1, which explicitly permits hydro 
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provisions (discussed above in Section III(B)2) that allow for collection, use, 
and disclosure for purposes relating to law enforcement have tended to be the 
most prominent. Media reports, case law, and transparency reports produced by 
Canadian telecommunications providers suggest that many section 7(3) requests 
for disclosure seek subscriber information in relation to online child sexual 
exploitation investigations. Since the Spencer ruling in 2014, these requests must 
be made pursuant to a production order. examples drawn from case law in which 
police have relied upon “pIpeDA requests” in order to access subscriber identity 
indicate that a standard form letter is used, in which the officer identifies that the 
officer is acting in his or her capacity as a law enforcement officer investigating a 
child sexual exploitation offense, requests disclosure of the last known customer 
name and address of the account associated with a specified Ip address being 
used at a specified date and time, and identifies the legislative source from which 
the officer’s authority to make the request derives (typically the constating act 
and/ or regulations for the police force to which that particular officer belongs).
In its 2015 Transparency Report, Rogers Communications indicated that 
it complied with 83,871 requests for disclosure by law enforcement agencies, 
or 97  percent of requests made that year.88 Telus Communications similarly 
received 57,167 requests in 2015,89 while Canada’s largest telecommunications 
provider, Bell, has yet to release any transparency reports.90 prior to the SCC’s 
Spencer ruling in 2014, state access to ISp subscriber data required only five 
minutes of paperwork, with documents released through access to information 
requests suggesting that some telecommunications providers may have created 
law enforcement databases to make subscriber data readily accessible to state 
officials.91
providers to disclose personal information about their customers to a peace officer for the 
purpose of investigating an offense, unless disclosure is contrary to an express request by the 
customer. In Gomboc, a majority of the SCC concluded that the defendant’s failure to specify 
that he wished his information to be kept confidential when granted the option to do so, 
made it possible for the hydro authority to voluntarily disclose that information to the police. 
However, the Court left to another day the question of whether the regulation itself was con-
stitutional. Similar kinds of provisions may well be buried in any number of legislative or 
regulatory instruments at the federal, provincial, and territorial level.
88.  Rogers Communications, 2015 Rogers Transparency Report (May 2016), http:// about. 
rogers.com/ about/ helping- our- customers/ transparency- report.
89. Telus Communications, Sustainability Report 2015, “Business Operations: Transparency,” 
https:// sustainability.telus.com/ en/ business- operations/ transparency- report/ .
90.  Michael Geist, “Why Telecom Transparency Reporting in Canada Still Falls Short,” 
Michael Geist (blog) (May 30, 2016), http:// www.michaelgeist.ca/ 2016/ 05/ why- telecom- 
transparency- reporting- in- canada- still- falls- short/ .
91.  Jim Bronskill, “RCMp Drops Some Internet- Related probes Following Supreme Court 
Ruling,” CBC News (november 21, 2014), http:// www.cbc.ca/ news/ politics/ rcmp- drops- 
some- internet- related- probes- following- supreme- court- ruling- 1.2844390; Michael Geist, 
“The Spencer effect: no More Warrantless Access to Subscriber Info with Five Minutes of 
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Apart from pIpeDA requests, it is clear that law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies interact with and rely upon private sources of information in a variety 
of ways, including through data mining techniques that scan publicly available 
information online,92 as well as through purchasing information from private- 
sector data brokers.93 However, the exact nature, extent, and prevalence of these 
practices remains unclear.
F.  Role of the Courts
The courts play a central role in delineating the parameters within which the 
government may gain access to personal information in various capacities dis-
cussed above, including: articulating the constitutional parameters surrounding 
access, reviewing and (where applicable) enforcing decisions by privacy commis-
sioners, and hearing and deciding applications for warrants and prior judicial 
authorizations for interceptions. In 2013, Federal Court Justice Richard Mosley 
held that that CSIS breached its duty of candor when it solicited help from Five 
eyes partners while executing a surveillance warrant.94 Furthermore, as noted 
above, the 2014 SCC ruling on voluntary disclosure of subscriber data in Spencer 
has had significant impact on Canadian private- sector disclosure norms, requir-
ing that law enforcement seek pre- authorization before requesting subscriber 
data from ISps.
G.  Standards for Use, Access, Retention, and/ or Destruction 
by Government
Standards for government use, access to, retention, and/ or destruction of 
information about individuals are set first and foremost by the privacy Act for 
federal institutions and by various provincial and territorial privacy acts for 
their respective jurisdictions. The key provisions in the federal legislation are 
set out in detail in Section III(B)1 above. The sharing of information among the 
CSe, CSIS, and the RCMp through memorandums of understanding techni-
cally permitted under the privacy Act have been the subject of some controversy. 
police Work,” Michael Geist (blog) (november 21, 2014), http:// www.michaelgeist.ca/ 2014/ 
11/ spencer- effect- warrantless- access- subscriber- info- five- minutes- police- work/ ; Geist, Why 
Watching the Watchers, above note 47, at 243.
92.  Security Intelligence Review Committee, Checks and Balances:  Viewing Security 
Intelligence Through the Lens of Accountability, Annual Report 2010– 2011, http:// www. 
sirc- csars.gc.ca/ pdfs/ ar_ 2010- 2011- eng.pdf.
93.  Canadian Internet policy and public Interest Clinic, On the Data Trail:  How Detailed 
Information about You Gets into the Hands of Organizations with Whom You Have No 
Relationship, A Report on the Canadian Data Brokerage Industry (April 2006), http:// www.
cippic.ca/ sites/ default/ files/ May1- 06/ DatabrokerReport.pdf.
94. Re X, 2013 FC 1275.
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of particular concern has been the possibility that the more onerous warrant 
provisions applicable to the RCMp might be circumvented through cooperation 
with CSIS and/ or CSe, each of which has access to its own specific authoriza-
tion provisions discussed above.95 The more general issue of information shar-
ing between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and between Canadian 
agencies and foreign counterparts (particularly those who engage in torture) has 
also been canvassed in several prominent public inquiries.96 Despite cautions 
against increased information sharing, Bill C- 51 introduced provisions authoriz-
ing federal agencies and departments to share information pursuant to national 
security investigations, as discussed in more detail above.
H.  Cross- Border and Multi- jurisdictional Issues
participation in numerous information sharing arrangements and networks97 to 
some degree facilitates law enforcement agencies’ access to general information 
outside of Canadian borders through counterparts in other jurisdictions. More 
formal requests for access to such data can also be made from law enforcement 
officials in other countries under the numerous mutual legal assistance treaties 
to which Canada is a signatory.98 Canada also cooperates with its co- signatories 
to the UK- USA Security Agreement, as noted above in Section III(C)3. Further, 
as discussed above, passage of Bill C- 51 brought with it explicit authorization for 
sharing of certain kinds of information (such as no- fly lists) with foreign states.
protecting the privacy of Canadians’ data has certainly involved cross- border 
issues, particularly in relation to that data’s accessibility to US authorities under 
the PATRIOT Act. For example, Canadian entities’ outsourcing of data- related 
services to US entities generated recommendations from the British Columbia 
95. CSeC, Annual Report 2010– 2011, above note 42; Forcese, above note 38, at 501– 02.
96.  Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian officials in Relation to Maher 
Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (2006), 
http:// epe.lac- bac.gc.ca/ 100/ 206/ 301/ pco- bcp/ commissions/ maher_ arar/ 07- 09- 13/ www. 
ararcommission.ca/ eng/ AR_ english.pdf; Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of 
the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, Air India Flight 182: A Canadian Tragedy (2010), http:// 
publications.gc.ca/ collections/ collection_ 2010/ bcp- pco/ Cp32- 89- 4- 2010- eng.pdf; Frank 
Iacobucci, Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah 
Almaki, Ahmad Abou- Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin Final Report (2008).
97. See, for example: the Virtual Global Taskforce Combatting online Child Sexual Abuse, 
involving organizations from Canada, the United States, Australia, europe and else-
where: RCMp, Virtual Global Taskforce: International Law Enforcement Working Together to 
Protect Children, http:// www.rcmp- grc.gc.ca/ ncecc- cncee/ vgt- eng.htm.
98. Included amongst the countries with whom Canada has signed such treaties are Australia, 
China, France, India, the United States, and numerous others. Information exchange 
network for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and extradition, Principles Providing a 
Framework for Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition and More Information: Canada 2004, 
http:// www.oas.org/ juridico/ mla/ en/ can/ en_ can- mla- gen- g8iag.html.
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privacy Commissioner in 2004 for, inter alia, legislation making it an offense to 
outsource the handling of a British Columbian’s personal information outside of 
Canada.99 A complaint to the pCC relating to the transborder flow of Canadians’ 
personal information to a US data broker resulted in a judicial decision declaring 
that the pCC had jurisdiction to investigate the complaint, even though pIpeDA 
did not have extraterritorial effect.100 Given that the pCC may assert jurisdiction 
in cases involving extraterritorial elements, so long as there is a real and sub-
stantial connection to Canada, the pCC has issued recommendations relating 
to Canadian companies’ outsourcing of data- related services to firms in foreign 
countries, reminding Canadian entities of their pIpeDA obligations relating to 
notice and consent.101 More recently, the pCC issued a publication identifying 
the privacy implications relating to cloud computing and reiterating the juris-
dictional constraints and capacities of the office of the privacy Commissioner of 
Canada in relation to it.102
IV.  RECENT CONTROVERSIES
The last five years have seen significant changes to Canadian national secur-
ity and lawful access regimes, as well as dramatic revelations of bulk, indis-
criminate, and pervasive international surveillance affecting and involving 
Canadians. Systematic domestic and international access to Canadian private- 
sector data remains a complex issue, governed by a patchwork of laws that fea-
ture many moving parts. As Lisa Austin notes, increased information sharing 
and the increasingly blurred investigatory roles of law enforcement, border con-
trol, and intelligence agencies have made “gaining a clear public understand-
ing of proposed changes to lawful access laws or the full significance of legal 
cases before the courts […] extremely difficult.”103 Although an extended dis-
cussion of the systemic effects of recent Canadian legislative changes lies beyond 
the scope of this chapter, we highlight some pertinent events, concerns, and 
controversies below.
In 2013, following the high- profile suicides of two Canadian teens, the 
Canadian government passed legislation prohibiting the non- consensual 
99. office of the Information and privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, Privacy and 
the USA Patriot Act:  Implications for British Columbia Public Sector Outsourcing (october 
2004), https:// www.oipc.bc.ca/ special- reports/ 1271.
100. Lawson v. Accusearch Inc., 2007 FC 125.
101.  Outsourcing of Canada.com Email Services to US- Based Firms Raises Questions for 
Subscribers, 2008 CanLII 58164 (pC).
102. privacy Commissioner of Canada, Reaching for the Cloud(s): Privacy Issues Related to 
Cloud Computing (2010), http:// www.priv.gc.ca/ information/ pub/ cc_ 201003_ e.cfm.
103.  Lisa M. Austin, “Lawful Illegality:  What Snowden Has Taught Us about the Legal 
Infrastructure of the Surveillance State,” in Michael Geist, ed., Law, Privacy, and Surveillance 
in Canada in the Post- Snowden Era (2014) 103, 106.
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distribution of intimate images, which also contained lawful access provisions 
long sought by Canada’s previous federal government. Bill C- 13 established new 
warrants and production orders for transmission, tracking, and financial data 
held by private- sector organizations, available to public officers who have rea-
sonable grounds to suspect that an offense has been or will be committed under 
domestic law or under a law of a foreign state. As the current pCC notes, Bill 
C- 13 leaves the definition of “public officers” broad, potentially offering “not just 
police, but anyone from a township reeve to a fisheries officer to a mayor with 
lawful access to personal information under reduced thresholds.”104 The new law 
also includes an immunity provision that “increases the likelihood of voluntary 
disclosures at the very time that Canadians are increasingly concerned with such 
activity,”105 and imposes no good faith or reasonableness requirement on organi-
zations that voluntarily disclose information to authorities. others have further 
argued that the reasonable suspicion standard for metadata warrants in Bill C- 13 
seems at odds with the values underpinning the SCC’s Spencer decision, which 
recognized a significant privacy interest in subscriber data held by ISps.106
These changes take on new significance when considered alongside Bill C- 51, a 
piece of controversial antiterror legislation passed in 2015. In addition to autho-
rizing information sharing across federal departments for national security pur-
poses, Bill C- 51 makes changes to the no- fly list regime, and introduces provisions 
that criminalize knowingly advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism 
offenses in general. The new speech crime provisions in C- 51 expand the range 
of situations where Bill C- 13’s metadata warrants may be issued, and raise the 
troubling possibility that “to detect the wrong type of speech, police may need to 
monitor all sorts of other speech during which the bad things might be said.”107 
Furthermore, Bill C- 51’s permissive information sharing provisions may afford 
CSIS and other agencies indirect access to metadata that has been collected by 
police under the relaxed reasonable suspicion standard established in Bill C- 13.108
Metadata collection in particular has become a matter of heightened public 
concern and debate in Canada in light of the 2013 Snowden revelations. The 
legal basis for CSe’s metadata collection programs is the subject of an ongoing 
constitutional challenge by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association 
and related “Stop Illegal Spying” public outreach campaign.109 Furthermore, in 
104. pCC, 2014– 2015 Privacy Act Annual Report, above note 7, at 14.
105. Michael Geist, Testimony before the Justice and Human Rights Committee (May 29, 2014), 
https:// openparliament.ca/ committees/ justice/ 41- 2/ 27/ dr- michael- geist- 1/ only/ .
106. John Geddes, “Cyberbulling, the Supreme Court and the Future of Bill C- 13,” Maclean’s 
(June 21, 2014), http:// www.macleans.ca/ news/ canada/ suspicion- may- not- cut- it/ .
107. Forcese & Roach, above note 53, at 127.
108. Ibid., at 128.
109. British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, “Stop Illegal Spying” (last visited April 26, 
2017), https:// bccla.org/ stop- illegal- spying/ .
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light of recent insights into the extent of international spying, some have called 
for efforts to build more Canadian Internet exchange points, promote greater 
Canadian network sovereignty, and take measures to prevent data flow to coun-
tries with questionable privacy and surveillance practices.110
Despite having review bodies that can separately evaluate RCMp, CSe, 
and CSIS conduct, Canada currently lacks a body that can review cross- 
departmental national security activities. As Roach and Forcese write, 
“accountability bodies [in Canada] are restricted in the extent to which they can 
carefully scrutinise security service operations— each review body is ‘siloed’ to 
its own agency and cannot share confidential information.”111 Furthermore, 
as four former Canadian prime ministers noted in an open letter published 
during the debates surrounding Bill C- 51, “the lack of a robust and integrated 
accountability regime for Canada’s national security agencies makes it difficult 
to meaningfully assess the efficacy and legality of Canada’s national security 
activities.”112
In April 2017, the House of Commons approved Bill C- 22, the national 
Security and Intelligence Committee of parliamentarians Act and on May 30, 
2017 the Senate referred the Act to Committee. If enacted, this bill would create 
a committee of parliamentarians with the power to review any matter or activ-
ity relating to national security or intelligence. Although public response to Bill 
C- 22 has been largely positive to date,113 some doubts remain as to whether the 
body will be able to act free of executive interference, and whether enhanced 
review can be effective without further substantive changes to the complex legal 
framework governing lawful access, information sharing, and national security 
investigations in Canada.114
110.  Andrew Clement & Johnathan A. ober, “Canadian Internet ‘Boomerang’ Traffic and 
Mass nSA Surveillance:  Responding to privacy and network Sovereignty Challenges” in 
Michael Geist, ed, Law, Privacy and Surveillance in Canada in the Post- Snowden Era (2014) 
13, 35.
111. Forcese & Roach, above note 53, at 145.
112. Jean Chrétien, Joe Clark, paul Martin & John Turner, “A Close eye on Security Makes 
Canadians Safer,” The Globe and Mail (February 19, 2015), http:// www.theglobeandmail.com/ 
opinion/ a- close- eye- on- security- makes- canadians- safer/ article23069152/ ; Forcese & Roach, 
above note 53, at 400.
113.  Ian McLeod, “Liberal plan for new national Security Watchdog Gets Thumbs Up 
from experts, Despite ‘Inevitable Flaws,’ ” National Post (June 19, 2016), http:// news.
nationalpost.com/ news/ canada/ canadian- politics/ liberal- plan- for- new- national- security- 
watchdog- gets- thumbs- up- from- experts- despite- inevitable- flaws; Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association, “Bill C- 22: A Step towards Real Accountability” (June 20, 2016), https:// ccla.org/ 
bill- c- 22- a- step- towards- real- accountability.
114. Geist, Watching, above note 47, at 226; Austin, above note 103, at 104.
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V.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Canada is at something of a crossroads in terms of expanded systematic state 
access to data held by the private sector. Constitutional and statutory norms 
protecting reasonable expectations of privacy from state intrusion generally 
underline the importance of prior judicial authorization and investigations 
focused by reasonable grounds relating to identifiable offenses. However, these 
norms have already been challenged by provisions that empower CSe to surveil 
Canadians’ data with ministerial approval, compel private- sector organizations 
to collect and disclose personal information to authorities, and facilitate easier 
access to intercept authorization, if not warrantless access to data. exceptions 
in the Privacy Act and pIpeDA that permit sharing of personal information 
between government institutions as well as recent provisions authorizing vol-
untary personal information disclosure by the private sector to law enforcement 
agencies further erode the standard of prior judicial authorization (subject to the 
SCC’s findings in Spencer). Recent legislation authorizing information sharing 
among law enforcement, security agencies, other government officials, and, in 
some cases, foreign states, raises further cause for concern and presents chal-
lenges for meaningful and robust public accountability and oversight. Whether a 
newly proposed oversight committee would adequately address those challenges 
remains the subject of some controversy.
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Systematic Government Access  
to Private- Sector Data in the United States I
S T E P H A N I E  K .   P E L L*
I.  ABSTR ACT
After the September 11 (9/ 11) attacks, law enforcement’s mission expanded to 
include, at times even prioritize, the general “prevention, deterrence and disrup-
tion” of terrorist attacks, which presumed a new emphasis upon threat detec-
tion and identification by analyzing patterns in larger, less specific bodies of 
information.
Moreover, after 9/ 11, law enforcement was integrated into a much larger intelli-
gence gathering operation directed at “connecting the dots” proactively, in order 
to avert the next terrorist attack. This new focus, spread across a broad range of 
federal and state agencies, has created a voracious appetite for information— data 
found most often in the possession of industry, given consumer use of new tech-
nologies to facilitate personal, social, business, and economic transactions.
Indeed, the unprecedented level of “third- party” possession of information 
inevitably makes the private sector the most reliable and comprehensive source 
of information available to law enforcement and intelligence agencies alike. 
notwithstanding the impacts on business costs or innovation— whether for a 
criminal or intelligence terrorism matter or more traditional crimes where per-
petrators leave electronic fingerprints with a host of third parties— there is an 
expectation by law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and even legislators that 
industry third parties will facilitate real- time government access to data when 
needed, and that these data will be in possession of the relevant private entities if 
and when a government agency realizes their potential investigative value.
This chapter will explore the potential applications of systematic government 
access to data held by third- party private- sector intermediaries that would not be 
* The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the position of the 
United States Military Academy at West point, the Army, or the United States government.
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considered public information sources but, rather, data generated based on the role 
these intermediaries play in facilitating economic and business transactions (includ-
ing personal business, such as buying groceries or staying at a hotel on vacation).
II.  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Following the September 11th attacks, the mission of police and prosecutors 
expanded dramatically. Before that date, most law enforcement resources were 
allocated for the post- facto investigation or prospective prevention of specific 
crimes (such as organized crime and drug trafficking investigations), with far 
fewer devoted to intelligence collection and threat detection to prevent an attack 
upon the homeland. After September 11th, however, law enforcement’s mission 
expanded to include, at times even prioritize, the general “prevention, deter-
rence and disruption” of terrorist attacks, which presumed a new emphasis upon 
threat detection and identification by analyzing patterns in larger, less specific 
bodies of information. Moreover, after 9/ 11, law enforcement was integrated into 
a much larger intelligence gathering operation directed at “connecting the dots” 
proactively, in order to avert the next terrorist attack.
This new focus, spread across a broad range of federal and state agencies, has 
created a voracious appetite for information— data found most often in the pos-
session of industry, given consumer use of new technologies to facilitate per-
sonal, social, business, and economic transactions. Indeed, the unprecedented 
level of data in the possession of third parties inevitably makes the private sec-
tor the most reliable and comprehensive source of information available to law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies alike. Moreover, although many sources 
and forms of information are already available to law enforcement, the wide-
spread adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) technology will generate additional 
forms of metadata, potentially revealing sensitive information that would have 
been difficult for the government to obtain in the past.
notwithstanding the impacts on business costs, business reputation, or 
innovation— whether for a criminal or intelligence terrorism matter or more 
traditional crimes where perpetrators leave electronic fingerprints with a host of 
third parties— there is an expectation by law enforcement, intelligence agencies, 
and even legislators that industry third parties will facilitate real- time govern-
ment access to data when needed, and that these data will be in possession of the 
relevant private entities if and when a government agency realizes their potential 
investigative value.
perhaps the earliest, most visible post- September 11th expression of the gov-
ernment’s appetite for information came in the form of a data mining project 
led by the Defense Advanced Research projects Agency (DARpA), originally 
named “Total Information Awareness” (TIA), but later, significantly, renamed 
“Terrorism Information Awareness.”1 The new name might have suggested a new 
1. Fred H. Cate, “Government Data Mining: The need for a Legal Framework,” 43 Harv. C.R.- 
C.L. L. Rev. 445, 449 (2008).
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and limiting precision in the scope of the project, but this change should not be 
read to signal any change, either in practice or in the program’s ultimate goal. 
In 2002, John poindexter, retired admiral and director of DARpA’s Information 
Awareness office, identified the “transaction space” as one of the “significant new 
data sources that need to be mined to discover and track terrorists.”2 This “trans-
action space” included data encompassing communications, financial, educa-
tion, travel, medical, veterinary, country entry, place/ event entry, transportation, 
housing, critical resources, and government records. As part of the TIA program, 
DARpA “Red Teams” would develop model attack scenarios and then determine 
the types of transactions that would be necessary to carry out such attacks in 
reality.3 These transactions could form patterns that would be discernable in data-
bases to which the government would have lawful access. Having developed tar-
getable patterns of attack precursor behavior, the government, it was proposed, 
could then search across databases to detect the presence of those patterns.
Although the funding for this kind of “total information awareness” pro-
gram was ultimately terminated by Congress in 2003, following protests about 
the privacy impact of such an operation, the kind of threat forecasting through 
data mining represented by the TIA concept was an early indicator of the role 
powerful automated suspicion algorithms may increasingly play in law enforce-
ment and intelligence operations. Moreover, the Snowden disclosures, beginning 
in the summer of 2013, revealed other kinds of collection programs aimed at 
facilitating certain kinds of comprehensive information awareness by the gov-
ernment, for specific purposes.4
This chapter will explore the potential applications of systematic US govern-
ment access to data held by third- party private- sector intermediaries that would 
not be considered public information sources5 but, rather, data generated based 
on the role these intermediaries play in facilitating economic, business, and per-
sonal transactions. For the most part, US laws and regulations do not directly 
2. John poindexter, Director, Info. Awareness office, overview of the Info. Awareness office, 
prepared Remarks for Delivery at DARpATech 2002 Conference (August 2, 2002), at 1, http:// 
www.fas.org/ irp/ agency/ dod/ poindexter.html.
3.  Info. Awareness office, US Dep’t of Def., Report to Congress Regarding the Terrorism 
Information Awareness Program (2003) 15, https:// epic.org/ privacy/ profiling/ tia/ may03_ 
report.pdf.
4. Although numerous classified documents have been made public since the initial Snowden 
disclosures in summer of 2013, this chapter will only make reference to declassified or unclas-
sified information pertaining to these disclosures. There may be additional examples relevant 
to this discussion that are in the public realm but, nevertheless, remain classified.
5. With government access to the full Twitter Firehose, a service that pushes public tweets to 
end users in near real time that match customers’ criteria, the government could collect volu-
minous and possibly indiscriminate amounts of information on an ongoing basis. Although 
such activity raises significant privacy concerns, this chapter focuses on data in the posses-
sion of third parties that is not otherwise in the public realm.
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authorize ongoing, indiscriminate government access to data held by third- party 
intermediaries.6 For purposes of this chapter, the term systematic denotes one or 
more of the following practices, each of which permits the government to obtain 
information without any process or using processes to facilitate either ongoing 
and indiscriminate collection or discrete but significant over- collection of infor-
mation by: (1) exploiting7 gaps in existing statutes regulating government access 
to certain types of data held by specifically enumerated types of third parties; 
(2) pushing, even breaking, the boundaries of statutory language to permit the 
bulk collection of data; (3) using presidential authorizations; (4) creating infor-
mal partnerships with private entities; or (5) exploiting the lack of constitutional 
or statutory impediments to government access to certain types of data held by 
specific third parties. The ways in which systematic government access may oper-
ate are rarely transparent, often presenting themselves only when a controversy 
surfaces in the press, as was the case of the Terrorist Surveillance program, an 
nSA program discussed below involving the warrantless interception of phone 
conversations when at least one party was located in the United States, or, more 
recently, the nSA’s broad, indiscriminate collection and storage of US domestic 
telephone records, also discussed below.
This chapter examines the primary US constitutional and statutory authori-
ties governing law enforcement and intelligence agency access to private- sector 
data. As these various authorities are discussed, relevant examples of systematic 
government access to private- sector data— whether by voluntary disclosure or 
compelled legal process— are raised and integrated into the analysis.8
6. US law mandates some ongoing third- party disclosures of various types of information 
involving, for example, cargo and passengers coming into the United States from abroad 
or financial data that might assist the government in identifying money laundering or ter-
rorist financing. These data are divulged to the government pursuant to various regulatory 
requirements.
7. The term “exploiting” as used in this paragraph is not meant to convey a sinister motive. 
Rather, if the government is not prohibited from collecting data by the Constitution or by 
statute, then it can lawfully collect that data consistent with internal agency guidelines and 
authorized investigative activities, with very limited, if any, barriers.
8. This chapter is written as an overview of the subject matter and is not meant to be a compre-
hensive treatment of systematic access to private- sector data in the United States. of note, this 
chapter does not address the application of executive order (e.o.) 12333, issued by president 
Reagan in 1981 and modified several times since, which, among other things, regulates the 
collection of information about foreigners outside the United States for foreign intelligence 
purposes. e.o. 12333 governs activities that are “not covered by statute and do not [otherwise] 
require a court order.” Timothy edgar, “Surveillance Reform: privacy Board Turns to e.o. 
12,333,” Lawfare (May 3, 2015), https:// www.lawfareblog.com/ surveillance- reform- privacy- 
board- turns- eo- 12333. The privacy and Civil Liberties oversight Board (pCLoB), an inde-
pendent, bipartisan executive branch agency authorized by Congress to ensure that “liberty 
concerns are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, regu-
lations, and policies related to efforts to protect the nation against terrorism” (42 U.S.C. § 
2000(c)(2) (2012)), has held public hearings about e.o. 12333 and also plans to issue a public 
report.
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III.  US CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
The primary constitutional limit on the government’s ability to obtain private 
or personal information is the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreason-
able searches and seizures. Supreme Court Fourth Amendment case law has pre-
scribed certain tests to determine whether a search has occurred, which is the 
preliminary question to be answered before turning to whether any particular 
search is unreasonable. Justice Harlan’s famous concurrence in Katz v. United 
States,9 now commonly referred to as the Katz test, guides courts in determining 
what constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment: courts must determine 
whether the government conduct in question violates a subjective expectation 
of privacy and an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. More recently, 
in United States v. Jones,10 a case involving the government’s warrantless attach-
ment and use of a GpS device to track the movements of Jones’s car for 28 days, 
Justice Scalia wrote a majority opinion articulating a property- based rationale 
for determining what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. This trespass- 
based test is satisfied when: (1) a “trespass” occurs, (2) the trespass is to a target 
enumerated in the Fourth Amendment (“persons, houses, papers, or effects”), 
and (3) it occurs with the intent “to find something or to obtain information.”11 
of note, the application of this trespass, property- based rationale allowed the 
majority to avoid ruling in a way that would have had implications for other 
types of tracking technologies that solely employ the transmission of radio or 
other electronic signals not enabled by a direct physical trespass, such as track-
ing a target’s cell phone through compelled disclosure of location information 
possessed by a third party. Indeed, the law is still in flux with respect to whether 
the Fourth Amendment protects location information in the possession of a 
third- party carrier.
Generally speaking, the Fourth Amendment provides little to no protection 
for non- content information stored by third parties. Specifically, the infamous 
third party doctrine, a long- standing constitutional principle suggests, when 
taken in its strongest expression, that once data is disclosed to a third party, 
it no longer receives Fourth Amendment protection.12 The seminal cases estab-
lishing the third- party doctrine are United States v. Miller,13 a case concerning 
9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
10. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
11.  See orin Kerr, “The new Doctrine of What Is a Fourth Amendment Search,” Volokh 
Conspiracy Blog (January 23, 2012), http:// volokh.com/ 2012/ 01/ 23/ the- new- doctrine- of- 
what- is- a- fourth- amendment- search/ .
12. For a detailed discussion about the difficulty of applying the third- party doctrine in an 
Ip- based communications environment, see Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Susan Landau, 
and Stephanie K. pell, “It’s Too Complicated:  How the Internet Upends Katz, Smith, and 
electronic Surveillance Law,” 30 Harvard Tech. L.J. 1 (2017).
13. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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cancelled checks where the Supreme Court reasoned that the respondent “can 
assert neither ownership or possession” in documents “voluntarily conveyed to 
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business,”14 and 
Smith v.  Maryland,15 where the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does 
not apply to transactional information associated with making phone calls (for 
example, time/ date/ length of call and numbers dialed) because that information 
is voluntarily conveyed to third parties to connect the call, and phone companies 
record the information for a variety of legitimate business purposes.
The privacy protections that do exist for third- party records are primarily 
found in statutes enacted by Congress specifically in response to Supreme Court 
opinions limiting Fourth Amendment protections. Additional privacy protec-
tions may be found in agency guidelines and privacy policies, some of which 
exist because Congress has mandated their creation by statute. Although it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to conduct an analysis of the full scope of such 
policies (some of which may be classified) and their impact on the government’s 
systematic access to third- party records, policy that is managed by political lead-
ership of an agency is always subject to change, for better or worse.
IV.  STATUTORY OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS
For purposes of exploring potential systematic government access to third- party 
private- sector data, it is often useful to think about statutory privacy protections 
in terms of (1) what kind of third- party private- sector entities they regulate, and 
(2) what type of information they regulate. Sometimes, a statute will regulate 
the disclosure of a specific type of information to the government, but only by 
a specific type of third party. Thus, the disclosure of the same type of informa-
tion by a third party not covered by the statute could lawfully occur without any 
legal process. In the service of exploring the potential for systematic govern-
ment access, this section will analyze the primary statutes regulating third- party 
disclosure of information to the government, the electronic Communications 
privacy Act (eCpA),16 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),17 the stat-
utes authorizing national Security Letters (nSLs),18 and the Right to Financial 
privacy Act (RFpA).19 These statutes, although certainly not the only authorities 
14. Ibid. at 442– 43.
15. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
16.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2511– 2520 (2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701– 2712 (2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121– 3127 
(2012).
17. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801– 1862 (2012 & Supp. 2014).
18. There are five provisions of law that authorize the FBI to issue five types of nSLs: 12 U.S.C. 
§ 3414(a)(5)(A) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1681u (2012  & Supp.  2015); 15 
U.S.C. § 1681v (2012 & Supp. 2015); 50 U.S.C. § 436, recodified as 50 U.S.C. 3162 (Supp. 2014)].
19. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401– 3422 (2012).
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affecting government access to and retention of third- party private- sector data, 
provide the richest opportunity for discussion of systematic government access 
to these data. As these key statutes govern various aspects of government access 
to (1) electronic communications, (2) financial data, and (3) other records in the 
possession of third parties for both criminal and national security investiga-
tions, the discussion below will group these authorities as they relate to these 
three major categories of information.
A.  Electronic Communications Data: ECPA, FISA, and NSLs
1.  “Real- Time” Communications Content
The Wiretap Act (Title I of eCpA) governs law enforcement access to real- time wire, 
oral, and electronic communications in criminal investigations. To collect these 
communications, the government must establish, in a written application to a judge 
of competent jurisdiction, that there is probable cause to believe: (1) an individual is 
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated 
in the Wiretap Act; and (2) particular communications concerning that offense will 
be obtained through the requested interception.20 In addition to this probable cause 
showing, the government must also demonstrate that other normal investigative 
procedures have been tried and have failed, or reasonably appear unlikely to suc-
ceed if tried, or would be too dangerous to execute.21 The Wiretap Act also limits 
this intrusive surveillance tool to specific crimes listed in the statute. This list is 
extensive and includes a broad range of terrorism- related statutes.
In the case of terrorism national security investigations, however, the fed-
eral government’s ability to intercept real- time communications is not limited 
to authorities provided in the Wiretap Act. Such investigations— involving the 
collection of foreign intelligence about “foreign powers” or “agents of foreign 
powers” in addition to or even in the absence of pursuing activity that may vio-
late criminal statutes— are often more readily and appropriately pursued under 
FISA authorities. Accordingly, FISA authorizes interception of real- time wire, 
oral, and electronic communications when, by written application to the FISA 
Court, the government demonstrates that there is probable cause to believe that 
(1) the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign 
power, and (2) each of the facilities or places at which electronic surveillance is 
directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power, which includes a so- called “lone wolf” (i.e., an unaffiliated foreign 
individual posing a threat).22
Warrants granted pursuant to the Wiretap Act are often called “super war-
rants” and considered by some to be the gold standard with respect to limiting 
unconstitutional and/ or over- collection of communications content. The “high 
20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(3)(a),(b) (2012).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(c) (2012).
22. 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2012 & 2014 Supp.).
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comfort” with the statute derives from several factors, including, but not limited 
to the fact that the probable cause showing is predicated upon the discovery of 
evidence of a specific crime, that non- relevant communications must be mini-
mized, and that all federal wiretap applications must go through a special review 
process at the DoJ in Washington DC (Main Justice). Although a comprehen-
sive comparison between the Wiretap Act and FISA is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, FISA also contains minimization and oversight provisions, including its 
own specialized review process at Main Justice and a certification by a high- level 
official that such information cannot be obtained by normal investigative tech-
niques. FISA’s probable cause standard, however, is premised on the collection of 
foreign intelligence relating to foreign powers or agents of foreign powers rather 
than the collection of evidence a crime, arguably permitting a broader, more 
flexible exercise of government surveillance powers.
notwithstanding the lower threshold of FISA surveillance standards, in 2005 
the New York Times reported that the Bush administration, via classified presi-
dential authorizations, had granted the nSA authority for warrantless moni-
toring of international telephone calls and electronic communications (such 
as email), even when one party was a US person located on US soil.23 This so 
called Terrorist Surveillance program (TSp), which circumvented FISA, was 
evidently developed through a public- private partnership where nSA infor-
mally arranged with top telecommunications company officials to gain access 
to switches carrying America’s communications without warrants or court 
orders.24 After the TSp was exposed, industry members sought and received 
retroactive immunity for their participation, which had been at least partially 
contingent upon guarantees that they would not suffer adverse consequences 
stemming from their uncompelled informal cooperation.25 The TSp illustrates 
a problematic example of systematic access to private- sector data: the executive 
branch, through a classified presidential order, circumvented existing provi-
sions of the FISA statute and bypassed congressional oversight by, among other 
things, enlisting the assistance of third- party telecommunications providers in 
its legally questionably operation.26
23.  James Risen and eric Lichtblau, “Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without Courts,” N.Y. 
Times (Dec. 16, 2005); see also Jon D. Michaels, “All the president’s Spies:  private- public 
Intelligence partnerships in the War on Terror,” 96 Cal. L. Rev. 901, 910 (2008).
24. Michaels above note 23 at 910.
25. on December 29, 2011, the ninth Circuit, in Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 671 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 
2011) upheld the constitutionality of § 802 of the FAA of 2008, which gave telecom companies 
a path to retroactive immunity from charges of misconduct, including privacy violations, for 
cooperating with the Bush administration’s warrantless wiretapping efforts.
26. For further discussion of the TSp, how it violated FISA, and how it was brought under 
court supervision via the FAA, see Stephanie Cooper Blum, “What Really Is at Stake with the 
FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and Ideas for Future Surveillance Reform,” 18 Boston Univ. 
Public Interest L.J. 269 (2009).
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Ultimately, Congress brought the TSp under the umbrella of FISA and some 
degree of FISC oversight by enacting the protect America Act of 2007 (pAA)27 
and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA).28 When compared with tradi-
tional FISA processes, however, the FAA, via Section 702,29 “impose[s] signifi-
cantly fewer limits on the government when it targets foreigners located abroad, 
permitting greater flexibility and a dramatic increase in the number of people 
who can realistically be targeted.”30 Specifically, Section 702 authorizes the attor-
ney general and the Director of national Intelligence jointly to authorize surveil-
lance, and to compel third- party assistance for such surveillance, which targets 
people who are not US persons and who are reasonably believed to be outside the 
United States, so long as the surveillance is conducted to acquire foreign intelli-
gence information. notably, there is no requirement that the government make 
an individualized showing to the FISC that there is probable cause to believe a 
particular target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Instead, the 
attorney general and the director of national intelligence make annual certifica-
tions authorizing the targeting to acquire foreign intelligence information and 
develop targeting and minimization procedures that must meet certain criteria. 
The FISC reviews and approves the annual certifications and accompanying pro-
cedures, evaluating whether they satisfy the identified criteria.
When examining the government’s use of Section 702, the privacy and Civil 
Liberties oversight Board (pCLoB) found general government “compliance with 
the text of Section 702 [and that] the text of 702 provides the public with transpar-
ency into the legal framework for collection.”31 one significant public criticism of 
Section 702, however, concerns what some call “backdoor searches.”32 Although 
US persons cannot be targeted pursuant to Section 702 (with the understanding 
that some US person information will be collected incidentally), it appears that 
some US person identifiers have been used to query information collected under 
Section 702, and that Section 702 may not explicitly prohibit such searches.33 
In response, lawmakers attempted to amend the Defense Appropriations Act of 
2017 with a provision preventing the nSA from using funds for such queries.34 
27. protect America Act of 2007, pub. L. no. 110- 55, 121 Stat. 552. The pAA was limited to six 
months, expiring in February 2008.
28. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, pub. L. no. 110- 261, § 403, 122 Stat. 2463, 2473 (2008).
29. The second story published about the Snowden disclosures in June 2013 involved Section 
702 and the pRISIM program. See pCLoB, Report on the Surveillance Program Operated 
Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (July 2, 2014) at 1– 8.
30. Ibid. at 10.
31. Ibid. at 8.
32. See Ashley nicole Baker, “Congress Must Shut the Backdoor on Section 702 Surveillance,” 
FreedomWorks, blog post (June 15, 2016).
33. Ibid.
34. See Amendment to H.R. 5293, offered by Rep. Thomas Massie of Kentucky.
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Section 702 is set to expire in 2017. When Congress considers the statute for 
reauthorization, the unresolved issue of whether and how to amend Section 702 
in response to backdoor searches will likely arise once again.
2.  Stored Communications Content
Title II of eCpA, the Stored Communications Act (SCA),35 governs law enforce-
ment access to the content of communications when in the possession of a third- 
party providing an “electronic communications service” (eCS)36 or a “remote 
computing service” (RCS)37 to the public. These definitions reflect the state of 
the Internet and corresponding Internet- based services that existed in 1986, the 
year the SCA was enacted by Congress. Although the definition of RCS certainly 
reflects Congress’s understanding that there could and would be third- party 
storage of content (“computer storage or processing services”), Congress could 
not have foreseen the extent to which various types of third- party storage used 
by consumers and businesses alike would become a booming business model 
due to an explosion in cloud- based services. Recall that in 1986, third- party stor-
age was prohibitively expensive, causing most people and businesses using com-
puters to store electronic content locally on a hard drive or floppy disk.
Consistent with Fourth Amendment doctrine, law enforcement must nor-
mally get a warrant in order to search and seize a laptop, desktop, or thumb 
drive. Congress extended the warrant protection via statute to communications 
content stored in an eCS (such as unopened email).38 Today, however, a large 
amount of data stored in the cloud (including opened emails) is arguably in RCS 
storage. In 1986, Congress did not extend full warrant protections to commu-
nications content in RCS storage.39 Rather, under the SCA, the government can 
compel third- party providers to disclose communications content in RCS stor-
age with an 18 USC § 2703 (d) order (a court order under which the government 
must show, with “specific and articulable facts,” that there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that the information sought is “relevant and material” to an ongoing 
criminal investigation), or even with a subpoena.40 This disparity in the level of 
privacy protections given to information stored “in the cloud” versus content 
35. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701– 2712 (2012).
36.  An electronic communication service (eCS) is “any service which provides to users 
thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” examples include 
telephone or email services. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2012).
37. A “remote computing service” (RCS) is a “provision to the public of computer storage or 
processing services by means of an electronic communications system.” 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) 
(2012). Roughly speaking, a remote computing service is provided by an off- site computer 
that stores or processes data for a user. examples include data stored “in the cloud,” such as 
online backup services.
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012).
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2012).
40. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(b), (d) (2012).
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stored on a laptop, combined with the sheer amount of content now in third- 
party storage, has given the government much greater access to private- sector 
communications content. In response to this disparity, since 2010, Congress has 
held several hearings followed by the introduction of several bills that, among 
other things, would provide the same warrant protections to content stored in 
the cloud (or other forms of RCS storage). Although no legislation has passed as 
of April 2017, courts have begun to address this disparity. Specifically, in the 2010 
Warshak opinion, the Sixth Circuit held that “if government agents compel an 
ISp to surrender the contents of a subscriber’s emails, those agents have thereby 
conducted a Fourth Amendment search, which necessitates compliance with the 
warrant requirement absent some exception.”41 Moreover, the Court held that 
“to the extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to obtain such 
emails warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional.”42 Although not a Supreme 
Court opinion or an amendment to eCpA, Warshak is a strong step toward the 
protection of content “in the cloud.”
3.  Stored Non- content Communications Data
A strong potential for systematic government access to non- content communica-
tions data comes from gaps in existing statutes and government practices. The 
SCA governs law enforcement access to stored non- content communications 
data when it is in possession of a third party providing an eCS or RCS service 
to the public. The SCA, however, only regulates non- content data (for example, 
transactional or other records pertaining to subscriber and customer names, 
addresses, length and type of service, temporarily assigned network address, 
means and source of payment) with respect to entities providing eCS and RCS 
services. If this non- content data is in the possession of a third party that is 
not acting as a public eCS or RCS, then the SCA does not provide any level of 
protection for the data. Without any statutory protection, third parties can, if 
they choose, voluntarily disclose data without any process. For example, when 
security researchers discovered that Apple and Google phones were collecting 
and transmitting back to the companies information about a device’s nearby wi- 
fi access points and geolocation data,43 the transmission of the location data was 
arguably not a function of an eCS or RCS service and thus would not receive the 
SCA protections otherwise afforded to historical location data. The government 
could, therefore, compel the disclosure of that location data with a subpoena 
(when the SCA would otherwise require a court order) or it could be disclosed to 
the government voluntarily by a third- party entity, in the absence of any emer-
gency and without any process.
41. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010).
42. Ibid. at 288.
43.  See Julia Angwin and Jennifer Valentino- Devries, “Apple, Google Collect User Data,” 
Wall Street Journal (April 21, 2011), http:// online.wsj.com/ article/ SB10001424052748703983
704576277101723453610.html.
 
C o U n T R y  R e p o R T S184
184
Moreover, the SCA does not prohibit the entities that provide public eCS and 
RCS services from disclosing non- content data to other nongovernmental enti-
ties. once in the possession of these fourth- party entities (such as data brokers), 
which are not providing public eCS and RCS services, the data can be sold or 
otherwise disclosed to the government without process. These fourth- party 
commercial data brokers collect information from a range of third parties (not 
just those regulated by the SCA) and can provide “one stop shopping” for law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies alike.44
The SCA also contains one of the five national Security Letter (nSL)45 authori-
ties, a series of foreign intelligence statutory authorities, similar to subpoenas, 
allowing the government to compel certain types of non- content data principally 
from communications providers, financial institutions (defined very broadly), 
and credit agencies. The FBI and other designated intelligence agencies can issue 
nSLs without court authorization, much like subpoenas. Unlike subpoenas, how-
ever, nSLs need not even be reviewed by a prosecutor. The nSL authority found 
in the SCA permits the government to obtain subscriber or customer identifying 
records and, the government argues, other types of transactional records46 in the 
possession of eCS and RCS providers (for example, non- content data pertaining 
to telephone and email communications).
Three different DoJ Inspector General (IG) Reports released between 2007 
and 2010 document a series of abuses concerning the FBI’s use of nSL authori-
ties. Although these reports identify several types of abuses, two key problems 
are particularly relevant to the examination of when and how the government 
can get unmediated access to third- party data. First, the FBI, in violation of 
eCpA and various internal guidelines, used “exigent letters” (ad hoc instru-
ments with implied legal authority where none existed) to acquire information 
from communication providers with the promise that actual process (nSLs or 
subpoenas) would follow.47 Going forward, this kind of subterfuge with prom-
ises that “process is on its way” should raise red flags for all public- private rela-
tionships. Second, from April 2003 through January 2008, employees of certain 
communications providers were located in FBI’s Communications Assistance 
Unit (CAU), which included being provided with FBI email accounts and access 
44. See Michaels, above note 23 at 918.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012).
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012). The Washington Post reported that the government was seek-
ing from Congress what it characterized as a “technical clarification” to § 2709 to facilitate 
the collection of transactional records. others characterized the government’s request as an 
expansion of collection authority under § 2709. See ellen nakashima, “White House proposal 
Would ease FBI Access to Records of Internet Activity,” Washington Post (July 29, 2010), 
http:// www.washingtonpost.com/ wp- dyn/ content/ article/ 2010/ 07/ 28/ AR2010072806141_ 
pf.html.
47. See oversight Review Division, office of the Inspector General, A Review of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s Use of Exigent Letters and Other Informal Requests for Telephone 
Records (Jan. 2010).
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to the CAU computer share drive.48 These on- site providers’ employees regularly 
attended CAU unit meetings and were treated by CAU personnel as “team mem-
bers.” Although the IG recognized that the collegial relationship between the 
co- located personnel fostered a productive working relationship, the 2010 report 
also notes that the “proximity of the on- site providers’ employees to the CAU 
personnel, combined with the lack of guidance, supervision, and oversight of 
their interactions with FBI employees … contributed to some of the most seri-
ous abuses identified in this review.”49 Indeed, in this instance, there appeared to 
be a merger of the “public” and “private” roles.50
In 2014, the DoJ IG issued a fourth report reviewing the FBI’s use of nSLs. 
This report clarifies an issue the Washington Post had flagged four years earlier51 
concerning the types of records the FBI could collect under eCpA’s nSL pro-
vision. Although the FBI has historically interpreted Section 2709 of eCpA as 
granting the authority to compel “electronic communication transactional 
records,”52 which have been defined in the media as “email metadata and header 
information, URL browsing data and more,”53 beginning in 2009, certain third- 
party companies refused to provide such records in response to nSLs on the 
grounds that nSLs do not, in fact, authorize the FBI to compel the produc-
tion of these records.54 This dispute is premised on a discrepancy in the stat-
ute: although “electronic communication transactional records” appear in one 
part of the statute (18 U.S.C. § 2709(a)), they don’t appear in the part of the stat-
ute that specifically lists the kinds of records available to the FBI under eCpA’s 
nSL authority (18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)). The companies take the position that the 
list found in Section 2709(b) is exhaustive and, accordingly, the statute does not 
authorize the FBI to compel electronic communication transactional records.55 
48. Ibid. at 24.
49. Ibid. at 25.
50.  Another public- private interface involved Sprint nextel developing a web interface to 
give law enforcement direct access to its subscribers’ location data in order to cope with the 
high volume of government demands the company was receiving for disclosure of these data. 
United States v. Pineda- Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J. dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc).
51. See above note 46.
52.  office of the Inspector General, oversight and Review Division, A Review of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Use of National Security Letters: Assessment of Progress in 
Implementing Recommendations and Examination of Use in 2007 through 2009 [hereinafter 
“2014 IG nSL Report”] (August 2014) at 70.
53. See Jenna McLaughlin, “Tech Companies Fight Back after years of Being Deluged with 
Secret FBI Requests,” The Intercept:  Unofficial Sources (June 21, 2016), https:// theintercept.
com/ 2016/ 06/ 21/ tech- companies- fight- back- after- years- of- being- deluged- with- secret- fbi- 
requests/ .
54. 2014 IG nSL Report, above note 52 at 70– 71.
55. Ibid. at 71– 72.
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The FBI disagrees with this position but has adapted by using a different author-
ity found in FISA— Section 215 of the pATRIoT Act— to compel the production 
of electronic communication transactional records.56 The FBI reported to the IG 
that the use of Section 215, which requires more internal review and approval 
by the FISA Court (FISC), has slowed down national security investigations.57 
The IG has consequently recommended that DoJ continue to pursue legislative 
clarification, consistent with DoJ’s prior efforts to seek a legislative fix.58
Whether one agrees with the FBI’s interpretation of eCpA’s nSL authority or 
believes that electronic communication transactional records should be obtain-
able under nSL authority, this example illustrates that third- party companies 
play an important role in controlling systematic access to private- sector data. 
Specifically, in this case, third- party companies challenged the FBI’s interpreta-
tion of the nSL authority, and it appears that Congress will affirmatively have to 
determine whether the government should have access to these kinds of records 
under the nSL authority’s low relevance threshold.
Although Section 215 of the pATRIoT Act (Section 501 of FISA) has added 
greater oversight to government collection of electronic communication trans-
actional records, the government has also used Section 215 to obtain systematic 
access to domestic telephone records. Section 215 permits the government to 
compel “tangible things” from third parties that are “relevant” to an “authorized 
investigation” in order: (1) “to obtain foreign intelligence information not con-
cerning a United States person,” or (2) to “protect against international terrorism 
or clandestine intelligence activities.”59 The very first published story about the 
Snowden disclosures in June 2013 involved the government’s use of Section 215 
to collect domestic call detail records and other domestic telephony metadata 
in bulk. Specifically, the FISC had issued questionable orders under Section 215, 
renewed approximately every 90 days, “authorize[ing] the nSA to collect nearly 
all call detail records generated by certain telephone companies in the United 
States, and specifie[d] detailed rules for the use and retention of these records.”60 
These records, stored in a centralized nSA database, included the date and time 
of a call, its duration, and the participating telephone numbers. The records did 
not, however, include the content of any telephone conversation. The program 
was “intended to enable the government to identify communications among 




59. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2014).
60. privacy and Civil Liberties oversight Board (pCLoB), Report on the Telephone Records 
Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (2014) at 8, http:// www.pclob.gov/ SiteAssets/ pages/ 
default/ pCLoB- Report- on- the- Telephone- Records- programme.pdf.
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United States.”61 If the government identified a phone number associated with 
a terrorist, for example, it could run that seed number against all the domestic 
telephone numbers stored in the database to assist in determining whether a 
known terrorist had contact with anyone in the United States.
one major criticism of this domestic surveillance program is that the “common 
sense” reading of the statutory text of Section 215 does not, on its face, appear to 
permit collection on this scale. More specifically, critics argue, an entire massive 
database of records— in this case the records of nearly every domestic telephone 
call— cannot be deemed relevant in its totality simply because some of the records 
in that database are actually relevant to an investigation. Indeed, if everything 
is relevant, then nothing is relevant and the limiting concept of relevance itself, 
as found in the statute, is rendered irrelevant. However well intentioned this 
collection program may have been, it is a problematic example of government 
systematic access to private- sector data. Although the government can rarely 
disclose the specific details of classified collection programs, it is important for 
the public to be able to gain a general understanding of the terrain and scope of 
the legal authorities permitting government surveillance. When reviewing the 
Section 215 bulk collection program, the pCLoB concluded that “Section 215 
does not provide an adequate legal basis to support the program.”62 Moreover, 
prior to the program’s disclosure in the summer of 2013, Senator Wyden warned 
his colleagues that “when the American people find out how their government 
has secretly interpreted the pATRIoT Act, they will be stunned and they will be 
angry.”63 With the passage of the USA FReeDoM Act in 2015,64 Congress ended 
the bulk collection of business records under Section 215.
4.  “Real Time” Non- content Communications Data
Although the SCA regulates government access to stored non- content data in 
the possession of certain types of third- party providers, Title III of eCpA (com-
monly referred to as the pen register and trap and trace device statute or simply 
as “pen/ Trap”) governs law enforcement’s ability to acquire real- time transac-
tional information about phone calls.65 While DoJ’s public manual on Searching 
and Seizing Computers does not give a detailed list of all of the specific types of 
transactional information that can be obtained with a pen/ Trap order, it notes 
that the statute’s “ ‘dialing, routing addressing [and/ or] signaling information’ 
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid. at 10.
63.  press Release, Senator Ron Wyden, In Speech, Wyden Says Official Interpretations of 
Patriot Act Must Be Made Public (May 26, 2011), http:// wyden.senate.gov/ newsroom/ press/ 
release/ ?id=34eddcdb- 2541- 42f5- 8f1d- 19234030d91e.
64. USA Freedmom Act of 2015, pub. L. no. 114- 23, 129 Stat. 268.
65. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121– 3126 (2012). In foreign intelligence investigations, the government 
may also use FISA pen/ Trap authorities. See 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (2012 & Supp. 2014).
 
C o U n T R y  R e p o R T S188
18
encompasses almost all non- content information in a communication.”66 The 
electronic Frontier Foundation (eFF) has interpreted the scope of DoJ’s poten-
tial collection ability to include:  the numbers a phone calls and from which it 
receives incoming calls; the starting and ending time of each call; the duration of 
each call; whether each call was connected or went to voicemail; and (although a 
disputed, controversial use of the pen/ Trap authority) “post- cut- through dialed 
digits” (digits dialed after a call is connected, such as a banking pIn or a pre-
scription refill number).67
enacted seven years after Smith v. Maryland, the pen/ Trap statute was a con-
gressional response to the Supreme Court’s holding that the Fourth Amendment 
does not apply to transactional information associated with making phone calls. 
The USA pATRIoT Act then expanded the government’s ability to use pen/ 
Traps to acquire real- time transactional information about email,68 which DoJ 
asserts, once again, could encompass almost all non- content information in a 
communication69 and eFF explains may include: addresses of sent and received 
email, the time each email is sent or received, the size of each email that is sent or 
received, and Ip (Internet protocol) addresses to include Ip addresses70 of other 
computers a target computer exchanges information with, as well as the commu-
nications ports and protocols used (which, in turn, can be used to determine the 
types of communications sent and the types of applications used).71
Concerns about how the pen/ Trap statute might facilitate systematic govern-
ment access to third- party data primarily derive from: (1) the statute’s low certifi-
cation standard, (2) the scope and volume of information that can presumably be 
collected with a pen/ Trap order, and (3) documented use of the statute to author-
ize a method of collection that courts granting orders did not realize they were 
authorizing. To obtain a pen/ Trap order, the government must only certify to a 
court that the information likely to be obtained is “relevant to an ongoing criminal 
66.  US Dep’t of Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual prop. Section, Criminal Div., 
Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations 
(3d ed., 2009) at 154 [hereinafter DoJ Manual].
67. See: https:// ssd.eff.org/ wire/ govt/ pen- registers. With respect to “post- cut- through dialed 
digits” or other communications content, the DoJ Manual, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c), instructs 
that the “government must also use ‘technology reasonably available to it’ to avoid record-
ing or decoding the contents of any wire or electronic communications … . Where there is 
no way to avoid the inadvertent collection of content though the use of reasonably available 
technology, DoJ policy requires that the government may not use any inadvertently collected 
content in its investigation.” See DoJ Manual, above note 66 at 155– 56.
68. See public Law 107- 56, Sec. 216 (oct. 26, 2001).
69. See DoJ Manual, above note 66.
70. See In re Application of United States, 416 F. Supp. 2d 13, 18 (D.D.C. 2006) (approving 
Internet pen/ Trap order seeking specified non- content information, such as originating Ip 
addresses).
71. See https:// ssd.eff.org/ wire/ govt/ pen- registers.
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investigation.”72 Insofar as this certification does not require a court to evaluate any 
facts to determine if the information is likely to be relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation, there is no meaningful judicial oversight. Moreover, there is no limi-
tation on the scope of information collected in a particular investigation, whether 
with single or multiple pen/ Trap orders. Although certain types of investigations 
require a broad collection of phone and email transactional information, if there is 
no meaningful judicial oversight regarding the scope of such collection, the poten-
tial for unmediated government access to third- party data looms large.
B.  Financial Data: Right to Financial Privacy Act, NSLs
Just as the SCA and the pen/ Trap provisions of eCpA were a congressional 
response to the lack of Fourth Amendment protections afforded to electronic 
communications in the possession of third parties, Congress enacted the Right 
to Financial privacy Act73 in 1978, two years after the Miller decision, where 
Supreme Court held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
documents voluntarily conveyed to banks and exposed to their employees in 
the ordinary course of business. The statute provides that federal agencies may 
not access the financial records of a customer of a financial institution without 
that customer’s consent, a search warrant, an administrative subpoena, a judicial 
subpoena, or a “formal written request.”74 The statute is subject to a number of 
exceptions, including disclosures required under other federal statues or rules. 
Moreover, the Act does not apply when the federal government obtains finan-
cial information from third parties that are not financial institutions, nor does it 
restrict disclosures to state or local governments or other private entities.75 The 
Act also contains one of the five nSL authorities,76 permitting the government to 
compel financial institution customer records in foreign intelligence investiga-
tions (for example, open and closed checking and savings accounts, transactions 
records from banks, private bankers, credit unions, thrift institutions, credit 
card companies, insurance companies, etc.).
After the September 11th attacks, it was reported that the government gained 
unprecedented access to the world’s banking databases through a relation-
ship with the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications 
(SWIFT), a Belgium- based cooperative that serves as “the central nervous system 
of international banking.”77 At that time, SWIFT purportedly carried informa-
tion for nearly 8,000 financial institutions, which conducted up to 12.7 million 
72. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2012).
73. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401– 3422 (2012).
74. 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (2012).
75. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401(1)– (3) (2012).
76. 12 U.S.C. § 3414 (2012).
77. Josh Meyer and Greg Miller, “US Secretly Tracks Global Bank Data,” L.A. Times (June 23, 
2006), at A1.
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financial transactions a day.78 Although SWIFT executives insisted that their 
organization’s participation had not been voluntary but, rather, was in compli-
ance with US government nSLs, SWIFT’s willing cooperation appeared to rep-
resent a major departure from typical practices.79 The SWIFT example illustrates 
how the government may use statutory authorities to acquire vast amounts of 
information— in this case purportedly with mere nSLs— such that the informa-
tion collection might be characterized as systematic government access aided 
by the cooperation of a “friendly” third party (likely due to circumstances sur-
rounding the September 11th attacks).
Additional mystery regarding government access to financial data surrounds 
a government practice referred to as “hotwatch” orders, “issued pursuant to the 
All Writs Act. Such orders direct a credit card issuer to disclose to law enforce-
ment each subsequent credit card transaction effected by a subject of [an] 
investigation immediately after the issuer records that transaction.”80 A  DoJ 
presentation obtained through a Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) request 
suggests that law enforcement’s preferred way of obtaining a “hotwatch” order is 
to contact the credit card security department and provide that department with 
an administrative subpoena and a court order for “non- disclosure.”81 Although 
the scope of information obtained from “hotwatch” orders is unclear, it is impor-
tant to note that the data are provided in “real time” and presumably will include 
information about the subject of the transaction (i.e., the type of purchase made 
or service conducted) that, in turn, can also reveal the location of the user at the 
time she made the transaction (in the case of a “brick and mortar” business or 
institution). Indeed, the DoJ presentation characterizes credit card “hotwatch” 
orders as “real time tracking.”82
C.  Other Records in the Possession of Third Parties
As previously noted, data not protected by the Constitution or regulated by 
statute requiring a court order for its production can be compelled by the gov-
ernment with “low level” process (i.e., subpoena or nSL) or even provided vol-
untarily to the government without any legal process. Such lack of regulation 
can potentially facilitate the kind of reported public- private partnerships with 
Western Union, Fedex, and major airlines seen in the aftermath of the September 
78. See Michaels, above note 23 at 916.
79. Ibid. at 917.
80. DoJ Memorandum to the Honorable James orenstein, october 11, 2005 at 9, https:// www.
eff.org/ document/ government- reply- eff- brief.
81.  See Christopher Soghoian, “DoJ’s “Hotwatch” Real- Time Surveillance of Credit Card 
Transactions,” Slight Paranoia Blog (December 2, 2010), http:// paranoia.dubfire.net/ 2010/ 12/ 
dojs- hotwatch- real- time- surveillance- of.html.
82. Ibid.
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11th attacks. Shortly after the attacks, then CIA director George Tenet invited 
Western Union executives to his office to persuade them to “be patriots.”83 Some 
of the information provided by Western Union following the exchange may 
have been disclosed in response to subpoenas, whereas some may have been 
provided though “informal cooperation” rather than legal compulsion.84 Since 
September 11th, Fedex has also reportedly “placed its databases at the govern-
ment’s disposal” and “demonstrated a willingness to open suspicious packages 
at the government’s informal request (i.e. without a warrant).”85 Major airlines 
were also reported to have turned over extensive amounts of passenger data to 
the government because “they thought they were obliged to do so.”86 Third- party 
desire and willingness to cooperate with the government post- September 11th 
in the fashion described is understandable and, moreover, legal. Indeed, gov-
ernment outreach to establish good working relationships with industry is often 
necessary and desirable. But if industry at large (such as supermarkets, hotels, 
travel agencies, etc.) routinely discloses information without minimal process, 
even when permitted under the law, then the government gets closer to achieving 
indiscriminate, systematic access to private- sector data.
V.  CONCLUSION
DARpA’s TIA program foreshadowed the potential of how machine learn-
ing techniques, when trained on the right data sets, might assist in “predictive 
policing”87 and predictive intelligence efforts. Given this potential, the govern-
ment’s desire and need for more private- sector data will only continue to increase. 
notwithstanding efforts to expand, contract, or more specifically regulate gov-
ernment access to third- party data, the ongoing public debates in this area must 
be informed by sufficient information about the government’s interpretation and 
use of its criminal and foreign intelligence authorities, including government 
“informal” practices.




87. See generally, Michael L. Rich, “Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and 
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Systematic Government Access  
to Private- Sector Data in the United States II
The US Supreme Court and Information Privacy
F R E D  H .  C AT E  A N D  B E T H  E .   C AT E *
I.  ABSTR ACT
The US Supreme Court has written a great deal about “privacy” in a wide vari-
ety of contexts. These include what constitutes a “reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy” under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution; privacy rights implicit 
in, and also in tension with, the First Amendment and freedom of expression; 
privacy rights the Court has found implied in the Constitution that protect the 
rights of adults to make decisions about activities such as reproduction, contra-
ception, and the education of their children; and the application of the two pri-
vacy exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act (FoIA).
The Court not only uses the term “privacy” in a variety of different settings, 
but has identified at least three distinct meanings of the term:
1. The Court has found a constitutionally protected right of decisional 
privacy, generally meaning personal autonomy to make decisions 
without unwarranted government intervention in certain areas that 
the Court has concluded implicate “fundamental” individual liberties. 
These areas include marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, child- rearing, and education.
2. In its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has provided a 
specific definition of privacy: whatever one “seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public,” provided that the individual 
has an “actual,” subjective expectation of privacy and that expectation is 
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“one that society was prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ” The Court 
has crafted many exceptions to this right; the most significant for the 
future of privacy protection is that information disclosed to or held by a 
third party may not be treated as private.
3. The Court has described both a statutory and constitutional “individual 
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters … .” In this context 
the Court repeatedly has found that even though information has 
been disclosed to and is held by third parties, this does not eliminate 
the existence of a lawfully protected privacy interest. This is a far 
more subtle and contextual view of privacy than the binary view of 
privacy that the Court has thus far applied in its Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.
II.  INTRODUCTION
The US Supreme Court has written a great deal about “privacy” in a wide variety 
of contexts. Between 1970 and 2016, the Court used the term “privacy” in 645 
opinions. In over half (342 opinions) an opinion significantly addressed some 
aspect of privacy.
The breakdown of those 342 opinions provides interesting insight into the con-
texts in which the Supreme Court concerns itself with privacy. (See Figure 9.1) 
not surprisingly, most of these opinions addressed privacy rights that the Court 
has found are protected by the US Constitution. The largest single category by 
far was cases involving the “reasonable expectation of privacy” under the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution (220, or 64  percent of opinions). opinions 
involving the First Amendment and freedom of expression issues accounted for 
17 percent (59), a large portion of which involved reviews of obscenity regula-
tions and prosecutions. Seventeen opinions (5 percent) involved what the Court 
has come to call “decisional privacy,” namely the privacy rights the Court has 








(n = 342, total greater than 100% due to double-counting)
Figure 9.1 U.S. Supreme Court Cases Involving privacy 1970– 2016.
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decisions about activities such as reproduction, contraception, and the education 
of their children. Highly controversial, decisions handed down by the Court in 
the last four years have affirmed by a bare majority a right to decisional privacy 
that extends to choosing civil marriage with a same- sex partner, and reaffirmed 
the right to choose abortion before the fetus is viable outside the womb.
Aside from constitutional privacy issues, 22 (6 percent) of the Court’s opinions 
involving privacy addressed the application of the two privacy exemptions to the 
FoIA. Seventy opinions (20 percent) did not fit within any discrete category. The 
total number of opinions does not add up to 342 (or the total percentages to 100 per-
cent) because a number of opinions addressed more than one aspect of privacy.
The breadth of the Court’s constitutional (as opposed to statutory) privacy 
jurisprudence reflects the fact that even though privacy is not explicitly protected 
in the Constitution, the Court has interpreted many of the amendments consti-
tuting the Bill of Rights to provide protection to a variety of elements of privacy. 
These include an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures by the government;1 the right to make decisions about contraception,2 
abortion,3 and other issues of “fundamental” individual liberty interests such 
as marriage, procreation, child- rearing, and education;4 the right not to disclose 
certain information to the government;5 the right to associate free from govern-
ment intrusion;6 and the right to enjoy one’s own home free from intrusion by the 
government,7 sexually explicit mail8 or radio broadcasts,9 or other intrusions.10
In this chapter we provide an overview of the Supreme Court’s treatment of pri-
vacy, first in its constitutional exposition, and second in its statutory interpretation 
of FoIA, with brief comments on its recent treatment of other privacy- protecting 
statutes. We conclude with a brief analysis of the apparent inconsistency within 
the Court’s jurisprudence of what constitutes a “reasonable expectation” of privacy 
and some thoughts on where the Court’s privacy jurisprudence may be heading.11
1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. Ibid. at 152– 53.
5. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
6. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
7. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
8. Rowan v. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
9. Federal Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
10. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
11.  The Court has little occasion to address common- law privacy protections, which typi-
cally apply via state tort law, unless it must consider whether they are pre- empted by fed-
eral statutory or constitutional provisions. In 2011, for example, the Court held that the First 
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III.  CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF A PRIVACY RIGHT
Fundamental rights in the United States are articulated in the federal 
Constitution. Two features of those rights are central to understanding the 
role of the Constitution in protecting privacy. First, rights articulated in the 
Constitution generally are protected only against government action.12 All con-
stitutional rights— whether to speak freely, confront one’s accusers, be tried by a 
jury of one’s peers— regulate the public, but not the private, sector. In the absence 
of state action, therefore, constitutional rights are not implicated in questions 
surrounding privacy.13 The second significant characteristic of constitutional 
rights is that they are generally “negative”; they do not obligate the government 
to do anything, but rather to refrain from taking actions that abridge constitu-
tionally protected rights.
A.  Fundamental Rights of Personal Decision- Making
The US Supreme Court’s most controversial constitutional right to privacy has 
developed within a series of cases involving decision- making about contracep-
tion, abortion, and other personal issues. In 1965, the Supreme Court decided in 
Griswold v. Connecticut that an 80- year- old Connecticut law forbidding the use 
of contraceptives violated the constitutional right to “marital privacy.”14 The jus-
tices voting to strike down the law identified a variety of constitutional sources 
for this right. Justice Douglas, writing the opinion for the Court, drew on notions 
of privacy implied within several provisions of the Bill of Rights:
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained 
in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one … . The Third Amendment 
in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers “in any house” in time of 
Amendment protected protesters at a military funeral against a state tort law charge of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
12. only the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery, applies directly to private par-
ties. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216– 20 (1905).
13. Although state action is usually found when the state acts toward a private person, the 
Supreme Court has also found state action when the state affords a legal right to one private 
party that impinges on the constitutional rights of another, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 264, 265 (1964), and in rare cases when a private party undertakes a traditionally 
public function, see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), or when the activities of the state 
and a private entity are sufficiently intertwined to render the private parties’ activities public, 
see Evans v. Newtown, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
14. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court later extended constitutional rights 
of access to contraception to unmarried individuals, see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972) (“[i] f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
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peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The 
Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the “right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.” The Fifth Amendment in its Self- Incrimination Clause enables the 
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to 
surrender to his detriment. The ninth Amendment provides: “The enumer-
ation in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”15
Justice Douglas wrote that the “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have pen-
umbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and 
substance.”16 Justices Goldberg and White, in concurring opinions, focused on 
the ninth Amendment and wrote that the autonomy of married couples to decide 
whether or not to have children was a fundamental and traditional right retained 
by the people. Justice Harlan’s concurrence grounded the privacy right in the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,17 which he believed protected certain 
“values implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” among them the right of married 
couples to engage in contraception without interference by the government.
Justice Harlan’s reliance on the due process clause emerged in subsequent cases 
as the dominant view of the constitutional basis for decisional privacy rights. 
Most controversially, eight years after Griswold, the Court, in Roe v. Wade, rec-
ognized a constitutional privacy right, grounded in due process, that encom-
passes “a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”18 The 
Court looked to “the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and 
restrictions upon state action… .”19 To guard against the potential for justices 
to greatly limit the scope of permissible legislative action by transforming their 
own policy preferences into constitutionally protected “liberties,” the Court in 
Roe v. Wade emphasized that the constitutional “guarantee of personal privacy” 
only includes “personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty’ … .”20 The Court specified that those fundamen-
tal rights include activities concerning marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, and child- rearing and education.21 Government regulation 
of those activities “may be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,’ ” and 
15. Ibid. at 484.
16. Ibid.
17. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: “no State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law … .” U.S. Constitution amend. XIV. The Fifth Amendment applies an identical prohibi-
tion to the federal government. U.S. Constitution amend. V.
18. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
19. Ibid.
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
21. Ibid. at 152– 53.
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they must be “narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at 
stake”22— a standard described as “strict scrutiny.”
Although the Supreme Court indicated that government intrusion into inher-
ently private areas of personal life would be subject to strict scrutiny, the Court 
over time has come to apply a lesser form of scrutiny to regulations involving 
abortion, and to emphasize the importance of balancing privacy with the gov-
ernment’s valid regulatory interests.23 Currently regulations imposed on preg-
nant women seeking abortions prior to fetal viability will be upheld as long as 
they do not impose an “undue burden” on access to abortion.24 The Court has 
defined an “undue burden” as a regulation that has the “purpose or effect of 
imposing a substantial obstacle” to getting a pre- viability abortion.
This standard is not without force and meaning. on the final day of its 
2015– 2016 term, the Court reaffirmed a woman’s right to choose abortion pre- 
viability and in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,25 struck down a Texas law 
that imposed two requirements on abortion providers, purportedly to protect 
women’s health. The Court examined the factual record and approved drawing 
“common sense” inferences from the facts, finding that the new rules had no 
demonstrated health benefits while making access to safe abortion considerably 
more difficult. In doing so the Court served notice that at least with respect to 
health- based abortion regulations, it would take a direct and close look at the 
evidence and not defer to legislative characterizations or judgments about a law’s 
impact on this privacy right.
The Court’s decisional privacy jurisprudence generally does not concern 
issues of informational privacy.26 In the abortion context, however, the Court 
has addressed certain rules that implicate informational privacy concerns. For 
a number of years following Roe v. Wade, the Court struck down state laws that 
required pregnant women, including minors, to obtain spousal or parental con-
sent to abortion (at least in the absence of an alternative when parental consent 
22. Ibid. at 155.
23. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
24. Ibid. After viability a state’s interest in preserving the potentiality of the life of the fetus 
outweighs the mother’s privacy rights and the state may ban abortion altogether except when 
needed to save the life or protect the health of the mother. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 
(2000). But see Gonzales v.  Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (rejecting facial challenge to fed-
eral partial- Birth Abortion Act of 2003, which does not contain an exception to the ban on 
partial- birth abortions to protect a woman’s health, but not ruling out challenges to indi-
vidual applications of the law).
25. 579 U.S. _ _ _ (2016).
26. Decisional “privacy” rights are better thought of as rights of personal autonomy, as Justice 
Ginsburg emphasized in her dissenting opinion on Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 172 (“legal 
challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some gen-
eralized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s 
course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”)
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is unavailable or inappropriate),27 and also struck down rules requiring women 
to receive information about risks and alternatives that the Court found to be 
designed to deter a woman from having an abortion.28 In 1992, however, the 
Court upheld a requirement that abortion patients receive an “informed con-
sent” booklet with information on risks and alternatives, a 24- hour waiting 
period, and a requirement that minors get the written consent of at least one 
parent, finding that none of these requirements unduly interfered with the right 
to access abortion.29
In recent years, states have passed additional laws requiring women seeking 
abortions to be given various types of information— for example, mandatory 
ultrasounds and fetal heartbeat audio, information on perinatal hospice care for 
fetuses likely to die shortly after birth, statements about studies showing that 
fetuses respond to pain stimuli at 20 weeks, and statements that “human physical 
life begins at conception.” Some lower courts struck down, on First Amendment 
grounds, laws requiring healthcare providers to perform ultrasounds on women 
seeking abortions and to display and describe their results in detail. The Supreme 
Court declined to review those rulings. After Whole Woman’s Health any future 
attempts to impose informational requirements may be in jeopardy if challeng-
ers demonstrate that the information has little to no relevance to making an 
informed decision about abortion but erects a substantial hurdle to getting an 
abortion.
As with abortion rights, the Court’s decisions involving same- sex relation-
ships and marriage have at once restated the importance of the constitutional 
liberty at stake and employed less than strict scrutiny to judge laws abridging 
that liberty. In Lawrence v. Texas,30 the Court held that a state law criminalizing 
private sexual conduct between consenting same- sex couples failed to pass mus-
ter under the due process clause. Although affirming that the freedom to make 
intimate personal choices is central to the liberty protected by due process, the 
Court effectively employed a much lower standard of review than strict scrutiny 
and found that the state law was not rationally related to furthering any legiti-
mate government interest.31 A decade later, in striking down federal and state 
bans on same- sex marriage, the Court once again used an amorphous but lesser 
standard, and focused on a form of privacy right grounded in dignity— the right 
to choose one’s partner and to have that choice respected by the government.
27.  For example, Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.  Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); 
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 
462 U.S. 416 (1983).
28. Akron, supra note 28; Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 
476 U.S. 747 (1986).
29. Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
30. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
31. Ibid. at 573– 74, 577– 78.
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B.  Protection against Government Disclosure of Personal Matters
The Supreme Court has addressed privacy in the context of a general constitu-
tional right against government- compelled “disclosure of personal matters.”32 In 
1977, the Supreme Court decided Whalen v. Roe, a case involving a challenge to 
a new york statute requiring that copies of prescriptions for certain drugs be 
provided to the state, on the basis that the requirement would infringe patients’ 
privacy rights. echoing Griswold, the unanimous Court wrote that the constitu-
tionally protected “zone of privacy” included “the individual interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters … .”33
nevertheless, having found this new privacy interest in nondisclosure of per-
sonal information, the Court did not apply strict scrutiny, a standard typically 
reserved for cases involving “fundamental” interests. Instead, applying a lower 
level of scrutiny, the Court found that the statute did not infringe the individu-
als’ interest in nondisclosure.34 The Court also explicitly rejected the application 
of the Fourth Amendment right of privacy to broad government data collec-
tion programs for regulatory purposes, writing that Fourth Amendment cases 
“involve affirmative, unannounced, narrowly focused intrusions.”35 The Court 
has never decided a case in which it found that a government regulation or action 
violated the constitutional privacy right recognized in Whalen.36
In Whalen, however, the Court provided a comparatively subtle and modern 
understanding of what “privacy” means:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast 
amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other mas-
sive government files. The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and 
social security benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our 
Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require the orderly 
32. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599– 600 (1977).
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid. at 603– 04.
35. Ibid. at 604, n.32.
36. Several federal appeals courts have relied on Whalen to find that a government regulation 
or action violated an individual’s constitutional privacy right in nondisclosure of personal 
information. See, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 
Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir. 1983); Schacter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 
1978); Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); Plante v. Gonzalez, 
575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978); and Doe v. Attorney General, 941 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1991). Courts 
in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, in contrast, have severely limited the scope of the Whalen 
nondisclosure privacy right, see Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990), 
and J.P.  v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981). Taking Whalen’s lead, those courts that 
have relied on the right of nondisclosure have applied only intermediate scrutiny, instead 
of the strict scrutiny typically used to protect fundamental constitutional rights. See Doe 
v. Attorney General, 941 F.2d at 796.
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preservation of great quantities of information, much of which is personal in 
character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed. The right to 
collect and use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a 
concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.37
The Court recognized that “in some circumstances that duty [to avoid unwar-
ranted disclosures] arguably has its roots in the Constitution.”38 The new york 
statute did not violate the Constitution because it “evidence[d] a proper concern 
with, and protection of, the individual’s interest in privacy.”39 The Court con-
cluded: “We therefore need not, and do not, decide any question which might be 
presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data— whether 
intentional or unintentional— or by a system that did not contain comparable 
security provisions.”40
C.  First Amendment
The Court has identified a number of privacy interests implicit in the First 
Amendment.41 For example, in NAACP v.  Alabama,42 the Court struck down 
an Alabama ordinance requiring the nAACp to disclose its membership lists, 
finding that such a requirement constituted an unconstitutional infringement 
on nAACp members’ First Amendment right of association.43
In Stanley v. Georgia,44 the Court explicitly linked privacy and free expression 
by identifying the mutual interests they serve. The Court overturned a convic-
tion under Georgia law for possessing obscene material in the home. Although 
the “[s] tates retain broad power to regulate obscenity,” Justice Marshall wrote for 
the unanimous Court, “that power simply does not extend to mere possession 
by the individual in the privacy of his own home.”45 The Court based its decision 
squarely on the First Amendment, which the Court found included the “right 
to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental 




40. Ibid. at 605– 06.
41. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceable to assemble … .” U.S. Constitution amend. I.
42. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
43. Ibid. at 464– 65.
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A 2013 case posed the link between privacy and First Amendment rights in 
the digital age, even more starkly than Stanley. Amnesty International and other 
lawyers, activists, and journalists communicating with clients and witnesses 
abroad claimed that the national Security Agency’s (nSA) reportedly sweep-
ing surveillance of phone and email communications under an amended foreign 
intelligence law had “chilled” their speech, silenced witnesses, and caused plain-
tiffs to travel abroad to have privileged and confidential conversations.
In a controversial 5- 4 decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International,47 the Court 
dodged plaintiffs’ claims, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because 
they could not show with sufficient certainty that the nSA, under the relevant 
law, would in fact monitor their particular communications with foreign con-
tacts. Rejecting evidence suggesting that such monitoring would indeed occur— 
in particular the nSA’s interception of client communications under an earlier 
and more stringent surveillance law— the majority characterized plaintiffs’ con-
cerns as “speculation” and (in the case of current travel costs) “simply the prod-
uct of their fear of surveillance,” neither of which could establish standing.
Importantly, the Clapper majority acknowledged that proven surveillance can 
raise significant First Amendment issues, and the national security context of 
the surveillance in question goes a long way toward explaining the majority’s 
reluctance to permit the plaintiffs’ claims to proceed to discovery. More often, 
however, the Court identifies privacy as an interest in tension with the First 
Amendment’s protection for freedom of expression and press. In Breard v. City 
of Alexandria,48 for example, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting solicita-
tion of private residences without prior permission. The Court found in the First 
Amendment’s free speech guarantee an implicit balance between “some house-
holders’ desire for privacy and the publisher’s right to distribute publications in 
the precise way that those soliciting for him think brings the best results.”49
The Court has invoked this same implied balancing test in numerous other 
cases. In Kovacs v. Cooper,50 the Court upheld a Trenton, new Jersey, ordinance 
prohibiting the use of sound trucks and loudspeakers:
[t] he unwilling listener is not like the passer- by who may be offered a pam-
phlet in the street but cannot be made to take it. In his home or on the street 
he is practically helpless to escape this interference with his privacy by loud-
speakers except through the protection of the municipality.51
In Rowan v.  U.S. Post Office,52 the Court upheld a federal statute that per-
mitted homeowners to specify that the post office not deliver to their 
47. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. _ _ _ , 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
48. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
49. Ibid. at 644.
50. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
51. Ibid. at 86– 87.
52. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
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homes “erotically arousing” and “sexually provocative” mail. In Federal 
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation,53 the Court allowed the 
Federal Communications Commission to sanction a radio station for broad-
casting “indecent” programming, finding that “the individual’s right to be 
left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.”54 In 
Frisby v. Schultz,55 the Court upheld a local ordinance that banned all residen-
tial picketing, writing that the home was “the one retreat to which men and 
women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits”56 and 
“the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick.”57 In Carey v. Brown,58 the 
Court wrote that “the State’s interest in protecting the well- being, tranquility, 
and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized 
society.”59
When privacy rights conflict with free expression rights before the Court, 
the latter usually prevail. When information is true and obtained lawfully, the 
Court has repeatedly held that the state may not restrict its publication with-
out showing a very closely tailored, compelling governmental interest. Under 
this requirement, the Court has struck down laws restricting the publication of 
confidential government reports,60 and of the names of judges under investiga-
tion,61 juvenile suspects,62 and rape victims.63 Moreover, there can be no recov-
ery for invasion of privacy unless the information published is highly offensive 
to a reasonable person and either false64 or not newsworthy.65 And the Court 
53. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
54. Ibid. at 748.
55. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
56. Ibid. at 484 (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 455).
57. Ibid. (quoting Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)).
58. 447 U.S. 455 (1980). The Court in Carey struck down an Illinois ordinance that generally 
prohibited residential picketing but permitted certain labor picketing; the Court rejected the 
state’s argument that the law properly balanced privacy interests with special solicitude for 
labor- related speech, emphasizing that picketing rules designed to protect privacy should be 
drawn without regard to the content of the speech. Ibid. at 470– 71.
59. Ibid. at 471.
60. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
61. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
62. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
63. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 
(1975).
64. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
65. Florida Star, 491 U.S. 254.
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has accorded a variety of procedural protections to all expression, whether true 
or false.66
The Court recently revisited the balance between freedom of expression and 
privacy in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.67 Sorrell involved a First Amendment chal-
lenge to a Vermont law prohibiting the sale, disclosure, or use of prescriber- 
identifiable information in pharmacy and related records for use in marketing 
or promoting prescription drugs. The law was aimed at combating expensive, 
targeted “detailing” campaigns by drug representatives using prescribed- specific 
data obtained from pharmacies, insurers, and so on via data mining companies; 
the state also argued, however, that the law was designed to safeguard prescriber 
privacy.68
Justice Kennedy, writing for the six- justice majority, assumed that “for many 
reasons, physicians have an interest in keeping their prescription decisions con-
fidential,” and strongly suggested that a state law that closely guarded the confi-
dentiality of such information and allowed its disclosure and use “in only a few 
narrow and well justified circumstances” would be upheld against the type of 
challenge brought by the pharmaceutical companies.69 The majority concluded, 
however, that prescriber data were widely available without prescriber consent 
to others, including “counterdetailers” promoting non- prescription drugs, and 
therefore the law was insufficiently tailored to serve its stated privacy goals.70
Strikingly, though, Justice Kennedy ended the majority opinion with a strong 
statement— one that echoes to some extent the concluding observations in 
Whalen, above— about the importance of privacy and the risks posed to it by 
technology- enabled access to and use of personal data held by the government 
or elsewhere:
The capacity of technology to find and publish personal information, includ-
ing records required by the government, presents serious and unresolved 
issues with respect to personal privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure. In 
considering how to protect those interests, however, the State cannot engage 
in content- based discrimination to advance its own side of a debate.
66.  Anderson v.  Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (requiring that the standard for 
summary judgment motions take into account the plaintiff’s burden at trial); Bose Corp. 
v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (requiring independent appellant review).
67. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
68. no patient- identifiable information was involved the disclosures.
69. 564 U.S. at 560.
70. The dissent argued that the majority overstated the access by others to prescriber data, cit-
ing state professional responsibility rules limiting disclosure of such data, the similarity of the 
exceptions in Vermont’s law to exceptions in the major federal health privacy law (the Health 
Insurance privacy and Accountability Act, or HIpAA), and the absence of record evidence 
indicating the widespread use of prescriber data for counterdetailing. Ibid. at 580 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).
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If Vermont’s statute provided that prescriber- identifying information 
could not be sold or disclosed except in narrow circumstances then the State 
might have a stronger position. Here, however, the State gives possessors of 
the information broad discretion and wide latitude in disclosing the informa-
tion, while at the same time restricting the information’s use by some speak-
ers and for some purposes, even while the State itself can use the information 
to counter the speech it seeks to suppress. Privacy is a concept too integral to 
the person and a right too essential to freedom to allow its manipulation to sup-
port just those ideas the government prefers.71
D.  Fourth Amendment
one of the colonists’ most potent grievances against the British government 
was its use of general searches. The hostility to general searches found powerful 
expression in the Fourth Amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.72
1.  Framework
The Fourth Amendment does not purport to keep the government from con-
ducting searches or seizing personal information. It only prohibits “unreason-
able” searches and seizures, but is silent about what makes a search or seizure 
“unreasonable.” In 1886, the Supreme Court first applied the term “priva[cy]” 
to the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,73 and for 80 years focused 
its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on whether a search required government 
officials to trespass on private property. In Olmstead v. United States,74 for exam-
ple, five of the nine justices found that wiretapping of telephone wires by federal 
officials did not constitute a search or seizure as there had been no physical tres-
pass and nothing tangible had been taken.
In 1967, the Court decided Katz v. United States,75 a case involving the consti-
tutionality of federal authorities’ use of an electronic listening device attached 
to the outside of a telephone booth used by Charles Katz, whom the authorities 
suspected of violating gambling laws. The Court found that this method of gath-
ering evidence infringed on Katz’s Fourth Amendment rights, even though his 
property had not been invaded. The Court wrote that “[t] he Fourth Amendment 
71. Ibid. at 580 (emphasis added).
72. U.S. Constitution amend. IV.
73. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625– 26 (1886).
74. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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protects people not places,” and therefore applies to whatever one “seeks to pre-
serve as private, even in an area accessible to the public … .”76
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan introduced what was later to become the 
Court’s test for what was “private” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.77 
Justice Harlan wrote that the protected zone of Fourth Amendment privacy was 
defined by the individual’s “actual,” subjective expectation of privacy, and the 
extent to which that expectation was “one that society was prepared to recognize 
as ‘reasonable.’ ”78 The Court adopted that test for determining what was “private” 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in 1968 and has applied it with 
somewhat uneven results ever since.79 The Court has found “reasonable” expec-
tations of privacy in homes,80 businesses,81 sealed luggage and packages,82 and 
even drums of chemicals,83 but no “reasonable” expectations of privacy in voice or 
writing samples,84 phone numbers,85 conversations recorded by concealed micro-
phones,86 and automobile passenger compartments,87 trunks,88 and glove boxes.89
The Supreme Court interprets the Fourth Amendment generally to require 
that searches be conducted only with a warrant issued by a court, even though 
this is not a requirement contained in the amendment itself.90 For a court to issue 
a warrant, the government must show “probable cause” that a crime has been 
or is likely to be committed and that the information sought is germane to that 
crime.91 The Court also generally requires that the government provide the sub-
ject of a search with contemporaneous notice of the search.92
76. Ibid. at 351.
77. Ibid. at 360– 61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
78. Ibid. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
79. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
80. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
81. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
82. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); 
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
83. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
84. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
85. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
86. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
87. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
88. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
89. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
90. Akihl Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure 3– 4 (1997).
91. 68 American Jurisprudence 2d, Searches and Seizures § 166 (1993).
92. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
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The Fourth Amendment’s protection, although considerable, is not abso-
lute. The Supreme Court has carved out a number of exceptions to the warrant 
requirement; for example, warrants are not required to search or seize items in 
the “plain view” of a law enforcement officer,93 for searches that are conducted 
incidental to valid arrests,94 for searches that serve “special needs” unrelated to 
law enforcement (e.g., warrantless drug tests of high school athletes and railway 
employees),95 and for searches specially authorized by the attorney general or the 
president involving foreign threats of “immediate and grave peril” to national 
security.96
Moreover, the Supreme Court interprets the Fourth Amendment to apply only 
to the collection of information, not its use. even if information is obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has consistently found 
that the Fourth Amendment imposes no independent duty on the government to 
refrain from using it. “The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly 
precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands, and an 
examination of its origin and purposes makes clear that the use of fruits of a past 
unlawful search or seizure ‘[works] no new Fourth Amendment wrong.’ ”97
Under the Court’s “exclusionary rule,” illegally seized data may still be used 
if the government agent acted in good faith,98 to impeach a witness,99 or in other 
settings in which the link between the unconstitutional conduct and the dis-
covery of the data is “too attenuated to justify suppression”100 or “the officer 
committing the unconstitutional search or seizure” has “no responsibility or 
duty to, or agreement with, the sovereign seeking to use the evidence.”101 Citing 
the significant societal costs imposed by excluding evidence relevant to a pros-
ecution, the Court suppresses the use of information obtained in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment only when doing so would have deterred the conduct 
of the government employee who acted unconstitutionally when collecting the 
information.
So, for example, the Court has allowed records illegally seized by criminal inves-
tigators to be used by tax investigators, on the basis that restricting the subsequent 
93. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
94. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
95. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ 
Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
96. 68 American Jurisprudence 2d, Searches and Seizures § 104 (1993).
97. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
98. Ibid. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)); see also Utah v. Strieff, 
579 U.S. _ _ _ (2016).
99. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
100. Utah, 579 U.S. _ _ _ .
101. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 (1975).
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use would not deter the original unconstitutional conduct.102 protecting privacy is 
not a consideration. The Court wrote in 1974 that the exclusionary rule operates as 
“a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights gen-
erally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the 
party aggrieved.”103 If the Court finds no independent Fourth Amendment basis for 
restricting the use of illegally obtained information, obviously the Court does not 
apply the Fourth Amendment to restrict the use of lawfully obtained information. 
The Fourth Amendment today thus poses no limit on the government’s use of law-
fully seized records, and in the case of unlawfully seized material restricts its use 
only to the extent necessary to provide a deterrent for future illegal conduct.
2.  The Miller Exclusion of Third- Party Records
The Supreme Court held in 1976 in United States v. Miller104 that there can be no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information shared with a third party. The 
case involved canceled checks, to which, the Court noted, “respondent can assert 
neither ownership nor possession.”105 Such documents “contain only informa-
tion voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the 
ordinary course of business,”106 and therefore the Court found that the Fourth 
Amendment is not implicated when the government sought access to them:
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the 
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government. This Court 
has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to 
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assump-
tion that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed 
in the third party will not be betrayed.107
The Court’s decision in Miller is remarkably sweeping. The bank did not just 
happen to be holding the records the government sought. Instead, the Bank 
Secrecy Act required (and continues to require) banks to maintain a copy of 
every customer check and deposit for six years or longer.108 The government thus 
compelled the bank to store the information, and then sought the information 
from the bank on the basis that as the bank held the data, there could not be any 
reasonable expectation of privacy and the Fourth Amendment therefore did not 
102. Ibid.
103. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354.
104. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
105. Ibid. at 440.
106. Ibid. at 442.
107. Ibid. at 443 (citation omitted).
108. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (2012); see 425 U.S. at 436; California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 
U.S. 21 (1974).
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apply.109 The Supreme Court was not troubled by this apparent end- run around 
the Fourth Amendment: “even if the banks could be said to have been acting 
solely as Government agents in transcribing the necessary information and com-
plying without protest with the requirements of the subpoenas, there would be 
no intrusion upon the depositors’ Fourth Amendment rights.”110
The Court reinforced its holding in Miller in the 1979 case of Smith v. Maryland, 
involving information about (as opposed to the content of) telephone calls.111 The 
Supreme Court found that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable to telecom-
munications “attributes” (e.g., the number dialed, the time the call was placed, 
the duration of the call, etc.), because that information is necessarily conveyed 
to, or observable by, third parties involved in connecting the call.112 “[T] elephone 
users, in sum, typically know that they must convey numerical information to 
the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this 
information; and that the phone company does in fact record this information 
for a variety of legitimate business purposes.”113
As a result, under the Fourth Amendment, the use of “pen registers” (to record 
outgoing call information) and “trap and trace” devices (to record incoming call 
information) does not require a warrant because they only collect information 
about the call that is necessarily disclosed to others.114 As with information dis-
closed to financial institutions,115 Congress reacted to the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion by creating modest statutory requirements applicable to pen registers,116 but 
the Constitution does not apply.
Although the Miller third- party doctrine and its binary view of privacy have 
never been overruled and have generally been followed by lower courts, the 
Supreme Court has declined to apply the doctrine in at least one case in which 
the Court found extensive and routine involvement of law enforcement in the 
design and administration of the third party’s collection of data. In Ferguson 
v. Charleston,117 the Court held that a hospital drug- screening program for preg-
nant women that provided the results to local police without the women’s con-
sent, in order to use threats of prosecution to prompt them to seek counseling 
and treatment, violated the Fourth Amendment. Justice Scalia dissented, not-
ing: “Until today, we have never held— or even suggested— that material which a 
109. 425 U.S. at 443.
110. Ibid. at 444.
111. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
112. Ibid. at 743.
113. Ibid.
114. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
115. Right to Financial privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401– 3422 (2012).
116. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121, 1841 (2012).
117. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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person voluntarily entrusts to someone else cannot be given by that person to the 
police, and used for whatever evidence it may contain.”118
Advances in technologies, and the development of new products and services 
in response to those changes, have significantly expanded the potential impact 
of Miller’s “third party doctrine.” Today there are vastly more personal data in 
the hands of third parties, they are far more revealing, and they are much more 
readily accessible than was the case in the 1970s. Moreover, for the first time, the 
government has the practical ability to exploit huge data sets. nodding to these 
developments, Justice Sotomayor suggested in 2012 that it may be time for the 
Court to revisit Miller and the third- party doctrine:
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information volun-
tarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital 
age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to 
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks … . I would not 
assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the 
public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection.119
3.  Recent Developments
The explosive growth in digital data creation, communication, and storage has 
led the Supreme Court to slowly, and somewhat reluctantly, confront how the 
Fourth Amendment will apply to protect privacy in this brave new world. The 
Court’s reluctance was evident in United States v. Jones,120 in which four justices 
(Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, and Thomas), joined by Justice Sotomayor, found that 
attaching a GpS device to the bumper of a suspect’s car without a warrant con-
stituted an unlawful search irrespective of any expectations of privacy, because 
the government’s action constituted a trespass to private property. The Court 
wrote that “the Katz reasonable- expectation- of- privacy test has been added to, 
not substituted for, the common- law trespassory test.”121
Although one could argue that the Court’s resurrection of common- law 
trespass as an independent basis for invoking the Fourth Amendment— after 
45  years of reliance on the Katz standard— worked an expansion of privacy 
rights, four concurring justices (Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) argued that 
the majority’s focus on trespass obscured the real privacy violation by the gov-
ernment:  “[T] he Court’s reasoning largely disregards what is really important 
(the use of a GpS for the purpose of long- term tracking) and instead attaches 
great significance to something that most would view as relatively minor (attach-
ing to the bottom of a car a small, light object that does not interfere in any way 
118. Ibid. at 95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. _ _ , 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
120. 565 U.S. _ _ , 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
121. Ibid. at 955 (emphasis in original).
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with the car’s operation).”122 This, the justices argue, is particularly problematic 
in the modern age when around- the- clock monitoring of a vehicle’s location can 
be accomplished by activating the vehicle’s stolen vehicle detection system or 
tracking one of the occupant’s cell phones.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, rejected the need to grapple yet with the 
thorny issues presented by the increasing ability to monitor human movements 
without physical contact: “We may have to grapple with these ‘vexing problems’ 
in some future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort 
must be had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for rushing forward to resolve 
them here.”123
Likewise, while upholding a “special needs” search of a police officer’s work- 
issued pager messages, the Court bypassed the question of whether the officer 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the pager, and found that 
even if the officer had a privacy expectation, the scope of the search was reason-
able and therefore constitutional. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, noted 
that “[r] apid changes in the dynamics of communication and information trans-
mission are evidence not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts 
as proper behavior … . At present, it is uncertain how workplace norms, and the 
law’s treatment of them, will evolve.” He concluded:
The Court must proceed with care when considering the whole concept of pri-
vacy expectations in communications made on electronic equipment owned 
by a government employer. The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully 
on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its 
role in society has become clear.124
In general the Court has expressed discomfort with using constitutional juris-
prudence, rather than statutory rules, to strike the right balance between pro-
tecting personal privacy and allowing legitimate governmental access. But even 
the Court has its limits, and has invoked the Constitution to shut down wanton 
misuse by the government of predigital doctrine in a strikingly different digital 
context. In the consolidated cases Riley v. California and United States v. Wurie, 
the Court confronted a constitutional challenge to the warrantless search of 
defendants’ cell phone contents following arrest. The Court held unanimously 
that the warrant exception permitting a “search incident to arrest” did not extend 
to the contents of a seized cell phone. emphasizing that modern cell phone own-
ers generally carry with them a massive amount of sensitive and highly reveal-
ing personal data, the Court required the police to get a warrant. Chief Justice 
Roberts, writing for the Court, dismissed the government’s attempt to analogize 
to searching the contents of a seized wallet or pack of cigarettes (“That is like 
saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the 
122. Ibid. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring).
123. Ibid. at 954.
124. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
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moon.”)125 even as the government’s extreme position forced a constitutional 
response, however— or perhaps, precisely for that reason— Justice Alito urged a 
statutory solution, writing that “it would be very unfortunate if privacy protec-
tion in the 21st century were left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt 
instrument of the Fourth Amendment.”126 As Congress has not yet updated the 
decades- old legislative framework for privacy in the crime- fighting (as opposed 
to counterterrorism and intelligence gathering) context, the Court stepped in to 
impose Fourth Amendment boundaries on the government’s remarkable claim 
to cell phone data.
The Court also rejected the government’s claim that officers could at least search 
the cell phones’ call logs without a warrant because the Court had allowed warrant-
less access to a phone company’s pen register in Smith v. Maryland. The Court dis-
tinguished Smith on the grounds that “[t] he Court in that case … concluded that 
the use of a pen register was not a ‘search’ at all under the Fourth Amendment,” and 
noted too that call logs typically include identifying information along with phone 
numbers. The Court did not discuss the third- party doctrine, either with respect 
to call logs or in noting the difficulties presented in cell phone data that are stored 
in the cloud; the government conceded that the warrant exception for searches 
incident to arrest did not cover a search of remotely stored files.
The Riley and Wurie cases, and to some extent Jones, reflect an unsurprising 
judicial rebuff of government assertions of near- limitless investigatory power 
using the tools and capacity of the digital age. In other recent Fourth Amendment 
cases, however, a majority of justices has given the government127 considerable 
latitude in developing and using broad databases for crime- fighting.
For example, in Utah v. Strieff, five justices allowed the use of drug and drug 
paraphernalia evidence in prosecuting a man who had been detained, and his 
identity demanded, without the necessary reasonable suspicion. The officer had 
checked the man’s identity against a database and found an outstanding traffic- 
based arrest warrant; he then searched the man pursuant to the arrest autho-
rized by the warrant, and found the drug evidence.
The Court held that discovery of the outstanding warrant was an “intervening 
event” that sufficiently attenuated the link between the original unlawful stop 
and the discovery of the evidence, so that the evidence need not be suppressed. 
The dissenting justices argued that running a check for outstanding warrants is a 
standard practice when officers conduct a stop, and there are a tremendous num-
ber of outstanding warrants for minor offenses; so, the upshot is a broad power 
for police to engage in dragnet- style searches of people on the street.
Likewise, in Maryland v.  King,128 a five- justice majority upheld a state law 
requiring DnA cheek- swab tests of persons arrested for violent offenses and entry 
125. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. _ _ _ , 134 U.S. 2473, 2488 (2014).
126. Ibid. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring).
127. 579 U.S. _ _ _ (2016).
128. 569 U.S. _ _ _ (2013).
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of the data into a national database. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, rea-
soned that arrestees have a decreased expectation of privacy and that DnA swabs, 
like fingerprinting, are valuable for ascertaining the arrestee’s identity and making 
informed decisions about bail and pretrial release. The dissent argued strenuously 
that the true purpose of the tests is to match DnA against samples in the database 
in order to solve cold cases, and predicted that soon anyone who is arrested for 
any reason, great or small, rightly or wrongly, may have his or her DnA taken and 
placed into a national database for crime- solving purposes.
IV.  FOIA
not all of the Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence addresses constitutional 
issues. The federal Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) permits “any person” 
to obtain access to all federal “agency records,” subject to nine enumerated 
exemptions.129 Two of the nine exemptions are designed to protect privacy: 
exemption 6 precludes disclosure of “personnel and medical files and similar 
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
privacy,” and exemption 7(C) bans release of “records or information compiled 
for law enforcement purposes [which] … could reasonably be expected to con-
stitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.”130
The Supreme Court has decided cases interpreting the extent of both exemp-
tions and, in the process, of “privacy.” In 1989, the Court decided U.S. Department 
of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,131 which involved press 
access to law enforcement rap sheets. The press argued that because the informa-
tion in an individual’s rap sheet was compiled from local, publicly available law 
enforcement and court records, the individual could not assert any privacy right. 
The Court disagreed, writing: “We reject respondents’ cramped notion of personal 
privacy.”132
The Court wrote, “both the common law and the literal understandings of 
privacy encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or 
her person. In an organised society, there are few facts that are not at one time 
or another divulged to another.”133 According to the Court, previous disclosure 
does not automatically remove the privacy interest. Instead, “the extent of the 
protection accorded a privacy right at common law rested in part on the degree 
of dissemination of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which the pas-
sage of time rendered it private.”134 The Court went on to note that according 
129. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1997).
130. Ibid. § 552(b)(6)– (7)(C).
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to “Webster’s initial definition, information may be classified as ‘private’ if it is 
‘intended for or restricted to the use of a particular person or group or class of 
persons: not freely available to the public.’ ”135
Based on this nuanced interpretation of privacy, the Court found that FBI rap 
sheets, even if they contain only material that is held by local law enforcement 
agencies and courts and that material has been made public, are nevertheless 
“private” within the meaning of FoIA because of the passage of time, the limited 
purposes motivating that disclosure, and the fact that rap sheets aggregate oth-
erwise disparate pieces of information.
The Court in Reporter’s Committee quoted approvingly from a speech by then- 
justice William Rehnquist: “In sum, the fact that ‘an event is not wholly “pri-
vate” does not mean that an individual has no interest in limiting disclosure 
or dissemination of the information.’ ”136 The Court concluded its analysis: “The 
privacy interest in a rap sheet is substantial. The substantial character of that 
interest is affected by the fact that in today’s society the computer can accumu-
late and store information that would otherwise have surely been forgotten long 
before a person attains age 80, when the FBI’s rap sheets are discarded.”137
Five years later, the Supreme Court relied on its broad definition of privacy 
from Reporter’s Committee in a case involving FoIA’s other privacy exemption, 
exemption 6, which applies to “personnel and medical files and similar files the 
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly un- warranted invasion of personal 
privacy.”138 In United States Department of Defence v.  Federal Labor Relations 
Authority,139 the Court was faced with a request by two unions for certain federal 
employees’ home addresses.
Addressing the issue of whether information as public as home addresses 
could ever be considered private, the Court wrote: “It is true that home addresses 
often are publicly available through sources such as telephone directories and 
voter registration lists, but ‘in an organised society, there are few facts that are 
not at one time or another divulged to another.’ ”140 The Court noted that the 
“individual’s interest in controlling the dissemination of information regard-
ing personal matters does not dissolve simply because that information may be 
135. Ibid. at 763– 64.
136. Ibid. at 710– 71 (quoting William Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent 
with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement?, nelson Timothy Stephens Lectures, University of 
Kansas Law School, pt. 1, p. 13 (Sept. 26– 27, 1974)).
137.  Ibid. at 771. In National Archives and Records Administration v.  Favish, 541 U.S. 157 
(2004), the Supreme Court further expanded its understanding of the “privacy” at issue in 
FoIA cases, by extending exemption 7(C) to family members of an individual who commit-
ted suicide.
138. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2012).
139. 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
140. Ibid. at 550 (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 763).
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available to the public in some form.”141 The Court found that “it is clear that 
[individuals] have some nontrivial privacy interest in nondisclosure.”142 The 
Court, therefore, found that exemption 6 prohibited the disclosure of federal 
employees’ addresses.
Most recently, the Court has rejected a corporation’s claim that disclosure 
of records provided to a federal agency in the course of an investigation would 
intrude on the corporation’s “personal privacy,” and therefore the records may 
be withheld under exemption 7(C).143 Applying familiar principles of statutory 
interpretation, the Court found that the word “personal” in both exemption 6 
and 7 connotes the privacy concerns of individuals, not entities.
V.  ASSESSMENT
It is not surprising that many commentators have considered the Supreme 
Court’s privacy jurisprudence to be confused and disjointed. The Court not only 
uses the term in a variety of different settings, but has defined it to have at least 
three distinct meanings.
The first, which the Court has described variously as a “right of personal pri-
vacy” or “areas or zones of privacy,”144 is constitutionally protected to the extent 
the right can be deemed to involve decisions whose personal nature is “ ‘fun-
damental’ ” or “ ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ”145 The Court has 
found fundamental rights of private decision- making concerning marriage, 
procreation, contraception, consensual sexual relations, family relationships, 
child- rearing, and education.146 Although this right generally does not impli-
cate information privacy, in certain cases it does, such as when abortion restric-
tions require women to receive, or provide, certain information regarding the 
pregnancy or fetus, as in the case of mandatory ultrasound or fetal heartbeat 
results, or mandatory spousal or parental notification. The Court has struck 
down spousal, but not parental, notification as imposing an unconstitutional 
“undue burden” on the right to access abortion before viability. It has upheld 
some mandatory informational requirements aimed at promoting informed 
consent, while declining to review cases striking down more recent, and contro-
versial, provisions such as mandatory ultrasounds or fetal heartbeat results. The 
Court’s recent decision in Whole Woman’s Health, which signaled its willingness 
to question state government assertions about both the benefits and burdens of 
new abortion regulations, may invigorate further challenges to such regulations.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid. at 501.
143. Federal Commc’ns Comm’n v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011).
144. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152.
145. Ibid. (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325).
146. 410 U.S. at 152– 53; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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The second meaning of privacy comes from the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. In this setting, the Court has provided a specific definition: 
whatever one “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public,”147 provided that the individual has an “actual,” subjective expectation 
of privacy, and that expectation is “one that society was prepared to recognize 
as ‘reasonable.’ ”148 The Court has crafted many exceptions to this right; the one 
with the most significant implications for the digital age is that for information 
to be treated as private, it must not have been disclosed to, or be held by, a third 
party.149 As a result, this understanding of privacy is essentially binary: informa-
tion is either not disclosed and therefore private, or it has been disclosed and 
therefore is not private. And this constitutional understanding of privacy is solely 
concerned with the collection of data, not with its retention, use, or sharing.
The Court describes its third meaning of privacy as “the individual interest 
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters … .”150 In the constitutional context, 
the Court has explicitly noted that information that the government consti-
tutionally may require an individual to disclose for one purpose, may never-
theless remain sensitive and subject to privacy protections. Many legitimate 
government activities “all require the orderly preservation of great quantities 
of information, much of which is personal in character and potentially embar-
rassing or harmful if disclosed. The right to collect and use such data for pub-
lic purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory 
duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.”151 Despite the fact that the information 
has been disclosed to, and is held by, someone other than the data subject, “in 
some circumstances that duty [to avoid unwarranted disclosures] arguably has 
its roots in the Constitution.”152 This interest in nondisclosure was recognized 
in Whalen, a case upholding the compelled disclosure of prescription informa-
tion, and has not yet invoked strict scrutiny by the Court to assess a government 
data- related activity. At the same time, the Court’s discussion in Sorrell suggests 
that a statute properly framed and even- handedly applied to protect privacy, 
might withstand a First Amendment challenge asserting rights to disclose and 
access such data.
In the statutory context, the Court has used this third meaning of privacy 
to block disclosure under FoIA. Repeatedly, the Court has found that even 
though information has been disclosed to and is held by third parties, this does 
not eliminate the existence of a lawfully protected privacy interest. “[T] he fact 
that ‘an event is not wholly “private” does not mean that an individual has no 
147. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
148. Ibid. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
149. Miller, 425 U.S. 435; Smith, 442 U.S. 735.
150. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599– 600.
151. Ibid. at 605.
152. Ibid.
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interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the information.’ ”153 This is 
a far more subtle view of privacy, in which privacy is measured on a spectrum, 
rather than the binary view of privacy that the Court has applied so far in its 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
The fact that there is inconsistency in the Court’s privacy jurisprudence is 
not surprising. In fact, the Court itself noted in Reporter’s Committee that the 
“question of the statutory meaning of privacy under the FoIA is, of course, not 
the same as the question whether a tort action might lie for invasion of privacy 
or the question whether an individual’s interest in privacy is protected by the 
Constitution.”154 However, the Court is inconsistent even within its constitu-
tional privacy jurisprudence, employing the term in Whalen to mean something 
broad and subtle and requiring protection beyond mere collection limits, and in 
the Court’s Fourth Amendment cases to refer to something that can be elimi-
nated by disclosure, and requires no protection beyond collection limits.
even more significant than the inconsistency, however, is that the meaning of 
privacy that the Court has so far articulated in its Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence—with minor exceptions—is inconsistent with popular perceptions about 
the meaning of privacy, and renders the Fourth Amendment impotent to pro-
tect against government intrusions into vast collections of personal information, 
given the extraordinary increase in both the volume and sensitivity of informa-
tion about individuals necessarily held by third parties.
professor Daniel Solove writes:  “We are becoming a society of records, and 
these records are not held by us, but by third parties.”155 Thanks to the prolifera-
tion of digital technologies and networks such as the Internet, and tremendous 
advances in the capacity of storage devices and parallel decreases in their cost 
and physical size, those records are linked and shared more widely and stored 
far longer than ever before, often without the individual consumer’s knowledge 
or consent.156 This is especially true as more activities move online, where mer-
chants record data not only on what individuals buy and how we pay for our 
purchases, but also on every detail of what we look at, what we search for, how we 
navigate through websites, and with whom we communicate.
The Miller exclusion from the Fourth Amendment of information disclosed to 
third parties means that all of this information, no matter how sensitive or how 
revealing of a person’s health, finances, tastes, or convictions, is available to the 
153. 489 U.S. at 710– 11 (quoting William Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent 
with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement?, nelson Timothy Stephens Lectures, University of 
Kansas Law School, pt. 1, p. 13 (Sept. 26– 27, 1974)).
154. 489 U.S. at 763 n.13.
155. Daniel J. Solove, “Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment privacy,” 
75 Southern California Law Review 1083, 1089 (2002).
156. Ibid.; James X. Dempsey and Lara M. Flint, “Commercial Data and national Security,” 
72 George Washington Law Review 1459 (2004); Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze:  The 
Destruction of Privacy in America (2001).
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government without constitutional limit. The government’s demand need not 
be reasonable, no warrant is necessary, and no judicial authorization or over-
sight is required. Jones and Riley suggest that the Court has begun to recognize 
the impact of technological change on the Fourth Amendment’s protection for 
privacy, and that some justices may even be willing to revisit Miller. The out-
come is uncertain however, and the Court plainly desires Congress, rather than 
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Systematic Government Access  
to Private- Sector Data in Australia
DA N  J E R K E R  B .  S VA N T E S S O N  A N D  R E B E C C A  A Z Z O PA R D I *
I.  ABSTR ACT
This study of systematic government access to private- sector data in Australia 
suggests that, although the Australian government has a range of powers to 
obtain such data, those powers appear primarily aimed at obtaining specific data 
for specific purposes. Little was found by way of direct unmediated access by the 
government to private- sector data or government access to private- sector data 
in bulk.
II.  NATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT AND FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES
Australia has a federal system of government with power distributed among six 
states, two territories, and the federal government. The Australian Constitution 
provides the federal government with the exclusive power to make laws on 
matters such as trade and commerce, taxation, defense, external affairs, and 
immigration and citizenship. It also outlines concurrent powers where both 
tiers of government are able to enact laws. The states and territories have inde-
pendent legislative power in all matters not specifically assigned to the federal 
government.1 Both state/ territory law and federal law affect the issues exam-
ined here. However, the most significant legislative initiatives are found on the 
federal level.
* The opinions expressed in this chapter are the authors’ own and do not reflect the view of 
any particular entity. The authors are grateful for the valuable feedback provided by nigel 
Waters.
1.  Australian Government, “How Government Works,” http:// www.australia.gov.au/ about- 
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Discussions2 have taken place aimed at the possible introduction of a federal 
Bill of Rights, but Australia currently lacks such an instrument. The Australian 
Human Rights Commission is responsible for promoting and encouraging pro-
tection of human rights in Australia. However, although Australia is a signatory 
to international instruments, such as the International Covenant on economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and political 
Rights with its optional protocol 2, there are no binding human rights princi-
ples on a federal level. nevertheless, a Statement of Compatibility with Human 
Rights is required to accompany any new legislation proposed at the federal level 
and is considered by the Joint parliamentary Committee on Human Rights.3 
Due to these protections and the ongoing debate about the role of a charter or 
bill of human rights in Australia, the Australian Human Rights Commissioner 
has indicated that there is currently no intention to pursue a charter at the fed-
eral level.4 If we turn to the state/ territory level, the Australian Capital Territory 
introduced its Human Rights Act in 2004. Section 12 of that Act specifically pro-
tects privacy.5 Similarly, the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 
2006 (Vic) of Victoria contains such protection.6 Further, other states also, for 
example new South Wales, have considered implementing such human rights 
protection.
Australian privacy law underwent a major overhaul in 2014 following the 
release of a 2,694 page report, in 2008, by the Australian Law Reform Commission 
(ALRC).7 That report made a number of recommendations, which the govern-
ment implemented in part in amendments to the privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and the 
introduction of the Australian privacy principles (Apps), which came into force 
in March 2014. In addition to establishing the Apps, which apply to both fed-
eral government agencies and some private sector organizations, the amended 
privacy Act established more comprehensive credit reporting obligations on 
credit providers and provided the privacy Commissioner with enhanced powers 
to deal with privacy complaints.
As part of its 2008 report the ALRC recommended that Australia introduce a 
statutory cause of action for serious invasions of privacy.8 This recommendation 
2.  https:// www.humanrights.gov.au/ our- work/ rights- and- freedoms/ projects/ lets- talk- about- 
rights- human- rights- act- australia (last visited July 22, 2016).
3. Human Rights (parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth), § 8.
4.  Australian Human Rights Commission, Rights and Responsibilities Consultation Report 
(2015) 49, https:// www.humanrights.gov.au/ sites/ default/ files/ document/ publication/ rights- 
and- responsibilities- report- 2015.pdf.
5. Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).
6. Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), § 13.
7. ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice (May 2008) ALRC 108, 
available at http:// www.alrc.gov.au/ publications/ report- 108.
8. Ibid.
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was not adopted as part of the privacy Act reform, and was renewed by the ALRC 
in a subsequent report in 2014 with the specific suggestion that the statutory 
cause of action be contained in a tort in Commonwealth legislation, separate 
to the privacy Act. The recommendation was for the tort to apply only to inten-
tional or reckless invasions of privacy and to be available to people who have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.9 The government has not indicated a willing-
ness to adopt the recommendations to date, and commentators have suggested 
that “uncertainty and inconclusiveness is destined to continue for some time 
yet” in relation to this issue.10
III.  STATUTORY AND REGULATORY OVERVIEW
In addition to the key areas of data access focused on below, other examples of more 
or less systematic government access to private- sector data can be found, such as 
in the context of government use of private entity CCTV footage,11 ID scanning 
at clubs,12 special reporting duties placed on selected healthcare providers,13 pri-
vate, or semiprivate operators of toll roads and public transport smartcards.14 More 
recently, health information is collected by the newly developed Australian Digital 
Health Agency when individuals register for an eHealth record.15
A.  Laws Requiring, Explicitly Authorizing, or Restricting 
Governmental Access to Private- Sector Data
The privacy Act 1988 (Cth) contains 13 Apps that regulate, in general terms, the 
use of personal information by federal “agencies,” a term used to include, for 
example, Ministers, Departments, bodies and tribunals established or appointed 
for a public purpose, persons holding or performing the duties of a government 
office, federal courts, and the Australian Federal police.16 State, territory, and 
9. ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Final Report (2014) ALRC 123, http:// 
www.alrc.gov.au/ sites/ default/ files/ pdfs/ publications/ final_ report_ 123_ whole_ report.pdf.
10. Margaret Jackson and Gordon Hughes, Private Life in a Digital World (2015) at 191.
11. See for example: Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places: Final 
Report (2010) VLRC 18, http:// www.austlii.edu.au/ cgi- bin/ disp.pl/ au/ other/ lawreform/ 
VLRC/ 2010/ 18.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=CCTV.
12. See further, Australian privacy Foundation, “Identity Scanning by Registered Clubs” (last 
visited July 15, 2016), http:// www.privacy.org.au/ papers/ ClubIDScans.html.
13. See, for example Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth), § 23DS.
14.  See further:  nigel Waters, Government Surveillance in Australia (August 2006), http:// 
www.pacificprivacy.com.au/ Government%20Surveillance%20in%20Australia%20v6.pdf.
15. Australian Digital Health Agency, at: http:// digitalhealth.gov.au (last visited July 16, 2016).
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local government bodies are not covered and are instead regulated in state or 
territory law.17 The privacy Act also does not apply to Australian intelligence 
agencies.
Agencies regulated by this scheme shall not collect personal information 
(other than “sensitive information,” which has additional protections) unless the 
information is reasonably necessary for, or directly related to, one or more of the 
“entity’s functions or activities.”18 Further, the collector must collect personal 
information only by lawful and fair means19 and take reasonable steps to ensure 
that the personal information collected is “accurate, up to date and complete.”20 
Similar regulation can be found on the state level in some states.
Sensitive information, which includes information or opinion about an indi-
vidual’s racial or ethnic origin; political opinions; membership in a political, 
professional or trade association or trade union; religious beliefs or affiliations; 
philosophical beliefs; sexual orientation or practices; criminal record; or health, 
genetic, or biometric information,21 can only be collected by an agency if the 
individual consents to the collection and “the information is reasonably neces-
sary for, or directly related to, one or more of the agency’s functions or activities” 
or if there is a relevant exception.22 Those exceptions include if:
 (a) the collection of the information is required or authorized by or 
under an Australian law or a court/ tribunal order; or
 (b) a “permitted general situation” exists, which includes where it is 
unreasonable or impracticable to obtain the individual’s consent to 
the collection and the agency reasonably believes the collection is 
necessary to lessen or prevent a serious threat to life, health, or safety 
of an individual, or to public health and safety;23 or
 (c) the agency is a prescribed “enforcement body” and the agency 
reasonably believes that “the collection of the information is 
reasonably necessary for, or directly related to, one or more of the 
[agency’s] functions or activities.”24
17. privacy and personal Information protection Act 1998 (nSW), privacy and Data protection 
Act 2014 (Vic), Information privacy Act 2009 (Qld), personal Information protection Act 




21. privacy Act 1988 (Cth), § 6.
22. Australian privacy principle 3.3.
23. privacy Act 1988 (Cth), § 16A.
24. Australian privacy principle 3.4.
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The impact of this regulation on systematic government access to private- 
sector data is interesting. on the one hand, it clearly sets boundaries for how 
governmental access to private- sector data may be had, and its broad scope of 
application means that it affects a wide range of government functions. on the 
other hand, this regulation is significantly undermined by the ease by which it 
can be circumvented. For example, AusCheck— a branch of the national Security 
Law and policy Division of the Attorney- General’s Department— has the role 
of undertaking background checking for persons to hold certain identification 
cards. The AusCheck Act 2007 (Cth) explicitly authorizes AusCheck to collect, 
use, and disclose personal information for AusCheck purposes. Importantly for 
the discussion here, such collection, use, and disclosure is “taken to be autho-
rised by law for the purposes of the privacy Act 1988.” 25 Thus, specific legislation 
can be used to nominate data use practices as being authorized by law so as to fit 
within the regulation discussed above.
on a more general level, it is worth noting how one expert has observed that:
Government agencies generally appear to consider any information law-
fully obtained as “fair game” for any subsequent lawful function. Moreover, 
the cumulative effect of the various statutory disclosure provisions is that 
information obtained by one agency for a specific purpose becomes at least 
potentially available to a range of other agencies for quite different purposes.
Information privacy laws, in those Australian jurisdictions which have 
them, purport to limit use and disclosure to the purpose for which informa-
tion is obtained, but this principle is substantially undermined by the many 
exceptions, including where “required or authorised by law” and “where rea-
sonably necessary for [a range of public purposes].”26
B.  Separate Laws for Law Enforcement Access, Regulatory Access, 
and/ or National Security Access
Under current law, the privacy Act 1988 (Cth) does not apply to some Australian 
government agencies “involved in law enforcement, intelligence gathering and 
national security” such as intelligence and defense intelligence agencies,27 and 
there are special rules regulating access by prescribed enforcement bodies for 
“enforcement related activities” broadly referring to activities such as the “pre-
vention, detection, investigation, prosecution or punishment of criminal offences 
25. AusCheck Act 2007 (Cth), § 13(1).
26.  nigel Waters, Government Surveillance in Australia (August 2006), http:// www.pacific 
privacy.com.au/ Government%20Surveillance%20in%20Australia%20v6.pdf (internal foot-
note omitted).
27. office of the Australian Information Commissioner, “Which Law enforcement Agencies 
Are Covered by the privacy Act?” https:// www.oaic.gov.au/ individuals/ faqs- for- individuals/ 
law- enforcement- surveillance- photos/ resources- on- law- enforcement (last visited April 25, 
2017). See for example privacy Act 1988 (Cth), § 7. The term “intelligence agency” is defined 
in § 6(1) of the privacy Act 1988 (Cth).
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or breaches of a law imposing a penalty or sanction” and also surveillance, intel-
ligence gathering and monitoring activities, among others.28
The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), part 1AA, Division 4B, gives the Australian Federal 
police (AFp) “notice to produce powers.” For example, section 3ZQM provides 
power to request information or documents about terrorist acts from operators 
of aircraft or ships. That section allows an authorized AFp officer, who believes 
on reasonable grounds that an operator of an aircraft or ship has information 
or documents (including in electronic form) that are relevant to a matter that 
relates to the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act has occurred 
or will occur), to “ask the operator questions relating to the aircraft or ship, or its 
cargo, crew, passengers, stores or voyage, that are relevant to the matter”29 and to 
“request the operator to produce documents relating to the aircraft or ship, or its 
cargo, crew, passengers, stores or voyage: (i) that are relevant to the matter; and 
(ii) that are in the possession or under the control of the operator.”30
Section 3ZQn provides similar powers where “an authorised AFp officer con-
siders on reasonable grounds that a person has documents (including in elec-
tronic form) that are relevant to, and will assist, the investigation of a serious 
terrorism offence.”31 no prior court approval is required for these categories of 
requests. In contrast, where an AFp officer considers, on reasonable grounds, 
that the person has documents (including in electronic form) that are relevant 
to, and will assist, the investigation of a serious offense, an application can be 
made to a judge of the Federal Circuit Court for a “notice to produce” order. To 
grant such an order, the Judge must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, 
by information on oath or by affirmation, that: “(a) the person has documents 
(including in electronic form) that are relevant to, and will assist, the investiga-
tion of a serious offence; and (b) giving the person a notice under this section is 
reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose 
of investigating the offence.”32 on state- level, most jurisdictions require warrants 
issued either by judges or magistrates.33
28. privacy Act 1988 (Cth), § 6(1), definition of “enforcement related activity.” This defini-
tion also includes the conduct of protective or custodial activities; the enforcement of laws 
relating to the confiscation of the proceeds of crime; the protection of the public revenue; the 
prevention, detection, investigation, or remedying of misconduct of a serious nature; or the 
preparation for, or conduct of, proceedings before any court or tribunal; or the implementa-
tion of court/ tribunal orders.
29. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), § 3ZQM.
30. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), § 3ZQM.
31. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), § 3ZQn.
32. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), § 3ZQo.
33.  nigel Waters, Government Surveillance in Australia (August 2006), http:// www. 
pacificprivacy.com.au/ Government%20Surveillance%20in%20Australia%20v6.pdf, p. 4. See, 
for example, Law enforcement (powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (nSW), Victoria police 
Act 2013 (Vic).
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Special rules apply to data gathering by the Australian Security Intelligence 
organisation (ASIo). ASIo’s data collection powers, particularly relating to com-
puter and data access and surveillance devices, were modernized and broadened 
in 2014 following the passing of the national Security Legislation Amendment 
Act 2014 (Cth).
part III, Division 2 of the Australian Security Intelligence organisation Act 
1979 (Cth) provides ASIo with a range of special powers relating to matters such 
as search warrants,34 requesting information or documents from operators of 
aircraft or vessels,35 inspection of postal articles and delivery service articles,36 
the use of surveillance devices,37 the use of tracking devices,38 and the collec-
tion of foreign intelligence within Australia.39 Most important here, section 25A 
grants computer access powers. The Director- General may request the Minister 
to issue a warrant for computer access. The Minister must only issue such a war-
rant if: “satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that access by 
the organisation to data held in a computer (the target computer) will substan-
tially assist the collection of intelligence in accordance with this Act in respect of 
a matter (the security matter) that is important in relation to security.”40
prior to recent amendments, this provision referred to access to data held in 
“a particular computer.” A submission in May 2011 cautioned against the use 
of the phrase “data held in a particular computer” and suggested that with an 
increasing uptake in cloud computing, it may be difficult for ASIo to accurately 
predict in advance whether a person has stored relevant data locally on the “tar-
get computer” or “in the cloud.”41 It also noted that, under the previous wording, 
ASIo would appear restricted from accessing data stored in the cloud where a 
warrant has been granted for access to a target computer, even if, for example, 
the suspect in question has stored his/ her login details for the cloud storage on 
that computer.42
34. Australian Security Intelligence organisation Act 1979 (Cth), § 25.
35. Australian Security Intelligence organisation Act 1979 (Cth), § 23.
36. Australian Security Intelligence organisation Act 1979 (Cth), §§ 27 & 27AA.
37.  Australian Security Intelligence organisation Act 1979 (Cth), § 26, 26A, 26B, 26C 
and 26D.
38. Australian Security Intelligence organisation Act 1979 (Cth), §§ 26e.
39. Australian Security Intelligence organisation Act 1979 (Cth), §27A.
40. Australian Security Intelligence organisation Act 1979 (Cth), § 25A(2).
41.  Dan Svantesson, “Submission in relation to the Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
Legislation Committee’s inquiry into the Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Bill 
2011” (May 26, 2011), http:// www.aph.gov.au/ parliamentary_ Business/ Committees/ Senate/ 
Legal_ and_ Constitutional_ Affairs/ Completed_ inquiries/ 2010- 13/ intelligenceservices/ 
submissions.
42. Dan Svantesson, “Submission in relation to the Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation 
Committee’s Inquiry into the Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Bill 2011” (May 
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In 2014, the definition of “computer” was broadened to include multiple com-
puters, computer systems, or networks, and to enable the target computer of a 
computer access warrant to extend to all computers at a particular premises or 
operating in a network, and all computers associated with, used by or likely to be 
used by, a person (whose identity may or may not be known).43 The effect of this 
is that ASIo now has broadened powers to “use the computers of innocent third 
parties to gain access to a computer used by a suspected terrorist or criminal” 
and to “target information stored in the cloud or to intercept information flows 
between computers.”44
It is also worth noting that, the Attorney- General has issued guidelines for 
the operation of ASIo. Under those Guidelines, information is to be obtained by 
ASIo in a lawful, timely, and efficient way. Further, the obtaining of information 
must take place in accordance with the following: (1) any means used for obtain-
ing information must be proportionate to the gravity of the threat posed and the 
probability of its occurrence, and (2) inquiries and investigations into individu-
als and groups should be undertaken using as little intrusion into individual pri-
vacy as is possible. Further, the more intrusive the investigative technique, the 
higher the level of officer that should be required to approve its use, and wherever 
possible, the least intrusive techniques of information collection should be used 
before more intrusive techniques.45 Finally, the Director- General “shall take all 
reasonable steps to ensure that personal information shall not be collected, used, 
handled, or disclosed by ASIo unless that collection, use, handling, or disclosure 
is reasonably necessary for the performance of its statutory functions (or as oth-
erwise authorised, or required, by law).”46
26, 2011), http:// www.aph.gov.au/ parliamentary_ Business/ Committees/ Senate/ Legal_ and_ 
Constitutional_ Affairs/ Completed_ inquiries/ 2010- 13/ intelligenceservices/ submissions.
43. Australian Security Intelligence organisation Act 1979 (Cth), §§ 22 and 25A(3) as amended 
by national Security Amendment Act 2014 (Cth).
44.  K. Lachmayer and n. Witzleb, “The Challenge to privacy from ever Increasing State 
Surveillance: A Comparative perspective,” 37(2) UNSWLawJl 770 (2014), http:// www.austlii.
edu.au/ cgi- bin/ download.cgi/ cgi- bin/ download.cgi/ download/ au/ journals/ UnSWLawJl/ 
2014/ 28.pdf.
45.  Australian Security Intelligence organisation, Attorney- General’s Guidelines in rela-
tion to the performance by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation of its function of 
obtaining, correlating, evaluating and communicating intelligence relevant to security (includ-
ing politically motivated violence), https:// www.asio.gov.au/ sites/ default/ files/ Attorney- 
General’s%20Guidelines.pdf (last visited April 27, 2017), Guideline 10.4.
46.  Australian Security Intelligence organisation, Attorney- General’s Guidelines in rela-
tion to the performance by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation of its function of 
obtaining, correlating, evaluating and communicating intelligence relevant to security (includ-
ing politically motivated violence), https:// www.asio.gov.au/ sites/ default/ files/ Attorney- 
General’s%20Guidelines.pdf (last visited April 27, 2017), Guideline 13.2.
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If we look specifically at the legislative powers to access communications data, 
section 313 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) imposes obligations on 
all carriers47 and carriage service providers48 “to provide assistance to officers 
and authorities of the Commonwealth, states and territories as is reasonably nec-
essary for enforcing the criminal law and laws imposing pecuniary penalties, 
assisting the enforcement of the criminal laws in force in a foreign country, pro-
tecting revenue or safeguarding national security.”49 Significantly, this includes, 
amongst other obligations, providing assistance to agencies in relation to the 
interception of communications and access to stored communications. 50
Further, although sections 276– 278 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) 
place restrictions on the use and disclosure of telecommunications data, special 
exemptions apply for law enforcement and national security agencies. There are 
also different powers available for access to telecommunications “data,” gener-
ally considered to be metadata, as opposed to the content of the communications 
themselves.
When dealing with telecommunications data, a distinction is drawn between 
“voluntary disclosure” on the one hand and “authorised disclosure” on the other. 
Voluntary disclosure of information or a document to ASIo is allowed provided 
the disclosure is in connection with the performance by ASIo of its functions.51 
Similarly, section 177 allows such voluntary disclosure to “an enforcement 
agency if the disclosure is reasonably necessary for the enforcement of the crimi-
nal law, or a law imposing a pecuniary penalty, or for the protection of the public 
revenue.”52 In the context of such disclosure, there is a risk of “oversupply” in that 
telecommunications employees might disclose more than what is necessary.53
Authorized disclosure can relate to data held by the telecommunications oper-
ator, or so- called prospective information or documents. ASIo54 and enforcement 
47. That is, somewhat simplified, the holder of a carrier license. See further Telecommunications 
Act 1997 (Cth), § 7.
48. That is, somewhat simplified, a person who supplies, or proposes to supply, a listed car-
riage service to the public. See further Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), § 87.
49.  Australian Government, “overview of legislation:  The Telecommunications Act 
1997,” https:// www.ag.gov.au/ nationalSecurity/ TelecommunicationsSurveillance/ pages/ 
overviewoflegislation.aspx (last visited July 17, 2016).
50. Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), § 313(7).
51. Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), § 174(1).
52.  Sharon Rodrick, “Accessing Telecommunications Data for national Security and Law 
enforcement purposes,” 2009 UMonashLRS 15, http:// www.austlii.edu.au/ au/ journals/ 
UMonashLRS/ 2009/ 15.html, p. 28.
53. Ibid., p. 29.
54. Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), § 175.
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agencies55 may authorize the disclosure of specific information or documents 
held by a telecommunications operator without a warrant. More interestingly, 
they can also authorize disclosure of prospective data on an ongoing basis, such 
as specific web browsing activities or the real- time location of phones or other 
devices,56 excluding the content or substance of communications.57 As far as 
enforcement agencies are concerned, authorization must not be made unless the 
disclosure is reasonably necessary for the investigation of an offense punishable 
by imprisonment for at least three years.58 Further, before making the authori-
zation, the authorized officer “must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that any 
interference with the privacy of any person or persons that may result from the 
disclosure or use is justifiable and proportionate” having regard to certain mat-
ters, including the gravity of any conduct in relation to which the authorization 
is sought, the likely relevance and usefulness of the information or documents, 
and the reason the disclosure or use is proposed to be authorized.59 notably, 
these rules do not apply to ASIo.60
Although the ability of certain government agencies to access telecommunica-
tions data has been in place for some time, there were previously no requirements 
on service providers to retain the data for any particular period of time or to 
specify the types of data that were to be retained. Mandatory retention require-
ments were implemented in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Act 1979 (Cth) from october 2015 and rationalized on the basis that the value 
of the tools previously available to national security and law enforcement agen-
cies to access telecommunications data were being “undermined by the level of 
change in the telecommunications environment,”61 including the development of 
new technologies and the globalization of the telecommunications industry. The 
55. Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), §§. 178, 178A & 179. Recent 
amendments restricted the types of agencies that are able to access data under the TIA Act. 
By § 176A, the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), now applies to 
certain “criminal law enforcement agencies” or an agency declared by the Minister to be an 
“enforcement agency” for the purposes of the Act.
56. For ASIo, see Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), § 176, and 
for enforcement agencies, refer to Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
(Cth), § 180. See further, Sharon Rodrick, “Accessing Telecommunications Data for national 
Security and Law enforcement purposes,” 2009 UMonashLRS 15 http:// www.austlii.edu.au/ 
au/ journals/ UMonashLRS/ 2009/ 15.html, pp. 31– 35.
57. Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), § 172.
58. Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), § 180(4).
59. Ibid., § 180F.
60.  Sharon Rodrick, “Accessing Telecommunications Data for national Security and Law 
enforcement purposes,” 2009 UMonashLRS 15, http:// www.austlii.edu.au/ au/ journals/ 
UMonashLRS/ 2009/ 15.html, p. 34.
61. parliament of Australia, Explanatory Memorandum to Telecommunications (Interception 
and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014, paragraph 1.
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changes also recognize the government’s view of the importance of telecommu-
nications data in the investigation of serious criminal investigations including 
“counter- terrorism, organized crime, counter- espionage and cyber security … 
murder, rape and kidnapping.”62 There is now a statutory obligation on telecom-
munications and Internet service providers to retain certain prescribed telecom-
munications data, including identification and contact information; the source 
and destination of a communication; the date, time, and duration of a commu-
nication; and the type of communication, for a period of two years.63 That data is 
then available for access by certain enforcement agencies.
of note, the retention requirements do not require service providers to retain 
the content or substance of a communication,64 such as the content of emails or 
telephone calls, or web browsing history,65 and the service provider must protect 
the confidentiality of the information by encrypting it and protecting it from 
unauthorized interference or unauthorized access.66
Certain national security and law enforcement agencies still have the ability 
to access or intercept the content or substance of a communication (for exam-
ple the content of an email or SMS) by obtaining an interception warrant67 or 
stored communications warrant68 for certain purposes or in a life threatening 
emergency.69 In relation to both interception and stored communication war-
rants the issuing authority must have regard to certain matters including how 
much the privacy of any person would be likely to be interfered with, the gravity 
of the conduct constituting the serious offense or contravention, how much the 
information would be likely to assist in connection with the investigation, and to 
62. Ibid., paragraph 5.




67. For example, under § 9 of Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), 
the Attorney- General may issue a warrant on request by the Director General to assist ASIo 
in carrying out its function of obtaining intelligence relating to security. part 2.5 allows cer-
tain agencies to apply for interception warrants where the information is likely to assist in 
connection with the investigation of a serious offense (which is defined in § 5D as including 
murder, kidnapping, acts of terrorism, people smuggling/ trafficking etc.).
68. Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), part 3.3. Section 116(1) 
sets out when an issuing authority can issue a stored communications warrant that includes 
where the information would be likely to assist in connection with an investigation by the 
agency or a foreign country of a serious contravention in which the person is involved (includ-
ing as a victim). A serious contravention is defined in section 5e as including an offense pun-
ishable by imprisonment of at least three years or a fine of at least 180 penalty units for an 
individual.
69. Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), § 30.
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what extent other investigative methods have been used by or are available to the 
agency.70 These powers were not increased by the Amendment Act.
Taken together, this provides Australian law enforcement and national secur-
ity agencies with broad access to private- sector data. At the same time, it appears 
that, on most occasions, the regulatory framework outlined in this section would 
be used for “small scale” access to data in individual cases as the requirements 
imposed, for example by the Attorney- General Guidelines, ought to ensure that, 
typically only specific data for specific purposes is collected rather than data 
in bulk. Having said that, one can of course imagine scenarios where access is 
sought to larger volumes of for example, airline cargo or crew data, or indeed, 
systematic access in the sense of repeated access is being sought. Further, the 
powers granted to ASIo could be used for systematic, direct and unmediated, 
access to private- sector data.
C.  Laws Requiring Broad Reporting of Personal Data  
by Private- Sector Entities
There are some examples of Australian law requiring broad reporting of per-
sonal data by private- sector entities, such as the Anti- Money Laundering and 
Counter- Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth), the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1997 (Cth), and the Customs Act 1901 (Cth).
1.  Anti- Money Laundering and Counter- Terrorism  
Financing Act 2006 (Cth)
on December 12, 2007, Australia introduced its Anti- Money Laundering and 
Counter- Terrorism Financing programs. The programs are regulated in the 
Anti- Money Laundering and Counter- Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) 
(AML/ CTF Act). These programs— which apply to private entities such as banks, 
non- bank financial services, remittance (money transfer) services, bullion deal-
ers, and gambling businesses71— explicitly require broad reporting of personal 
data by private- sector entities. More specifically, the aim is for reporting enti-
ties to help identify, mitigate, and manage the risk of their products or services 
facilitating money laundering or terrorism financing.72 The scheme is overseen 
by Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC).73
Where a private entity provides a “designated service,” it is classed as a report-
ing entity and must adopt, maintain, and comply with an AML/ CTF program.74 
70. Ibid., § 46(2), § 116(2).
71. Australian Government, “An introduction to AML/ CTF programs” (July 29, 2016), http:// 
www.austrac.gov.au/ chapter- 6- amlctf- programs.
72. Ibid.
73. http:// www.austrac.gov.au/ .
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Such a program includes several obligations (e.g., relating to the training and 
screening of staff, ensuring that an adequate monitoring system is in place, etc.) 
but most important for our purposes, it includes an obligation to submit three 
different types of reports.
• Suspicious Matter Reports (SMRs)75— where a reporting entity suspects 
that a matter may be related to an offense, tax evasion, or the proceeds 
of crime, it must submit a SMR within three business days, or where the 
suspicion relates to the financing of terrorism, within 24 hours. Such a 
report is to include all details known about the suspicious matter, the 
person/ organization(s) to which the matter relates, and any transactions 
related to the matter.76
• Threshold Transaction Reports (TTRs) (where applicable)77— where 
a reporting entity provides or commences to provide a designated 
service to a customer that involves the transfer of physical currency 
or e- currency of AUD10,000 or more it must complete a TTR 
within 10 business days. The information to be provided within a 
TTR includes details of the customer of the designated service, the 
individual conducting the transaction (if different from the customer), 
the recipient of the proceeds of the transaction (if different from the 
customer), and the transaction, including cash and other components.78
• International Funds Transfer Instruction (IFTI) reports (where 
applicable)79— where a reporting entity sends or receives a funds 
transfer instruction to or from a foreign country, it must complete an 
IFTI report within 10 business days. The information to be provided 
within a IFTI includes details of the transfer instruction, the parties 
involved in the transaction, or details of the ordering and beneficiary 
customers for the remittance, the originating and destination country’s 
remittance service providers (if applicable), and any additional 
information relating to the instruction.80
The AML/ CTF Act contains a set of tables in section 6 that outlines in detail 
what constitutes a “designated service.” examples include where the service is 
75. Ibid., §§ 41– 42.
76.  Australian Government, “Reporting requirements,” http:// www.austrac.gov.au/ files/ 
reporting- requirements_ dec2010.pdf (last visited April 25, 2017).
77. Anti- Money Laundering and Counter- Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth), §§ 43– 44.
78.  “Reporting requirements,” http:// www.austrac.gov.au/ files/ reporting- requirements_ 
dec2010.pdf.
79. Anti- Money Laundering and Counter- Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth), §§ 45– 46.
80. “Reporting requirements,” http:// www.austrac.gov.au/ files/ reporting- requirements_ 
dec2010.pdf.
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provided in the course of carrying on a business: opening an account, accept-
ing deposits or allowing withdrawals, making a loan, issuing a debit or credit 
card, supplying goods through a finance lease, supplying goods by way of hire 
purchase, issuing traveler’s checks, providing remittance services that transfer 
money or property, dealing with certain superannuation- related transactions 
or services, issuing or accepting liability under life insurance policies, issuing 
or selling securities and derivatives, exchanging foreign currency, receiving or 
accepting a bet, placing or making a bet, allowing a person to play a game on 
an electronic gaming machine, paying out winnings on bets, and exchanging 
money for gaming chips or tokens and vice versa.
2.  Customs Act 1901 (Cth)
The Australian government collects passenger data, and where an operator of an 
international passenger air service fails to provide ongoing access to that data 
in a manner and form requested by the government, that operator commits an 
offense.81 The Act makes clear that: “The obligation to provide access must be 
complied with even if the information concerned is personal information (as 
defined in the privacy Act 1988).”82
3.  Taxation and Employment
The Australian Taxation office (ATo) collects private- sector data systematically 
in a range of ways. For example, upon hiring a new employee, the employer must 
collect, and report to the ATo, the employee’s tax file number (a unique identifier 
allocated by the ATo).83 Systematic reporting is also required under the Income 
Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), which requires all employers and financial insti-
tutions in Australia to report all earned and unearned (investment) income to 
the ATo.84
4.  Education
In Australia, providers of higher education (some of which, such as Bond 
University, are private entities) must report certain data to the government. In 
particular, systematic reporting requirements relate to the personal informa-
tion of students on student visas (international students), and students who have 
access to government benefits.85
81. Customs Act 1901 (Cth), § 64AF(1).
82. Customs Act 1901 (Cth), § 64AF(1) note 2.
83. Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth).
84. nigel Waters, Government Surveillance in Australia (August 2006), http:// www.pacificprivacy.
com.au/ Government%20Surveillance%20in%20Australia%20v6.pdf, p. 15.
85. See further, Higher education Support Act 2003 (Cth). That Act contains specific provi-
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D.  Laws Permitting or Restricting Private- Sector Entities 
from Providing Government Officials with Voluntary  
Broad Access to Data
The Apps in the privacy Act 1988 (Cth) also regulate when private- sector enti-
ties may provide government officials with voluntary broad access to data, as 
well as the disclosure of specific data. However, due to a range of significant 
exemptions (e.g., the Act does not apply to some organizations with an annual 
turnover of AUS $3 million86 or less), that Act is only applicable to a small pro-
portion of Australian private- sector entities. Thus, the majority of Australian 
private- sector entities are unregulated in their voluntary provision of data to 
the government.87
entities that do fall under the privacy Act’s regulation must not use or dis-
close personal information about an individual for a purpose (the secondary 
purpose) other than the primary purpose of collection unless the individual has 
consented to the use or disclosure or one of the following relevant exceptions 
applies:
 (a) the individual would reasonably expect the information to be used or 
disclosed for the secondary purpose and the secondary purpose is:
 (i) if the information is sensitive information—directly related to the 
primary purpose; or
 (ii) if the information is not sensitive information—related to the 
primary purpose; or
 (b) “the use or disclosure of the information is required or authorised by 
or under an Australian law or a court/ tribunal order;” or
 (c) a “permitted general situation” exists in relation to the use or 
disclosure of the information which includes (subject to certain 
conditions) where the entity reasonably believes that the use or 
disclosure is necessary to lessen or prevent a serious threat to the 
life, health or safety of an individual or to public health or safety, 
where the entity has reason to suspect that unlawful activity or 
misconduct of a serious nature that relates to the entity’s functions 
or activities has been, is being or may be engaged in, or the entity 
reasonably believes that the use or disclosure is reasonably necessary 
to assist an entity to locate a person who has been reported as 
missing; or
 (d) the disclosure is by an organization and a “permitted health situation” 
exists in relation to the use or disclosure of the information, which 
includes where the disclosure of health information is necessary 
for research or the compilation or analysis of statistics, relevant to 
86. Roughly equal to US $3 million.
87. nigel Waters, Government Surveillance in Australia (August 2006), http:// www.pacificprivacy.
com.au/ Government%20Surveillance%20in%20Australia%20v6.pdf, p. 3.
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public health or public safety where it is impracticable to obtain the 
individual’s consent, the disclosure is conducted in accordance with 
approved guidelines and the organisation reasonably believes that the 
recipient will not disclose the information; or
 (e) the entity reasonably believes that the use or disclosure of the 
information is reasonably necessary for an “enforcement related 
activity” conducted by, or on behalf of, a prescribed enforcement 
body, including:
 (i) the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution or 
punishment of criminal offences or breaches of a law imposing a 
penalty or sanction; or
 (ii) the conduct of surveillance activities, intelligence gathering 
activities or monitoring activities; or
 (iii) the conduct of protective or custodial activities; or
 (iv) the enforcement of laws relating to the confiscation of the 
proceeds of crime; or
 (v) the protection of the public revenue; or
 (vi) the prevention, detection, investigation, or remedying of 
misconduct of a serious nature, or other conduct prescribed by 
the regulations; or
 (vii) the preparation for, or conduct of, proceedings before any 
court or tribunal, or implementation of the orders of a court or 
tribunal.88
E.  Judicial Authorization Requirements for Major  
Categories of Data
As noted throughout, warrants issued by judges play a major role in Australia. 
However, exceptions can be found, such as in relation to the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) that, for example, allows an authorized 
officer of a criminal law- enforcement agency to authorize data disclosure.
F.  Standards for Use Once the Government Acquires Data
The privacy Act 1988 (Cth)’s Apps also regulate how the federal government 
agencies may use data once it has been acquired. Importantly, the regulations 
referred to above (contained in App6) similarly apply to the use and disclosure 
of personal information that is collected by a government agency.
In addition to these obligations, the Apps impose obligations on both agencies 
and organizations to take reasonable steps to ensure that the personal informa-
tion collected is accurate, up to date, and complete;89 to check the accuracy and 
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relevancy of personal information before it is used or disclosed;90 to provide 
access to the information it holds on an individual to that individual on request 
(subject to some exceptions such as those under the Freedom of Information Act 
1982 (Cth) for example);91 to provide information about the data it holds;92 and to 
take reasonable steps to protect the information from misuse, interference, and 
loss and from unauthorized access, modification or disclosure.93
examples of similar legislation can be found on state- level.
G.  Cross- Border and Multi- jurisdictional Issues
Section 5B of the privacy Act 1988 (Cth) regulates the extraterritorial reach of 
the Act. That section extends the application of the privacy Act 1988 (Cth) to acts 
done, or practice engaged in, outside Australia and the external territories by an 
organization or small business operator provided that: (1) the overseas act was 
not required by an applicable foreign law, and (2) the relevant organization meet 
one of the following two tests, described as the “Australian link.”
The first test, found in section 5B(2) is met where the organization in question 
is: (1) an Australian citizen, (2) a person whose continued presence in Australia is 
not subject to a limitation as to time imposed by law, (3) a partnership formed in 
Australia or an external Territory, (4) a trust created in Australia or an external 
Territory, (5) a body corporate incorporated in Australia or an external Territory, 
or (6) an unincorporated association that has its central management and con-
trol in Australia or an external Territory.
The second test, outlined in section 5B(3) is met where the organization in 
question: (1) is not described in subsection (2) (i.e., does not meet the first test), 
(2) carries on business in Australia or an external Territory, and (3) “the personal 
information was collected or held by the organisation or operator in Australia or 
an external Territory, either before or at the time of the act or practice.”
Section 5B has not been subject to any extensive judicial interpretation and 
several aspects of its application (particularly in relation to the second test men-
tioned above) must be seen as unclear. For example, it is not clear under which 
circumstances an organization is held to be “carrying on business in Australia or 
an external Territory.”94 The App Guidelines issued by the office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner (App Guidelines) acknowledge that the phrase “car-
ries on business in Australia” is not defined in the privacy Act 1988 (Cth), but 





94.  See further, Dan Svantesson. “protecting privacy on the ‘Borderless’ Internet— Some 
Thoughts on extraterritoriality and Transborder Data Flow” (2007) Bond Law Review 19.1, 
http:// works.bepress.com/ dan_ svantesson/ 3.
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corporations and consumer law, whilst stressing that these concepts must be 
assessed in the context of the privacy Act 1988 (Cth).95 The App Guidelines pro-
vide the following factors that may be considered in assessing whether an entity 
is carrying on a business in Australia:
 (a) the entity has a place of business in Australia;
 (b) people who undertake business acts for the entity are located in 
Australia— for example, an entity may carry on business in Australia 
where an agent acting on its behalf carries on its business from some 
fixed place in Australia;
 (c) the entity has a website that offers goods or services to countries 
including Australia;
 (d) Australia is one of the countries on the drop- down menu appearing 
on the entity’s website;
 (e) web content that forms part of carrying on the business, was uploaded 
by or on behalf of the entity, in Australia;
 (f) business or purchase orders are assessed or acted upon in  
Australia; or
 (g) the entity is the registered proprietor of trademarks in Australia.96
However, the App Guidelines caution that the presence or absence of one of 
these factors will not be determinative, and provides the example that an entity 
will not generally be regarded as carrying on business in Australia solely on the 
basis that a purchase order can be placed in Australia.97
Further, App8 (and section 16C of the privacy Act 1988 (Cth)) deal specifically 
with cross border disclosures of personal information. That framework requires 
the relevant entity to ensure that an overseas recipient will handle the personal 
information in accordance with the Apps. There are however, exceptions, includ-
ing where the overseas recipient is subject to a similar protection regime as the 
Apps, where the disclosure is required or authorized by or under an interna-
tional agreement relating to information sharing (noting that this does not apply 
to organizations98), or where the entity is an agency and that agency reasonably 
believes that the disclosure is reasonably necessary for an enforcement related 
95.  office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Australian Privacy Principle 
Guidelines, B13 (internal footnotes omitted), available at https:// www.oaic.gov.au/ resources/ 
agencies- and- organisations/ app- guidelines/ App_ guidelines_ complete_ version_ 1_ April_ 
2015.pdf (last visited July 15, 2016).
96. Ibid., B19.
97. Ibid., B20 and B21.
98.  office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Australian Privacy Principle 
Guidelines, 8.47, available at https:// www.oaic.gov.au/ resources/ agencies- and- organisations/ 
app- guidelines/ App_ guidelines_ complete_ version_ 1_ April_ 2015.pdf (last visited July 
15, 2016).
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activity by an (Australian) enforcement body and the recipient performs func-
tions or exercises powers that are similar to those of an enforcement body.
H. Impacts of Snowden Leaks on Australia
The amendments to national security legislation by the national Security 
Legislation Amendment Act 2014 (Cth) also attempted to address potential 
shortfalls in the provisions addressing the protection of intelligence- related 
information arising from the leaks of documents revealing surveillance matters 
by edward Snowden, a former national Security Agency (nSA) contractor in the 
United States.99 While working as a computer analyst, Snowden collected and 
later leaked to journalists thousands of documents allegedly describing the sur-
veillance activities of the nSA.
The impact on Australia from those leaks is reported to be:
Australian intelligence agencies are understood to have scoped the poten-
tial damage for future leaks from the Snowden affair and have assessed that 
between 15,000 and 20,000 secret Australian intelligence files could have been 
accessed by Snowden through his computer at nSA, although it is unknown 
how many of these he actually stole before seeking refuge in Russia.
The majority of the stolen reports are likely to discuss political, economic 
and military intelligence gleaned by Australian agencies, especially the 
Australian Signals Directorate (formerly the Defence Signals Directorate, 
DSD), in the Asia- pacific region.100
The Australian Signals Directorate is an intelligence agency within the 
Australian  Department of Defence, responsible for collecting and analyzing 
foreign signals intelligence to support military and strategic decision- making.101
Most significantly from an Australian perspective, the documents leaked by 
Snowden reportedly revealed:102
 (a) that Australian diplomatic facilities throughout the Asia- pacific 
region were involved in an nSA- led covert signals intelligence 
99.  Department of parliamentary Services, National Security Legislation Amendment Bill 
(No.1) 2014 Bills Digest (2014– 2015) 19 http:// www.aph.gov.au/ parliamentary_ Business/ 
Bills_ Legislation/ bd/ bd1415a/ 15bd019.
100.  p. Maley and C. Stewart, “Snowden Stole up to 20,000 Aussie Files,” The Australian 
(December 5, 2013), p.  1 http:// www.theaustralian.com.au/ national- affairs/ foreign- affairs/ 
edward- snowden- stole- up- to- 20000- aussie- files/ story- fn59nm2j- 1226775491490, and as 
reported in Department of parliamentary Services, National Security Legislation Amendment 
Bill (No.1) 2014 Bills Digest (2014– 2015) 19, http:// www.aph.gov.au/ parliamentary_ Business/ 
Bills_ Legislation/ bd/ bd1415a/ 15bd019.
101. Australian Signals Directorate, www.asd.gov.au (last visited July 17, 2016).
102. R. Tanter, “Indonesia, Australia and the edward Snowden Legacy: Shifting Asymmetries 
of power,” 12(10) The Asia- Pacific Journal (2014), http:// apjjf.org/ - Richard- Tanter/ 4088/  
article.pdf.
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program codenamed STATeRooM in which surveillance collection 
units operated within embassies and diplomatic missions to monitor 
certain signals (microwave, Wi- Fi and satellite signals for example). 
The documents reportedly demonstrate that data intercepted by 
STATeRooM in Australian embassies was automatically shared with 
the nSA.
 (b) that the nSA and the DSD conducted a surveillance operation on 
Indonesia during the United nations climate change conference in 
Bali in 2007.
 (c) that the DSD monitored and intercepted the 3G cell phone calls of 
Indonesian president Susilo Bambang yudhoyono, his wife, and inner 
circle of advisers. The relevant documents were DSD powerpoint 
slides held by the nSA explaining the DSD’s achievements in 
monitoring and intercepting activities in relation to Indonesian 
leadership targets.
The reported impact of these leaks was not only the revelation of the types 
of activities the Australian intelligence agencies conduct but also the techni-
cal capacities of the ASD and the extent of the collaboration with the US nSA, 
and caused significant damage to Australia’s relationship with Indonesia.103 The 
Australian foreign minister responded to the Snowden affair by condemning his 
actions, seeking to “manage the impact of [our] relationships with others targeted 
by the Snowden allegations,” and commenting that the Australian government 
is “satisfied with the robust oversight and collection management arrangements 
that apply to Australia’s intelligence activities.”104
103. Ibid.
104. J. Bishop, “US- Australia: The Alliance in an emerging Asia” (2014), http:// foreignminister.
gov.au/ speeches/ pages/ 2014/ jb_ sp_ 140122.aspx?ministerid=4.
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Systematic Government Access  
to Private- Sector Data in China
Z H I Z H E N G   WA N G
I.  ABSTR ACT
In accordance with facilitating Chinese e- government construction, many laws 
made for the purpose of state security, public security, censorship, and taxation 
have granted the Chinese government extensive power of access to private- sector 
data generated in such businesses as information, finance, trade, travel, enter-
tainment, and so on, operated in China. There are no laws or practices related 
to governmental systematic access currently found in China. However, this kind 
of systematic data access will certainly find itself any time in the future enforce-
ment and ensuing legislation once the Chinese government realizes it is neces-
sary with the evolution of e- government strategy.
II.  NATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT AND FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES
Although it is a mixed system,1 with elements of civil law, common law, socialist 
law, and to a limited extent, traditional law, and is officially named the Socialist 
System of Laws with Chinese Characteristics,2 China’s legal system in fact has a 
formal structure approximately resembling the civil law model despite its dis-
tinctive Chinese Characteristics. China is also a very centralized country with a 
powerful government controlled by the Chinese Communist party (CCp). The 
CCp maintains its power of absolute control over the law through its highly 
effective mechanisms and its absolute majority of members in the three branches 
1.  Randall peerenboom, “The X- Files:  past and present portrayals of China’s Alien ‘Legal 
System,’ ” 2 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 37 (2003).
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of government: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.3 executive officials 
also make up almost two- thirds of the legislature. Technically, politics and Law 
Committees are installed in the CCp at the national and local levels to over-
see the direction and cooperation of courts, procuratorate, and police to ensure 
CCp’s leadership over judicial issues.4 Usually laws are shadows of the CCp’s 
policies, and courts, procuratorate, and police share the same interest.5 It is often 
said that “police prepare all the food, prosecutors serve it, and the courts eat it.”6 
In addition, it is the government not the congress that practically plays an initiat-
ing, driving, and decisive rule in legislation.7
“The people’s Republic of China practices ruling the country in accordance 
with the law and [is] building a socialist country of law,”8 was first incorporated 
into the Constitution as a “ruling strategy”9 in 1999, but rule of law or even rule 
by law at most is still on the arduous odyssey. As the Chinese delegation described 
in the 56th session of the United nations Commission on Human Rights:
The Chinese society is now in the process of transition from too much empha-
sis on the rule of person and insufficient emphasis on the rule of law to estab-
lishing concept of the rule of law, from supremacy of the power to supremacy 
of the law, from too much emphasis on duties and insufficient emphasis on 
rights to establishing a correct notion about rights and obligations.10
China was indeed “in transition toward rule of law but still falling short of 
the minimal standard of achievement required to be considered rule of law”11 
10 years ago, and the situation remains much the same now and will be not much 
3.  Xianhong Qin, “CCp’s Influence on Legislation” (2001), http:// www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/ 
paperCollection/ Details.aspx?id=2357.
4. Migalhas International, “The Legal System of China” (2007), http:// lexuniversal.com/ en/ 
articles/ 3656.
5. Dingjian Cai, History and Reform: New China’s Journey to Legal Construction (CUpL press, 
1999), at 259.
6. Zhiwei Tong, “Let Sunshine of Constitution Shed on penal Laws Application” (2010), http:// 
article.chinalawinfo.com:81/ article_ print.asp?articleid=54698.
7.  Jun Feng, “Sixty years Administrative Legislation:  Retrospect and perspective” (2009), 
http:// www.iolaw.org.cn/ showArticle.asp?id=2836.
8. Constitution of the people’s Republic of China, Article 5, Amendment 3.
9. White paper released by State Council Information office, The Socialist Legal System with 
Chinese Characteristics (2011).
10. Delegate Briefs Un Commission on China’s Human Rights Achievements (2007), http:// 
english.people.com.cn/ english/ 200004/ 07/ eng20000407_ 38494.html.
11.  Randall peerenboom, “Let one Hundred Flowers Bloom, one Hundred Schools 
Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China,” 23 Mich. J. Int’l L. 471, 525 (2002).
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changed in the near future under the current political system of this one- party 
socialist state unless a substantial political reform takes place.
In 2004, “The State respects and preserves human rights”12 was included in the 
Constitution and human rights are thus endowed with a certain legal concept. 
However, the idea and scope of human rights in China, especially in terms of 
the official interpretation, is somewhat different from what is universally held in 
most countries. China stresses the right to development and group rights more 
than political rights and individual rights. “While China has acknowledged 
the importance and legitimacy of human rights, it has also challenged the pre-
tense of a universal consensus on human rights issues, or at least the consensus 
among much of the cosmopolitan elite in economically advanced Western lib-
eral democracies.”13
privacy as a fundamental human right is still relatively new to China. In the 
Chinese language, the word for privacy— “yinsi”— connotes “illicit secrets and 
selfish, conspiratorial behavior.”14 Furthermore, necessary protection of the right 
to be let alone is assumed in most people’s minds in China to be from fellow 
citizens rather than from the government because of the long- standing dossiers 
system, household registration system (Hukou), and misleading education and 
propaganda imposed on people.15 The awareness of people about governmental 
intrusion has grown in recent years but is still very vague and weak.16
There was not a legal term named “right of privacy” in laws and regulations 
before the end of 2009 when the new Tort Liability Law was enacted and the word 
first appeared, but without a definition or further interpretation.17 It is interest-
ing to note that privacy clearly as a legal right is first present in the Chinese pri-
vate law instead of the public law because this facet of privacy protection is not 
related to restriction of government power.
Articles 37, 38, 39, and 40 of the Constitution do promise that the freedom 
of a person, his dignity, his residence, and the secrecy of his correspondence 
are “inviolable” and protected from “unlawful” infringements, which alto-
gether indirectly sets a vague privacy protection framework to provide a min-
imum level of protection for the privacy of the citizen for the purpose of social 
12. Constitution of the people’s Republic of China, Article 33, Amendment 4.
13. Randall peerenboom, “Law and Development of Constitutional Democracy: Is China a 
problem Case?,” 19 Colum. J. Asian L. 185 (2006).
14.  “China:  The Long March to privacy,” The Economist (January 12, 2006), http:// www. 
economist.com/ node/ 5389362.
15. Changqiu Liu, “Role of perception, Awareness and Law in Citizen’s personal Information 
protection,” Social Science Weekly (2009) at 49.
16.  Hao Wang, “Legal Consciousness and Root of Chinese Citizen’s Right of privacy 
protection,” Journal of Senyang Normal University (Social Science edition) (2007) 31(1).
17. Tort Liability Law of the people’s Republic of China Article 2.
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stability.18 However, in constitutional law, penal laws, penal litigation laws, state 
security laws, and other public- sector laws there are many exemption rules and 
vague definitions that grant government extensive rights and sizable flexibility 
for investigation, seizure and, search, especially in the matter of state security or 
keeping social order.19
The reasons there is a lack of a more comprehensive and unified privacy and 
data protection law in China are complex, but the situation is not accidental. 
privacy is an interest and a right more important to citizens than to the gov-
ernment. The absence of the real representative system for people’s interests, 
the dominant role of government in legislation, and government’s desire to 
strengthen and extend its power inevitably result in the long time vacancy of 
privacy protection, which, in turn, benefits and facilitates the construction of a 
powerful e- government and electronic dossier society. In fact, the surveillance 
and censorship systems in China, considered to be the largest and most sophis-
ticated in the world,20 are exactly the confluence of prolonged privacy under- 
protection and rapid e- government development.
Under the above context, it is really hard to define the boundaries of govern-
mental access to private- sector data, but it’s not difficult to conclude that the 
government’s systematic access to data held by anyone will become possible and 
realistic with the evolution of the e- government strategy in accordance with its 
vital interest in maintaining the state’s control on information and “preserving 
stability” of the society.
III.  STATUTORY AND REGULATORY OVERVIEW
A.  Laws Requiring, Explicitly Authorizing, or Restricting 
Governmental Access to Private- Sector Data
As discussed above, communications privacy is protected from “unlawful” 
infringements, which are supposed to be committed by citizens not by govern-
ment. In fact government enjoys an extensive and unrestricted power of inves-
tigation and censorship of communications whenever state security or public 
security is involved. Article 40 of the Constitution provides,
The freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens of the people’s Republic 
of China are protected by law. no organisation or individual may, on any 
ground, infringe upon the freedom and privacy of citizens’ correspondence 
18. Qianzhe Wang, “on the Constitutional establishment of Right to privacy,” Legal System 
and Society (2011) 23.
19.  Jian Shi, “Reflection and Reconstruction of Criminal Investigation procedure,” Social 
Sciences Journal of Colleges of Shanxi (2004) 16(8).
20.  opennet Initiative, Internet Filtering in China (2009), http:// opennet.net/ research/ 
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except in cases where, to meet the needs of state security or of investigation 
into criminal offences, public security or procuratorial organs are permitted 
to censor correspondence in accordance with procedures prescribed by law.21
As for procedures prescribed by law, they either lack explicit interpretation or are 
not known to citizens. This constitutional provision, in the name of privacy pro-
tection, actually becomes the primary source of legal authority for many national 
laws or departmental regulations related to criminal investigation, censorship, 
or surveillance, any of which normally involves governmental access to data.
As illustrated below, those kinds of governmental access to data are usually 
explicitly authorized, and there are no explicit restrictions.
1.  State Security Law (1993)
Because of the particular importance attached to state security and social sta-
bility by the Chinese government, China’s State Security Law is instrumental 
in the role of authorizing governmental access to the private- sector data, and 
its legislative foundation is laid according to Articles 1, 4, 28, 36, 51, and 54 of 
the Constitution, which prohibit the sabotage of the socialist system; acts detri-
mental to the security, honor, and interests of the motherland; and infringement 
upon the interests of the state, of society, and of the collective.22
There are two articles in the State Security Law permitting the state secur-
ity organization to accede, when necessary, to any information or data held by 
anyone in China. Article 11 stipulates that “where state security requires, a state 
security organisation may inspect the electronic communication instruments 
and appliances and other similar equipment and installations belonging to any 
organisation or individual,”23 and Article 18 states “When a State security organ-
isation investigates and finds out any circumstances endangering State security 
and gathers related evidence, citizens and organisations concerned shall faith-
fully furnish it with relevant information and may not refuse to do so.”24 The 
only restriction for this access is that state security officials must go through 
their own internal strict approval procedures in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the state.25
The penal Law of China further makes a crime the refusal to provide informa-
tion. Article 311 requires “Whoever, while clearly knowing that another person 
has committed a crime of espionage, and when a state security organisation 
inquires him about relevant circumstances and collects relevant evidence from 
him, refuses to provide them shall, if the circumstances are serious, be sentenced 
21. Constitution of the people’s Republic of China Article 40.
22. Constitution of the people’s Republic of China article 1, article 4, article 28, article 36, 
article 51, and article 54.
23. State Security Law, art. 11.
24. State Security Law, art. 18.
25. State Security Law, art. 10.
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to fixed- term imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention or 
public surveillance.”26
2.  Law of Guarding State Secrets (2010 Revision)
Article 28 of Law of the people’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets 
(2010 Revision) stipulates that “operators and service providers of the Internet 
or any other public information network shall cooperate with the public security 
organisation, the national security organisation and the procuratorial organisa-
tion in the investigation of secret leakage cases. Where any operator or service 
provider finds that any information disclosed via the Internet or any other public 
information network involves any state secret, it shall immediately stop trans-
mitting it, keep the relevant records, and report to the public security organ-
isation, national security organisation or secrecy administrative department. 
operators and service providers shall delete information which involves state 
secrets as required by the public security organisation, the national security 
organisation or the secrecy administrative departments.”27
3.  Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic  
of China (2012 revision)
Search and seizure procedure is found here in sections 5 and 6 of this law. Any 
belongings related to crime are subject to search, and any evidence including 
material evidence and documentary evidence shall be seized. The search war-
rants are obtained not from court but through their own internal approval 
procedures or may not be required if an emergency occurs when an arrest or 
detention is being made.
Article 101 Investigators shall conduct an inquest or examination of the 
sites, objects, people and corpses relevant to a crime. When necessary, 
experts may be assigned or invited to conduct an inquest or examina-
tion under the direction of the investigators.
Article 109 In order to collect criminal evidence and track down an 
offender, investigators may search the person, belongings and residence 
of the criminal suspect and anyone who might be hiding a criminal or 
criminal evidence, as well as other relevant places.
Article 110 Any unit or individual shall have the duty, as required by the 
people’s procuratorate or the public security organ, to hand over mate-
rial evidence, documentary evidence or audio- visual material which 
may prove the criminal suspect guilty or innocent.
Article 111 When a search is to be conducted, a search warrant must be 
shown to the person to be searched. If an emergency occurs when an 
26. penal Law of China, art. 311.
27. Law of the people’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets, art. 28.
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arrest or detention is being made, a search may be conducted without a 
search warrant.
The electronic data is included as evidence in the newly amended version passed by 
the national people’s Congress on March 14, 2012. The phrase of “respecting and 
protecting human rights” is also included in this revision, but is considered by many 
legal scholars as an empty promise because this new amendment vests more powers 
than ever before in the public security and state security organization.28
B.  Separate Laws for Law Enforcement Access, Regulatory Access, 
and/ or National Security Access
The core part of the above- mentioned surveillance and filtering system is the 
well- known golden shield project run by the Ministry of public Security (MpS). 
There are another 11 nationwide golden projects29 managed or overseen by other 
relative government departments such as the State Administration of Taxation, 
China Customs, the people’s Bank of China (pBoC), Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT), etc. The 12 golden projects together with “two 
networks,”30 “one website,”31 and “four databases”32 are a series of ambitious 
initiatives to build an advanced e- government as a national informatization 
process. These projects and databases are loosely based on a framework set by 
Guiding opinion on Construction of e- Government in our Country by the State 
Informatisation Leading Group (2002). This opinion is technically of a very low 
level legal authority but quite crucial in actual authorization of government 
access to private- sector data in the name of e- government “designed to reinforce 
its surveillance capabilities.”33 Accordingly, all the provinces have enacted their 
own local Informatisation Rules to join the informatization process.
28.  “China passes new Law Allowing Secret Detentions,” CNN (March 14, 2012), http:// 
edition.cnn.com/ 2012/ 03/ 14/ world/ asia/ china- criminal- law/ ; see also “Article 73 Sparks 
Controversy on Secret Detentions,” Caixin (March 12, 2012), http:// www.caixinglobal.com/ 
2012- 03- 12/ 101015879.html.
29.  “Golden Macro economy, Golden Tax, Golden Customs, Golden Finance, Golden 
Cards, Golden Auditing, Golden Insurance, Golden Agriculture, Golden Bridge, Golden 
Quality, Golden Travel, Golden Medical” Sina (2009), http:// tech.sina.com.cn/ it/ 2009- 09- 15/ 
20423440557.shtml.
30. one intranet for internal use, one extranet connected with the Internet.
31. Government portal site.
32.  Basic population Information Database, Basic Legal person Information Database, 
natural Resource, Space and Geography Information Database, Macro economy Information 
Database.
33.  Jeffrey Seifert et  al., “Using e- Government to Reinforce Government– Citizen 
Relationships:  Comparing Government Reform in the United States and China,” Social 
Science Computer Review, Vol. 27, no. 1, http:// unpan1.un.org/ intradoc/ groups/ public/ 
 documents/ un- dpadm/ unpan043654.pdf.
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one of the four databases is the national Basic population Information 
Database by the MpS. It is based on the resident identification system, which 
has the basic information of 1.3 billion people.34 The individual fingerprint will 
be included in the ID system in the near future.35 Besides the four databases, 
other databases include the national Individual Credit Information Database,36 
completed in 200637 and overseen by the pBoC; and the Basic Internet Database 
coordinated by the MpS and being built by local police at the provincial level.38
The Basic Internet Database is mainly made of data collected monthly since 
2006 from ISps (Internet Service providers), ICps (Internet Content providers), 
IDCs (Internet Data Centers), and email services.39 no explicit authorization for 
building this database can be found in any laws, and there are only orders from 
local police compelling the businesses to submit monthly reports with a data 
collection template designed by the MpS.40 The data collected include all users’ 
account and registration information, both individual and corporate, and other 
data in which the government is interested.41
Building those projects and databases involves systematic data digitaliza-
tion and data collection of almost every aspect of a person’s life. Data held in 
the private sector are compelled to contribute to the projects and databases in 
accordance with the e- government construction based on requirements of vari-
ous laws related to public security, state security, finance, taxation, insurance, 
and so on.
The vague language and exemption rules in many laws and regulations give 
the government substantial flexibility and higher demand for data access. What 
is more, extensive mandatory data retention imposed on telecommunications, 
ISps, ICps, and IDCs increase much ease of this government access to data.
All of the kinds of governmental access discussed above or below, with explicit 
mandate or not, take the form of a mediated report that is obviously not the 
34. national Health and Family planning Commission of the pRC, “Q&A: Guiding opinions 
on Accelerating population Health Information Construction” (2013), http:// www.nhfpc.gov.
cn/ guihuaxxs/ s10742/ 201312/ 2519dea9a4b14318a0736881116275ee.shtml.
35. Cao yin, “ID Cards May Carry Fingerprint Data,” China Daily (oct. 25, 2011), http:// www.
chinadaily.com.cn/ china/ 2011- 10/ 25/ content_ 13966191.htm.
36. Built according to Interim Measures for the Administration of the Basic Data of Individual 
Credit Information.
37. “Individual Credit Information Database Covers 570 Mln persons,” Xinhua News Agency 
(August 30, 2007), http:// www.china.org.cn/ china/ national/ 2007- 08/ 30/ content_ 1222501.htm.
38. A Notice for Collection of Data in the Name of Security Inspection from Inner Mongolia 
Public Security Bureau (Retrieved: March 7, 2012).
39. Ibid.
40.  Templates found in the compressed file (Retrieved:  March 7, 2012), http:// huhehaote.
cyberpolice.cn/ news/ 2008- 10- 8- 102831.rar.
41. Ibid.
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systematic access we mean here. one reason for the absence of systematic access 
and relative laws may be the government’s efforts to accelerate the adoption 
rate of cloud service in China.42 However, observing the way and practice of 
e- government construction ongoing, we can imagine that the systematic access 
will find its way in one form or another once the government realizes it is neces-
sary, and e- government evolves into a new stage.
1.  Accounting Law
Article 35 of Accounting Law of the people’s Republic of China (1999 Revision) 
requires “all units must … accept the supervision and inspection … by the rel-
evant supervisory and inspection departments” and “honestly furnish account-
ing documents, account books, financial accounting statements and other 
accounting materials and relevant situations, and may not refuse inspection, 
conceal materials or report falsely.” The relevant supervisory and inspection 
departments include “departments in charge of finance, auditing and taxation, 
the people’s banks as well as securities regulatory and insurance regulatory 
authorities.”43
All companies no matter whether publicly listed or not are subject to this 
supervision. This law also gives different government departments the right to 
gain access to private- sector data.
2.  Tax Laws
one of China’s taxation administration regimes is invoice management.44 Since 
early 2001,45 most of the businesses involved in the sale of products and services 
have been forced, in the name of the taxation reform starting from Beijing and 
three other provinces,46 to buy certified fiscal cash registers called tax- control 
cashier in China to record detailed business transactions and invoice use includ-
ing many personally identifiable pieces of information.47 Those recorded data are 
required to be stored in an IC card to send regularly to local taxation authorities.48 
42. The State Council’s Opinion on Promoting Innovative Development of Cloud Computing 
and Breeding New Business Patterns of Information Industry (2015), http:// www.sic.gov.cn/ 
news/ 473/ 5471.htm.
43. Accounting Law of the people’s Republic of China, art. 35.
44. Invoice Management Measures of the people’s Republic of China.
45.  “Chaos of Tax Control Devices Result in Fall of Top Beijing Local Taxation officials” 
(2011), http:// finance.sina.com.cn/ roll/ 20110915/ 053210482508.shtml.
46. Ibid.
47. Notice of the State Administration of Taxation on Printing and Distributing the Opinions on 
Promoting Application of Tax Control Devices and Cashiers (2004), http:// www.chinatax.gov.
cn/ n810341/ n810765/ n812193/ n812983/ c1202387/ content.html.
48.  Operator’s Manual of Tax Control Cashier (2006), http:// www.chinaacc.com/ upload/ 
news/ 2006/ 1/ 27/ lvxin7118200612715481642090.doc.
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The taxation authority can also use a taxation management access card to collect 
those data from the tax- control cashier.49 This practice is authorized by Article 23 
of Law of the people’s Republic of China on the Administration of Tax Collection 
and the notice50 from the State Administration of Taxation to provincial taxa-
tion authorities in accordance with the building of the Golden Tax project, one 
of China’s 12 e- government projects mentioned above.51 “promotion of using 
online invoice management system” is included in the Invoice Management 
Measures of the people’s Republic of China when amended 2010.52
3.  Internet- Related Laws
As indicated below, the public security organizations and other various govern-
ment departments have been given extensive powers in the name of protection 
of information security by a series of computer, Internet, and telecommunica-
tion laws to censor the “illegal and harmful” content and to investigate criminal 
activities. These laws will be significant in helping government gain the system-
atic data access in the future when deemed necessary.
For example, according to current regulation, any Internet Data Center (IDC) 
and web hosting services must be licensed and required to verify, record, and 
report actual users’ information and online activities.53 In some provinces and 
local municipalities IDC services are even required to provide police with an 
administrator account for regular inspection.54
An order dated April 11, 2011, from local police of Langfang, a small city near 
Beijing, explicitly requires any businesses or institutions providing nonprofit 
Internet access service in a public place, such as shops, hotels, restaurants, bars, 
bookstores, schools, etc., to install police- licensed monitoring software, in the 
name of computer security, to record customers’ identities and Internet activities 
and send those recorded data to the police system in real time.55
49. Ibid.
50. Notice of the State Administration of Taxation on Printing and Distributing the Opinions 
on Promoting Application of Tax Control Devices and Cashiers (2004), http:// www.chinatax.
gov.cn/ n810341/ n810765/ n812193/ n812983/ c1202387/ content.html.
51. Tax Control Device for the Golden Tax Project (2006), http:// www.csj.sh.gov.cn/ pub/ xxgk/ 
zcfg/ swzsgl/ 200609/ t20060907_ 284636.html.
52. Invoice Management Measures of the people’s Republic of China, art. 23.
53.  Regulation on Telecommunications of the people’s Republic of China, art. 7; see also 
Regulation on Internet Information Service of the people’s Republic of China, arts. 4 & 14.
54.  Changzhou Municipal Measures of Administration of Data Center, art. 15; see also 
Baoding Municipal Measures of Security Administration of Data Center, art. 15.
55. Notice from Langfang Public Security Bureau on Further Implementing Security Measures 
for Nonprofit Internet Service Providers (2011).
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4.  Regulation on Internet Information Service  
of the People’s Republic of China (2000)
This law promulgated by the state council imposes mandatory data retention 
on many Internet- related businesses and grants many government departments 
power of access to data retained.
It requires that “Internet information service providers that engage in the pro-
vision of such services as news, publishing, or electronic bulletin board services, 
etc. shall keep a record of the information they provide, the times of dissemi-
nation and the URLs or domain names. Internet access service providers shall 
keep a record of such information as the times online subscribers are online, the 
subscribers’ account numbers, the URLs or domain names, the callers’ telephone 
numbers, etc. Internet information service providers and Internet access service 
providers shall keep copies of such records for 60 days and shall provide them to 
the relevant State authorities when the latter make inquiries in accordance with 
the law.”56
5.  Provisions on the Technical Measures for the Protection 
of the Security of the Internet 2005
These provisions enacted by the MpS further include IDCs into data retention. 
Any ISps, ICps, and IDCs are required to record and keep for at least 60 days the 
users’ registration information, web addresses visited, Ip addresses, time stamp, 
content published etc. for the possible use of police later.57 Furthermore, a BBS 
service provider must have “the function of auditing the information as regis-
tered by users and information as publicised.”58 The law authorizes the public 
security organization to “offer guidance to and carry out supervision and exami-
nation” on the implementation of the cybersecurity measures.59
6.  Regulations on the Administration of Business Sites 
of Internet Access Services 2002
This law governs Internet cafes and similar places and vests both the MpS and 
culture authority the power of access to data. Article 23 requires that “An oper-
ating entity shall verify and register the identification cards or other valid cer-
tificates of the Internet users, and shall record the relevant net information. The 
registration and records reserved shall be kept for at least 60 days, and shall be 
provided when the departments of culture administration or public security 
consult them pursuant to law. The registration and records reserved may not be 
56. Regulation on Internet Information Service of the people’s Republic of China, art. 14.
57. provisions on the Technical Measures for the protection of the Security of the Internet, 
art. 10.
58. provisions on the Technical Measures for the protection of the Security of the Internet, 
art. 9.





C o U n T R y  R e p o R T S252
25
modified or deleted during the period of keeping.”60 The actual practice is to send 
those recorded data to the police system in real time.61
7.  Interim Measures for the Trading of Commodities 
and Services through the Internet 2010
This regulation governs online sales and is promulgated by the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce. It requires that “A network trading 
platform service provider shall file operating statistics about network commod-
ity transactions and the relevant services with the local administrative depart-
ment for industry and commerce on a regular basis.”62
The mandatory data retention in this interim law requires that a network trad-
ing platform service provider shall examine, record, and retain the information 
about network commodity transactions. Information about the business license 
or individual identity of a business operator shall be preserved for at least two 
years from the date when the business operator is removed from the network 
trading platform. The backups of trading records and other information shall be 
retained for at least two years from the date when a transaction is concluded.63
8.  Measures for the Administration of Internet  
E- mail Services 2006
These measures by the MIIT provide that “Citizens’ privacy of correspondence 
in using Internet e- mail services shall be protected by law. Unless the public 
security organisation or procuratorial organisation makes an inspection on 
the contents of correspondence pursuant to the procedures prescribed in law 
when required by national security or investigation of crimes, no organisation 
or individual shall infringe upon any citizen’s privacy of correspondence on any 
pretext.”64
“The procedures prescribed in law” are not, as usual, further detailed. The 
exemption rule and vague expression of language virtually grants the police 
much room to gain access when the police consider it necessary. Actually there 
is an email data collection template designed by the MpS required to report to 
police on a monthly basis.65
60. Regulations on the Administration of Business Sites of Internet Access Services, art. 23.
61. Wang na, “Real Time Monitoring on Computers in Internet Cafe to Be Installed within 
the year” (2006), http:// www.china.com.cn/ zhuanti/ 2006/ wldd/ txt/ 2006- 05/ 14/ content_ 
6208216.htm.
62.  Interim Measures for the Trading of Commodities and Services through the Internet, 
art. 30.
63. Ibid. art. 29.
64. Measures for the Administration of Internet e- mail Services, art. 3.
65. Collection Template for email Service found in the compressed file (Retrieved: Mar. 7, 
2012), http:// huhehaote.cyberpolice.cn/ news/ 2008- 10- 8- 102831.rar.
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9.  Interim Provisions on the Administration of Internet 
Culture (2011 Revision)
This law enacted by the Ministry of Culture governs online music, online games, 
online shows, online works of art, online cartoons, etc. Article 20 stipulates 
that “an Internet cultural entity shall record the contents in the back- up of the 
cultural products, the time and Internet web address or domain name of the 
back- up. The back- up of the records shall be kept for 60 days, and be provided 
when the relevant department of the state makes an inquiry in accordance with 
the law.”66
10.  Interim Provisions on the Administration of Internet 
Publication 2002
This provisions jointly promulgated by the General Administration of press and 
publication and the former Ministry of Information Industry (MII), now the 
MIIT, govern online books, newspapers, periodicals, audio and video products, 
electronic publications, etc. Article 22 requires that Internet publishers shall 
keep a record of the published contents, time, and Ip address, and the record 
shall be kept for 60 days and be provided when the relevant departments of the 
state make inquiries pursuant to law.67
11.  Provisions for the Administration of Internet News 
Information Services 2005
Article 21 provides that an Internet news service provider shall record the con-
tents of the news information it has published or transmitted, the time, etc. The 
backup of the records shall be preserved for at least 60 days, and be provided 
when the relevant department inquires them in accordance with the law.68
12.  Management Provisions on Electronic Bulletin Services 
in Internet 2000
enacted by the former MII, this department rule governs BBS, online chat, and 
other online interactive service. It requires that user accounts, interactive con-
tents, time stamp, and telephone number, and other information be recorded and 
kept for 60 days, and be provided when the relevant state organization inquires 
about them.69
66. Interim provisions on the Administration of Internet Culture, art. 20.
67. Interim provisions on the Administration of Internet publication, art. 22.
68. provisions for the Administration of Internet news Information Services, art. 21.
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13.  Several Provisions on Regulating the Market Order 
of Internet Information Services 2011
Article 11 of this law is another example of an exemption rule for government access 
and states that “without obtaining the permission of users, an Internet information 
service provider may not collect information which is relevant to users and can 
serve to identify users solely or in combination with other information (hereinaf-
ter referred to as the “personal information of users”), and nor may it provide the 
personal information of users to others, unless it is otherwise provided by laws or 
administrative regulations.”70
This law was issued at the end of 2011— shortly after a widespread leakage of 
accounts (including emails) and passwords affecting more than 10 million users 
of several Chinese websites71 to appease the wild anger of Chinese netizens. The 
leakage is said to be a protest against the real name registration regulation for 
microblogs (Chinese social media like Twitter) effective from March 2012.72 Most 
people couldn’t understand why passwords were stored without even a simple 
encryption in those commercial websites. It was rumored that the unencrypted 
practice of password storage was required by police for their convenience of access. 
Considering Tom- Skype (Skype in China) practice73 leaked in 2008, the rumor is 
not really ungrounded.
As for the intelligence access, there is no unified law or much regulation govern-
ing intelligence activities. Due to China’s special political system, all government 
and semi- government agencies including press might be mobilized to collect and 
analyze intelligence for governmental decision- making although there are some-
times no explicit legal mandates. For example, People’s Daily, a national newspaper, 
has established a department and uses software to monitor and collect users’ com-
ments, opinions, and sentiments about government through its news portal as a 
kind of intelligence for government.74
Generally speaking, the Chinese intelligence system is primarily made up of 
the military intelligence service and the state security organization and public 
security organization. The state security organization is similar to the CIA but 
enjoys law enforcement powers including arrest, search, and seizure according 
70.  Several provisions on Regulating the Market order of Internet Information Services, 
art. 11.
71. Lea yu and Xuyan Fang, “100 Million Usernames, passwords Leaked,” Caixin (December 
29, 2011), http:// www.caixinglobal.com/ 2011- 12- 29/ 101016125.html.
72. “12 Detained or punished over Fabricating Massive Leak of online personal Data” People’s 
Daily Online (January 11, 2012), http:// english.people.com.cn/ 90882/ 7701857.html.
73.  John Markoff, “Surveillance of Skype Messages Found in China,” The New York Times 
(october 1, 2008), http:// www.nytimes.com/ 2008/ 10/ 02/ technology/ internet/ 02skype.html.
74. For details of the department see http:// yq.people.com.cn/ service/ index.html.
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to the State Security Law and Criminal procedure Law.75 Based on broad defi-
nitions and interpretations from the various laws about public security, state 
security, and defense the public security organizations are mainly responsible 
for domestic intelligence whereas the state security organizations and military 
intelligence service are responsible for foreign intelligence including Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. The construction of the Basic Internet Database noted above is part 
of the so called “greater intelligence” strategy employed by the MpS.76
C.  Laws Requiring Broad Reporting of Personal Data  
by Private- Sector Entities
1.  Anti- money Laundering Laws
Article 3 of the Anti- Money Laundering Law of the people’s Republic of China 
2006 requires that all financial institutions inside China “develop and improve 
the system for client identity identification, system to keep the materials of cli-
ent identity and trading record, and system to report large amount trading and 
suspicious trading, and implement their duties of anti- money laundering.”77 The 
Measures on the Administration of Client Identity Identification and Materials 
and Transaction Recording of Financial Institutions further stipulates that a 
financial institution shall “appropriately preserve client identity materials and 
transaction records, guarantee that each transaction be reflected, so as to pro-
vide information needed” and “so as to facilitate anti- money laundering investi-
gation, supervision, and administration.”78
The Anti- Money Laundering Monitoring Analysis Centre (CAMLMAC), as 
China’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), was established in 2004 according to 
the requirement of the Anti- Money Laundering Law. CAMLMAC is operated 
under the central bank the poBC and is the main agency authorized to col-
lect and analyze reports of large and suspicious transactions from all financial 
institutions, including banks, insurances, securities, fund managements, etc. 
and some other specific non- financial institutions such as payment and clearing 
organizations.79
Accounting firms and law firms, pawn stores, lotteries, and sales of real 
estate, jewelry, and precious metals are classified as specific non- financial insti-
tutions according to the law, have not been immediately incorporated into the 
75. State Security Law of the people’s Republic of China, art. 26; Criminal procedure Law of 
the people’s Republic of China, art. 4.
76.  See http:// www.pzhga.com/ c/ 24/ 2308.html; see also http:// www.mps.gov.cn/ n2256871/ 
n2256873/ c5105621/ content.html.
77. Anti- Money Laundering Law of the people’s Republic of China, art. 3.
78. The Measures on the Administration of Client Identity Identification and Materials and 
Transaction Recording of Financial Institutions, art. 3.
79. http:// www.camlmac.gov.cn/ com/ info.do?action=detail&id=183.
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transaction- reporting mechanisms, and may be required to comply with anti- 
money laundering rules and regulation in the future.80
In addition, for the last few years, a considerable number of regulations and rules 
have been made to provide more detailed directions. Currently, large- value and 
doubtful transactions are required to send reports regularly to local branches of the 
poBC electronically.81
Under the pressure of supervision and inspection and in fear of missed reports 
of suspicious transactions, many financial institutions report indiscriminately to 
the CAMLMAC large amounts of ordinary transactions. The CAMLMAC collects 
more than 50 million reports annually, of which only a few are useful data for anti- 
money laundering operations.82
China has joined several international anti- money laundering conventions 
including the United nations Convention against Transnational organised Crime, 
United nations Convention against Transnational organised Crime, and United 
nations Convention against Corruption.83
2.  Measures for the Control of Security  
in the Hotel Industry 1987
Measures for the Control of Security in the Hotel Industry 1987 by the MpS require 
“A hotel shall register guests” and “the guest’s identification card shall be examined 
and an accurate registration of all stipulated items shall be made. If accommodation 
is provided to a foreign guest, the accommodation registration form shall be submit-
ted to the local public security organisation within 24 hours of the guest’s arrival.”84 
It also authorizes provincial, autonomous region, and directly administered munic-
ipal public security departments to formulate detailed implementing rules.
All provincial detailed rules enacted require hotels to upload within two hours 
the detailed registered personal information of both domestic and foreign guests 
including photos and credit cards to the Hotel public order Administration 
Information System controlled by the MpS formerly through certified desktop 
software and now through websites.85 The Hotel public order Administration 
80. Director’s Speech on Financial Intelligence in 2005 (Retrieved March 7, 2012), http:// www.
camlmac.gov.cn/ com/ info.do?action=detail&id=180.
81. Administrative Measures for the Financial Institutions’ Report of Large- Sum Transactions 
and Doubtful Transactions, arts. 7, 8, and 17.
82.  “A Survey and Suggestion on the Anti- Money Laundering Report System” (December 
31, 2011), http:// www.zjfn.com.cn/ infoweb/ wnewsdetail.asp?id=3672; see also “More than 50 
Million Suspicious Reports Received Annually,” 21st Century Network (December 14, 2011), 
http:// finance.jrj.com.cn/ 2011/ 12/ 14092411827388.shtml.
83.  See CAMLMAC Introduction (Retrieved March 7, 2012), http:// www.camlmac.gov.cn/ 
com/ info.do?lmId=15&action=query.
84. Measures for the Control of Security in the Hotel Industry, art. 6.
85. Shanghai Municipal Detailed Rules for public Security Administration in Hotel Industry, 
art. 11.
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Information System is closely related with the Basic population Information 
Database and other databases such as motor vehicles management system, crim-
inal information system, etc. in the police system.86
3.  Interim Measures for the Administration of Air Transport 
Itineraries/ Receipts of E- tickets (2008)
It stipulates that the electronic data of itineraries/ receipts of passengers shall 
be properly kept by the distributing entities as authorized by the Civil Aviation 
Administration of China for five years, and after the expiration of that period, 
that data shall be eliminated after being reported to and approved by the Civil 
Aviation Administration of China and the State Administration of Taxation.87
In addition, all Chinese passengers’ information is processed by a state- owned 
company called TravelSky and connected with the airport security system.88
4.  Regulation on the Administration of Entertainment 
Venues 2006
The “entertainment Venues” refers to the singing, dancing, and gaming places 
that are operated for profit and are open to the general public and for the self- 
entertainment of consumers.89 This regulation requires that these places shall 
keep the video materials as recorded down by the closed circuit television for 
30 days for future investigation, and shall not delete them or use them for other 
purposes.90 These places are also required to establish a roster of working staff 
members, which shall indicate the true names and photocopies of identity cards, 
and to set up a log of business operations that indicates the duties, working 
hours, and working places of its working staff, and shall not delete or alter the 
log of business operations, and shall keep it for 60 days.91
Measures for the public Security Administration of entertainment Venues by 
the MpS further requires these businesses “to cooperate with the public security 
organ in establishing an information system for public security administration 
of entertainment Venues according to the relevant provisions on informatisa-
tion of the State, and input, at real time and faithfully, the information on the 
working staff, log of business operations and safe patrolling, and transmit and 
report it to the public security organ.”92
86. See Beijing Wen Tong Technology Co., Ltd., Solution for Hotel Security Information System 
(2010), http:// www.99rfid.com/ fangan/ newsList.Asp?DonforType=62800286807201010251610.
87.  Interim Measures for the Administration of Air Transport Itineraries/ Receipts of 
e- tickets, art. 23.
88. See http:// www.travelsky.net/ publish/ english/ index.html.
89. Regulation on the Administration of entertainment Venues, art. 2.
90. Ibid. arts. 15, 32.
91. Ibid. arts. 25, 32.
92. Measures for the public Security Administration of entertainment Venues, art. 26.
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D.  Laws Permitting or Restricting Private- Sector Entities 
from Providing Government Officials with Voluntary  
Broad Access to Data
There are no laws currently governing this issue. The government can always find 
an excuse or reason to gain data access through the vague language of relative 
laws. In other cases private- sector entities might provide government officials 
with voluntary broad access to data in seeking favorable policy or government 
investment.
E.  Role of the Courts for Major Categories of Data
The role of courts in China is minor as long as the government is involved.93
F.  Standards for Use
As noted above, most of data acquired have been used to build the e- government 
projects and databases. The Guiding opinion on Construction of e- Government 
and provincial Informatisation rules encourage interdepartmental data sharing 
to reduce costs and to maximize utilization of the resources except when state 
secrets are involved.94
The Anti- Money Laundering Law and Statistics Law do clearly impose a 
restriction of use solely for anti- money laundering or survey purpose.95
G.  Cross- Border and Multi- jurisdictional Issues
Current China laws only claim jurisdiction on corporations with data servers 
established inside China. There are no laws found on governing cross- border 
data flow.
93. GWU professor Donald Clarke even said, “The courts are not necessarily where you would 
go to seek justice in China.” This is particularly true if a criminal case, or if public or state 
security is involved. As noted earlier, courts always accept what the police prepare.
94. Guiding opinion on Construction of e- Government and provincial Informatization § 2.
95. Law of the people’s Republic of China on Anti- money Laundering, art. 5; Statistics Law of 
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Systematic Government Access  
to Private- Sector Data in India*
S U N I L  A B R A H A M
I.  ABSTR ACT
India does not have many laws that explicitly prescribe or prohibit systematic 
government access to private- sector data apart from some provisions in laws such 
as the Information Technology Act, Anti- Money Laundering Act, and epidemic 
Diseases Act. Security consultants and employees of private- sector organiza-
tions impacted by such regulation who spoke under conditions of anonymity 
did not agree regarding the existence and scope of systematic government access. 
Security consultants paint a picture of comprehensive and unfettered access to 
databases of personal information, while employees claim strict adherence to 
the letter and spirit of the law both in terms of proactive and reactive systematic 
access to data. The truth must lie somewhere in- between.
The appetite in some parts of the government for systematic access appears 
to be growing. In February 2012, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) wrote to the 
Department of Telecom demanding that telecom operators and ISps cooperate 
to enable comprehensive real- time tracking of Internet usage on mobile phones. 
This included plans for India- centric “Skype” for use by government officials and 
to address national security and the establishment of a core group “for finalisa-
tion of Internet protocol Detail Record (IpDR) for Internet and GpRS service, 
and standardisation of parameters that will have to be stored by mobile phone 
companies in a log.”1 This is because apparently the telecom operators and ISps 
were unable to identify mobile customers who had visited specific websites.
* Editor’s Note: This chapter has not been updated since originally published in 2012.
1. eT Bureau, “Intelligence Bureau Want Telcos to Keep eye on Internet Traffic on Mobile 
phones,” The Economic Times (February 23, 2012), http:// articles.economictimes.indiatimes.
com/ 2012- 02- 23/ news/ 31091065_ 1_ phones- ip- internet- usage.
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A month later, a national newspaper obtained documents that revealed that the 
government was planning amendments to the operator licenses to ensure real- 
time monitoring of “location data” of all mobile phones.2 Combined with large 
scale surveillance projects in the Unique Identity (UID), national population 
Registry (npR), nATGRID, and CMS project, it would be fair to say that sys-
tematic access of private- sector data in India is growing steadily. This chapter 
provides an overview of the policies and practices around systematic access.
II.  NATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT AND FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES
In India, the Constitution establishes a federal structure of governance com-
prised of a central government and multiple national states. Both the central 
government and the states have various levels of legislative and executive author-
ity. The Indian Constitution also establishes a framework for the judiciary that 
is composed of the Supreme Court, High Courts, and subordinate courts that 
exist at the state and substate level. In this system courts are granted jurisdic-
tion over issues found in both federal and state laws, while the higher judiciary 
is empowered to take decisions on constitutional issues. Additionally, a range of 
tribunals and special courts have been established with authority over specific 
sectoral issues.
provisions defining what information can be disclosed and accessed by a gov-
ernment in Indian law are typically found under specific sectoral legislation, and 
are reflections of an intent to protect a broad and fundamental right to privacy. 
Currently, in India there is no explicit or fundamental right to private and no 
horizontal privacy law. Instead, various statutes covering other subject mat-
ters contain provisions that either implicitly or explicitly protect privacy rights. 
In addition, the right to privacy has been read into the Constitution of India 
by the Supreme Court as a component of the right to life and personal liberty 
under Article 21. The Indian judicial system has also addressed a right to privacy. 
A recent example of this is the naz Foundation case. In 2009, the Delhi High 
Court reinterpreted Section 377 of the Indian penal Code, which up until this 
point in time was routinely used to criminalize homosexuality in India. A criti-
cal aspect of the ruling was the court’s recognition of the citizen’s fundamental 
right to privacy. However, in 2013 the Supreme Court of India overturned the 
decision on the basis that only the parliament can change a law.
Currently, the Department of personnel and Training (DopT) and the Ministry 
of Law have been working on a draft privacy bill. Several versions of the draft bill 
have leaked. When the bill becomes law it would serve as the umbrella of privacy 
legislation, defining key principles and instituting the office of the ombudsman 
or privacy commissioner. In the absence of such overarching privacy legislation, 
2. Atideb Sarkar, “Soon, Govt Will Keep Track of Where every Mobile User Is,” The Indian 
Express (February 16, 2012), http:// www.indianexpress.com/ news/ soon- govt- will- keep- 
track- of- where- every- mobile- user- is/ 912681/ 0.
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questions of jurisdiction and boundaries of governmental access to private- sector 
data are currently defined predominantly through case law, other sectoral acts 
and rules, and executive orders. But not all sectors have addressed the question. 
For instance, there is no explicit policy or case law addressing government access 
to images captured on CCTV cameras by private companies. Furthermore, sec-
tors that have defined boundaries have defined them at varying levels. For exam-
ple, in the financial sector, there are provisions that clearly limit governmental 
access to information held by private companies, whereas in the telecommunica-
tions sector a multi- tiered blanket surveillance regime exists.
III.  STATUTORY AND REGULATORY OVERVIEW
In the context of governmental access and disclosure to information held by the 
private sector, there are legal requirements for private industry to report transac-
tions to the government in order to prevent the carriage of offenses, and to pro-
tect public order and health. For example, typically all employers must disclose 
business transactions to the government, doctors must report the occurrence of 
specific diseases, and banks must report suspicious transactions that could be 
connected to money laundering. A growing global trend, though, that has also 
begun in India, is systematic governmental access, disclosure, retention, and col-
lection of information for the purposes of surveillance, national security, and 
crime detection.
The four mechanisms— access, disclosure, collection, and retention— are 
interrelated, but signify different levels of surveillance. Systematic access often 
bypasses traditional safeguards in place to protect against excessive access to 
information by the government. Systematic disclosure is based on a require-
ment from the government that the private entity routinely disclose informa-
tion. proactive disclosure by default allows systematic access by the government. 
Augmenting the extent of systematic access and disclosure of information are 
data collection and retention standards. The more information collected, the 
longer the retention of information, the more information available for access or 
disclosure to the government.
In India, the adoption of these practices is slowly being incorporated into 
already established legislation through rules and amendments, is emerging in 
draft legislation, and at the same time is largely being practiced outside the legis-
lative scope. each sector in India has a set of laws that establishes provisions reg-
ulating governmental access to information held by businesses. In some cases, 
like for the telecommunication sector, governmental access bypasses traditional 
safeguards, whereas in other cases the access still must be mediated and substan-
tiated with a court order.
A.  Systematic Access
In India, systematic access to information by the government does not necessar-
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through generic application of provisions, extended data retention periods, and 
broad collection of data. Three bodies of Indian law that enable systematic access 
to information by the government include legislation pertaining to: traditional 
search and seizure, banking and securities, and health.
B.  Search and Seizure Law
The government has always had generic access to information held by private 
entities via the technologically neutral Section 91 of The Code of Criminal 
procedure, 1973 (Crpc),”any court or any officer in charge of a police station” 
to issue “summons to produce document or other thing” and Section 92, 
which enables “commissioner of police or District Superintendent of police” 
to “cause search to be made for and to detain such document, parcel or thing 
pending the order of a document, parcel or thing.” even today, law enforce-
ment officials approach private- sector organizations using Crpc Section 91 
and 92, instead of relevant sections under the appropriate legislation. Though 
access to information under the Crpc is subject to traditional safeguards, as a 
court order must be issued by a magistrate before accessing information, the 
generic use of the provision transforms it into a policy tool that can be used 
for systematic access.
C.  Banking Law
Under the Reserve Bank Act, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is the authority 
responsible for collecting information. For the government to access documents, 
it must either request access from the Reserve Bank, or obtain a court order and 
request information from the banking branches themselves. As a safeguard to 
access, the provisions of the Bankers Book evidence Act applies to all informa-
tion or documents maintained by the system provider. Under the Bankers Book 
evidence Act, banks are not compelled to produce a Bankers Book in a case to 
which they are not a party— unless ordered to by a court or judge. The RBI is 
allowed to disclose information only in four instances: (1) protect the integrity, 
effectiveness, and security of the payment system; (2)  in the interest of bank-
ing or monetary policy; (3)  in the operation of the banking system; (4)  or in 
the public interest. System providers are allowed to disclose information in only 
three instances: (1) when it is required under the provisions of the Act; (2) if it is 
expressly consented to by the system participant; or (3) if it is in obedience to the 
orders passed by a court or statutory authority.
The Reserve Bank Act established the Know your Customer (KyC) norms as 
a transparency and accountability measure for clients. The purpose of the KyC 
norms is to enable banks to monitor customer transactions in order to detect 
illegal activities such as ghost accounts [Benami], tax fraud, money laundering, 
financing of terror, and phishing. According to the KyC norms, full details of 
the name and address as well as copies of ID documents must be kept on record. 
Banks are permitted to create customer profiles based on risk categorization that 
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include information pertaining to the customer’s identity, social and financial 
status, nature of business, and clients. Banks must also monitor and proactively 
disclose complex large transactions, and all unusual patterns that do not seem to 
have an economic or lawful purpose. All transaction records are to be retained 
for at least five years. Banks must ensure that a record of transactions in the 
accounts is preserved and maintained. Access to KyC information is currently 
governed by the regulations in the Reserve Bank Act, which requires a court 
order for access.
D.  Securities Law
The legislation was passed for the purposes of protecting and regulating the 
interests of investors in the financial market. In the Act, systematic access by 
the government is enabled through the SeBI Board, which is empowered with 
broad access to private- sector data. For example, the board is vested with the 
same powers as a civil court, including requiring the discovery and produc-
tion of account books and other documents. The board also has the authority 
to call for information, undertake inspection, and make inquiries into the stock 
exchanges and mutual funds of:  intermediaries, self- regulatory organizations, 
banks, or any other corporation established under a Central or State Act in the 
securities market. As a safeguard to unauthorized access and disclosure, the 
board is permitted to undertake inspection only if it has reasonable grounds to 
believe that the company has been indulging in insider trading or fraudulent and 
unfair trading practices. expanding the amount of systematic access possible, 
documents collected as evidence must be retained by the authority for a period 
of six months. Last, the Act enforces a penalty for failure of companies to furnish 
information on returns, and a penalty for nondisclosure of acquisition of shares 
and takeovers.3
E.  Health Law
The persons with Disabilities (equal opportunities, protection of Rights and 
Full participation) Act, 1996 which mandates the reservation of job posts for 
persons with disabilities, allows for systematic access. To do this the Act per-
mits any person who is authorized by the Special employment exchange as well 
as persons authorized by general or special order by the government, to access, 
inspect, question, and copy any relevant record, document or information in the 
possession of any establishment.4
3. The Securities and exchange Board of India Act, 1992.
4.  Chapter  5 employment, persons With Disabilities (equal opportunities, protection of 
Rights and Full participation) Act (1996).
 
 
C o U n T R y  R e p o R T S264
264
IV.  SYSTEMATIC ACCESS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT/ NATIONAL 
SECURITY
In India, legislation that enables systematic access specifically to law enforce-
ment agencies or on the grounds of national security often (1) does not require 
law enforcement or government agencies to produce a court or executive order 
for access; (2) does not define how the agency can use the accessed information; 
(3) does not restrict access to information to specific ranks of officials, but instead 
allows for any officer of any agency to access information; and (4) penalizes the 
private entity noncompliance with disclosure or access requests. Systematic 
access to information by law enforcement agencies or for reasons of national 
security can be found under India’s Internet law, communications law, and ter-
rorist legislation.
A.  Internet Law
The Information Technology Act (ITA) 2008 allows the governmental security 
agencies for investigation purposes broad systematic access to user informa-
tion held by the private sector. The provisions are unique in the fact that though 
they grant broad access to security agencies, they do not establish grounds for 
access, that is, national security. This augments the amount of access possible as 
it removes a standard for permitted access. The following sections and rules are 
relevant:
1. “Data Protection” section and the “Reasonable Security Practices and 
Procedures and Sensitive Personal Information” rules: Systematic 
access by the government is allowed by (a) not requiring security 
agencies to gain prior authorization before accessing information; 
(b) permitting access to any governmental agency; (c) permitting 
access to any type of “sensitive personal data or information”; and 
(d) permitting accessed data to be used for broad and generic purposes. 
For instance, body corporates are required to share information on 
receipt of merely a written request from any governmental agency. 
These agencies are not required to state in writing the reason for 
requesting information; thus the provision does not protect against 
the nonspecific collection of personal information. When obtained, 
sensitive personal information may be used by governmental agencies 
broadly for: verification of identity, prevention, detection, investigation 
including cyber incidents, prosecution, and punishment of offenses. The 
rules represent a dilution from traditional procedure established under 
the Crpc as they do not require a court order from a specified authority 
to access information, and they do not require the type of information 
sought to be identified.
2. Intermediary Liability section and due diligence rules: These 
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intermediaries to provide any authorized governmental agency with 
information that is requested in writing, and second, by enforcing 
extensive data retention for a period of 90 days to aid with investigation 
after take- down notices are received, thus lowering the standard for 
what types of data can be retained as any affected party can send  
a take- down notice.
3. The “Cyber Café ” rules: These rules facilitate access to law enforcement 
and security agencies by mandating ID disclosure and a one year 
of data retention at the Cyber Café. Also, the seniority level of the 
authorized official and circumstances for data access are lowered. Any 
Inspector authorized by the registering agency is allowed to inspect the 
premises of any Cyber Café whenever he/ she chooses. The Cyber Café 
owner must, and is held legally responsible for, providing every related 
document, register, and necessary information to the inspecting officer 
on demand. The scope of access by the government is augmented by the 
amount of personal information collected and retained by Cyber Cafés. 
In addition to systematic access, the rules require monthly disclosure of 
the log register showing data- wise usage details to an agency identified 
by the registration agency.
B.  Communications Law
Systematic access by governmental security agencies can be found in Indian 
interception law. The three laws that address the interception of communica-
tions are the Indian post office Act 1898, the Information Technology Act 2008, 
and the Telegraph Act 1885. When compared, it is possible to see a weaken-
ing of standards among the interception regulations found in these Acts. For 
example, under the post office Act, interception of postal articles is permitted in 
the occurrence of a public emergency, or in the interest of public safety or tran-
quility. Under the Telegraph Act, interception of telephone calls is permitted in 
the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state, 
friendly relations with foreign states, or public order, or for preventing incite-
ment to the commission of an offense. Under the IT interception of electronic 
communications is permitted for the additional reason of preventing incitement 
to the commission of a cognizable offense relating to the above.
Furthermore, the ITA legal access to information begins with permission 
to intercept communication data, which must be granted by the Competent 
Authority. According to the ITA, conditions in which interception, monitoring, 
and decryption are permitted include: in the interest of the sovereignty or integ-
rity of India, the defense of India, the security of the state, friendly relations with 
foreign states, or public order, or for preventing incitement to the commission of 
any cognizable offense, or for investigation of any offense. These conditions are a 
dilution of the conditions laid out in the Telegraph Act as they allow for informa-
tion to be intercepted for the additional purpose of investigation.
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Furthermore, under the ITA the Competent Authority may issue directions 
to any agency of the government to monitor and collect traffic data for a range 
of “cybersecurity” purposes including, inter alia, “identifying or tracking of any 
person who has breached, is suspected of having breached, or being likely to 
breach cybersecurity.” Also under the ITA, if permission is granted, any agency 
of the government may intercept, monitor, or decrypt information transmitted, 
received, or stored in any computer resource. Thus, intermediaries must provide 
all facilities, cooperation, and assistance for the interception, monitoring, and 
decryption of information to authorized agencies. This includes assisting in: the 
installation of equipment of the authorized agency; the maintenance, testing, or 
use of such equipment; the removal of such equipment; and any action required 
for accessing stored information under the direction. This requirement is also 
not found in the Telegraph Act, which requires service providers only to appoint 
nodal officers in charge of handling the interception orders.
Augmenting the degree of access to information under the ITA are three 
mechanisms:
1. Decryption Key Holders are required to disclose both the decryption 
key and provide assistance in decrypting information to authorized 
authorities. Thus, once the government is in possession of the disclosed 
decryption key, hypothetically it can access the information at any 
point of time.
2. If an intermediary fails to comply with directions issued by 
governmental agencies, they are held criminally liable.
3. Real- time collection of traffic data from any computer resource either 
in transit or in storage is permitted; thus agencies have the ability to 
access large amounts of unspecified data.
Though authorized agencies are prohibited from using or disclosing contents of 
intercepted communications for any purpose besides investigation, they are per-
mitted to share the contents with other security agencies for the purpose of inves-
tigation or in judicial proceedings, and, additionally, if a security agency of the 
central government asks for intercepted information from agencies at the state level.
C.  Terrorist Legislation
Systematic access is also found in Indian terrorist legislation. Since its inde-
pendence, India has seen the enactment of many central and state legislations 
focused on containing and combating terrorism. out of these, at least three have 
imparted greater powers of systematic access to police, security agencies, and the 
government by lowering interception standards. These include: The Maintenance 
of Internal Security Act (1971– 1978), the Maharashtra Control of organised 
Crime Act (1999), The prevention of Terrorism Act (2002), and the Unlawful 
Activities prevention Act (1967) amended in (2004). Through these acts, wire-
tapping standards at the time have been diluted by: (1) permitting wiretapping 
 
Systematic Government Access to private-Sector Data in India 267
267
without authorization or warrant, (2) permitting wiretaps to be conducted with-
out a given time limit, (3) permitting all wiretaps (authorized and unauthorized) 
to be used as evidence in court, and (4) removing traditional wiretapping safe-
guards found in Indian law.
For the private sector, the rules allowing systematic access are dangerous as 
they hold specific actors responsible for providing information to the govern-
ment, while failing to provide a form of redress if an official abuses this power, 
or if the information is used for unauthorized purposes. Additionally, the rules 
do not establish if the government is responsible for the security of collected or 
inspected data. Thus, it is unclear who will be held liable if there is a data breach.
V.  BROAD DISCLOSURE
In India there are three categories of legislation and policy that explicitly require 
the proactive disclosure of information to the government: banking laws (includ-
ing anti- money laundering), health laws (including legislation pertaining to epi-
demics), and ISp policy found under communication law.
A.  Banking Laws
private- sector banks are most directly implicated by proactive disclosure 
requirements in Indian law. The prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 
(pMLA) mandates all banking companies, financial institutions, and interme-
diaries to maintain records pertaining to suspicious client transactions to be 
disclosed to the RBI.5 Though these records are not disclosed directly to the gov-
ernment, they are indirectly disclosed because the central government, through 
the RBI, establishes the procedure and manner of maintaining and furnishing 
these records. Additionally, if the principal officer of a banking company, finan-
cial institution, or intermediary notices suspicious transaction, the officer must 
furnish the information to the RBI within the prescribed time. Records are to be 
maintained for a period of 10 years from the date of cessation of the transactions.
B.  ISP and Telecom Policy
The government of India has put in place a proactive disclosure regime specif-
ically for communication data through powers established in the ISp license 
[called the UASL: Unified Access Service License] The license provides the gov-
ernment with expansive access to communication data held by ISps and Telcos. 
They are required to maintain and make available to different authorities a wide 
range of information including:
• A list of all subscribers to its services on a password- protected website 
for easy access by government authorities. This website should also 
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contain a traceable identity and the geographical location of any 
subscriber at any given time. ISps must also be prepared to make 
available a log of all users connected to its service, and a record of the 
service they are using (mail, telnet, http, etc.). The log must be available 
to the government “at any prescribed moment.”
• User logs along with copies of the packets originating from the 
Customer premises equipment of the ISp must be available to the 
Telecom Authority.
• A log of commercial records with regard to the communications 
exchanged on the network for a period of “at least one year” must be 
made available to the licensor for security reasons.6
Though ISp agreements are rooted in the Telegraph Act and thus are subjected to 
its safeguards, the proactive disclosure regime under the ISp license is so expan-
sive because (1) there is no regulation governing how long information held by 
intermediaries can be retained, and (2)  there is no differentiation in terms of 
levels of access and disclosure protection between different categories of data; 
user logs are subjected to the same protection as the geographical location of an 
individual.
For the private sector the implications of these provisions are severe, as under 
law service providers are held to a double- edged sword, where on one hand they 
are held criminally liable if they do not comply with governmental requests for 
interception, and on the other hand they are held responsible for violations per-
taining to secrecy, confidentiality, and unauthorized interception.
C.  Health Legislation
Broad disclosure of health- related information has implications for both pri-
vate and public institutions. The rationale for proactive disclosure in the health 
sector, unlike banking or telecommunications, has primarily to do with pub-
lic safety, order, and health as in the case of tracking epidemics. The epidemic 
Diseases Act of 1947 requires that the government be informed if any part of the 
state is “visited by, or threatened with, an outbreak of any dangerous epidemic 
disease.” In order to prevent the outbreak of a disease the government authorizes 
authorities to inspect persons traveling within the country or across a national 
border and inform the government of the findings of such inspections.
proactive disclosure is also being enforced by the government through real- 
time monitoring of health patients. For example, launched on March 8, 2009, 
the Save The Baby Girl (STBG) project was created with the objective of curbing 
female feticide and enhancing the sex ratio.7 The STBG system is implemented in 
6.  Guidelines for Cyber Café Rules § 5(3). The log register must contain the user’s name, 
address, gender, contact number, type and detail of identification document, date, computer 
terminal identification, log- in time, and log- out time.
7. www.savethebabygirl.com.
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two phases: an online portal and the installation of a video- capture device called 
Silent observer (SIoB) to the ultrasound machines. The SIoB, also known as the 
“active tracker,” monitors ultrasound tests and records sonography images of 
each sonography conducted. The sonography video is accessible to doctors and a 
few government and company officials.
In 2006, the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) published the 
ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human Subjects. The guidelines 
outline general principles that should be followed when conducting research on 
human participants. principles that protect patient privacy include: principle of 
informed consent, principle of privacy and confidentiality, principle of account-
ability and transparency, and principle of compliance. Under the guidelines, 
proactive disclosure is facilitated through government- initiated surveillance 
studies. Surveillance studies require ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, 
interpretation, and dissemination of data regarding a health- related event or to 
measure the burden of a disease.
VI.  CATEGORIES OF DATA
Indian law does not make specific distinctions on the role of the court for access 
to different categories of communication data. For example, the interception of 
communications can be carried out through a court order, but security agencies 
are not required to explicitly obtain an order for certain types of data.
The clearest distinction between categories of data and the standards required 
for access to information by the government is from the 1997 case PUCL 
v.  Union of India. The Supreme Court of India held that the interception of 
communications was an infraction of the constitutionally guaranteed right to 
life and personal liberty, unless permitted under the procedure established by 
law. Subsequently, the Supreme Court framed guidelines to be followed when 
intercepting telephone lines. The Central Government subsequently notified the 
Supreme Court’s procedural safeguards as rules under the Telegraph Act. The 
rules state that: only a home secretary from the central or state government can 
authorize a wiretap; requests for interception must specify how the information 
will be used; each order unless canceled earlier will be valid for 60 days and can 
be extended to a maximum of 180 days; a review committee at the central/ state 
level will validate the legality of the wiretap; before an interception order can be 
approved, all other possibilities of acquiring the information must be consid-
ered; the committee can revoke orders and destroy the data intercepted; records 
pertaining to an interception order will be destroyed every six months, unless 
required for functional purposes; and records pertaining to an interception 
maintained by the service provider will be destroyed every two months.
In the case of an emergency, immediate interception is permitted to be author-
ized by the Joint Secretary or any official above, provided that that the Union 
Home Secretary is informed within three days, and receives confirmation within 
seven days. However, according to some security experts based in Delhi and in 
Mumbai: (1) all phone calls in sensitive cities such as Mumbai are recorded for 
 
C o U n T R y  R e p o R T S270
270
two or three days, these records are reviewed by the police, and specific numbers 
are then retained for longer durations; and (2) all international voice traffic is 
retained for two or three days. However, representatives of Indian telecos speak-
ing under conditions of anonymity assured us that such blanket voice retention 
measures were neither technically nor economically possible. The truth however 
lies somewhere in- between.
Telecos engage in data retention of voice and Internet traffic and metadata, 
but have rolled out legal interception equipment based upon the big data oppor-
tunity and the frequency of intercept or information requests. By examining 
media coverage of crime one can make an informed guess about the scope and 
nature of data retention. During the investigation of Arushi’s murder it was clear 
that Internet traffic logs detailing search engine queries and details of when the 
modem was turned on and switched off could be recovered weeks after the inci-
dent. In contrast during the investigation of Sister Valsa John’s murder it was not 
possible to recover her call records without finding the device.
VII.  STANDARDS FOR USE
Standards for governmental use of accessed information vary across sectors, 
and in most cases are nonexistent. Apart from these safeguards for telephonic 
interception, which can be extrapolated to proactive disclosure, no other explicit 
standards for use or safeguards against abuse are mentioned in sectoral law. one 
of the six safeguards notified in the Telegraph Act rules as a result of the Supreme 
Court’s verdict in PUCL v. Union of India impacts use of intercepted informa-
tion: “all copies of the intercepted material must be destroyed as soon as their 
retention is not necessary under the terms of the Act.”8 The ITA Interception 
Rules prescribe maintenance of records by the designated officer to include “the 
name and other particulars of the officer or the authority to whom the inter-
cepted or monitored or decrypted information has been disclosed, the number 
of copies, including corresponding electronic records of the intercepted or moni-
tored or decrypted information made and the mode or method by which such 
copies, including corresponding electronic record are made, the date of destruc-
tion of the copies.” However, in contrast, the “Guidelines for anti- money laun-
dering measures” issued by Sebi do not mention any similar privacy safeguards 
under the sections dealing with “record keeping” and “retention of records.”
VIII.  CROSS- BORDER AND MULTI- JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
The ITA 2008 in its preliminary chapter clarifies that it does not only apply 
to India’s jurisdiction; it says it “applies also to any offense or contravention 
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thereunder committed outside India by any person.”9 This is in contrast with the 
Telegraph Act, which only “extends to the whole of India.”
IX.  RECENT CONTROVERSIES AND/ OR PENDING 
UNRESOLVED ISSUES
A.  Blackberry
The four years of negotiations between the Indian government and Research in 
Motion (RIM) demonstrate how the Indian government includes an element of 
proactive disclosure outside of the legislative sphere. Since March 2008, India 
has threatened to place a ban on RIM’s Blackberry services, unless given real- 
time and direct access to communication traffic. The Indian government dur-
ing negotiations has proposed six solutions to allow for direct access to the 
BlackBerry network. The solutions involve:  (1)  physically locating the servers 
(network operating Centres) within India, thus giving the government clear 
jurisdiction; (2)  enforcing a blanket data retention of all Internet data and 
email for a minimum period of six months; (3)  lowering RIM’s encryption to 
40 bit from the current 256 bit to allow easy interception of communications; 
(4) encryption key escrow for both BIS and BeS with the Indian government; 
(5)  negotiate a “Government to Government” solution where legal intercep-
tion orders will be routed through the US or Canadian governments, who will 
then comply and carry out interception on behalf of the Indian government; or 
(6) complying with the requirements of the Central Monitoring System (CMS), 
an interception network that allows security agencies to intercept emails, cyber 
chats, monitor voice calls, SMS, MMS, GpRS, fax communications on landlines, 
and CDMA and GSM networks— all in real time.10
If enforced, the CMS will create a system where the government will not need 
to require disclosure of information from the private sector, but instead will 
be able to access this information on its own. Solutions 4 and 6 proposed by 
the Indian government explicitly fall into the category of proactive disclosure, 
allowing the government to bypass the private actor and legal safeguards. This 
will also subvert the legal protections and safeguards found in confidentiality 
clauses, and take away an accountability and transparency mechanism that is 
typically in place when private entities protect information under contract. The 
policy and practice emerging from the standoff between RIM and the Indian 
government is commonly understood within and outside government to set the 
standard for data access and interception for other private- sector companies 
offering similar cloud- based encrypted communication services such as Google 
9. ITA Interception Rules § 16 (2009).
10.  John Ribeiro, “India to Set Up Automatic Monitoring of Communications,” PC World 
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Mail and Skype. RIM made several counteroffers to the Indian government often 
without directly responding to their demands. However, most recently RIM has 
opened a noC in Mumbai that would subject it to the terms and conditions of 
the Unified Access Service License. This arrangement would allow for intercep-
tion of pIn messages, and BIS traffic but not BeS traffic, and would also resolve 
the government’s anxiety over domestic traffic being routed to foreign noCs. It 
is unclear from media reports whether key escrow for BIS users has been imple-
mented. The Indian government however continues to demand interception of 
corporate or BeS traffic. This could only be resolved via proactive disclosure or 
key escrow as mandated in the UASL (though never implemented).
B.  NATGRID
In 2011, the national Intelligence Grid (nATGRID) was established as an 
attached office of the Ministry of Home Affairs; it facilitates governmental sys-
tematic access by providing security agencies with a license to go through and 
link 21 databases from government and private- sector organizations such as 
an tax records; air, train, and bus travel; Internet; and phone telecom records.11 
nATGRID complicates the picture of governmental access to information, 
because it does not operate via legislation, and claims only to connect databases. 
Thus, regulations and procedures do not exist. For the private sector this means 
that nATGRID could override any safeguards in place.
C.  Corruption
Though the ITA rules do not comprehensively protect against systematic access, 
they do establish certain safeguards to prevent systematic access by the gov-
ernment. However, in practice the government often ignores these safeguards. 
Recently, in Mumbai, two city assistant police commissioners were accused of 
selling call details from conversations of high- profile individuals.12 The police 
commissioners allegedly used their position to gain access to the communication 
records from telecos. only one of the telcos responded when the investigating 
police officers approached seeking the names of the officers to whom details had 
been disclosed. This incident reveals that law enforcement officials abuse their 
positions to dilute data access safeguards. This demonstrates the loose imple-
mentation of the interception safeguard. In addition, it is clear that service pro-
viders are not transparent about data access either, because it is illegal or because 
11. Vibhuti Agarwal, “Q&A: nATGRID Chief Raghu Raman,” Wall Street Journal (June 29, 
2011), http:// blogs.wsj.com/ indiarealtime/ 2011/ 06/ 29/ qa- natgrid- chief- raghu- raman/ .
12. “Two Delhi Cops May Land in the Dock for Selling Cell Call Records,” Times of India 
(March 11, 2012), http:// articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ 2012- 03- 11/ mumbai/ 31144815_ 
1_ delhi- officers- delhi- cops- service- providers.
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they are afraid of consequences demonstrating the lack of redress and protection 
for service providers that is given if there is abuse by government entities.
D.  CCTV
There are no specific laws governing the use of CCTV (closed circuit television) 
cameras in shops, offices, colleges, hostels, and other private- sector establish-
ments. However, in new Delhi, other metro cities, and state capitals, the police 
have been strongly advocating the installation of CCTV cameras in private- sector 
establishments. Hotels are asked to install CCTV cameras at reception desks, 
front entrances, car parks, and all lobbies of the hotel until the guests enter their 
private rooms. The police have also been encouraging private establishments to 
make CCTV camera feeds available in real time by using web- streaming tech-
nologies. Most recently, the Delhi police called for mandatory real- time feeds of 
bars and pubs in noida following the gang rape of an ex- employee. CCTV camera 
footage has been successfully used by the police to secure convictions for a wide 
variety of crimes. For example, CCTV cameras have been installed in response 
to terror attacks, such as the German bakery blast that took place in pune. After 
the attacks that took place in 2010, the city amended the development control 
rules and made it mandatory for 24/ 7 cameras to be installed in public areas.13 
CCTVs are an example of an area where systematic access of private- sector data 
is growing rapidly in the absence of any regulatory framework.
X.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The practices around systematic access of private- sector data in India are diffi-
cult to understand clearly as very few members of the private sector are willing 
to speak about it even under conditions of anonymity. When it comes to policy, 
in many cases there is no explicit policy; where policy does exist it is unclear and 
lacking sufficient safeguards, allowing for a wide range of interpretations. When 
data retention is prescribed there are usually very few safeguards— no breach 
notification, no transparency requirements, usually not even internal record- 
keeping is required, no mandatory deletion/ obfuscation policy, no requirement 
to publish a data- retention policy.
Given unclear policy and the cost of data retention, private- sector practices 
vary across the different organizations, across geographic regions, across mar-
ket segments, and also across sectors. no indigenous private- sector organization 
publishes a data retention policy or is transparent about government access. no 
indigenous private- sector organization appears to publicly resist data access or 
surveillance demands of the government. In its annual report, Bharati Airtel 
says “In the lawful interception domain, we received 422 appreciation letters 
13.  Radheshyam Jadhav, “CCTV Cameras in public places Will need Govt’s Go- Ahead,” 
Times of India (February 9, 2011), http:// articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ 2011- 02- 09/ 
pune/ 28545041_ 1_ cctv- cameras- fire- stations- pmc.
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from various law enforcement agencies in the last one year alone.”14 The report is 
not clear about the total number of interceptions facilitated.
Surveillance and systematic access is usually permitted under law during a 
“public emergency” on when “public safety or tranquility,” “sovereignty and 
integrity of India,” “security of the state,” “friendly relations with foreign states,” 
or “public order” is undermined or to “prevent incitement to the commission 
of any offense.” over time the standards for surveillance and systematic access 
have been diluted from a “public emergency” to “prevent incitement to the com-
mission of any offense.” This is a pretty significant dilution given that the ITA 
has placed what some consider unconstitutional limits of freedom of expression 
by criminalizing acts such as “sending, by means of a computer resource or a 
communication device, any content that is grossly offensive or has menacing 
character; or any content which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of 
causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal 
intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will.” Given this lowering of the threshold 
on free speech, the government could order surveillance or systematic access to 
private- sector data using different provisions of the law involving trivial reasons.
The government of India does not seem to exercise a scientific temper or 
adopt principles of natural justice when it comes to surveillance and systematic 
access to private- sector data. It appears to be sold on a techno- utopian vision of 
“surveillance for surveillance’s sake” or very little appreciation of “privacy by 
design principles” or “privacy as a prerequisite for security” or “excessive sur-
veillance compromising security.” Massive surveillance projects are being rolled 
out without waiting for enabling legislation. This attitude of government is best 
understood via the design and implementation of projects such as the Baby Girl 
project, nATGRID, and CMS.
Given the policy vacuum, the lack of clarity in policy, and the distance 
between policy and implementation, the impact on the private sector has four 
dimensions: (1) unclear liability when personal data fall into the wrong hands, 
(2) lack of redress system available to the private sector in case of abuse by a gov-
ernment official, (3)  a tendency for collusion between government actors and 
private- sector actors that can result in tampering of cyber- evidence, and (4) the 
likelihood that without transparency and access to recourse this will result in a 
private surveillance and censorship regime.
14. Bharati Airtel Annual Report, 2010– 2011.
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Systematic Government Access  
to Private- Sector Data in Japan
M O T O H I R O  T S U C H I YA
I.  ABSTR ACT
The Japanese legal system has been based on the German legal system since 
the mid- nineteenth century, but the American legal system was grafted on to 
it following Japan’s defeat in World War II in 1945. The postwar Constitution 
contained an article regarding the secrecy of communication and protected pri-
vacy in terms of respect of individuals. As of 2015, the Japanese government had 
64,632 record files containing personal/ privacy information of Japanese and for-
eign persons. now, as the personal Information protection Law in the executive 
Branch, which was enacted in 1988, and the personal Information protection 
Law, which was enacted in 2003, strictly regulate privacy, there have been fewer 
problematic cases regarding governmental access to private- sector data. Data 
gathering for law enforcement or intelligence activities has also been weaker 
following World War II. private- sector corporations/ organizations might share 
data with government agencies, but this is based on voluntary arrangements, not 
by any mandatory system. More focus is being cast not on governmental access 
to private- sector data, but on citizen’s access to data, which government agencies 
are holding, as well as the establishment of a national ID system.
II.  NATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT AND FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES
After the Meiji Restoration in 1867, Japan started adopting Western- style legal 
systems, especially from Germany, or prussia. Japan needed to place the reins of 
government back in the hands of the emperor from the rule of the Shoguns of the 
Tokugawas from the seventeenth century to mid- nineteenth century. However, 
the emperor was not to become an absolute ruler but the head of a constitutional 
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Leaders of the Meiji Restoration needed the emperor as a symbol of a new polit-
ical system, but tried to retain actual power in their own hands. prussia was an 
example of such a system. other social systems were mixtures of other Western 
traditions. For example, the road system was adopted from the United Kingdom. 
Japan still drives on the left.
The attempt of the empire of Japan to become a regional hegemon was 
defeated by Japan’s losing of World War II, which ended in 1945. The General 
Headquarters (GHQ) of the Allied Forces occupied the main four islands of 
Japan until 1952, while okinawa was kept under the military administration 
of the United States until 1972. GHQ broke down many of the extant political, 
economic, and social systems in order to transform Japan into a more peaceful 
and democratic state. However, GHQ did not abolish the imperial system. This 
means that Japan’s current legal system retains elements of the prewar systems.
At first, GHQ tried to allow the Japanese to redesign a new constitution them-
selves, but their first draft was considered too conservative. Then, General Douglas 
MacArthur ordered his GHQ staff to draft a constitution, and it was handed to the 
Japanese drafters. As there were many new Dealers in GHQ, the new Constitution 
is imbued with idealism. For example, Article 9 abolished the use of armed forces 
to solve international disputes. But it became one of the core problems regarding 
Japanese postwar diplomacy and national security policy. Later administrations 
in the United States requested Japanese rearmament, and the Japan Self- Defence 
Forces was established under the Japan- US Security Treaty.
Although the Constitution introduced American idealism, many of the statu-
tory laws inherited from the prewar systems were still influenced by the German 
legal system. That is, the American legal system was grafted on the previous sys-
tem after Japan lost World War II. For 70 years after its promulgation, many peo-
ple have tried or proposed modification of the Constitution, but such attempts 
have been unsuccessful as the procedure to do so is so difficult. In July 2016 
House of Councilors election the Liberal Democratic party, new Komeito, and 
other parties, which were in favor of revising the Constitution, won two- thirds of 
the House. It is one step further for the revision, but prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
posed a cautious position, though the revision is his long- time ambition.
The Japanese Constitution does not have any specific stipulations regarding 
protecting privacy, but Article 13, that people be respected as individuals, is 
said to protect rights of privacy. And Article 21, “nor shall the secrecy of com-
munication be violated,” clearly guarantees the secrecy of communication in 
writing. However, despite these articles in the Constitution, statutory laws were 
not enacted even after Japan regained its independence in 1952. The personal 
Information protection Law in the executive Branch was enacted in 1988 and 
the personal Information protection Law covering the private sector was enacted 
in 2003. The 2003 Law was a direct response to the eU Data protection Directive. 
Before the 2003 Law, there were privacy protection guidelines in each economic/ 
social sector. There was no omnibus act covering public and private sectors on 
the same basis. Most of those guidelines were made by each sector or industry 
to cope with its own problems without statutory laws. The 2003 Law overrode 
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these guidelines and started regulating information gathering, storage, and dis-
semination in an excessive way. This has served to stifle government, business, 
and social activities. For example, in schools, parents cannot share their con-
tact information, as school managers don’t want to take the risks of storing such 
“sensitive” information. The law doesn’t punish a thief who steals privacy infor-
mation, but punishes an administrator who lets it be stolen. people, businesses, 
and even government agencies started avoiding holding privacy information.
even before the 2003 Law, the Japanese government had hesitated to system-
atically access private- sector data. Based on bitter prewar and wartime expe-
riences regarding the invasion of privacy and other human rights violations, 
Japan’s mass media strongly opposes the presence of any government hand in 
private- sector information. Therefore, formal access to such information is not 
favored in Japan. The government relies on weaker, informal access to private- 
sector data. The private sector has set up its own guidelines and the government 
requested reports from it based on business laws regulating each sector.
Governmental data collection is also limited in law enforcement and intelli-
gence activities. There is no corresponding law to the IpA (Investigatory powers 
Act) in the United Kingdom and the USA FReeDoM Act in the United States. 
Interception of communications, or wiretapping, is not a popular tool among 
Japanese law enforcement/ intelligence agencies. This is a deep- seated taboo 
after World War II, based on the widely shared repentance that spy agencies 
and military police powers abused wiretapping during the war. nonetheless, the 
Interception Law for law enforcement purposes was enacted in 1999 while loud 
oppositions were heard against the enactment, but executive wiretapping is not 
clearly authorized. There is no strong power to seek wider wiretapping in the 
Japanese society.
In these contexts, there seems to be very few cases of systematic access to 
private- sector data by the Japanese government, as far as the author finds.
III.  STATUTORY AND REGULATORY OVERVIEW
A.  Freedom to Collect and Store Information
In principle, there is freedom to collect information for the government or the 
private sector in Japan.1 However, in cases of invading others’ rights or of clearly 
violating the social order, such activities might be prohibited. Among others, 
in cases involving specific and sensitive information, invasion of privacy is rec-
ognized.2 However, there is no clear definition in the laws of what is “sensitive” 
1.  Taro Komukai, Introduction to Information Law (Joho Ho Nyumon) (Tokyo:  nTT 
publishing, 2008), p. 82 (in Japanese).
2. Hisamichi okamura and Fumio Shimpo, Electronic Networks and Personal Information 
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information. Section 4.4.2.3 of the Japanese Industrial Standards (JIS) Q 15001 
defines it as follows:
1. Issues of thought, creed and religion
2. Race, nation, birthplace, domicile of origin, physical handicap, mental 
disability, criminal record, and other factors of social discrimination
3. participatory status in a labor union
4. participatory status in political activity
5. Medical and sexual life
Article 133 of the Criminal Law prohibits the opening of private mail. Articles 4 
and 179 of the Telecommunications Business Law protect secrecy of commun-
ications. Article 3 of the Secrecy protection Law regarding Japan- US Mutual 
Defense Aid Arrangements protects defense secrets connected to American mil-
itary forces, but general defense secrets are not covered in full. A security clear-
ance system has not been introduced to cover both the public and private sectors. 
one covers parts of the Ministry of Defence and the Self-Defence Forces.
private- sector trade secrets are partially protected by Articles 3 and 4 of the 
Unfair Competition prevention Law. It was revised in november 2005 to add pen-
alties. Trade secrets must be kept secret and not be revealed to the public (Article 2).
Under the current laws, it is not necessarily illegal to steal information in Japan. 
If you take out confidential information from a stored place, you will be punished 
for stealing paper sheets or digital disks, not for stealing the information itself. 
However, the Unauthorised Access prevention Law dissuades information theft 
in a sense. It was enacted in 1999 to respond to the rapid increase of computer- 
related crimes.
There is freedom to store information as well as collect information for the gov-
ernment and the private sector under the current laws in Japan.3 Usually it is not 
requested for any party to disclose what kinds of information are kept. However, 
if personal/ private information is kept in one way or another, the personal 
Information protection Law can be applied to maintain such information securely.
It is possible for government to collect, store, or access information using its 
public powers. But such information can be regarded as public property. More 
people are claiming that government information activities be checked under 
citizens’ eyes.
B.  Personal Information Protection Law
The most powerful law influencing governmental and private information activ-
ities is the personal Information protection Law enacted in 2003. The law strictly 
regulates the purpose of information collection and mandates strong protection 
of stored data. As a result of this law, collection and storage of personal/ privacy 
data have stagnated in Japan. Incidental leaks of such data impose a high price 
for administrators in terms of compensation and reputation. It is also true for 
3. Komukai, above note 1, pp. 83– 84.
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government. Government agencies avoid unnecessary gathering of private data 
because of fear of being blamed following any leak of citizens’ privacy.
The law demands the definition of the purpose of data collection in each case 
to be as clear as possible (Article 20), and nobody can deal with data beyond 
defined purposes (Article 21). It is also forbidden to share data with a third party 
without consent (Article 28).4
As of 2015, the Japanese government has 64,632 record computer and manual 
(paper) files containing personal information of Japanese and foreign persons 
(Appendix 1).5 This number doesn’t include data on businesses corporations and 
other private organizations. Such files contain identifiers of more than 1,000 per-
sons. If they contain fewer, they are not counted in this number. This number 
was reduced from 85,822 in 2011.
Table 13.1 shows examples of record systems containing personal information 
held by the Japanese government. The biggest owner of personal information 
among Japanese government agencies is the national Tax Agency, which gathers 
financial information on residents in Japan. Chapter 4 of the establishment Law 
of the Ministry of Finance describes the mandates of the national Tax Agency. 
But it does not tell us how the agency is collecting data.
4. okamura and Shimpo, above note 2, p. 194.
5. http:// www.soumu.go.jp/ main_ content/ 000413445.pdf.
Table 13.1. examples of Record Systems Containing personal Information 
Held by the Japanese Government
Ministry/ Agency Examples of Record Systems
national Tax Agency personal tax ledger; List of mandatory tax collector at 
the source; List of class attendants for alcohol selling; 
and others
Ministry of Justice List of prisoners; Data on persons who enter and exit 
Japanese border (Japanese and foreigners); and others
national police Agency Drivers’ license information and others
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs
List of foreign residents; passport control file; List of 
foreign media; and others
Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare
List of health care recipients; List of pension recipi-
ents; public nursing care insurance recipients; List of 
money transfer to foreign countries; and others
Ministry of Defence List of land owners for US bases
Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport 
and Tourism
List of first- class architect; List of airline service 
employees; and others
source: http:// www.soumu.go.jp/ main_ sosiki/ gyoukan/ kanri/ pdf/ shikojyokyo_ h22/ 
shikojyokyo_ h22_ 12.pdf.
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The government ministries, departments, and agencies are collecting these 
data based on (1) establishment laws of each government sector, and (2) business 
laws regulating each economic sector. The details of data collection methods are 
usually defined in ministry orders.
C.  Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies
In Japanese society, government intelligence agencies are weaker as compared 
with other societies. The leader of the Japanese intelligence community is the 
Cabinet Intelligence Research office (CIRo), and the community includes 
departments and agencies of the national police Agency, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the public Security Intelligence Agency, and the Ministry 
of Defence. But none of them holds big powers to access private- sector data. 
no cases of such agencies systematically accessing private- sector data have 
been found in the research process of this chapter. There is no question about 
these agencies collecting data on targets, but such activities are case- by- case 
and not systematic and regular. The national police Agency and prefectural 
police departments all over Japan collect data especially on crime organiza-
tions such as cults and “yakuzas (mafias)” for law enforcement purposes. In 
order to stop money laundering, financial institutions are requested to report 
“doubtful” transactions to law enforcement agencies based on the narcotics 
and psychotropic Control Law and others, but this report is not manda-
tory. The government cannot access financial information without proper 
warrants.
Most cases involve accessing financial records for tax collection based on 
Article 141 of national Tax Collection Act (See Table 13.2). In other cases the 
Ministry of Justice is gathering data on persons who enter and exit Japanese 
borders based on the emigration and Immigration Management and Refugee 
Recognition Law. As Japan is an island country, it is necessary to use vessels on 
the sea or airplanes to cross the border.





Legal Entities and Others
Cases based on Laws 2,698 293
Cases for public Interests 
or Cases with First person’s 
Consent a
279 232
a For example, the Imperial Household Agency discloses records of people who receive 
medals.
source: http:// www.soumu.go.jp/ main_ content/ 000413445.pdf.
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So far, there are fewer cases of the use of communications interception, or wire-
tapping, for law enforcement or other purposes.6 The Interception Law for law 
enforcement purposes was enacted in 1999, and it mandates annual disclosure of 
the number of interceptions done by police agencies all over Japan (Table 13.3). 
However, executive wiretapping to prevent future terrorism attacks or crimes is not 
authorized under the Japanese laws.
The Interception Law does not exclude computer communications. However, 
as Table 13.2 shows, all of the authorized interceptions in 2011 were mobile calls, 
because usually criminals prefer prepaid or illegally obtained mobile phones. 
Interception of Internet traffic is said to be legal under the current laws, but has not 
been used yet. The national police Agency is still cautious about using the method. 
But it will be considered in the future. of course, stored digital records in computers 
and other devices are searched with warrants.
The tradition of strict protection of communications secrecy dissuades telecom-
munications/ Internet service providers from stopping apparently harmful traffic. 
They are allowed to access neither content nor corresponding communications 
data such as traffic data, service use data, and subscriber data. They only use such 
data to manage the quality and security of their networks with special reasons.7
6. Fumio Shimpo, Birth and Development of Rights of Privacy (Privacy no Kenri no Seisei to 
Tenkai) (Tokyo: Seibundo, 2000), pp. 250– 278 (in Japanese).
7.  Ikuo Takahashi, Koichiro Hayashi, Makoto Funahashi, and Kazuo yoshida, “Strange 
Destiny of Secrecy of Communications (Statutory Law),” Joho Network Law Review, vol. 8 
(2009), pp. 1– 26 (in Japanese).




Requests Authorized Communication 
Method
Number of Arrested 
Persons
1 8 8 Mobile 9
2 6 6 Mobile 4
3 12 12 Mobile 8
4 2 2 Mobile 12
5 4 4 Mobile 0
6 3 3 Mobile 3
7 3 3 Mobile 0
8 5 5 Mobile 3
9 6 6 Mobile 14
10 3 3 Mobile 12
11 7 7 Mobile 14
12 5 5 Mobile 0
source: http:// www.moj.go.jp/ content/ 000118702.pdf.
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D.  Business Laws
In Japan there are various business laws corresponding to each economic (some-
times social) sector, and supervisory authorities in the government can request or 
mandate reports mainly on financial data from participants in each sector. Most of 
such reports are on an on- demand basis, but usually businesses and persons submit 
reports without reluctance. This is an important and useful way for the Japanese 
government to understand the situation of each industry (Table 13.4).
IV.  RECENT CONTROVERSIES AND/ OR PENDING 
UNRESOLVED ISSUES CONCERNING SYSTEMATIC 
GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO PRIVATE- SECTOR DATA
As cloud services on the Internet are becoming popular, the problem of data juris-
diction is being discussed here and there. If we put data in the United States, the US 
government could access the data under the USA FReeDoM Act and other laws. 
If we put data in the eU area, the eU Data protection Directive would influence 
the data. or, we might not be able to retrieve the data once we sent it to the eU if 
the eU or a Member State prohibits data transfer for any reason.8 Furthermore, it 
is said that data stored in servers in China might be accessed without legal reason. 
Therefore, it is not the governmental access to private- sector data that matters in 
Japan, but the way the government uses such services.
on the other hand, there is no statue in Japan to regulate data transfer overseas. 
However, there are semiformal guidelines clarifying the details of handling data, 
which prohibits international data transfer. Article 25 of the Foreign exchange and 
Foreign Trade Law does not authorize international data transfer in some cases.9
However, this debate was drastically changed after the Great east Japan 
earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011. The City of Takada in Iwate prefecture 
Table 13.4. examples of Business Sectors and Business Laws in Japan
Business Sector Business Law Supervisory Authority
Telecommunications Telecommunications 
Business Act
Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications
Banking Banking Act Financial Services Agency
electric power electricity Business 
Act
Ministry of economy, Trade and 
Industry
Railways Railway Business Act Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism
8. Hiroshi Kondo and Kei Matsumoto, Cloud and Law (Cloud to Hou) (Tokyo: Kinyu Zaisei 
Jijo Kenkyukai, 2011), pp. 117– 22 (in Japanese).
9. Kazuaki yoshii, “Legal Risks in Cloud Service,” Joho Network Law Review, vol. 10 (2011), pp. 
159– 74, footnote 47 (in Japanese).
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and three other cities and towns lost critical servers containing the basic data of 
their residents. The local governments could not issue certificates and other offi-
cial documents. Following this, it is now being discussed whether or not critical 
data and information should be kept on- site. Data should be stored in remote sites 
in multiple locations. Cloud services can be insurance against such risks.
Japan maintains a domiciliary register system. every citizen must be regis-
tered with the local government following birth. Family trees are also kept in 
government servers. The system used to be paper- based, but it was digitized and 
networked in 2000. Servers of local governments in Japan were interconnected 
to exchange traffic. This change raised a lot of privacy concerns, and several local 
governments refused to connect to the system.
However, in a networked society, it is critical to have digital data and a unique 
personal ID. Japanese residents have several unique IDs, for the domiciliary reg-
ister system, for the tax ID system, for the pension system, the health insurance 
system, the driver’s license system, and others. More and more people want one- 
stop service with one ID. A national ID system is now on the political agenda.
In october 2015 “My number” system started and all residents (citizens and 
foreigners living in Japan) started to be given their own 12- digit numbers (arti-
ficial persons get 13- digit numbers). This new system is for (1) realization of fair 
society, (2) effective government, and (3) advancement of people’s convenience. 
These numbers are used for social security services, tax collection, and disas-
ter countermeasures. They are similar to Social Security numbers in the United 
States, but they should not be shared for other services in private sectors. There 
are growing concerns about data breach, but the government claims this system 
will make related systems more transparent and efficient.
Related to the “My number” system, the personal Information protection 
Commission (ppC) was established on January 1, 2016, by reorganizing the 
Specific personal Information protection Commission. The ppC is an indepen-
dent body from government structures, and supervises private and government 
entities, which deal with personal information.10
V.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In general, there have been no serious problems reported regarding systematic 
access to private- sector data by the Japanese government so far. This does not 
mean that there is actually no problem. Real problems might be just hidden from 
the public eye.
At any rate, the present political atmosphere does not allow such systematic 
access. And the impact of the personal Information protection Law in 2003 has 
suppressant effects over data gathering by government and business actors.
on- demand reports from the private sector to the government are a more 
common practice in Japan. This is not systematic and regular access, but works 
well between the business sector and the Japanese government.
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Systematic Government Access  
to Private- Sector Data in the  
Republic of Korea
S A N G  JO   JO N G *
I.  ABSTR ACT
This chapter examines the statutory grounds for governmental access to private- 
sector data in Korea. It focuses on issues such as the circumstances under which 
access is allowed without a warrant and how unjustified government access can 
take place in practice.
II.  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In 2011, the Cultural Minister yu In- chon was attending a welcoming ceremony 
held at Incheon International Airport to greet the 2010 Vancouver Winter 
olympic champion skater Kim yu- na. During the ceremony, the minister 
stretched out his arms toward Kim’s shoulders as a gesture of welcome, but the 
scene was captured and slightly edited to look as if the minister tried to hug Kim 
as she reluctantly avoided him. This video clip was posted on a website for funny 
pictures/ video clips, and the humiliated minister sued for libel the Internet 
users who uploaded it.1 Upon the filing of the complaint, the police requested 
the Internet users’ names, resident registration numbers, cell phone numbers, 
and date of subscription, which the ISp provided two days later. Then, one of 
the accused whose personal information was given to the police sued the ISp for 
disclosing his personal information in breach of the ISp’s terms of use. The case 
*  The author expresses his gratitude to Ms. Hanhee yang for her help in translating this 
chapter.
1.  Kwon Mee- yoo, “Culture Minister yu Upset at yu- na Video,” The Korea Times (Seoul, 
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generated a heated controversy over whether such governmental access without 
proper warrants was an infringement on privacy or the right of personal infor-
mation. Six years later, the Supreme Court of Korea came to a conclusion2 that 
illustrates some of the realities and statutory limits of governmental access to 
private- sector data in the Republic of Korea.
Systematic government access to private- sector data can take place in a variety 
of ways. Under some circumstances, access requires warrants issued by a court, 
whereas in other situations it does not. notably, due to the unique truce situa-
tion, under which the Republic of Korea is technically still at war with north 
Korea, Korean authorities are sometimes allowed to obtain private- sector data 
without warrants, for national security purposes.3
This chapter will examine the statutory grounds for governmental access to 
private- sector data in Korea, focusing specifically on issues such as the circum-
stances under which access is allowed without a warrant and how unjustified 
government access can take place in practice.
III.  NATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT AND FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES
Article 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea states, “The privacy of no 
citizen shall be infringed,” and Article 18 states, “The privacy of correspondence 
of no citizen shall be infringed.” The Constitution does not explicitly mention a 
fundamental right of personal information or data protection. However, based 
on Article 37, which reads, “freedoms and rights of citizens shall not be neglected 
on the ground that they are not enumerated in the Constitution,” and in light 
of Article 10 (which recognizes the human worth and dignity of all citizens) 
and Article 21 (which protects freedom of expression), plus Articles 17 and 18, 
it is reasonable to conclude that personal information privacy is a fundamental 
right. Indeed, Korean courts have held that the rights to privacy and the pursuit 
of happiness in these Articles provide the ideological basis for acknowledging 
a so- called “right to self- determination of personal information” as a separate 
constitutional right.4 This “right to self- determination of personal information” 
is in turn embodied and delineated in various statutes, including the “personal 
Information protection Act.”
previously, the obligations of government bodies with regard to personal 
information protection were regulated by the “Act on personal Information 
protection of public Agencies” (ApIppA). on September 30, 2011, the ApIppA 
was replaced by and incorporated into the “personal Information protection 
2. Supreme Court of Korea Decision 2012 da 105482 (S Korea, March 10, 2016).
3. Government organization Act, art 29; personal Information protection Act [hereinafter 
pIpA], art 18; Communication privacy Act [hereinafter CpA], art 8.
4.  Supreme Court of Korea Decision 96 da 42789 (S Korea, July 24. 1998); Constitutional 
Court of Korea Decision 99 hun- ma 513, 2004 hun- ma 190 (S Korea, May 26, 2005).
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Act,” which covers both the public and private sectors. Further regulations appli-
cable to the private sector are also found in a variety of industry- specific statutes, 
including the Act on promotion of Information and Communications network 
Utilisation and Information protection (Communications network Act), the 
Act on Use and protection of Credit Information (Credit Information Act), the 
Communication privacy Act (Communication privacy Act), the Act on Real 
name Financial Transactions and Guarantee of Secrecy (Real name Financial 
Transactions Act), the Act on Report and Use of Specific Financial Transaction 
Information (Financial Transaction Information Act), and the Act on Use and 
protection of Location Information (Location Information Act).
enacted in 2011, the personal Information protection Act (pIpA) is a com-
prehensive statute that imposes obligations on entities dealing with personal 
information (“processors”), both in the public sector and the private sector. pIpA 
establishes basic principles regarding the collection, use, and disclosure of per-
sonal information. It is notable that pIpA explicitly requires, as a general rule, 
that processors obtain consent from the data subject; in the case of a disclosure, 
the data subject must be informed as to the recipient of the personal informa-
tion, what personal information will be transferred, the purpose for which the 
information will be used, and the period for which it will be retained. These 
requirements also apply when providing personal information to a third party 
overseas.5 Moreover, pIpA requires the government to “work out policy meas-
ures necessary to enhance the personal information protection standard in the 
international environment.”6
As for the obligations of the state, pIpA provides that the government “shall 
devise policy measures to prevent any harmful effect from collecting personal 
information for any purpose other than the intended purpose, misusing, abus-
ing, or excessively monitoring and tracking, etc. personal information, thereby 
protecting human dignity and personal privacy.”7 Article 15 permits collec-
tion and use not only with consent but also “where special provisions exist in 
laws” and “where it is unavoidable so that the public institution may carry out 
such work under its jurisdiction as stated by laws and regulations.”8 Apart from 
these basic principles, pIpA does not say much about the scope and procedures 
regarding government access to third- party private- sector data. Instead, the 
standards for government access to personal information must be found else-
where. personal information is acquired by public authorities using the existing 
warrant system or under numerous administrative procedures. In addition, data 
that does not fit within the pIpA definition of personal information can always 
be submitted to the government voluntarily and informally.
5. pIpA, above note 3, art 17(3).
6. pIpA, above note 3, art 14.
7. pIpA, above note 3, art 5.
8. pIpA, above note 4, arts 15(1)2 and 15(1)3.
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IV.  STATUTORY OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS
A.  Laws regarding Governmental Access to Private- Sector Data
This section will examine pIpA and other statutes in greater detail.
As a preliminary point, it should be emphasized that private- sector data can 
be divided into two categories: personal information data and everything else. 
Statutes on privacy including pIpA define personal information as “the infor-
mation pertaining to any living person that makes it possible to identify such 
individual by his/ her name, resident registration number, image, etc. (including 
the information which, if not by itself, makes it possible to identify any specific 
individual if combined with other information).” However, Internet log records 
(the date, frequency, and length of connections) and telephone calling records 
(the originating and called numbers, with time and duration) do not normally 
fall within the scope of the definition of personal information unless they are put 
together with name or personal identification number. Internet logs and dialed 
number records, sometimes referred to as “transactional data,” are considered to 
be personal information if and only if the service provider collecting the logs or 
records has another database containing users’ names and/ or personal ID num-
bers and if the company is technically capable of easily putting those databases 
together.
pIpA Article 15 states as a basic principle that personal information must be 
collected only with consent of the subject of such information.9 However, the 
government can obtain personal information without consent where it is nec-
essary for a public institution to carry out its official duties under its jurisdic-
tion as stated by other laws and regulations that supersede pIpA, or where it is 
deemed necessary explicitly to protect the data subject or any third party from 
impending danger to his/ her life, body, or property. The phrase “official duties 
under its jurisdiction as stated by laws and regulation” refers to the obligations 
and authorities of public bodies prescribed in the Government organisation Act, 
the Resident Registration Act, the national Taxation Act, the Medical Service 
Act, the Infectious Disease Control and prevention Act, and the national Health 
Insurance Act, as well as relevant regulations enacted by local governments. For 
example, the Ministry of public Administration and Security collects data on 
public officers for the purpose of personnel, ethics, services, and pension man-
agement.10 It also operates the “national Human Resource Database,” which 
accumulates large amounts of personal information. Medical records are col-
lected and used by the national Health Insurance Corporation in the ordinary 
course of insurance benefits management.11
9. pIpA, above note 3, art 15.
10. Government organization Act, art 29.
11. national Health Insurance Act, art 13.
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In principle, the processors of personal information can disclose personal 
information only with the consent of the data subject, and only within the scope 
of the initial purpose of collection.12 There is an exception in the pIpA, however, 
that the government and public agencies can disclose personal information for 
the purpose of law enforcement “where it is necessary for the investigation of 
crimes, indictment and prosecution, or for the court to process the case or for 
punishment and enforcement of care and custody.”13
pIpA establishes specific rules for what is referred to as “sensitive informa-
tion,” which includes information on ideology, belief, admission/ exit to and from 
trade unions or political parties, political mindset, and health and sexual life.14 
yet there are some exceptions in the Act: The government is allowed to acquire 
genetic information or criminal records when necessary.15 pIpA also limits the 
collection and use of resident registration numbers unless it comes under excep-
tions specified by the Act. pIpA also requires the government to provide a means 
for Internet users to subscribe to its websites without submitting their resident 
registration numbers. In response to the ongoing digitalization of governmental 
functions, with the result that personal information is stored and managed in 
the interlinked systems of public agencies, placing at risk information privacy in 
the public sector, pIpA requires public institutions in specified circumstances to 
conduct privacy impact assessments.16
Whereas pIpA acts as a comprehensive and basic statute on personal informa-
tion protection, the Telecommunication Business Act (TBA) specially regulates 
telecommunication service providers. Basically, the Act states that telecommu-
nication service providers must obtain consent from the data subject before pro-
viding personal information to a third party, and the third party can use the 
information only in accordance with the purpose for which it was provided.17 
However, when submitting information to law enforcement authorities who pos-
sess a warrant issued by a court pursuant to the Criminal procedure Act, consent 
of the data subject is not necessary.18
Apart from pIpA and TBA, a number of other statutes, including the Credit 
Information Act, the Communication privacy Act, the Real name Finance Act, 
and the Act on Use and protection of DnA Identification Information (DnA 
Identification Act), provide for data seizure by warrant or other means.





17. Act on Communications network promotion and personal Information protection, art 
24- 2 [hereinafter Comm network Act].
18. Huh Soon- Chol, “Internet Search and the Right to Informational Self- Determination,” 
10:2 Korean Public LJ 157 (Korean Comparative public Law Association, 2009).
C o U n T R y  R e p o R T S292
29
In scholarly discourses in Korea, there is a controversy over whether electronic 
data is subject to seizure and search. According to the Criminal procedure Act, 
“the court may seize any articles which it believes may be used as evidence or lia-
ble to confiscation.” In addition, “A person, effects, dwellings … may be searched 
only when there are circumstances which warrant the belief that there are arti-
cles liable to seize therein.”19 It is argued that, under the express language of these 
provisions, only tangible articles are eligible to be seized or searched and therefore 
the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the seizure and search of intangible 
data. Although the seizure and subsequent search of hard discs, laptops, and other 
physical media containing data is one action, demanding the disclosure of data 
stored on such devices is quite different. This distinction raises a question as to 
the legitimacy of the search and seizure provisions of the Criminal procedure Act 
when applied to searches of stored data. Moreover, it is not clear under existing 
statutes whether the data subject must be notified of the execution of a warrant 
for data pertaining to that person. In the case of so- called transactional data, the 
Communication privacy Act requires the law enforcement authorities to notify 
the data subjects in writing within 30 days after obtaining records for the pur-
pose of investigation.20 However, the Criminal procedure Act imposes no such 
obligation when seizing and searching articles from a third party, so under that 
Act enforcement authorities are not required to give any notice when seizing and 
searching personal information held by a telecommunication service provider.
A warrant issued by a court is not the only means by which the government 
can obtain personal information. As will be explained below, there are other 
explicit provisions scattered in various statutes allowing the government to 
request personal information from the private sector without any warrant.
19. Criminal procedure Act, art 106, 109.
20.  CpA, above note 3, art 13- 3, 9- 2. The phrase used in the english version of the 
Communication privacy Act is not “transactional data” but rather “communication confir-
mation data,” which the Act defines as follow:
“The term “communication confirmation data” means the data on the records of tele-
communications falling under any one of the following items:
(a) The date of telecommunications by subscribers;
(b) The time that the telecommunications commence and end;
(c) The communications number of outgoing and incoming call, etc. and the  
subscriber’s number of the other party;
(d) The frequency of use;
(e) The computer communications or internet log- records relating to facts of using 
the telecommunications services by the users of computer communications or 
internet;
(f) The data on tracing a location of information communications apparatus  
connecting to the information communications networks; and
(g) The data on tracing a location of connectors capable of confirming the location 
of information communications apparatus to be used by the users of computer 
communications or internet for connecting with the information communications 
networks.
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B.  Law Enforcement Access, Regulatory Access,  
and/ or National Security Access
1.  Law Enforcement Access without Court Permission
Regarding public sector data, the government and public agencies may disclose 
personal information for the purpose of law enforcement without any court per-
mission under the pIpA.21 Regarding private- sector data, however, government 
access is only made possible by consent of the data subject, statutory provision, 
or court permission. There are some exceptions: first, the TBA provides a tel-
ecommunication service provider may comply with a request for provision of 
communications data from a court, a prosecutor, the head of an investigative 
authority, or the head of an intelligence agency, when necessary for a trial, a 
crime investigation, the execution of a sentence, or national security. The TBA 
specifically provides that telecommunication service providers “may” provide to 
law enforcement agencies communications data such as names of their users, res-
ident registration numbers of users, addresses of users, phone numbers of users, 
identification codes used to identify the rightful users of communications net-
works, and dates on which users commence or terminate their subscriptions.22
However, such governmental access without a judicial warrant was challenged 
in the lawsuit described at the beginning of this chapter, which questioned the 
legitimacy of an ISp’s providing the police with users’ personal information. 
The Seoul Central District Court held that the ISp was not responsible for any 
mental stress experienced by the data subject, because the TBA allows ISps to 
provide personal information for trials, crime investigation, or national security 
reasons.23 on appeal, however, the Seoul High Court found that the ISp has no 
obligation to disclose information upon the mere request of law enforcement 
authorities. Rather, the Seoul High Court held, an ISp is responsible for decid-
ing whether it should provide the requested personal data based upon a careful 
examination of specific factors such as the seriousness and urgency of the crime, 
the importance of the public interest, and the degree of infringement on the per-
sonal information rights of the data subjects. Accordingly, the High Court held 
the ISp in this case breached its responsibility and infringed the users’ rights of 
self- determination and to anonymous speech, and ordered the ISp to compen-
sate the users.24
2.  The Supreme Court Decision on Law Enforcement Access
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, raising issues as to the availability 
and scope of the government’s authority to access private- sector data and any 
responsibility of ISps when presented with government requests. At the end of 
21. pIpA, above note 3, art 18.
22. Telecommunication Business Act, art 83.
23. Seoul Central District Court Decision 2010 gahap 72873 (S Korea Jan. 13, 2011).
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the court hearing, which took several years, the Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded the decision of the Seoul High Court.25 Regarding the availability and 
scope of government access, the Supreme Court distinguished between mere 
“contact information” such as name, address, phone number, resident registra-
tion number, and user identification codes on the one hand and “telecommuni-
cation confirmation data” such as when and how long users communicated, with 
whom they communicated, and their location information on the other. The 
Supreme Court found that the Communication privacy Act clearly provides that 
the police and other investigative authorities need court permission to get access 
to telecommunications confirmation data held by the private sector and also to 
intercept “telecommunication contents.”26 It was held by the Supreme Court, 
however, that the TBA allowed ISps to voluntarily provide “contact informa-
tion” without court permission for the purpose of facilitating law enforcement. 
The constitutional issue relating to such government access to private- sector 
data without a court’s permission had already been addressed in 2012, when 
the Constitutional Court of Korea decided that the statutory provision of the 
TBA does not violate the fundamental right of privacy under the Constitution 
of Korea as long as it does not impose a mandatory obligation on ISps to provide 
contact information to law enforcement authorities.27
As the voluntary mechanism of governmental access to private- sector data 
was interpreted as being constitutional, the Supreme Court of Korea moved for-
ward to deny the responsibility of ISps: ISps are themselves not the police nor 
judicial institutes and, accordingly, ISps are not expected to bear any respon-
sibility for making case- by- case decisions about how to respond to requests for 
personal information by investigative authorities.28 Although ISps are not under 
a mandatory obligation under the TBA to provide contact information unless 
there is court permission, in reality they do not have any alternative but to pro-
vide the data in accordance with formal requests of law enforcement authori-
ties. In the case of abusive requests by law enforcement authorities, there may be 
infringement of personal information rights, but liability for that, the Supreme 
Court held, must not be borne by ISps but by the abusive authorities themselves.
As our national security is threatened not only by military attacks from 
north Korea but also by terrorist attacks from the Islamic State, the Act on Anti- 
Terrorism for the protection of Citizens and public Security (Anti- Terrorism Act)29 
was recently enacted. To have access to communication contents, entry/ depar-
ture information, and financial information, the national Intelligence Agency 
25. Supreme Court of Korea Decision 2012 da 105482 (S Korea, Mar. 10, 2016).
26. CpA, above note 3, art 13.
27. Constitutional Court of Korea Decision 2010 hun- ma 439 (S Korea, March 23, 2012).
28. Supreme Court of Korea Decision 2012 da 105482 (S Korea, March 10, 2016).
29. Act on Anti- Terrorism for the protection of Citizens and public Security (law no 14071, 
enacted on March 3, 2016).
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(nIA) of Korea will have to follow the procedure under the Communication 
privacy Act, the Immigration Control Act, and the Act on Reporting and Using 
Specified Financial Transaction Information. According to the Anti- Terrorism 
Act, however, the nIA will be able without a court warrant to ask ISps to provide 
contact information, location information, and other relevant personal informa-
tion regarding terrorist suspects.30 Following the Supreme Court decision, ISps 
are not responsible to data subjects for disclosure of their personal information 
unless the requested data clearly do not relate to terrorist suspects.
3.  Wire- Tapping and Other Communication- Restricting 
Measures
The Communication privacy Act allows “communication- restricting measures” 
for the investigation of crimes prescribed in the Criminal Act, the national 
Security Act, or the Military Secret protection Act, or for other national security 
purposes, subject to court permission.31 The term “communication- restricting 
measures” means “censoring any mail, wire- tapping any telecommunications, 
providing the communication confirmation data and recording or listening to 
conversations between others that are not made public.” These measures are per-
mitted only when there is a substantial reason to suspect that a crime is being 
planned or committed or has been committed and it is otherwise difficult to 
prevent the commission of the crime, to arrest the criminal, or to collect the 
evidence. The heads of certain intelligence and investigative authorities may 
also take these measures, when they expect the national security is at risk and 
the collection of intelligence is required to prevent such danger.32 When the 
communication- restricting measures are to be taken against a Korean national, 
permission must be obtained from a senior chief judge of the high court. With 
respect to communications of countries hostile to the Republic of Korea, foreign 
agents, or groups or persons suspected of engaging in antinational activities or in 
intelligence collection activities for a foreign power, approval must be obtained in 
30. Ibid., art 9.
31. CpA, above note 3, arts 5– 7.
32. CpA, above note 3, art 7. This Act further provides that heads of Intelligence can use such 
measures without court permission, when the following conditions are met:
 (1) It must be an urgent situation in which an act of conspiracy exists that threatens 
the national security or an imminent planning/ carrying out of any serious or 
organized crimes that may cause death or serious injury.
 (2) There must be a substantial reason to suspect that such conspiracy or crime is 
being planned or committed or has been committed.
 (3) There must be emergency grounds that make it impossible to go through normal 
procedures to obtain court permission.
However, the heads must apply to the court for ex post facto approval as soon as possible, and 
if they fail to obtain the approval within 36 hours from the commencement of the measure, 
the measure must be terminated immediately.
 
C o U n T R y  R e p o R T S296
296
writing from the president of the Republic of Korea. Communication- restricting 
measures undertaken for the investigation of crime shall not last more than two 
months and, for national security purposes, four months.
In the event of urgent situations involving an act of conspiracy that threatens 
the national security, or the planning or committing of any serious or organized 
crime that may cause death or serious injuries, the public prosecutor, police offi-
cer, or any of the heads of the intelligence and investigative agencies may take a 
communication- restricting measure without permission from the court,33 pro-
vided an application for permission is filed with the court immediately thereafter. 
If the court does not issue permission within 36 hours from the commencement 
of the measure, the prosecutor, police officer, or agency head must halt the exe-
cution of the measure.
As wiretapping and other communication- restricting measures involve dis-
closure of communication contents, the threat to privacy becomes serious and 
could have an enormous chilling effect on freedom of expression if abused by 
the government. When the Korea national Intelligence Agency had access to 
certain data packets by wiretapping the Internet under the permission of the 
Seoul Central District Court, the alleged suspect brought a constitutional suit 
arguing that the statutory provision allowing for data packet wiretapping was in 
violation of the fundamental right of privacy under the Constitution. Although 
the constitutional suit was dismissed because the alleged suspect died,34 the case 
highlighted the serious tension between privacy and national security and the 
possibility of abuse by the government.
4.  Regulatory Access
The government may also obtain access to privately held information for reg-
ulatory or administrative purposes. When the government collects personal 
information from the private sector, it is not always clear whether the purpose 
is for law enforcement or administrative management. one example is the per-
sonal information concerning copyright infringers submitted to the Minister 
of Culture, Sports and Tourism. In the name of enhancing copyright protec-
tion, the Copyright Act of Korea gave the minister the authority to demand 
that Internet Service providers (ISps) delete or stop transmitting illegal repro-
ductions or to suspend the infringer’s account for online service for a limited 
period.35 Furthermore, upon the request of a copyright holder seeking data for 
lawsuits, the minister may order an ISp to provide the list of people who are sus-
pected of having copies of or transmitting illegal reproductions.36 Although such 
governmental seizure of personal information without any control by the court 
33. CpA, above note 3, art 8.
34. Constitutional Court of Korea Decision 2011 hun- ma 165 (S Korea, February 25, 2016).
35. Copyright Act of 1957, art 133- 2.
36. Ibid., art 103- 3.
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may promote copyright protection, it has been criticized for unduly infringing 
the privacy of Internet users.37
5.  Transparency Report
Given the difficulty of achieving a good balance between the public interest 
and privacy, and also given the growing concern among Internet users about 
their personal information, ISps in Korea such as naver and Kakao have begun 
publishing transparency reports.38 These transparency reports have been made 
voluntarily. There is no statutory provision requiring government agencies or 
companies to issue transparency reports. Unlike ISps, telecommunication com-
panies such as KT, SK Telecom, and LG U+ have not published transparency 
reports yet. It was reported in the New York Times that those three companies 
had provided law enforcement agencies with subscriber information such as 
names, addresses, resident registration numbers and other customer informa-
tion pertaining to more than 6 million phone numbers in the first half of 2014 
alone.39 They provided the information whenever a request was made, without 
demanding a warrant or informing affected customers.
After the decision of the Seoul High Court in 2012 described above, ISps such 
as naver and Kakao had stopped providing any contact information of their 
users to government authorities without court warrants or court orders. In 2014, 
however, there was a news report that government authorities were scrutiniz-
ing the data of users of Kakao’s messaging app, Kakao Talk. Because court war-
rants or orders should be strictly limited to criminal investigations or national 
security, overbroad court warrants or orders might have raised serious privacy 
concerns among Kakao users. Due to the news report, an estimated 610,000 
South Korean smartphone users visited a German competitor Telegram on the 
same day, a fortyfold increase over the previous day.40 South Korean users posted 
reviews on Telegram saying they left Kakao to seek “a Cyber- asylum.” As in the 
FBI- Apple encryption dispute,41 the government and ISps in Korea are facing the 
37.  Sang Jo Jong, “Development and Regulation of Internet Industry,” Justice (Issue 
115, September 2011) 766– 87; Sang Jo Jong, “Telecommunication and Intellectual 
property:  Interaction of Technology, Market and Law,” 10:2 Journal of Korean Law (Seoul 
national University Law Research Institute, october 2011) 277– 301.
38. Transparency Reporting Index, Access now http:// www.accessnow.org/ pages/ 
transparency- reporting- index.
39. Se- Woong Koo, “South Korea’s Invasion of privacy,” The New York Times (April 2, 2015), 
http:// www.nytimes.com/ 2015/ 04/ 03/ opinion/ south- koreas- invasion- of- privacy.html?_ r=0.
40. “Kakaotalk, Telegram, and the South Korean Government,” Omona They Didn’t! (october 
10, 2014), http:// omonatheydidnt.livejournal.com/ 14318239.html.
41. “Apple vs the FBI: A Complete Timeline of the War over Tech encryption,” Digital Trends 
(April 3, 2016), http:// www.digitaltrends.com/ mobile/ apple- encryption- court- order- news/ .
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most difficult task of balancing the conflicting interests of national security and 
personal information.
C.  Reporting Financial Data and/ or Passenger Records
Generally, there are a number of circumstances in which that the govern-
ment can obtain private- sector data without a warrant. For example, the Korea 
Communications Commission can demand data from ISps when a breach of the 
Communications network Act occurs or becomes known to the Commission, or 
when necessary to protect Internet users.42 The Board of Audit and Inspection, 
which is empowered to audit the conduct of officials of the national and local 
governments, can order third parties including ISps to submit information per-
taining to an inspection.43
Governmental access to private- sector financial data occurs in two ways: one 
is when the government requests financial data from credit information compa-
nies, and the other is when the government collects the financial data itself in the 
course of administering a government program.
The first method of government access has a statutory basis. According to 
the Credit Information Act, when the head of a public institution requests in 
writing credit information for a purpose allowed by related Acts and subordi-
nate statutes, the credit information company shall provide such information.44 
Although in principle financial information on loans and guarantees may be 
disclosed only with the prior consent of the data subject, the Act lists a number of 
exceptions: when the information is sought in accordance with a court order or 
a warrant, or in an emergency where a person’s life is endangered. Also, a credit 
information company must submit information to the government without 
obtaining any prior consent when the information is sought under the statutes 
relating to taxation.45 The government also might obtain some financial infor-
mation from credit information companies in connection with the supervision 
of such companies by the Financial Services Commission. The Commission is 
authorized to inspect the business and financial standing of credit information 
companies and demand related information or summon related personnel.46
42.  Comm network Act, above note 17, art 64. Although the Korea Communications 
Commission can demand personal information under this authority, there is a certain limit 
to the Commission’s discretion. Moreover, ISps have a responsibility to protect personal 
information by not providing data in excess of such limit. In this sense, although pIpA is not 
directly applied to the Commission’s authority, the basic concepts of pIpA provide criteria 
that are useful in defining the limits of the Commission’s discretion and the responsibility of 
ISps, respectively.
43. Board of Audit and Inspection Act, art 27.




Systematic Government Access to private-Sector Data in the Republic of Korea 299
29
The government also has access to information from financial institutions 
in connection with its anti- money laundering program.47 More specifically, 
financial institutions are required to report to the Commissioner of the Korea 
Financial Intelligence Unit any transaction exceeding US $5,000 (or the equiva-
lent in foreign currency) or 10 million Korean won when the financial institution 
has reasonable grounds to suspect that the transaction is in relation to money 
laundering, terrorist activities, or other crime. Financial institutions also must 
report payments or receipts of cash exceeding 20 million Korean won, subject to 
some exceptions, within 30 days.
Some financial information is gathered by the government in the course of 
the government’s own credit activities. For instance, the Korea Credit Guarantee 
Fund (KCGF) and Korea Technology Finance Corporation (KTFC) are estab-
lished by the government and collect financial information from customers as 
they carry out their activities. They can request resident registration numbers 
from the Minister of Administration and Security or personally identifiable 
information from financial institutions with the consent of the data subject.48
When collecting and investigating credit information, credit information 
companies need to specify the purpose of such collection and investigation and 
they may use only reasonable and fair measures to the extent required to serve 
the specified purpose.49 KCGF and KTFC bear the same liability and are sub-
ject to the same limits as ordinary credit information companies with regard 
to collection and investigation of credit information. Also, credit information 
companies are not allowed to collect or investigate information that is related to 
certain sensitive matters, including national security, trade secrets, R&D results, 
and political beliefs.50
passenger records are also submitted to the government for administrative 
use. For example, the Director of Customs may request shipping or airline com-
panies to allow inspection of passenger reservation data on the network of the 
company or to submit such data to the government for the purpose of detecting 
counterfeit goods, narcotics, firearms and explosives, and other illegal goods.51 
Upon request, the companies must provide nationality, name, date of birth, pass-
port number, reservation number, address, telephone number, itinerary, and 
travel agency.
Immigration officers also have access to passenger records in certain circum-
stances. For example, immigration officers may request passenger records from 
transportation and shipping companies for the purpose of identifying any pas-
senger with an invalid passport or false identity guarantee or invitation, or who is 
47. Act on Report and Use of Specific Financial Transaction Information, art 4, 4- 2.
48. Credit Info Act, above note 44, arts 24, 34.
49. Ibid., art 15.
50. Ibid., art 16.
51. Customs Act, art 137- 2.
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carrying firearms or explosives or is otherwise harmful to the general public (e.g., 
drug addicts).52 The specific items of information that immigration officers may 
obtain include are nationality, name, date of birth, passport number, reservation 
number, address, telephone number, itinerary of journey, and travel agency.
The government may also order individuals, entities, and private- sector 
organizations, as well as other public agencies, to submit data that the govern-
ment determines are necessary for statistical purposes.53
D.  Voluntary Broad Access to Data
As far as personal information is concerned, pIpA and a number of other rele-
vant statutes regulate government access. These statutes prescribe quite clearly 
the scope of government access and thus provide statutory protection for per-
sonal information. on the other hand, in the case of information that is not “per-
sonal information” as defined in these statutes or any information that is beyond 
the scope of these statutes, informal and voluntary disclosure by an entity in 
the private sector to the government can readily occur without any legal proc-
ess. As explained above, personal information includes information that when 
combined with other information makes it possible to identify an individual. It is 
extremely difficult, however, to make clear distinctions between information that 
could, in combination with other information, be used to identify an individual 
and information that could never be used in that way, for it would depend on how 
the data are structured or treated technically.54 For example, non- content com-
munication data, such as searched keywords, online behavior records, purchase 
records, or terminal location records that do not reveal identifiable information 
by themselves are likely to be regarded as non- personal information, which could 
be disclosed to the government without any legal responsibility. Therefore, when 
investigatory authorities request such non- personal information, the third- party 
entity would lack any statutory grounds for rejecting the request.55
To evade possible legal liability, private- sector telecommunication providers 
and Internet service providers tend to obtain comprehensive prior consent from 
their subscribers. For example, Apple’s privacy policy, which is made a part of 
the Terms of Use for Apple’s website, states as follows:
It may be necessary— by law, legal process, litigation, and/ or requests from 
public and governmental authorities within or outside your country of 
52. Immigration Control Act, art 73- 2.
53. Statistics Act, art 25.
54. Korea Communications Commission, Personal Information Protection Guideline for ISP 
(December 2009) 8– 10.
55. na Jon youn for Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA), Use and Protection of Personal 
Information in Ubiquitous Computing Environment (2009) 44– 45 [hereinafter youn, ‘Use’].
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residence— for Apple to disclose your personal information. We may also dis-
close information about you if we determine that for purposes of national 
security, law enforcement, or other issues of public importance, disclosure is 
necessary or appropriate.56
Whether a court would nullify such unlimited and unfair prior consent in favor of 
the users is not yet clear. There are opinions that such broad prior consent should 
be accepted at least in practice to protect the service providers, considering the fact 
that the government exercises substantive power over private- sector entities.57
E.  The Role of the Courts
In summary, pIpA, the Communications network Act, the Communication 
privacy Act, the Credit Information Act, the DnA Identification Act, and other 
statutes addressing personal information require the consent of the data subjects 
for disclosure of personal information held by a third party. As a general rule, the 
provision of data without consent is allowed only when a court grants a warrant 
in connection with a criminal investigation or for similar reasons. Therefore, the 
court is in the position to judge whether the data in question is really necessary 
and to determine if the investigation is beyond the legitimate scope of the rele-
vant authorities.
In many cases, however, the statues allow the government to access data with-
out a court warrant in the name of law enforcement or administrative functions. 
For example, the Credit Information Act, the Customs Act, the Immigration 
Control Act, and the Copyright Act authorize government access to private- 
sector information for efficient execution of those statutes. In some cases, for 
example with regards to credit information and traveler records, disclosure with-
out a warrant is permitted in emergency situations. In the case of information 
related to copyright infringement, which ISps must submit to the government 
without judicial review or a court warrant, commentators have criticized the 
relevant statute as imbalanced because it offers too much protection to copyright 
holder while neglecting to protect the privacy of those suspected of infringement.
Where there are statutory grounds for government access without a warrant, 
the courts do have a role in that they must determine ex post whether the gov-
ernmental access was within the scope of the statute and satisfied all the relevant 
substantive and procedural requirements. A good example is the court’s review 
of the case involving the poster of a video clip who sued the ISp for deleting his 
posting based solely on the copyright holder’s infringement claim.58 However, 
as explained above, in the recent Supreme Court case involving the government 
56. privacy policy, Apple Korea http:// www.apple.com/ kr/ privacy/ .
57.  Kim Ki Chang for national Assembly Research Service (nARS), Cloud Service and 
Personal Information Protection (policy Research Report, December 2011).
58. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 88 USpQ 2d 1629 (n.D. Cal. 2008); 
Seoul High Court 2010 na 35260 (S Korea, october 13, 2010).
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minister and the olympic skater, where the ISp, without a court order, handed 
over personal information of a suspect accused of libel, it was found extremely 
difficult to hold an ISp liable for disclosing information to the government in the 
absence of a clear responsibility on the ISp to examine and balance the conflict-
ing interests of the data subject and law enforcement.59
In general, pIpA and other statutes related to personal information specify the 
conditions and procedures for governmental access to data held by the private 
sector. private information that does not fall into the exact definition of personal 
information has little chance of being protected by laws or judicial oversight. 
Thus, it is important that the private sector itself endeavors to protect such per-
sonally non- identifiable information through a privacy policy or other voluntary 
mechanisms. equally, the government needs to seek to expand the protection of 
the laws by legislating more specific and transparent procedures for government 
access.60
F.  Standards for Use, Access, Retention, and/ or Destruction
pIpA, the principle statute for personal information protection, explicitly limits 
the use of information by data processors (including public agencies) to the initial 
purpose of collection.61 In addition, the Act requires the immediate deletion of 
information after the specified retention period prescribed or if the information 
is no longer needed.62 Such removal or deletion of data must be accomplished in 
a way that does not allow it to be recovered or restored.
Most legislation related to personal information contains provisions on usage 
and retention similar to those in pIpA. For example, the Communications 
network Act,63 the Credit Information Act,64 the Communication privacy Act,65 
the DnA Identification Act,66 the Customs Act,67 and the Immigration Control 
Act68 all have articles addressing purpose specification, use limitation, and data 
retention.
59. Supreme Court of Korea Decision 2012 da 105482 (S Korea, March 10, 2016).
60. Sang Jo Jong for Korea Communications Commission, Legal Review on Protection and Use 
of Personally Non- identifiable Information (2010) 106– 15.
61. pIpA, above note 3, art 15.
62. Ibid., art 21.
63. Comm network Act, above note 17, arts 24, 29, 64, 64- 2.
64. Credit Info Act, above note 44, arts 15, 19.
65. CpA, above note 3, arts 12, 13.
66. Act on Use and protection of DnA Identification Information, arts 12, 13, 15.
67. Customs Act, art 137- 2; Customs Act, presidential decree, art 158- 2.
68. Immigration Control Act, arts 12- 2, 38, 73- 2.
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G.  Cross- Border and Multi- jurisdictional Issues
pIpA states that when information processors (including public agencies) provide 
personal information to a third party overseas, they shall inform the data sub-
jects of the purpose for which the information will be disclosed and obtain their 
consent.69 However, consent is not required with respect to personal information 
handled by the government according to the Statistics Act or received for analy-
sis in relation to national security.
A recently proposed statute on Internet cloud services, entitled the “Act on 
promotion of Cloud Computing and User protection (draft),” includes a provi-
sion stating that when a user’s data will be stored overseas, the cloud computing 
service provider shall disclose the name, privacy policy, and legal procedures of 
that country where the data will be located.70 Also, the provider shall take neces-
sary measures to safeguard the data stored overseas.
V.  CURRENT LEGISLATIVE ISSUES AND CONCLUSION
To summarize, there are quite a number of statutes regarding personal informa-
tion protection in Korea, and some of them provide relatively detailed regulatory 
measures. Some commentators criticize these laws as too burdensome for data 
controllers while offering too little protection of personal information.71 on the 
other hand, existing legislation fails to address many issues regarding personal 
information protection.72 These omissions include information related to brows-
ing history, online behavior, online purchase records, and location information 
generated by devices such as cell phones, all of which are easily combined with 
other types of information to produce identifiable information on specific indi-
viduals. Accordingly, there are calls for regulations or guidelines defining the 
limit of governmental access to such information.73
69. pIpA, above note 3, art 17.
70.  Act on promotion of Clouding Computing and User protection (draft) art 27 (Korea 
Communication Commission public notice 2012- 79).
71.  Sang- Jo Jong, “Developments in Advertising Technologies and Their Challenge to 
Information privacy,” Justice (Issue 106, September 2008) 601– 23; Sang- Jo Jong and young- 
Joon Kwon, “The protection of personal Information and Its Civil Remedies,” BupJo (Vol 58:3, 
March 2009) 5– 73.
72. Korea Communications Commission, Personal Information Protection Guideline for ISP 
(December 2009) 8– 10.
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Organizational Accountability, Government 
Use of Private- Sector Data, National Security, 
and Individual Privacy
J A M E S  X .  D E M P S E Y,  F R E D  H .  C AT E ,  
A N D  M A R T I N  A B R A M S *
I.  ABSTR ACT
Companies that collect personal data in the course of their business must be 
accountable for the safe and fair management of that data. The accountability 
of companies as data stewards extends both to their own processing of data and 
to processing by their vendors and partners to whom data is disclosed, thus 
prompting companies to use contract and other means to ensure that entities 
to whom they disclose data will likewise be responsible, in a chain of accounta-
bility that can extend through multiple links. This accountability principle has 
now been widely incorporated into national and international data protection 
standards. However, when a government entity demands that a company dis-
close data in its possession or control, the chain of accountability can be broken 
if government itself, shielded by secrecy, is not accountable. This chapter exam-
ines what companies can do to remain accountable in the face of government 
disclosure demands. In addition, it concludes that the principles and practices of 
accountability that have been developed around corporate handling of personal 
information collected in commercial contexts are directly applicable to data gov-
ernance within police and intelligence agencies and are especially relevant when 
those agencies demand disclosure of data held by the private sector.
* Jennifer Stoddart, Privacy Commissioner of Canada from 2003 to 2013, participated in the 
systematic access project and chaired meetings in Montreal and London that focused on the 
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II.  THE TENSION BETWEEN CORPOR ATE ACCOUNTABILITY 
AND GOVERNMENT ACCESS
Under the now well- accepted principle of information accountability, companies 
that collect personal data in the course of their business must be accountable for 
the safe and fair management of that data. The accountability of companies as 
data stewards extends both to their own processing of data and to processing by 
their vendors and partners to whom data is disclosed. a commitment to the con-
cept of accountability leads companies both to carefully structure their own data 
collection, use, and retention practices and to use contract and other means to 
ensure that the entities to which they disclose data will likewise be responsible, 
in a chain of accountability that can extend through multiple links.
What happens, however, to accountability when a government entity demands 
that a company disclose data in its possession or control? How can a company fol-
low through on its accountability commitments when the fact of the government’s 
demands and the government’s uses of data are cloaked in secrecy? Before  the 
Snowden leaks and other related disclosures, there was a quiet concern among 
many private- sector entities that government demands were growing.1 after the 
Snowden leaks, it became apparent that many countries around the world were 
demanding disclosure of large quantities of data directly from companies or were 
seizing it as it moved over communications links between data centers.2
In 2015, in Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, the issue came to a head. 
For years, the eU- US Safe Harbor agreement had allowed companies to trans-
fer data to the United States if they promised to adhere to privacy standards at 
least equivalent to those that would have applied to the data had it remained in 
europe. However, the data stored in the United States became subject to US gov-
ernment disclosure demands. In Schrems, the Court of Justice of the european 
Union declared the Safe Harbor invalid because it had been adopted without 
sufficient findings about the rules limiting those US government demands or the 
availability of any redress for abuse. In essence, the Court found, the accounta-
bility chain was broken: companies transferring data to the United States were 
required to comply with government demands with no assurance that such 
demands were appropriately limited in purpose and scope.
1. We recognize that there is a difference between an enforceable or compulsory “demand” 
and a “request” that could, under applicable law, be complied with on a permissive or volun-
tary basis. This chapter concerns both mandatory and permissive disclosures, and we use the 
words “demand” and “request” interchangeably.
2.  For example, a study for the european Parliament found that “[p] ractices of so- called 
‘upstreaming’ (tapping directly into the communications infrastructure as a means to inter-
cept data) characterize the surveillance programmes” of four out of five of the eU Member 
States selected for the study. “national Programmes for Mass Surveillance of Personal data in 
eU Member States and Their Compatibility with eU Law,” a study for the directorate General 
for Internal Policies (2013), http:// info.publicintelligence.net/ eU- MassSurveillance.pdf.
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While invalidating the Safe Harbor, the Schrems decision left key questions 
unanswered: What are the minimum standards for government demands? What 
is the responsibility of the accountable corporation when data is requested by 
government entities? But as Schrems confirmed the threat that government 
access poses to the accountability framework, its disruption of trans- atlantic 
data flows created an urgent need for solutions. and it appears that the accounta-
bility framework itself offers part of that solution: elements of the accountability 
framework can be extended to governmental demands for and uses of data. In 
approving the Privacy Shield as a suitable improvement over the Safe Harbor, the 
eU gave some initial indication of what types of internal and external oversight 
are sufficient to extend the chain of accountability to the government agency 
demanding access to data held by the private sector. It also indicated how the 
transparency element of accountability could be satisfied when both the fact of 
disclosure and the government’s uses of the data once obtained must be kept 
secret.
accountability in the face of government demands implicates the interests of 
at least four sets of stakeholders: the companies that collect and process data in 
the course of providing the vast range of services that characterize the informa-
tion society; the data protection regulators that enforce privacy laws; the law 
enforcement and national security agencies that require information about indi-
viduals and that rely on the cooperation of the private sector to carry out their 
vital responsibilities; and consumers, represented by policymakers, regulators, 
and civil society organizations.
accountability is inextricably linked to, but nevertheless distinct from, the 
substantive criteria for data processing. In Schrems, the CJeU was concerned 
both with the criteria limiting government access and use and with the mecha-
nisms by which “persons whose personal data is concerned have sufficient guar-
antees enabling their data to be sufficiently protected against the risk of abuse.” 
other chapters in this volume discuss the substantive criteria for access, centered 
on the principles of necessity and proportionality. These include rules as to per-
missible purposes of data collection and other processing, the factual threshold 
that must be met to initiate such actions, the scope and duration of surveillance, 
and retention periods. accountability focuses on the question of how, once those 
rules are established, an entity can ensure that they are followed. In the context 
of governmental access, accountability turns on the question of how a corpora-
tion can assure itself that a government entity demanding data is accountable for 
the further processing of that data.
III.  THE INFOR MATION ACCOUNTABILITY FR AMEWORK
The effort to develop accountability principles for data governance began in 2009 
as a dialogue among privacy enforcement agencies, governments, civil society, 
and business, co- facilitated by the office of the Privacy Commissioner of Ireland 
and the Centre for Information Policy Leadership at Hunton & Williams LLP. 
The project published “data Protection accountability: The essential elements” 
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in october 2009, describing five essential elements that are the structural build-
ing blocks for accountability- based privacy governance.3 The five elements are:
1. organizational commitment to accountability and adoption of internal 
policies consistent with external criteria.
2. Mechanisms to put privacy policies into effect, including tools, training, 
and education.
3. Systems for internal ongoing oversight and assurance reviews and 
external verification.
4. transparency and mechanisms for individual participation.
5. Means for remediation and external enforcement.
These essential elements articulate the conditions that must exist in order for an 
organization to establish, demonstrate, and test its accountability with respect to 
the personal data that it processes. one has to look at all five essential elements 
of accountability to determine whether an organization is fully accountable. For 
private- sector organizations to be fully accountable, they must have mechanisms 
to assure the obligations that are attached to data (no matter the application) 
travel with the data. This requires different mechanisms in different situations. 
Sometimes contracts are enough. In other situations, there needs to be assurance 
reviews or audits. no matter the due diligence a company might do, a company 
cannot be fully accountable unless the entities it provides data to are accountable 
as well.
The principle of accountability was featured prominently in the Madrid 
resolution, adopted by the International Conference of data Protection and 
Privacy Commissioners in october 2009. another important milestone was 
reached in July 2010 when the article 29 Working Party issued an opinion on 
the principle of accountability, proposing a requirement that data controllers put 
in place appropriate and effective measures to ensure that privacy rules are com-
plied with and to demonstrate compliance to supervisory authorities. In 2012, the 
Federal Privacy Commissioner of Canada and the Information Commissioners 
of alberta and British Columbia released a document articulating what data 
protection authorities would expect of organizations under an accountabil-
ity approach.4 In 2013, when the organisation for economic Co- operation and 
3. http:// tiaf01.ipower.com/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2013/ 09/ the- essential- elements- of- 
accountability.pdf. The elements of accountability have been fleshed out in a series of 
guides and tools. See http:// www.huntonfiles.com/ files/ webupload/ CIPL_ accountability_ 
Phase_ II_ Paris_ Project.PdF and http:// www.informationpolicycentre.com/ files/ Uploads/ 
documents/ Centre/ accountability_ Chart_ Phase_ Iv.pdf. additional materials on account-
ability are complied at: http:// www.informationpolicycentre.com/ resources/ .
4. office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (oPC) and offices of the Information and 
Privacy Commissioners (oIPCs) of alberta and British Columbia, Getting Accountability 
Right with a Privacy Management Program (2012), https:// www.priv.gc.ca/ information/ guide/ 
2012/ gl_ acc_ 201204_ e.asp.
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development revised its highly influential privacy framework, it noted that “the 
principle of accountability [has] received renewed attention as a means to pro-
mote and define organisational responsibility for privacy protection.” Building 
on this experience, the new Part Three of the oeCd Guidelines (“Implementing 
accountability”) introduced the concept of a privacy management program 
and articulated its essential elements.5 The asia- Pacific economic Cooperation 
forum’s Cross- Border Privacy rules adopted an accountability- based code of 
conduct.
Since then, the concept has increasingly come to be incorporated in national 
data protection systems. In January 2015, for example, the French data protection 
authority (CnIL) issued a data governance standard that specified 25 require-
ments for an accountable organization, starting with the existence of both inter-
nal and outward- facing privacy policies defining the various permitted uses of 
data within the company.6 ten elements of the French standard focus specifically 
on the appointment and role of a chief privacy officer inside a company, whereas 
others address the need for a compliance assessment process and the establish-
ment of procedures by which data subjects can exercise their rights. In 2015, the 
Colombian data Protection authority issued its own accountability guidelines, 
as did Hong Kong and australia.
With the 2016 adoption of the european Union’s new General data Protection 
regulation, accountability has reached its fullest implementation in law. article 
5 of the GdPr expressly states that “the controller shall be responsible for, and 
be able to demonstrate compliance with,” the core principles relating to the proc-
essing of personal information (an obligation that the regulation expressly refers 
to as “accountability”). article 24 further specifies the controller’s responsibility:
taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as 
well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms 
of natural persons, the controller shall implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures to ensure and to be able to demonstrate that process-
ing is performed in accordance with this regulation. Those measures shall be 
reviewed and updated where necessary.
essentially identical language appears in the equally important but often over-
looked directive on personal data processing in the police and judicial area, also 
adopted in 2016, thereby expressly extending the accountability principle to law 
enforcement agencies.7
5.  The OECD Privacy Framework (2013), http:// www.oecd.org/ sti/ ieconomy/ oecd_ privacy_ 
framework.pdf.
6.  CnIL, Privacy Seals on Privacy Governance Procedures (2014), https:// www.cnil.fr/ sites/ 
default/ files/ typo/ document/ CnIL_ Privacy_ Seal- Governance- en.pdf.
7. Directive (EU) 2016/ 680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 Apr. 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent 
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as the european data Protection Supervisor has noted, although accounta-
bility is not a new concept, “[w] ith the GPdr, however, comes a quantum shift 
in emphasis: controllers are responsible.” accountability, the edPS emphasizes, 
“goes beyond compliance with the rules— it implies culture change.”8
IV.  RECONCILING ACCOUNTABILITY  
AND GOVERNMENT ACCESS
This brings us, then, to our challenge:  if a national security agency obtaining 
data from a private- sector company is itself not accountable, the company pro-
viding the data has a gap in its accountability framework, even if the company 
provides the data under compulsion. What steps can be taken to fill this gap by 
companies, regulators, and agencies demanding data from the private sector?
The issue of accountability and government access to private- sector data has 
at least four elements:
• How should accountable companies review and limit requests for 
disclosure?
• How might those requests be parsed beyond what is legal to what is 
appropriate?
• How might accountable companies be transparent about both requests 
for data and how they are parsed?
• How might the concept of accountability extend to the governmental 
entities that are the recipients of the data?
The first three of these questions have been explored by individual companies 
and on a multi- stakeholder basis by the Global network Initiative (GnI) and 
authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of crim-
inal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, 
article 19, http:// eur- lex.europa.eu/ legal- content/ en/ tXt/ PdF/ ?uri=CeLeX:32016L0680&
from=en.
8.  edPS, “edPS launches accountability Initiative” (2016), https:// secure.edps.europa.eu/ 
edPSWeB/ webdav/ site/ mySite/ shared/ documents/ Supervision/ accountability/ 16- 06- 07_ 
accountability_ factsheet_ en.pdf. The edPS uses the following formulation of accountability:
accountability in personal data processing involves:
 1. transparent internal data protection and privacy policies, approved and endorsed by 
the highest level of the organisation’s management;
 2. Informing and training all people in the organisation on how to implement the policies;
 3. responsibility at the highest level for monitoring this implementation, assessing and 
demonstrating to external stakeholders and supervisory authorities the quality of the 
implementation;
 4. Procedures for redressing poor compliance and data breaches.
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others.9 The fourth question— how to extend the principles of accountability to 
the practices of government itself— is receiving increasing attention as some gov-
ernments bring their surveillance practices into the light and strengthen their 
oversight mechanisms. The Privacy Shield agreement between the United States 
and the eU provided some answers to the fourth question, although it remains 
to be seen whether the agreement survives the inevitable challenges it will face.
V.  WHAT CAN COMPANIES DO TO REMAIN ACCOUNTABLE 
IN THE FACE OF GOVERNMENT DEMANDS?
Major companies have addressed some aspects of this challenge, committing to 
review requests from government agencies, including national security agencies, 
and challenge overbroad ones. Under the GnI implementation guidelines, it is not 
sufficient for companies merely to say, “We only comply with lawful demands.”10 
The GnI implementation guidelines specify that companies should have in place 
procedures to carefully assess not only whether a government demand is law-
ful but also whether it is overbroad or inconsistent with international human 
rights standards. The guidelines specifiy that, when required to provide personal 
information to governmental authorities, participating companies will:
• narrowly interpret and implement government demands that 
compromise privacy.
• Seek clarification or modification from authorized officials when 
government demands appear overbroad, unlawful, not required by 
applicable law or inconsistent with international human rights laws and 
standards on privacy.
• request clear communications, preferably in writing, that explain the 
legal basis for government demands for personal information, including 
the name of the requesting government entity and the name, title and 
signature of the authorized official.
• require that governments follow established domestic legal processes 
when they are seeking access to personal information.
• adopt policies and procedures to address how the company will 
respond when government demands do not include a written directive 
or fail to adhere to established legal procedure. These policies and 
9. The Global network Initiative is a multi- stakeholder collaboration of companies, human 
rights advocates, investors, and others, working to help Internet companies meet their human 
rights obligations with respect to privacy and free expression when responding to govern-
ment demands to disclose customer information or take down or block content. https:// www.
globalnetworkinitiative.org/ .
10.  Global network Initiative, Implementation Guidelines for the Principles on Freedom of 
Expression and Privacy, http:// globalnetworkinitiative.org/ implementationguidelines/ index.
php (last visited on april 27, 2017).
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procedures shall include a consideration of when to challenge such 
government demands.
• narrowly interpret the governmental authority’s jurisdiction to access 
personal information, such as limiting compliance to users within that 
country.
• Challenge the government in domestic courts or seek the assistance 
of relevant authorities, international human rights bodies or non- 
governmental organizations when faced with a government demand that 
appears inconsistent with domestic law or procedures or international 
human rights laws and standards on privacy.11
Some companies have sought to increase transparency around government 
requests as another key aspect of accountability. transparency in this context con-
cerns both legal authorities and the scope of the government’s exercise of those 
authorities: What types of information are being disclosed to government agen-
cies, and under what legal authorities and for what purposes; and how much data, 
affecting how many customers, is disclosed? Companies are largely at the mercy of 
national laws and government policy in terms of what they can disclose, but some 
have pushed to the full extent of those boundaries. even before the Snowden leaks, 
companies in the United States, starting first with Google, began issuing transpar-
ency reports in which they publish statistical information about the number of gov-
ernment disclosure demands they receive and/ or the number of accounts affected. 
Since 2013, this practice has expanded in the United States. The USa FreedoM 
act, adopted by Congress in 2015, clarified and expanded the ability of compa-
nies to disclose information about the number of government demands they had 
received and the number of customer accounts that were specifically targeted by 
those demands.12 Still, US companies remain constrained by some government- 
imposed limits.
outside the United States, there has also been movement toward corporate 
transparency. a  2015 report found that, for the first time a small handful 
of Canadian carriers had begun issuing their own transparency reports.13 
There have also been some positive changes, especially in europe. a  major 
11. Ibid., pp. 8– 10.
12.  The law does not permit companies to disclose the number of customers affected by 
demands, so if a company receives one request affecting millions of customers, it cannot use 
the numbers to indicate that. other parts of the USa FreedoM act prohibited the issuance 
of bulk demands.
13.  andrew Clement & Jonathan a.  obar, Keeping Internet Users in the Know or in the 
Dark: A Report on the Data Privacy Transparency of Canadian Internet Carriers (March 12, 
2015) at p. 5, https:// ixmaps.ca/ docs/ dataPrivacytransparencyofCanadianCarriers- 2014.pdf. 
The report went on to state, “While the details in these reports are typically scanty, and not 
up to the standards being established by large US service providers, this is a good sign that 
Canadian carriers are beginning to respond to public pressure for greater transparency.” Ibid.
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development occurred in 2014, when vodafone issued a transparency report 
on law enforcement demands it faced in 29 countries.14
other european- based companies followed suit, including orange, deutsche 
telekom, and teliasonera, as did the australian telstra. These reports are lim-
ited to law enforcement requests. vodafone’s reports are by far the most detailed 
outside the United States. as deniz duru aydin of access now noted in July 
2015, “Whole continents, such as Latin america and asia, remain dark, as nei-
ther telecoms nor governments reveal their handover of user data.”
a third component of corporate accountability with respect to government 
access concerns whether the company maintains control over its own network. 
vodafone’s 2014 report contained an extraordinary acknowledgment that in 
some countries authorities had unmediated access to the company’s communi-
cations network:
However, in a small number of countries the law dictates that specific agen-
cies and authorities must have direct access to an operator’s network, bypass-
ing any form of operational control over lawful interception on the part of the 
operator. In those countries, vodafone will not receive any form of demand 
for lawful interception access as the relevant agencies and authorities already 
have permanent access to customer communications via their own direct link.
vodafone made it clear that it was opposed to these requirements of direct access 
and that it preferred instead to follow the lawful interception technical standards 
set down by the european telecommunications Standards Institute (etSI), 
which define the separation required between a government monitoring center 
and the operator’s network. as vodafone explained:
The etSI standards are globally applicable across fixed- line, mobile, broad-
cast and internet technologies, and include a formal handover interface to 
ensure that agencies and authorities do not have direct or uncontrolled access 
to the operators’ networks as a whole. We continuously encourage agencies 
and authorities in our countries of operation to allow operators to conform 
to etSI technical standards when mandating the implementation of lawful 
interception functionality within operators’ networks.
VI.  WHAT CAN GOVERNMENTS DO  
TO RESPECT ACCOUNTABILITY?
although the GnI principles encourage companies to challenge government 
demands that appear inconsistent with domestic law or procedures or inter-
national human rights laws and standards on privacy, companies are limited 
14. vodafone, Law Enforcement Disclosure Report (last visited april 27, 2017), https:// www.
vodafone.com/ content/ sustainabilityreport/ 2014/ index/ operating_ responsibly/ privacy_ 
and_ security/ law_ enforcement.html#csctag.
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in what they can do. Prior to the Snowden leaks, there had been some atten-
tion to the principle of government accountability with respect to acquisition 
of private- sector data, especially in the jurisprudence of the european Court 
of Human rights (in cases such as Weber and Saravia v. Germany and Liberty 
v. UK), as well as in the prescient report of Frank La rue, the Un special rappor-
teur. In the United States, intense debates around the PatrIot act and related 
governmental powers led to the creation of the independent Privacy and Civil 
Liberties oversight Board and to the creation of Privacy officers within fed-
eral law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Following the Snowden leaks, 
there were extensive calls on both sides of the atlantic for greater governmental 
accountability. The Schrems decision, in striking down the Safe Harbor, affirmed 
those calls and prompted a more granular focus on US practices.
In 2014, in response to the Snowden leaks, the article 29 Working Party 
adopted an opinion on surveillance15 in which it made specific recommendations 
for governments that map to two key components of accountability: transpar-
ency and oversight. on transparency, the Working Party said that Member States 
should be “transparent to the greatest extent possible about their involvement in 
intelligence data collection and sharing programmes, preferably in public, but 
if necessary at least with their national parliaments and the competent supervi-
sory authorities.”16 This includes transparency as to legal authorities: “these pro-
grammes have to be based in clear, specific, and accessible legislation.” effective 
and independent oversight of the intelligence services is of the “highest impor-
tance,” the Working Party said. It identified specific elements of oversight that 
it found to be best practices drawn from the mechanisms in place in Member 
States:
• Strong internal checks for compliance with the national legal 
framework;
• effective parliamentary scrutiny; and
• effective, robust, and independent external oversight, “performed 
either by a dedicated body with the involvement of the data protection 
authorities or by the data protection authority itself.”17
In June 2014, the office of the High Commissioner for Human rights (oHCHr) 
issued a report on the right to privacy in the digital age. The oHCHr specif-
ically noted the importance of procedural safeguards and effective oversight, 
stating that the right to the protection of the law against unlawful or arbitrary 
15. article 29 data Protection Working Party, Opinion 04/ 2014 on Surveillance of Electronic 
Communications for Intelligence and National Security Purposes (adopted on april 10, 
2014), http:// ec.europa.eu/ justice/ data- protection/ article- 29/ documentation/ opinion- 
recommendation/ files/ 2014/ wp215_ en.pdf.
16. Ibid., p. 12.
17. Ibid., p. 13.
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interference or attacks on privacy “must be given life through effective pro-
cedural safeguards, including effective, adequately resourced institutional 
arrangements.”18 The oHCHr went on to state:
Internal safeguards without independent, external monitoring in particular 
have proven ineffective against unlawful or arbitrary surveillance methods. 
While these safeguards may take a variety of forms, the involvement of all 
branches of government in the oversight of surveillance programmes, as well 
as of an independent civilian oversight agency, is essential to ensure the effec-
tive protection of the law.19
and the oHCHr called out the right to an effective remedy, noting that article 
2 of the ICCPr states in paragraph 3 (b)  that States parties to the Covenant 
undertake “to ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his 
right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative 
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal sys-
tem of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy.”20 effective 
remedies, the oHCHr stated, can come in a variety of judicial, legislative, or 
administrative forms, but they typically share certain characteristics. First, those 
remedies must be known and accessible to anyone with an arguable claim that 
his or her rights have been violated. notice (that either a general surveillance 
regime or specific surveillance measures are in place) and standing (to challenge 
such measures) thus become critical issues in determining access to an effective 
remedy. Second, effective remedies will involve prompt, thorough, and impartial 
investigation of alleged violations. Third, for remedies to be effective, they must 
be capable of ending ongoing violations. Fourth, he stated, where human rights 
violations rise to the level of gross violations, nonjudicial remedies will not be 
adequate, as criminal prosecution will be required.
Companies, too, in the wake of the Snowden revelations called for greater 
governmental accountability, to restore trust. Under the banner of “reform 
Government Surveillance,” a group of US- based companies recommended that 
accountability elements be built into government surveillance practices, includ-
ing those of the US government. The companies’ recommendations specifically 
highlighted transparency and oversight.21
Individual companies also called for greater government transparency. For 
example, when verizon released its 2014 transparency report, in which it pub-
lished data on national Security Letters, the company noted that it was still 
18.  office of the United nations High Commissioner for Human rights, The Right to 
Privacy in the Digital Age (June 30, 2014) at 12 http:// www.ohchr.org/ en/ HrBodies/ HrC/ 
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limited in what it could publish, and it called on the US government to itself be 
more open: “We once again call on all governments to make public the number 
of demands they make for customer data from such companies, because that is 
the only way to provide the public with an accurate data set.”22
although several chapters in this volume find that national governments have 
in recent years extended their surveillance powers, some national governments 
have at the same time improved their accountability mechanisms.
It is undeniable, for example, that the United States is more transparent 
than it was before the Snowden leaks. The 2015 USa FreedoM act, as noted 
above, expanded somewhat the ability of companies to disclose information 
about government requests they received. The office of the director of national 
Intelligence has a website, IC on the record,23 which publishes information of 
a scope and depth that would have been inconceivable before the Snowden 
leaks, including opinions of the special court that authorizes surveillance 
inside the United States, procedures for exercising various authorities, sta-
tistics on the use of those authorities, and compliance reports. The national 
Security agency and the Central Intelligence agency have both appointed sen-
ior officials devoted solely to the privacy and civil liberties portfolio. Likewise, 
the UK in 2015 published what it promised would be an annual transparency 
report on investigatory powers.24 also in the UK, an independent Interception 
of Communications Commissioner publishes detailed reports on the authori-
ties exercised by the government, including both descriptions of the legal stan-
dards and statistical data on the frequency of their use. (In both the United 
States and the UK, the statistics provide only a partial picture of the scope of 
government surveillance.)
In 2014, US president Barack obama issued a policy directive making certain 
commitments as to how the US government will handle data collected through 
signals intelligence in the national security context.25 Substantively, the direc-
tive specified that signal intelligence activities of the United States “shall be as 
tailored as feasible,” but it went on to acknowledge that the US government did 
22.  verizon, “Updates to our 2013 transparency report,” Verizon News (March 3, 2014), 
https:// www.verizon.com/ about/ news/ updates- to- our- 2013- transparency- report. verizon 
provides service in 18 countries in addition to the United States. In all but Germany, it is 
prohibited from reporting information about the interception of content. See verizon, 
International Report http:// www.verizon.com/ about/ portal/ transparency- report/ 
international- report/ (last visited april 27, 2017).
23. https:// icontherecord.tumblr.com/ .
24. HM Government Transparency Report 2015: Disruptive and Investigatory Powers, https:// 
www.gov.uk/ government/ uploads/ system/ uploads/ attachment_ data/ file/ 473603/ 51973_ Cm_ 
9151_ transparency_ accessible.pdf.
25. Presidential Policy directive 28— Signals Intelligence activities (January 17, 2014), 
http:// www.whitehouse.gov/ the- press- office/ 2014/ 01/ 17/ presidential- policy- directive- 
 signals- intelligence- activities.
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engage in bulk collection of communications and information about communi-
cations. The directive spoke specifically to accountability:
[t] he policies and procedures of IC [Intelligence Community] elements, and 
departments and agencies containing IC elements, shall include appropriate 
measures to facilitate oversight over the implementation of safeguards pro-
tecting personal information, to include periodic auditing … .
The policies and procedures shall also recognize and facilitate the per-
formance of oversight by the Inspectors General of IC elements … and 
other relevant oversight entities, as appropriate and consistent with their 
responsibilities.
as Sarah St.vincent notes in her chapter in this volume, cases pending before the 
european Court of Human rights challenging the UK’s surveillance practices may 
produce further limits on government data collection and use, as did the recent 
CJeU case on data retention. already, the cases of the eCtHr constitute perhaps 
the fullest body of international law on government surveillance, analyzed by Ira 
rubinstein, Greg nojeim, and ron Lee in their chapter in this volume. Certain basic 
criteria that the eCtHr has articulated in assessing government access programs 
provide reference points in assessing government accountability:
• “In accordance with law.” Under the jurisprudence of the eCtHr, 
surveillance standards must be spelled out in a public law or regulation 
precisely enough to protect against arbitrary application and to inform 
the public of which entities can conduct surveillance and under what 
criteria. Such laws must specify not only the standards for collecting 
data but also the limits on examining, using, and storing it.
• oversight by independent entity. an independent body (judicial, 
executive, legislative) must oversee the actual implementation of 
surveillance procedures to protect against abuse.
• redress (remedy). Individuals must be able to obtain redress for 
violations of the established standards.26
one of the fullest discussions to date of government accountability can be found 
in the decision of the european Commission on the adequacy of the US com-
mitments that constitute the Privacy Shield.27 The Commission focused on both 
26. See d. Korff, “note on european and International Law on transnational Surveillance 
prepared for the Civil Liberties Committee of the european Parliament” (august 23, 2013), 
http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/ meetdocs/ 2009_ 2014/ documents/ libe/ dv/ note_ korff_ / note_ 
korff_ en.pdf.
27.  european Commission, Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/ 1250 of 12 July 
2016 pursuant to Directive 95/ 46/ EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the ade-
quacy of the protection provided by the EU- U.S. Privacy Shield, available at http:// ec.europa.
eu/ justice/ data- protection/ international- transfers/ eu- us- privacy- shield/ index_ en.htm.
G o v e r n a n C e  a n d  o v e r S I G H t320
320
the substantive rules limiting US surveillance as well as on the accountability 
mechanisms intended to assure compliance with those rules. The Commission 
found that the US intelligence agencies are subject to oversight by both inter-
nal and external bodies, congressional committees, and, to some extent, judi-
cial supervision. Within the executive branch, the Commission found that 
“[m] ultiple oversight layers have been put in place, including civil liberties or pri-
vacy officers, Inspector Generals, the odnI [office of the director of national 
Intelligence] Civil Liberties and Privacy office, the PCLoB [Privacy and Civil 
Liberties oversight Board], and the President’s Intelligence oversight Board.”28 
These oversight entities are supported, the Commission said, by compliance staff 
in all the agencies. The Commission further noted that intelligence agencies are 
encouraged (but not required) to design information systems to allow for auditing 
of queries or other searches of personal information.There are extensive report-
ing requirements, the Commission stated, with respect to noncompliance. In 
addition to oversight mechanisms within the executive branch, the Commission 
noted, congressional committees have oversight responsibilities regarding all US 
foreign intelligence activities. Third, the Commission noted, data acquisition in 
the United States is overseen by a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, an 
independent tribunal.
The Commission stated that a number of avenues were available under US 
law to eU data subjects concerned about whether their personal data had been 
processed by the US intelligence community. However, the Commission noted 
these avenues were limited by exceptions, including doctrines restricting judicial 
access. In order to address these concerns, the US government committed to cre-
ating a new oversight mechanism, the Privacy Shield ombudsman, independ-
ent of the intelligence agencies, to receive and investigate complaints. Moreover, 
the United States agreed that, unlike plaintiffs in ordinary judicial cases in the 
United States, an individual complaining to the ombudsman would not have 
to demonstrate that his/ her personal data have in fact been accessed by the US 
government in order to have a complaint heard. The US government made a 
commitment that individuals will receive from the ombudsman independent 
confirmation that US laws have been complied with or, in a case of violation, the 
noncompliance has been remedied.
It remains to be seen whether the Privacy Shield commitments of the US gov-
ernment are borne out in practice and whether they are upheld against the seem-
ingly inevitable challenges they will face at the national and eU level. But they 
represent perhaps the fullest commitment to date of any country to establish a 
system of accountability for data acquired from the private sector.
28. Ibid., para. 95.
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VII.  CONCLUSION: MAPPING THE ACCOUNTABILITY 
FR AMEWORK TO GOVERNMENT ACCESS PROGR AMS
applying the broad concept of accountability to intelligence services is not new.29 
Government officials, institutions such as the Geneva Centre for the democratic 
Control of armed Forces (dCaF), human rights advocates, and scholars around 
the world have for decades been developing and commenting upon best practices 
for intelligence oversight.30 The special insight we are proposing here is that the 
principles and practices of accountability that have been developed around cor-
porate handling of personal information collected in commercial contexts are 
directly applicable to data governance within police and intelligence agencies 
and are especially relevant when those agencies demand disclosure of data held 
by the private sector.
as expressed elsewhere in the volume, governments and human rights institu-
tions are continuing to define the standards for government demands of access 
to data held by the private sector. our point in this chapter is that the protection 
of privacy does not end when data is transferred pursuant to criteria meeting 
human rights standards. The transfer of private- sector data to the government for 
law enforcement or national security purposes starts a new accountability chain.
accountability, especially in the national security context, is difficult to main-
tain. any and all of the elements of an effective oversight system may fail or 
be frustrated, at least for a time. In the United States, from 2006 through 2013, 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court repeatedly, without written analysis, 
stretched a statute beyond recognition to authorize a bulk telephone metadata 
program (now ended). In 2016, in Germany, the data Protection Commissioner 
found that the foreign intelligence agency had illegally and massively restricted 
her supervision authority on several occasions, “making comprehensive and effi-
cient control not possible.”31 Moreover, accountability, as noted above, is only as 
effective in protecting rights as the substantive rules that the system enforces.32 
nevertheless, it is increasingly apparent that the five essential elements of 
29.  See, for example, Hans Born and Ian Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable:  Legal 
Standards and Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies (2005).
30. See Zachary K. Goldman and Samuel J. rascoff, Global Intelligence Oversight: Governing 
Security in the Twenty- First Century (2016).
31. andre Meister, “Secret report: German Federal Intelligence Service Bnd violates Laws 
and Constitution by the dozen,” Netzpolitik.org (September 2, 2016), at https:// netzpolitik.org/ 
2016/ secret- report- german- federal- intelligence- service- bnd- violates- laws- by- the- dozen/ .
32. “even if perfect compliance could be achieved, however, it is too paltry a goal. a good over-
sight system needs its institutions not just to support and enforce compliance but to design 
good rules.” Margo Schlanger, “Intelligence Legalism and the national Security agency’s 
Civil Liberties Gap,” 6 Harvard National Security Journal 112 (2015).
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accountability can and must be transposed into the governmental context. We 
conclude with the following observations:
A.  Organization Commitment to Accountability and Adoption 
of Internal Policies Consistent with External Criteria
accountability for any surveillance program begins with the criteria laid down 
in a public law. The eCtHr has made it clear that a law must describe a govern-
mental power precisely enough to protect against arbitrary application and to 
inform the public of which entities can conduct surveillance and under what 
criteria. However, translating the necessarily broad and often generic criteria of 
statue into internal operating procedures is not easy, especially in more com-
plex systems where multiple kinds of data may be collected through various 
means. nevertheless, the externally stated rules and the internal practices must 
be consistent.
B.  Mechanisms to Put Privacy Policies into Effect, including 
Tools, Training and Education
“tools” may include audit trails, documentation, and permissioning systems 
for internal access and query. tools may also include privacy impact assess-
ments, formal internal processes that assess the risks to individuals associated 
with new processing (including collection). of course, to make the assessment 
process meaningful, mitigating those risks must be part of the final process-
ing plan. Such privacy by design practices should be part of an agency’s com-
prehensive privacy program. training should start with an understanding of 
privacy and data protection, since the terms, although widely used, are often 
misunderstood.
C.  Systems for Internal Ongoing Oversight and Assurance 
Reviews and External Verification
nico van eijk, in his chapter in this volume, identifies the seven key characteris-
tics of effective oversight:
• oversight must be comprehensive, in three respects: (a) The government 
(the executive branch), the legislature, the judiciary, and a specialized 
(non- parliamentary, independent) commission should all play a role. 
(b) oversight should include prior oversight, ongoing oversight, and 
oversight after the fact. (c) The oversight bodies’ mandate should 
encompass review of both lawfulness and effectiveness.
• oversight should encompass all stages of the intelligence cycle, 
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• Some of the oversight bodies must be independent of the intelligence 
services and the government. Judicial oversight offers the best 
guarantees of independence.
• oversight should take place prior to the imposition of a measure. 
although prior judicial oversight is strongly preferred, van eijk states 
that a system of ministerial orders combined with prior oversight by an 
independent, specialized commission; after- the- fact oversight on the 
overall functioning of the system of surveillance by a parliamentary 
committee; and the possibility for individuals to complain before 
an independent body could also be compliant with human rights 
standards.
• oversight bodies should be able to declare a measure unlawful and to 
provide for redress.
• oversight should incorporate the adversary principle.
• oversight bodies should have sufficient resources to perform effectively.
D.  Transparency and Mechanisms for Individual Participation
transparency means both public awareness of what the law actually authorizes 
as well as numerical reporting to indicate the scope of government access. as the 
article 29 Working Party stated: “Some form of general reporting on surveil-
lance activities should be in place.”33 The systems of the United States and the 
UK, although not perfect, offer important templates for transparency. Individual 
participation, on the other hand, remains the most underdeveloped element of 
the accountability system.34
E.  Means for Remediation and External Enforcement
In its most robust form, remediation is normally equated to judicial redress. 
However, in approving the Privacy Shield, the eU Commission found that a 
“composite structure” that included the ombudsman Mechanism guaranteed 
individual redress. The key point is that some independent entity must have the 
ability to insist on remedial action, and the security services must commit to 
respect that judgment.
33. The Working Party cited the decision of the eCtHr in Youth Initiative for Human Rights 
v. Serbia (June 25, 2013).
34.  See rebecca richards, Civil Liberties and Privacy office, nSa, “defining Privacy” 
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Surveillance and Privacy Protection  
in Latin America
Examples, Principles, and Suggestions
E DUA R D O  B E R T O N I  A N D  C O L L I N   K U R R E
I.  ABSTR ACT
This chapter covers surveillance and privacy protection in Latin america pro-
viding examples, principles, and suggestions. The first part offers an overview 
of governmental surveillance regulation through an analysis of existing legis-
lation in four Latin american countries:  argentina, Colombia, Mexico and 
Peru. It should be noted that this analysis merely seeks to identify trends in 
legal frameworks, rather than provide a comprehensive account of existing laws. 
regulating state surveillance and creating a precedent of rights protection both 
off- and online is critical. to provide a more nuanced and updated understand-
ing of how human rights should be protected online, the second part of this 
chapter examines several sets of principles that have been created by civil society 
actors, technical experts, and human rights specialists. The chapter compares 
those principles with the actual legislation in the four countries surveyed, and 
concludes with some suggestions for future policymaking concerning commun-
ications interceptions and surveillance in Latin america.
II.  INTRODUCTION
debates concerning the protection of personal privacy and freedom of expres-
sion certainly predate edward Snowden’s 2013 revelation of massive national 
and international surveillance operations in the United States and beyond. In 
recent years, however, three interrelated factors have made discussions of pri-
vacy protection more salient: the permeation of Internet use across all facets of 
modern life, the resulting ease of data collection on an unprecedented scale, and 
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data on a massive basis. to be clear:  governmental surveillance might be jus-
tifiable in certain cases— for example, for the prosecution of serious crimes or 
human rights abuses. However, permitting any government unfettered access to 
citizens’ private communications violates fundamental rights, jeopardizes dem-
ocratic institutions, creates a culture of fear or self- censorship, and has proven 
ineffective in preventing future crimes.
In Latin america, historical context is important for discussions of privacy 
protection and judicial restrictions on governmental surveillance. In many 
cases, the most egregious violations of human rights under Latin american dic-
tatorial governments were fundamentally linked to surveillance operations con-
ducted by intelligence agencies. Such surveillance operations typically targeted 
dissident groups, journalists, students, and trade unions,1 even though the right 
to privacy was and is included in the constitutions of these countries.
The first part of this chapter provides an overview of governmental sur-
veillance regulation through an analysis of existing legislation in four Latin 
american countries:  argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. These coun-
tries represent a diverse sample group geographically and institutionally, and 
in terms of Internet penetration.2 It should be noted that this analysis merely 
seeks to identify trends in legal frameworks, rather than provide a comprehen-
sive account of existing laws.
regulating state surveillance and creating a precedent of rights protection 
both off- and online is critical. to provide a more nuanced and updated under-
standing of how human rights should be protected online, the second part of this 
chapter examines several sets of principles that have been created by civil society 
actors, technical experts, and human rights specialists. The chapter compares 
those principles with the actual legislation in the four countries surveyed.3
Finally, the chapter concludes with some suggestions for future policymaking 
concerning communications interceptions and surveillance in Latin america.
1. r.a. Ugarte & e. villa, Who’s Watching the Watchers?: A Comparative Study of Intelligence 
Organizations Oversight Mechanisms in Latin America, Privacy International, asociación por 
los derechos Civiles (2014). See https:// www.privacyinternational.org/ node/ 351.
2. according to the Internet Society (ISoC), the rate of Internet penetration in Latin america 
hovers around 30  percent (see http:// www.internetsociety.org/ what- we- do/ where- we- work/ 
latin- america- caribbean). Within the sample group, argentina and Colombia have higher- 
than- average penetration rates, whereas Mexico and Peru have lower (see http:// www.inter-
networldstats.com/ stats10.htm). In all cases, the growth in the rate of penetration shows no 
signs of slowing— on the contrary, the Latin american Internet audience grew 23 percent in 
2014 alone.
3. Principles that are included in the analysis are: necessary and Proportionate, tshwane, 
Manila, and oaS Inter- american Juridical Committee.
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III.  FOUR EXAMPLES OF SURVEILLANCE LEGISLATION 
IN LATIN AMERICA
In Latin america, surveillance legislation is frequently taken as a sugges-
tion instead of a firm rule, and the reality of government activities frequently 
oversteps legislated constraints. However, understanding the legal frameworks 
remains important for making valid and practical policy recommendations. In 
Latin america, two commonalities can be identified among intelligence activ-
ities:  first, partisan abuse of surveillance techniques to monitor the opposi-
tion; and second, habitual attempts of police and intelligence forces to increase 
autonomy and limit checks on authority. although the implications of such 
will be further explored later on, it is important to acknowledge that govern-
ments’ simultaneous obligations to safeguard individual rights while addressing 
threats to public safety are neither aligned nor mutually exclusive. Instead, these 
two imperatives are manifested as a balancing act for which there is no univer-
sal solution. In the following subsections, the legal frameworks for argentina, 
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru are briefly explored.
A.  Argentina
Though government surveillance capabilities are abundant and well known 
in argentina, the right to privacy in personal communications is specifically 
defined in the argentine Constitution.4 In terms of legislation for data protection 
and the right to privacy, the pendulum has swung in both directions. In addi-
tion to the requirement for judicial authorization and other specific protocols 
for communications interceptions specified in the Federal Criminal Procedure 
Code,5 the Personal data Protection Law, passed in 2000, addressed the admin-
istration of public and private databases with provisions for user consent and its 
revocation,6 the mandatory destruction of irrelevant data,7 and the requirement 
for legal authorization when releasing personal data.8 Four years later, the Mobile 
Communications Services Law 25.891 mandated that telecommunications com-
panies maintain databases of personal data (name, address, etc.) to enable the 
4. Constitution of the argentine nation. (1953, reinstated 1983). art. 18:  “The residence is 
inviolable, as are letters and private papers; and a law shall determine in what cases and for 
what reasons their search and seizure shall be allowed.” See https:// www.constituteproject.
org/ constitution/ argentina_ 1994.pdf.
5. argentine Criminal Procedure Code. (august 21, 1991). art. 236. See http:// www.infoleg.
gov.ar/ infolegInternet/ anexos/ 0- 4999/ 383/ texact.htm.
6. Personal data Protection Law, Law 25.326, art. 11, §§ 1– 4. (october 30, 2000). See http:// 
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clear identification of their customers,9 which many considered an unnecessary 
violation of privacy.10 Most recently, the 2014 argentina digital Law reiterated 
the inviolability of communications and granted all communications, electronic 
or otherwise, protection equal to that previously granted to postal services, per-
mitting interception only with authorization from a competent judge.11
other limits and safeguards for surveillance and intelligence gathering exist on 
the books. For example, the 1991 domestic Security Law established the Bicameral 
auditing Committee to monitor domestic security and intelligence activities.12 The 
first oversight mechanism of its kind in Latin america, the Committee had one 
widely publicized success case when it identified illegal state surveillance of unions 
and student organizations in 1993. However, its oversight and enforcement powers 
were limited.13
In 2001, the national Intelligence Law expanded the aforementioned commit-
tee, renaming it the Bicameral Committee for the oversight of Intelligence and 
Internal Security Bodies and activities.14 This Committee is now charged with the 
task of supervising all communications interceptions and has been granted the 
power to investigate intelligence activities on its own initiative.15 By law, all parts of 
the national Intelligence System must honor any of the Committee’s requests for 
information or documentation and must submit to it annual reports.16 The reports 
are approved by the Intelligence Secretariat’s directorate of Judicial Surveillance, 
which is also the sole overseer for judicial authorizations for communications 
interceptions.
These oversight mechanisms are frequently criticized by advocacy groups, on 
several grounds. First, the Intelligence Secretariat reports directly to the exec-
utive, effectively giving the president power over the subsidiary branches deal-
ing with criminal and military strategic intelligence.17 Some suggest that under 
9.  Mobile Communications Services Law, Law 25.891, art. 2.  (april 28, 2004). See http:// 
servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/95000-99999/95221/norma.htm.
10. v. Ferrari & d. Schnidrig, Vigilancia de las Comunicaciones por la Autoridad y Protección 
de los Derechos Digitales en Argentina, CeLe, eFF (october 2015). See https:// www.eff.org/ 
files/ 2015/ 11/ 24/ argentina- es- final.pdf.
11. argentina digital Law, Law 27.078, art. 5. (december 16, 2014). See http:// www.infoleg.
gob.ar/ infolegInternet/ anexos/ 235000- 239999/ 239771/ norma.htm.
12.  domestic Security Law, Law 24.059, art. 33. (december 18, 1991). See http://servicios. 
infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-4999/458/texact.htm.
13. Ugarte & villa, above note 1, p. 12.
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the control of the executive, the Secretariat has been used for political ends.18 
Moreover, the nGo asociación por los derechos Civiles (adC) has found that 
none of the deputies from Congress has ever received an annual report from 
the oversight Committee, meaning the check exists only in theory.19 Third, the 
regulatory decree 950 makes the Bicameral Committee’s capacity to access clas-
sified information dependent on the Secretariat’s authorization— effectively sub-
jecting the oversight mechanism to the will of the institution being monitored.20
In January 2015, following the controversial death of federal prosecutor 
alberto nisman, President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner held a televised 
address to present a bill to dissolve the Intelligence Secretariat. That bill became 
the Federal Intelligence agency Law, transferring the “personnel, assets, current 
budget, and equity” of the Intelligence Secretariat to a new entity, the Federal 
Intelligence agency (aFI).21 responding to criticisms, one improvement is that 
the executive- designated director and Subdirector of the aFI must be approved 
by the Senate, providing a legislative check.22 despite these changes, there is 
ongoing concern that surveillance and intelligence activities in argentina 
remain convoluted, politically charged, and, in practice, free of oversight from 
the public or independent bodies.
as the most technologically advanced country of those in question, argentina’s 
state and intelligence activities boast access to sophisticated techniques for 
data collection. one such measure is the new federal biometric system for the 
identification of citizens, SIBIoS, which was introduced by President Cristina 
Fernandez de Kirchner in 2011 and uses physical traits such as fingerprints and 
face scans to uniquely identify nationals and foreigners alike.
B.  Colombia
In terms of codified law, Colombia has clearly- defined processes and oversight 
mechanisms for data interception. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, requests 
for communications interceptions must be approved by the attorney general’s 
office.23 Such requests must have a stated investigative purpose and must spec-
ify the data subjects, the type of data to be collected, and the duration of the 
18. J.M. Ugarte, “Sistema de inteligencia nacional argentino: ¡Cambiar ya!,” Latin american 
Studies association (2000) p 13. See http:// lasa.international.pitt.edu/ Lasa2000/ Ugarte.PdF.
19. Ibid.
20. national Intelligence Law, decree 950, art. 2. (June 5, 2002). See http://servicios.infoleg.
gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-74999/74896/norma.htm.
21. Federal Intelligence agency Law, Law 27.126, art. 24. (February 25, 2015). See http:// www.
infoleg.gob.ar/ infolegInternet/ anexos/ 240000- 244999/ 243821/ norma.htm.
22. Ibid., art. 8.
23. Colombian Criminal Procedure Code, art. 114, § 3. (august 31, 2004). See https:// www.
oas.org/ juridico/ mla/ sp/ col/ sp_ col- int- text- cpp- 2005.html.
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surveillance.24 Furthermore, communications interceptions must be authorized 
by a competent judicial authority (although retroactive approval is permitted),25 
and the Penal Code specifies that illegal interception of data without judicial 
order carries criminal penalties of 36 to 72 months in prison.26
In addition to the protocols and safeguards for data collection indicated in the 
penal and criminal procedural codes, there are several laws that deal directly 
with governmental surveillance and personal data. expanding upon The 
telecommunications Law of 2009 and the Citizen Security Law, which expanded 
investigatory powers in 2011.27 decree 1704 mandated that service providers 
must maintain accurate subscriber details such as identity, address, and con-
nection information for a period of five years.28 although there is no specific 
provision for the companies to retain other communications metadata, the law 
specifies that if any additional metadata is retained for business purposes, the 
government can request it for up to five years.29
Colombia’s data Protection Law, passed in 2012, was intended to expand the 
constitutional “right to Know” as applied to personal information stored in pub-
lic or private databases.30 Under the law, the data subject must always give prior, 
express, and informed consent for all activities pertaining to the collection, use, 
and transfer of personal data— except those specifically exempted from the law, 
such as credit data.31 The data Protection Law established the national register 
of databases as a public directory of all databases in the country to be consulted 
by any citizen.32 However, personal data acquired by the various law enforcement 
agencies’ mass data collection platforms do not appear in these registers.
24. Colombian Penal Code, art. 269, § C. (July 24, 2000). See http:// perso.unifr.ch/ derechopenal/ 
assets/ files/ legislacion/ l_ 20130808_ 01.pdf.
25.  J.C. rivera & K. rodriguez, “vigilancia de las Comunicaciones por la autoridad y 
Protección de los derechos Fundamentales en Colombia,” eFF (May 2015). See https:// www.
eff.org/ files/ 2015/ 05/ 19/ colombia- principios- may- 14.pdf.
26. Ibid.
27. The telecommunications Law, Law 1341, art 4, § 10. (July 30, 2009). See http:// www.mintic.
gov.co/ portal/ 604/ articles- 3707_ documento.pdf. Citizen Security Law, Law 1453, arts. 52 and  53. 
(June 24, 2011). See http:// www.mintic.gov.co/ portal/ 604/ articles- 3709_ documento.pdf.
28. decree 1704, art. 4. (august 15, 2012). See http:// www.mintic.gov.co/ portal/ 604/ articles- 
3559_ documento.pdf.
29. rivera & rodriguez, above note 25, p 20.
30. data Protection Law, Law 1581. (october 17, 2012). See http:// www.sic.gov.co/ drupal/ sites/ 
default/ files/ normatividad/ Ley_ 1581_ 2012.pdf.
31. as specified in the Habeas data and database Management Law, Law 1266. (december 
31, 2008). See https://www.bancoldex.com/documentos/1291_Ley_1266_de_2008_(Habeas_
data).pdf.
32. data Protection Law, art. 14.
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In 2013, the government attempted to increase the checks on intelligence 
activities with the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Bill, which became Law 
1621. The law created the Legal Commission for Monitoring the activities of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, as well as an advisory committee for data 
and archive management.33 However, these committees may only scrutinize doc-
uments provided by the agencies themselves, resulting in no direct supervision 
from independent organizations.34 In addition, the intelligence bodies must sub-
mit an annual report to Congress. However, as in the case of argentina, the entity 
being monitored determines which information to submit for review. Moreover, 
such checks have proved to be largely irrelevant as the directorate of Criminal 
Investigation and Interpol (dIJIn)’s highly contested phone and Internet moni-
toring system, PUMa, was advanced in 2014, the same year that the government 
carried out the widely- publicized andrómeda surveillance operation, which is 
further discussed below.
C.  Mexico
Mexico’s Constitution clearly enshrines the inviolability of private communica-
tions and further specifies that only designated federal authorities may employ 
surveillance methods, and then only with judicial authorization and under threat 
of criminal prosecution for noncompliance.35 Yet the Law against organised 
Crime of 1996 expanded investigative and prosecutorial tools including elec-
tronic surveillance, undercover operations, and the prosecution for criminal 
association.36 although some criticized the law as a violation of the right to pri-
vacy or even a case of constitutionally- sanctioned espionage,37 the text of the law 
does provide safeguards. requests for communications interceptions, for exam-
ple, must be made in writing to a district judge and must state the objective and 
necessity of the intervention as well as a detailed plan of investigation, including 
specific people, places, and type of communication to be intercepted and the 
duration of the operation.38 The Mexican Supreme Court has further established 
the precedent that the phrase “private communications” in the Constitution 
33. Intelligence and Counterintelligence Law, Law 1621, arts. 19– 26. (april 17, 2013). See http:// 
wsp.presidencia.gov.co/ normativa/ Leyes/ documents/ 2013/ LeY%201621%20deL%2017%20
de%20aBrIL%20de%202013.pdf.
34. rivera & rodriguez, above note 25, p. 29.
35. Constitution of the Mexican States of american. (1917; last revision december 20, 2010). 
art. 16. See http://www.te.gob.mx/gobernadores/edomex/data/legisloc/constitucion.pdf.
36.  Federal Law against organized Crime, arts. 15– 28. (1996, nov 7). See http://www.
diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/101_070417.pdf.
37. See e. Gallegos, “Con la reforma anticrimen, el espionaje entrará a la Constitución,” La 
Jornada (april 28, 1996). http:// www.jornada.unam.mx/ 1996/ 04/ 28/ LeY00- 2704.html.
38. Federal Law against organized Crime, art. 16.
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encompasses any extant technologies and those that may evolve in the future, 
including communications via the Internet.39
Mexico is a federation like the United States or argentina, but until recently, 
there were separate and inconsistent penal codes for each of Mexico’s 32 states. 
With the implementation of the Federal Penal Processing Code in 2014, the coun-
try’s judicial proceedings were streamlined and made uniform nationwide.40 In 
terms of communications surveillance, the Code designates the attorney general 
as the governmental authority that may carry out surveillance activities for the 
purpose of criminal proceedings. The Code also establishes penalties for those 
who misuse data obtained during the interception of private communications 
or conduct such interventions without authorization from the attorney general’s 
office and a competent judge.41 However, the Penal Procedural Code lists “the 
placement of tracking and surveillance devices” as a recognized security tool,42 
and article 178 requires that any person “required by the attorney General or 
competent authority [shall] collaborate or provide information to geo- locate 
communication devices in real time.”43
This stipulation is based on the 2014 Federal telecommunications and 
Broadcasting Law, which significantly increased the state’s capacity to surveil 
private communications. although the telecommunications Law lists “the pro-
tection of personal data” as a user right,44 article 190 establishes an ample list 
of obligations for telecommunications service providers to comply with law 
enforcement activities. In addition to providing real- time location data upon 
request, the service provider must maintain a registry of communications made 
from any of its lines, identifying the following data: names, corporate name, and 
address of subscriber; types of communication or of services used; origins and 
destinations of communications; the date, hour, and length of the communica-
tions; and the activation and localizations tags, among others.45
39. Suprema Corte de Justicia de la nación. Primera Sala. amparo en revisión 1621/ 2010 y 
Contradicción de tesis 194/ 2012.
40. Mexican Penal Procedural Code, art. 211, § 1. (august 30, 1934). See http:// www.diputa-
dos.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/ pdf/ 9_ 120315.pdf. Code updated and applied nationwide via doF 
decree, (March 5, 2014). See www.dof.gob.mx/ nota_ detalle.php?codigo=5334903&fecha=05/ 
03/ 2014.
41. Ibid., art. 177.
42. Ibid., art. 24, §§ 15, 19.
43. “a la persona física o en su caso al representante de la persona moral que sea requerida 
por el Ministerio Público o por la autoridad competente para colaborar o aportar infor-
mación para la localización geográfica, en tiempo real de los dispositivos de comunicación 
en términos de lo dispuesto por la Ley Federal de telecomunicaciones y radiodifusión …” 
Ibid., art. 178 bis.
44. Federal telecommunications and radiodiffusion Law, art. 191. (July 14, 2014). See http:// 
www.dof.gob.mx/ nota_ detalle.php?codigo=5352323&fecha=14/ 07/ 2014.
45. Ibid., art. 190, § 2, a- G.
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despite the mandate for companies to collect and store massive quantities of 
personal information ex ante, the lengthy article 190 concludes with a reitera-
tion of the inviolability of private communications and the affirmation that only 
requests made by specific authorities will be honored, and only if they are author-
ized by a federal judge. regardless, the mandatory retention of metadata opens 
the door for breaches or unlawful transfers of information. It also has a chilling 
effect on freedom of expression. Considering Mexico’s current national digital 
Strategy, which has the stated goal of incorporating “information communica-
tion technologies into every aspect of the everyday lives of people, organisations, 
and government,”46 the potential for misuse becomes all the more critical.
D.  Peru
Peru has a similarly solid legal base for personal data protection. In the 1993 
Political Constitution, there are numerous provisions that pertain directly 
to data privacy. In addition to specifying the Freedom of expression, right to 
Privacy, and reputation protection,47 the Peruvian Constitution explicitly speci-
fies the right to Communications Privacy in Section 10 of the Bill of rights.48
The 2011 Personal data Protection Law expanded upon these rights.49 after 
giving a broad definition of data as any information on an individual that iden-
tifies him or makes him identifiable, the Law continues with a series of arti-
cles that directly require Legality, Consent, Purpose, Proportionality, Quality, 
Security, recourse, and Protection in the interception, transfer, management, or 
processing of data. The law also includes a provision stating that these principles 
will be the guiding force in future decision- making.50 Furthermore, the protocol 
for processing data requires authorization by a judge for data interception, and 
requires that any data obtained in violation of the Law be destroyed.51
46. national digital Strategy del Gobierno de la república. (november 2013), p 7. See http:// 
cdn.mexicodigital.gob.mx/ estrategiadigital.pdf.
47. Political Constitution of Peru. (1993). art. 2, § 4, 6, 7, respectively. See http://portal.jne.
gob.pe/informacionlegal/Constitucin%20y%20Leyes1/ConStItUCIon%20PoLItICa%20
deL%20PerU.pdf.
48. Ibid., art. 10: “al secreto y a la inviolabilidad de sus comunicaciones y documentos priva-
dos. / Las comunicaciones, telecomunicaciones o sus instrumentos sólo pueden ser abier-
tos, incautados, interceptados o intervenidos por mandamiento motivado del juez, con las 
garantías previstas en la ley. Se guarda secreto de los asuntos ajenos al hecho que motiva su 
examen. / Los documentos privados obtenidos con violación de este precepto no tienen efecto 
legal. …”
49. Personal data Protection Law, Law 29733. (July 3, 2011). See http:// www.leyes.congreso.
gob.pe/ documentos/ Leyes/ 29733.pdf.
50. Ibid., arts. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, respectively.
51. Ibid., art. 38.
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Similarly, the Protocol on the Interception and recording of Communications, 
enacted in 2014, clearly plots the procedure for communications interception in 
seven stages, including an opportunity for control or reexamination at the request 
of the affected.52 Permission for surveillance may be requested only by specific 
authorities (the criminal prosecutor, attorney general, or national prosecutor), must 
receive authorization from a federal judge, and may only be used in investigations 
concerning 15 serious crimes, which are specified within the text. additionally, 
those under surveillance must be notified upon completion, and data that is out-
side the pre- specified scope of an approved investigation must be destroyed.
despite the clarity of this communications interception regulation, the 
Legislative decree 1182, or “Stalker Law,” has been flagged by many as an unwar-
ranted expansion of police power. The decree states that service providers are 
immediately required to provide to authorities real- time location information 
about suspects of a serious crime, and no prior authorization from a judge or the 
prosecutor’s office is necessary provided the information is vital to the investi-
gation of a blatant crime for which the penalty would be more than four years 
in prison.53 although there is a liability regime in place for those who use the 
system maliciously, compliance with the limited requirements set out is assessed 
retroactively, and the system entirely removes the check of judicial authoriza-
tion. Furthermore, the decree requires all public telecommunications licensees 
(fixed and mobile) to retain data for 36 months minimum and up to three years 
in special storage systems that are easily accessible by authorities.54
decree 1182 was passed in July 2015, months after the dInI (national 
Intelligence directorate) was shut down after allegations of misconduct, but in 
September 2015 Bill 4809 was introduced to repeal it.55 Bill 4809 maintains many 
of the articles from the decree, but requires authorization by a criminal judge 
on duty in advance of, or within 24 hours after, requesting information from a 
service provider. It also restores the central role of the attorney general in inves-
tigations, as decree 1182 refers to the police force in general.56 as evident by 
the legislative volleying and coinciding closure of the Intelligence directorate, 
Peru remains equally mired in conflict and scandal concerning surveillance 
operations, despite its comprehensive legal framework for communications 
interceptions.
52. Miguel Morachimo, “vigilancia estatal de las Comunicaciones y derechos Fundamentales 
en Perú,” eFF, Hiperderecho (dec. 2015). See https:// www.eff.org/ country- reports/ Peru- eS- 
 final.
53.  Legislative decree 1182, art. 3.  (July 27, 2015). See https:// www.hiperderecho.org/ wp- 
content/ uploads/ 2015/ 07/ dL_ 1182.pdf.
54. Ibid., “disposiciones complementarias finales,” § 2.
55. Projected Law of Coordination for Use of derived data. (rec. September 10, 2015). See 
http:// www2.congreso.gob.pe/ Sicr/ tradocestProc/ Contdoc03_ 2011.nsf/ 0/ 210d4d53cb946e-
2b05257ebc0082aaa9/ $FILe/ PL0480920150910.pdf.
56. Ibid., art. 3.
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IV.  HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES
Massive governmental surveillance operations capitalizing on modern technolo-
gies are a phenomenon not limited to Latin america, and generally speaking 
legislation intended to regulate surveillance lags behind the pace of innovation 
in most countries. The protection of human rights and civil liberties in the dig-
ital realm is therefore an ever- evolving endeavor requiring participation and 
cooperation from states, the private sector, civil society, and beyond. Given the 
incomparable power that states maintain over safeguarding— or violating— the 
human rights of their citizens, regulating state surveillance and creating a prec-
edent of rights protection online is critical.
to provide a more nuanced and updated understanding of how human rights 
should be protected online, several sets of principles have been adopted by 
groups of civil society actors, technical experts, and human rights specialists. 
Below, brief overviews of four of these sets of principles are included to indicate 
their general directions and, more important, to highlight the ways in which 
many of the aforementioned national laws are similar. The principles under 
review are: the necessary and Proportionate Principles, the tshwane Principles, 
the Manila Principles, and the oaS Juridical Committee Principles.
A.  The Necessary and Proportionate Principles
The most directly applicable of the principles mentioned above are the 
International Principles on the application of Human rights to Communications 
Surveillance (2014), alternately referred to as the necessary and Proportionate 
(nP) Principles.57 The Principles include four key elements:
• any limitations to privacy must be explicitly provided for by law.
• Communications interceptions must be necessary for a legitimate aim 
and must be undertaken only after the exhaustion of alternative, less 
intrusive courses of action.
• Interceptions must be proportional to their intended aim, and must 
never exceed their stated purposes.
• Checks and safeguards against surveillance abuse must be established, legally 
and systematically, to ensure the continued protection of human rights.
The nP Principles gained many signatories from organizations based in 
argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.58 Indeed, language employed in the 
Principles appears nearly verbatim in some legislation, such as Peru’s 2011 
57. International Principles on the application of Human rights to Communications 
Surveillance. “necessary and Proportionate Principles.” (2014). See https://necessaryandpro 
portionate.org/principles.
58. In total: 9 organizations from argentina, 9 from Colombia, 17 from Mexico, and 6 from 
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Personal data Protection Law. overall, each of the countries in question has leg-
islation specifying the processes for authorizing and carrying out surveillance, 
as well as criminal penalties for noncompliance or the misuse of personal data— 
all elements of a sound surveillance system called for in the nP Principles. Yet 
despite the specified processes for communications interceptions, illegal surveil-
lance persists in criminal proceedings and intelligence gathering. Moreover, the 
patchwork of oversight mechanisms involving the judiciary and/ or legislature is 
often crippled because the overseers obtain only official information from the 
bodies that they seek to monitor, and there are virtually no provisions for public 
or independent oversight.
B.  The Tshwane Principles
The tshwane Principles on national Security and the right to Information (2013) 
acknowledge this deficiency, further recognizing that within police and intelli-
gence departments “illegal, corrupt, and fraudulent conduct may occur and may 
not be uncovered, and violations of privacy and other individual rights often 
occur under the cloak of national security secrecy.”59 as evident in the afore-
mentioned cases where surveillance is suspected, assumed, or even documented 
but rarely confirmed or curtailed, the public has very little knowledge about sys-
tems of surveillance and the procedures for authorizing them.60 For example, 
although habeas data is an established right in Latin america and many coun-
tries have comprehensive databases so that citizens may seek information gath-
ered about them, governmental operations are often hidden from such registries.
The tshwane Principles acknowledge that some level of secrecy is expected in 
pursuing the legitimate end of national security. However, the Principles stress 
that burden of establishing the legitimacy of any restriction falls squarely on 
the state. They specify that citizens’ access to information should be interpreted 
broadly and state restrictions narrowly.61 Furthermore, information should be 
withheld on national security grounds for only as long as necessary to protect a 
legitimate national security interest, and no public authority, including the intel-
ligence agencies, the armed forces, police, and other security agencies, should be 
exempt from disclosure requirements to the general public and for independent 
oversight.62
59.  The Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information (Tshwane 
Principles), new  York:  open Society Foundations (June 12, 2013)  p.  9. See https:// www.




62. Ibid., Principle 16, 5, and 10c, respectively.
 
Surveillance and Privacy Protection in Latin america 337
37
C.  The Manila Principles
The Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability, released in 2015, advocate that 
technical intermediaries such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), social net-
works, and search engines should be shielded from liability for the third- party 
content.63 These principles, which also count numerous signatories from the 
countries surveyed here, mandate that requests to intermediaries for the dis-
closure of personally identifiable information be made only via an order by a 
judicial authority.64 although the Manila Principles focus mainly on content 
restrictions and freedom of expression, they state that intermediaries should not 
be required to ensure that they have the capacity to identify users.65 This is highly 
relevant to the direct obligation on telecommunications companies to conserve 
personal information and metadata for government retrieval, clearly seen in 
Mexico and Peru.
D.  The OAS Inter- American Juridical Committee Principles
Perhaps a bit less idealistic in nature, the Inter- american Juridical Committee 
(IaJC) of the organisation of american States created a set of Principles for 
Privacy and Personal data Protection in the americas in 2012,66 and a Legislative 
Guide on Privacy and the Protection of Personal data in 2015.67 according to the 
IaJC, the Principles:
aim at encouraging Member States of the organisation to adopt measures 
ensuring respect for people’s privacy, reputations, and dignity. They were 
intended to provide the basis for Member States to consider formulating and 
adopting legislation to protect the personal information and privacy interests 
of individuals throughout our hemisphere.
The goal of the Guide is “to expand upon the Principles by giving additional 
context and guidance to Member States to assist in their preparation of national 
legislation.”




66.  Inter- american Juridical Committee. (March 9, 2012). Statement of Principles for 
Privacy and Personal data Protection in the americas. 80th regular Session. Mexico 
City: organization of american States. See https:// www.oas.org/ en/ sla/ iajc/ docs/ ijc_ current_ 
agenda_ privacy_ personal_ data_ protection.pdf.
67.  Inter- american Juridical Committee. (2015). Legislative Guide on Privacy and the 
Protection of Personal data. 86th regular Session. rio de Janeiro: organization of american 
States. See https:// www.oas.org/ en/ sla/ dil/ docs/ CJI- doc_ 474- 15_ rev2.pdf.
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one key difference between this document and the nP Principles is its overt 
recognition of the exceptions and limitations to the public’s right to access 
information about themselves, specifically in the case of criminal investigations.68 
although the recommendations set forth in the Legislative Guide are often 
paired with a deference to extant national legislation, it is consistent with the 
nP and tshwane documents in its assertion that communications interceptions 
must have a demonstrated necessity and legitimate ends and that only the citi-
zenry, “physical people” as opposed to government operations, have an interest 
in privacy.69
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
A.  The Disparity between Law and Practice
Perhaps the best example of the disconnect between law and principles, on the one 
hand, and actual practice, on the other hand, comes from Colombia. although 
the right to privacy is cemented in the Colombian Constitution,70 illegal phone 
tappings are so common that there is a colloquial word for them— “chuzadas.” 
In recent decades, communications surveillance has played a large part in the 
ongoing armed conflict between the Colombian government and the rebel group 
Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia, or FarC. In 2007, after years 
of bugging complaints from political opponents and journalists, then- president 
alvaro Uribe’s defence Minister acknowledged the existence of illegal wiretap-
ping operations— although he claimed that the government had no knowledge 
of the information being procured.71 as a result, 12 members of Congress were 
jailed on charges of colluding with paramilitaries.
Indeed, nearly every legislative initiative in Colombia addressing privacy or 
surveillance has been preceded by a scandal. In one sensational incident, news 
came to light in 2009 that the administrative department of Security (daS, 
now defunct) had illegally surveilled and actively harassed public figures. In 
2014, the widely- circulated newspaper Semana revealed that a Colombian army 
unit had spied on the government’s negotiating team during peace talks with 
68. Ibid., Principle 8.
69. Ibid., “definitions.”
70. The Constitution of Colombia. (1991). art 15: “all individuals have the right to personal 
and family privacy and to their good reputation, and the State has to respect them and to 
make others respect them. Similarly, individuals have the right to know, update, and rectify 
information collected about them in data banks and in the records of public and private enti-
ties.” See https:// www.constituteproject.org/ constitution/ Colombia_ 2005.pdf.
71.  d. Crowe, “Colombia admits Wiretapping operation,” The Washington Post (May 
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FarC in Havana, Cuba, during an operation code named andrómeda.72 Perhaps 
most strikingly, it is common knowledge that the attorney general’s office, the 
directorate of Criminal Investigation, and the Police Intelligence directorate 
each has its own separate mass data interception system— all of which are illegal 
according to Colombian law.73
although provisions intended to ensure the necessity and proportionality of 
communications interception, judicial oversight, and penalties for illegal sur-
veillance are present in Colombian law, there are clearly many shortcomings 
in the legal framework. For example, there is no way for individuals to know 
if they have been surveilled by the government, and there are no channels for 
recourse in the event that human rights abuses are discovered. transparency is 
virtually nonexistent, and oversight bodies only have access to information pro-
vided by the same entities they seek to monitor. Furthermore, the government’s 
possession and employment of multiple illegal data interception systems clearly 
indicates that laws need to specify in greater detail the exact capabilities and lim-
itations of law enforcement bodies.
Illegal surveillance by the government is so common that it’s expected and 
assumed, which has produced a strong culture of self- censorship, or at least tech-
nological guardedness. Looking forward, Colombia’s widespread surveillance is 
especially troubling considering the government’s aggressive policies to increase 
Internet and telecommunications access across the country.74
The situation in Mexico is not so different: in 1998, reports revealed that the 
Mexican government had been electronically eavesdropping on political oppo-
sition members, journalists, and human rights activists for nearly a decade.75 
In addition to thousands of pages of transcripts from bugged telephone lines, 
investigations revealed hidden microphones and cameras in government offices 
and receipts for the purchase of $1.2 million in Israeli surveillance equipment. 
“everything I say and do, I assume that I am being spied on,” vicente Fox, the 
Guanajuato governor who became president in 2000, told the Washington Post 
after learning that he was targeted in the operation.76
Peru had a similarly complicated experience with government surveillance 
throughout the 1990s. Until 2000, surveillance activities in Peru were conducted 
72. “Chuzadas: así fue la Historia,” Semana (august 2, 2014). See http:// www.semana.com/ 
nacion/ articulo/ chuzadas- asi- fue- la- historia/ 376548- 3.
73.  The attorney General’s office runs esperanza, the dIJIn has PUMa, and the dIPoL 
manages IrS.
74. d.M. vega, “Colombia’s digital agenda: Successes and Challenges ahead,” in The Global 
Information Technology Report, Beñat Bilbao- osorio et al., eds. (new York: World economic 
Forum, 2013). See http:// www3.weforum.org/ docs/ GItr/ 2013/ GItr_ Chapter2.1_ 2013.pdf.
75.  M. Moore, “Spy network Stuns Mexicans,” The Washington Post (april 13, 1998). 
See http:// www.washingtonpost.com/ archive/ politics/ 1998/ 04/ 13/ spy- network- stuns- 
mexicans/ a0314a5a- c22a- 4802- a23a- c93fabbd64bc/ .
76. Ibid.
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mainly by the Peruvian national Intelligence Service (SIn), which President 
Fujimori dissolved in 2000 amidst reports of bribes and other illegal activities. 
at present, Peru’s non- military national Intelligence System (SIna) is controlled 
by the dInI, which reports directly to the executive. In February 2015, the dInI 
was closed for reorganization for 180 days following the release of evidence indi-
cating that President ollanta Humala had committed espionage against criti-
cal political figures using dInI’s capacities.77 although SIna has a legislative 
check in place, the congressional oversight committee charged with monitoring 
the intelligence agency’s activities has little autonomy and relies exclusively on 
information provided by SIna itself to make its assessments.
Finally, argentina has also followed these patterns. The SIBIoS biometric 
face- and finger- scanning system mentioned above led Julian assange to refer 
to argentina as having “the most aggressive surveillance regime in all of Latin 
america.”78 In 2012, shortly after implementing this new system, the argentine 
gendarmerie cast doubts on its treatment of sensitive personal data when reports 
revealed that the government had committed espionage against political, labor, 
and social leaders, collecting the amassed data in a digital database ominously 
labeled “Project X.”79 only months later, argentina’s federal tax collection agency, 
aFIP, revealed the three pillars of their auditing strategy as: the maximum use 
of available technology, centralized data mining, and the employment of both 
operational and ex- ante inspection,80 further casting doubt on the government’s 
prudence in dealing with personal data.
to summarize— in Latin america, two commonalities can be identified 
among intelligence activities: first, partisan abuse of surveillance techniques to 
monitor the opposition; and second, habitual attempts of police and intelligence 
forces to increase autonomy and limit checks on authority.
B.  Policy Suggestions
It is clear that legal surveillance measures may be necessary under some circum-
stances, and for that reason they will continue. However, if the parameters defin-
ing what is “legal” are insufficiently executed, law enforcement agencies will be 
tempted to continue illegal ongoing practices or worse— even if surveillance is 
carried out in many circumstances in good faith or for fair purposes. For this 
77. M.  Morachimo (december 2015). See https:// www.eff.org/ country- reports/ Peru- eS- 
 final.
78. Infobae américa. (June 26, 2013). “Infobae: entrevista a Julian assange.” Youtube. See 
https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=If7Mbovuebg.
79. “La Gendarmería en el Banquillo,” Página 12 (February 7, 2012). See http:// www.pagina12.
com.ar/ diario/ elpais/ 1- 187784- 2012- 02- 17.html.
80.  “aFIP refuerza el Control ‘en Línea’ de las operaciones económicas,” aFIP Gacetilla 
de Prensa (august 15, 2012). See http:// www.afip.gob.ar/ novedades/ docsComunicados/ 
com3369.htm.
 
Surveillance and Privacy Protection in Latin america 341
341
reason, policy suggestions should be pursued on two axes: first, to strengthen 
accountability mechanisms within existing and future legal frameworks; and 
second, to increase human rights protection against governmental (understood 
in the broad sense) surveillance.
In terms of accountability, the first step would be pushing the existing over-
sight bodies, such as congressional committees, to better fulfill their assigned 
functions. This might involve granting them additional tools for monitoring the 
agencies under their control, or it might require the creation of third- party, inde-
pendent oversight groups. a  level of public oversight would not only increase 
accountability, but also serve to better inform civil society and reduce the chill-
ing effect produced by covert and obfuscated mass surveillance activities.
Concerning the protection of human rights, it is clear that surveillance— 
which, as has been previously established in this chapter, may be necessary to 
certain ends— affects personal rights to privacy, among others. However, under 
national and international standards, the main problem is not surveillance 
per se, but the threat posed by abusive or arbitrary surveillance measures. The 
burden of proving the necessity and proportionality of surveillance measures 
should rest squarely on the agencies conducting such activities. In all cases, 
respecting human rights should be a foremost concern, integrally incorporated 
into the design of legislation and oversight regimes, and never circumvented via 
loopholes or reactive legislation in the wake of tragedy. In other words, “human 
rights by design” should be the rule for policymaking in this field.
at present, terrorist attacks plotted and carried out by ISIS and other extrem-
ist groups have drawn the issue of communications surveillance to center stage. 
although increased access to wide arrays of personal data and communications 
may seem like a worthy exchange in the wake of mass and senseless violence, 
policymakers must resist the impulse toward hardline, tough- on- terror legisla-
tion that could easily transcend exceptional circumstances and become a new 
norm. at this moment in particular, policymakers must avoid perpetuating a 
dystopian culture of fear and guardedness, and governments around the world 
must not sacrifice the values of accountability, transparency, and human rights 
protection in the name of national security.
342
34
Bulk Collection. Fred H. Cate and James X. Dempsey.
© Fred H. Cate and James X. Dempsey 2017. Published 2017 by Oxford University Press.
17
Trust but Verify
The Importance of Oversight and Transparency in the Pursuit  
of Public Safety and National Security
S C O T T  C H A R N E Y *
I.  ABSTR ACT
This chapter addresses the elements of an oversight or governance system that 
should be applied to any government program seeking broad access to personal 
data held by the private sector, and for industry to responsibly respond to such 
requests or demands. If by “broad access” we mean “access not tied to any specific 
account or person,” our view is that such access is not acceptable, and it cannot 
be made acceptable through oversight or governance mechanisms. The issue of 
broad access received attention after the disclosures by edward Snowden. news 
reports regarding US government surveillance practices highlighted several pro-
grams but, for the purpose of examining the issue of broad access, this chapter 
focuses on the 215 Program. This bulk collection program, so named because it 
was authorized under Section 215 of the PatrIot act, involved a secret court 
order that required phone companies to provide metadata to the government.
II.  ANALYSIS
We have been asked to address, in practical terms, the elements of an oversight 
or governance system that should be applied to any government program seek-
ing broad access to personal data held by the private sector, and for industry to 
responsibly respond to such requests or demands. If by “broad access” we mean 
“access not tied to any specific account or person,” our view is that such access is 
not acceptable, and it cannot be made acceptable through oversight or govern-
ance mechanisms.




G o v e r n a n C e  a n d  o v e r S I G H t344
34
The issue of broad access received attention after the disclosures by edward 
Snowden. news reports regarding US government surveillance practices high-
lighted several programs but, for the purpose of examining the issue of broad 
access, we will focus on the 215 Program. This bulk collection program, so named 
because it was authorized under Section 215 of the PatrIot act, involved a 
secret court order that required phone companies to provide metadata (time, 
duration, and phone numbers, as opposed to content) to the government.
Following the Snowden disclosures, it is clear that reasonable minds can dif-
fer on the propriety of broad access and the bulk collection of records. although 
one can debate the merits of individual bulk collection programs, it helps to have 
an overarching framework to decompose such programs into their component 
parts and identify what, if anything, gives cause for concern. Such a framework 
would look as follows:
Before diving into the issue of broad access, it may be helpful to give an exam-
ple of the framework in action, using a situation that is familiar to many: air-
port security. over the past several years, there have been numerous attempts 
to improve the screening of passengers, particularly after law enforcement 
authorities interrupted assorted plots to blow up airplanes with liquid explo-
sives or explosives hidden in shoes. In response to these events, a government 
actor (the US government), with the objective of protecting airplanes and their 
passengers, took the action of deploying backscatter X- ray scanners. The impact 
of this action included passenger exposure to radiation and graphic images of 
bodies. notwithstanding government assertions that these machines were safe 
and appropriate, the public reaction suggested otherwise; that is, even if the right 
actor had the right objective, the actions taken produced unacceptable impacts. 
In response, the government moved to millimeter wave scanners (radio waves) 
and more opaque images. This change in action reduced the impacts of concern, 
and public opposition abated.
If we turn to the issue of broad access, the use of the framework highlights sev-
eral concerns. The first element— the actor— is government. It is true that com-
panies collect lots of data too, also raising privacy concerns.1 This being true, it 
is fair to ask, “are governments unique?” The answer is yes because (1) govern-
ments can compel the production of data, over the objections of the data holder 
ACTORS OBJECTIVES ACTIONS IMPACTS
Figure 17.1 Impact assessment Framework.




and/ or data subject; (2)  governments can compel silence, by providing non- 
disclosure orders; and (3) methods of accountability differ. although both gov-
ernments and private parties can be castigated in the court of public opinion for 
their actions, private companies are accountable to government regulators and 
cannot avoid public scrutiny by saying their activities are “classified.” Indeed, 
but for the disclosure of classified information by edward Snowden, there would 
have been no public discussion on the propriety of the government- run program. 
Thus, the concern is that the power of the state— and the secrecy rules the state 
can leverage— are problematic when collecting data on people who have com-
mitted no crime or suspicious activity.
The second element relates to objective. Here the objective is to protect public 
safety and national security by combatting terrorism and, hopefully, preventing 
terrorist attacks. This is clearly a proper objective for governments. Some may 
be concerned that data collected for this purpose may be subject to secondary 
uses (i.e., used to achieve some other objective), with or even without appropri-
ate authority. For that reason, there is prophylactic value in prohibiting collec-
tion in the first instance, as data never collected can neither be repurposed nor 
misused. But that does not change the fact that the objective of fighting terrorism 
remains valid.
The third and fourth elements— action and impacts— are closely related. as 
reflected in the example above on airport security, actors often have a range of 
options, and each of those options will have different impacts. In the scenario 
here, the “action” is the broad collection of data. The justification for such broad 
collection, according to the US government, is that “if you are looking for a nee-
dle, the haystack is relevant.”2 The problem with this argument is that it knows 
no bounds. Governments have always sought relevant evidence but relevancy, 
according to the dictionary, is defined as “connected with the matter at hand.”3 
Prior to these broad collection programs, law enforcement agents would identify 
with specificity the person being investigated and/ or the particular crime under 
investigation. an example might be “John Smith is planning to rob a bank” or 
“an unknown person is planning to bomb a subway in City X on June 3rd.” In 
support of such an investigation, law enforcement agents would collect relevant 
evidence specific to that person or crime. But in an age where loosely affiliated 
individuals are constantly plotting unknown attacks, those responsible for pro-
tecting public safety decided it was appropriate to collect haystacks and search 
for needles.
one way to test this argument is to apply it in related contexts. For exam-
ple, it has been written that a school shooter forecast his rampage three months 
2.  See ellen nakashima & Joby Warrick, “For nSa Chief, terrorist Threat drives Passion 
to ‘Collect It all’,” Washington Post (July 14, 2013), https:// www.washingtonpost.com/ world/ 
national- security/ for- nsa- chief- terrorist- threat- drives- passion- to- collect- it- all/ 2013/ 07/ 14/ 
3d26ef80- ea49- 11e2- a301- ea5a8116d211_ story.html.
3. Merriam- Webster, “relevant,” (retrieved 2012), http:// www.merriam- webster.com/ dictionary/ 
relevant.
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before his attack.4 one could argue that, to prevent the next school shooting, 
every diary in america should be collected, digitized, and stored so that this 
data store can be searched to prevent the next such attack. of course, this is not 
possible: there are physical impracticalities (too many homes to search), as well 
as constitutional and legal prohibitions. But that misses the philosophical point. 
This is not just about the laws of physics and potential legal impediments; the 
deeper philosophical question is whether we should seize haystacks to create an 
ability to search for needles, knowing that most of that hay is lawful activity, 
engaged in by law- abiding citizens.
This is a particularly important question as new technologies and big data analyt-
ics change the way people can be profiled. as noted by the Supreme Court,
GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s pub-
lic movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, pro-
fessional, religious, and sexual associations. See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 12 n. Y. 
3d 433, 441– 442, 909 n. e. 2d 1195, 1199 (2009) (“disclosed in [GPS] data … 
will be trips the indisputably private nature of which takes little imagination 
to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, 
the aIdS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the 
by- the- hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the 
gay bar and on and on”).5
as in the case with X- ray machines at airports, an action may reveal “too much” 
and make people uncomfortable. This is often referred to as “the creepiness 
factor.”
our view that bulk collection is inappropriate is validated by recent congres-
sional action, as Congress recently concluded that government agents can be 
effective without collecting haystacks.6 That said, there are times when gov-
ernments should be able to access data and, in fact, do so in secret. Microsoft 
believes— and there is no doubt our customers believe too— that people should 
be safe, both online and in the physical world. We should not create safe havens 
for criminals, and information, simply because it is digitized, should not be off 
limits to those responsible for preventing, investigating, and prosecuting crime. 
even for specific, tailored access, however, governance models are important.
In this regard, it is important to appreciate that different types of investiga-
tions are subject to different levels of oversight, as “one size does not fit all” when 
it comes to governance models. For example, when surveillance is conducted for 
4. Jordan Steffen, Zahira torres & Jennifer Brown, “report: arapahoe High School Shooter 
Wrote in diary of Coming rampage,” Denver Post (april 26, 2016), http:// www.denverpost.
com/ news/ ci_ 26702161/ final- details- arapahoe- high- school- shooting- be- revealed.
5. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (Sotomayer, J., concurring).
6. See USa Freedom act, Public Law no. 114- 23 (eliminating bulk collection of US phone 
records), https:// www.congress.gov/ 114/ plaws/ publ23/ PLaW- 114publ23.pdf.
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criminal investigative purposes, there is judicial supervision, followed by noti-
fication to the target when the investigation is complete7 and, sometimes, pro-
duction of that evidence in public court proceedings. This individualized notice 
is supplemented by broader public reports concerning the use of wiretapping as 
an investigative tool, and those reports are made public.8 This is not to suggest 
that “after- the- fact” oversight is a substitution for “before- the- fact” relevancy 
requirements, but rigorous oversight is one way to ensure that rules have in fact 
been followed and to build trust in governance processes.
By contrast, when surveillance is conducted for intelligence purposes (e.g., 
to monitor a foreign spy operating on US soil), the goal may not be the bring-
ing of public charges in open court, and notice to an intercepted party might 
never be appropriate. as such, there is no required notice to the parties inter-
cepted unless evidence collected pursuant to a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
act order is being offered in court.9 additionally, the reporting requirements 
require reporting to Congress (not the administrative office of US Courts), and 
the reports can be redacted to protect national security.10
although these situations do vary and governance models need to be tailored 
appropriately, from the discussion above we can glean several important prin-
ciples. First, there should be no broad or unfettered access; the requests should 
be specific. Second, the process for accessing data should include appropriate 
oversight, which means an appropriate segregation of duties (e.g., having courts 
approve legal requests for such access). Third, there should be transparency so 
that legislators and the public know the general scope of such surveillance activi-
ties. Indeed, a lawsuit filed by information technology companies led to just such 
transparency, as companies were granted the right to describe, in broad terms, 
the number of orders it receives, including those related to national security.11
although there is no doubt that government access to data cannot always be 
completely transparent, having specific requests, oversight by an independent 
judiciary, and transparency to regulators and the public will permit governments 
to protect public safety and national security while deflating concerns that the 
government is acting in ways that may chill fundamental rights, including rights 
of freedom of association and freedom of expression. In sum, it will ensure that 
the right parties pursue the right objectives with the right actions and impacts.
Finally, in a globally connected world, it is important to think about the inter-
national implications of surveillance programs. The fact is, surveillance laws 
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2012). There are exceptions to this rule.
8.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2519 (2012); http:// www.uscourts.gov/ statistics- reports/ analysis- reports/ 
wiretap- reports.
9. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c) (2012).
10. 50 U.S.C. § 1871(d) (2012).
11. See http:// www.microsoft.com/ about/ corporatecitizenship/ en- us/ reporting/ transparency/ .
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often differentiate between citizens and foreigners, as well as between domestic 
and international surveillance. These distinctions are premised on the fact that 
a government’s primary mission is to protect its own citizens’ public safety and 
national security. But the Snowden disclosures certainly made clear that spying 
on allies can create tensions in important relationships, as well as undermine 
trust in information technology.12 Unaddressed concerns about the security of 
the supply chain and communications networks can reduce the benefits offered 
by global innovation and connectivity.
This is not to suggest governments abdicate their responsibility to protect 
national security. But as the recent German SPd report on oversight and regu-
lation of signals intelligence makes clear, there are no international standards on 
intelligence collection that permit even friendly states to have a common code 
of conduct.13 to the extent that citizens of one country may be concerned about 
surveillance by governments other than their own, creating international stan-
dards, at least between like- minded countries, might increase trust in surveil-
lance programs, especially if those standards would prohibit, as the SPd would, 
“a ban on the creation of an nSa- style data haystack.”14
12. See Simon Shuster, “German Mistrust of the U.S. deepens amid Latest Spy Scandals,” 
Time (July 7, 2014), http:// time.com/ 2963472/ spy- scandals- damage- us- german- alliance/ ; 
Claire Cain Miller, “revelations of n.S.a. Spying Cost U.S. tech Companies,” New York Times 
(March 21, 2014), http:// www.nytimes.com/ 2014/ 03/ 22/ business/ fallout- from- snowden- 
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Regulating Foreign Surveillance 
through International Law
A S H L E Y  S .  D E E K S *
I.  ABSTR ACT
regulating how governments conduct foreign electronic surveillance against 
another state’s citizens poses a complex challenge. In the wake of edward Snowden’s 
leaks in 2013, the extent to which governments conduct surveillance of foreign state 
leaders and citizens became strikingly clear. and the extent to which the subjects 
of that surveillance are discontent with the status quo also became apparent. This 
chapter argues that, although states traditionally have been loath to regulate their 
intelligence activities using international law, that body of law offers an important 
avenue by which states can reduce criticisms stemming from human rights and 
other groups, help set the agenda for the future of foreign surveillance, and respond 
to foreign and domestic fears that government surveillance is unconstrained. The 
chapter describes the variety of pressures states face to modulate their foreign sur-
veillance, explains some of the benefits that states may accrue by doing so, and sug-
gests six procedural norms around which certain Western democracies may be able 
to coalesce.
II.  INTRODUCTION
regulating how governments conduct electronic surveillance against their own 
citizens and in their own territory is a potent challenge, in view of the scope 
and speed of technological developments and the evolving nature of security 
threats. regulating how governments conduct foreign electronic surveillance 
against another state’s citizens poses an even more complex challenge— but a 
* The arguments in this chapter are drawn from ashley S. deeks, “an International Legal 
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critical one.1 In the wake of edward Snowden’s leaks in 2013, the extent to which 
governments— especially the United States but also states such as the United 
Kingdom, Germany, australia, France, and Sweden— conduct surveillance 
of foreign state leaders and citizens became strikingly clear. and the extent to 
which the subjects of that surveillance are discontent with the status quo also 
became apparent.
This chapter argues that, although states traditionally have been loath to regu-
late their intelligence activities using international law, that body of law offers an 
important avenue by which states can reduce criticisms stemming from human 
rights and other groups, help set the agenda for the future of foreign surveil-
lance, and respond to foreign and domestic fears that government surveillance 
is unconstrained. The chapter describes the variety of pressures states face to 
modulate their foreign surveillance, explains some of the benefits that states may 
accrue by doing so, and suggests six procedural norms around which certain 
Western democracies may be able to coalesce.
III.  PRESSURES TO REGULATE
at least until recently, states have treated their spying activities as existing in an 
uneasy but stable relationship with international law. Most states and scholars 
seem to share the view that international law neither authorizes nor condemns 
spying by one state on another— or on the other’s citizens. Some even believe 
that international law affirmatively permits spying. This group usually points to 
the widespread and long- standing practice of spying in support of the claim that 
international law does not purport to regulate this type of activity. Before the 
Snowden leaks, there was little pressure on states to revisit this approach.
a smaller group of actors criticizes spying as a violation of international law. 
Until recently, this was a minority view, but this approach has garnered some 
traction as ordinary citizens begin to realize the extent to which foreign states 
are able to monitor and collect their data. These actors argue that foreign sur-
veillance implicates— and often runs afoul of— areas of international law such 
as human rights (and especially the right to privacy), diplomatic law, and cus-
tomary rules about the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. It remains 
unclear the extent to which states actually crafted these rules to reach surveil-
lance, but some actors seek to “repurpose” these existing rules for today’s foreign 
surveillance.
These demands on (Western, democratic) states to regulate their overseas 
surveillance come from disparate quarters, and arise against a contemporary 
backdrop characterized by three important conditions. First, many individuals 
1.  By “foreign surveillance,” this chapter means to capture peacetime surveillance by one 
state of the communications of another state’s officials or citizens who are located outside the 
surveilling state’s territory, using electronic means such as Internet and cell phone monitor-
ing or satellites. This type of surveillance currently faces the least amount of regulation in 
international law and in states’ domestic laws.
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around the globe have developed a personal understanding and concern about 
how foreign government surveillance affects them, because the government 
techniques involve accumulating large volumes of data of “ordinary” people. 
Second, the interests of corporations, foreign leaders, citizens, and elite opin-
ion in the United States and europe are aligning in a pro- regulation direction. 
Third, the very governments whose activities were most exposed by the docu-
ments revealed by Snowden are governments that are sensitive to public and elite 
pressures.
Specific examples of pressure to curtail foreign surveillance abound in polit-
ical, economic, and rights- based forms. once US surveillance policies came to 
light, for instance, the United States faced significant political pressure from the 
leaders of Germany, Brazil, and France to cease spying on their cell phones. (as a 
result of this pressure, the United States tightened its policies about when it would 
monitor the communications of heads of state of friendly governments.) In the 
economic sphere, US corporations such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft fear 
the perception that they are facilitating nSa surveillance and worry about losing 
business abroad. as a result, they have pressured the US government to reduce 
the breadth of its foreign intelligence- gathering. Third, activities in the United 
nations, the International Court of Justice, domestic european courts, and the 
european Court of Human rights reflect efforts (by foreign states, nongovern-
mental organizations, and individuals) to more aggressively protect the right 
to privacy. Some of these rights- based pressures may produce legal changes, as 
when a court rules against a government’s surveillance program. other rights 
pressures may be less direct but persist over time, as actors urge states to adopt 
a more expansive definition of what the right to privacy of communications 
entails.
In short, new pressures on states to roll back some aspects of foreign surveil-
lance abound. But given that states rarely have resorted to international law to 
collectively constrain their intelligence activities, why might some set of states 
wish to do so here? First and most obviously, they may agree to do so if the pres-
sures just discussed continue to strengthen. That is, states may decide that it is 
worth adopting new norms to satisfy their domestic constituents. Second, each 
state presumably would prefer a world in which its officials and citizens were 
subject to less foreign surveillance, but the only way to achieve that is to establish 
agreed rules of cooperation among like- minded and trustworthy states. Third, 
the absence of agreed norms of foreign surveillance may force certain states to 
reduce their intelligence sharing with other states that they perceive to be acting 
in troubling ways. establishing harmonious interpretations of joint international 
legal obligations could help sustain intelligence cooperation and data sharing.
IV.  SIX NOR MS
The first part of this chapter illustrated why the international landscape seems 
poised for change. If conditions and incentives stimulate states to develop inter-
national norms of foreign surveillance, what might those norms look like? The 
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best and most realistic place from which to draw inspiration is existing domestic 
surveillance laws. Many Western states have put in place domestic laws regulat-
ing how their governments may conduct surveillance of their own citizens (either 
at home or abroad) and how those governments may conduct surveillance of for-
eign actors who are communicating with those citizens. These laws have been 
tested in practice, have been developed in the crucible of public debates, and are, 
for the most part, publicly accessible. although very few states currently regulate 
purely extraterritorial surveillance, the communications of some foreign nation-
als receive some incidental protections (particularly when the foreign actors are 
communicating with a state’s nationals). There is little reason, therefore, not to 
accord those types of protections to all foreign nationals. Further, states are more 
likely to achieve inter- state agreement by focusing on procedural norms, rather 
than trying to achieve consensus about the substance of privacy rights.
I extracted the following six proposed norms from common principles found 
in the domestic laws of the United States, the United Kingdom, australia, 
Canada, and Germany. although not representative of all states’ surveillance 
laws, these states have some of the most extensive laws regulating surveillance. 
That suggests that these states have paid careful attention to how to appropriately 
balance privacy and national security, how to monitor and counterbalance the 
government’s surveillance power, and how to internally protect data once they 
collect it. In proffering these principles, the hope is that the norms will increase 
the accountability of state officials engaged in surveillance, reduce (though not 
eliminate) the disparity in treatment between citizens and foreigners, limit the 
ability of government actors to act in overly discretionary ways, and advance the 
transparency of the rules being applied.
The six principles that states should adopt are: (1) notice to the public of the 
applicable rules, (2) limits on the reasons that states may collect or query data, 
(3) a requirement for periodic reviews of surveillance authorizations, (4) limits 
on the length of time for which the state may hold the data, (5)  a preference 
for action by the host state intelligence services (rather than foreign intelligence 
services) wherever reasonable, and (6) the existence of a neutral body that will 
authorize surveillance ex ante or review it ex post.
The first principle is one of legality. People should know how their own state 
and foreign states are empowered or constrained in conducting foreign sur-
veillance. This includes knowledge about who may be subject to surveillance, 
which agencies are conducting the surveillance, and the use to which the col-
lected communications may be put. It does not mean that in any particular case 
a person has the right to know whether the state is monitoring his activities. But 
adopting this principle would improve the status quo, under which most indi-
viduals do not know whether states generally are engaged in foreign surveillance 
and under what rules.
The second principle is that states should limit the reasons they collect or query 
data. Most of the five states examined currently have collection limits or use lim-
its, though the content of those limits differs. The United States, for instance, 
may use the bulk metadata it has collected only to detect and counter espionage 
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and other activities directed by foreign powers against US interests, terrorist 
threats, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber threats, threats to 
US or allied forces, and transnational criminal threats. Germany may conduct 
strategic, warrantless surveillance of telephonic and Internet communications to 
avert the risk of an armed attack on Germany, the commission of international 
terrorist acts with a direct relation to Germany, international weapons or drug 
trafficking, or certain cases of counterfeiting and money laundering. These offer 
examples of types of collection limits that states might agree to adopt. States 
also could agree to take certain types of data or uses of data off the table, such 
as attorney- client communications or the sharing by states of intelligence about 
foreign businesses with their domestic companies.
Third, states should require that at least one government actor periodically 
reconsider an authorized surveillance activity. This would ensure that a state 
actor considers at fixed intervals whether continued surveillance is appropriate 
and thus would avoid indefinite surveillance of a target.
Fourth, states should agree to limit the length of time they may retain col-
lected data— perhaps to a year or 18 months. Intelligence officials have acknowl-
edged that older data is less important. This norm therefore should not pose a 
significant operational challenge, but would offer an important check on inten-
tional or accidental abuse or release of swaths of collected information.
Fifth, states should adopt a preference for surveillance by the state in which 
the suspicious activities are taking place. assuming that the territorial state has 
the capacity to conduct surveillance and a positive relationship with the state 
seeking the information, collection by the territorial state is likely to be more 
rights- protective because domestic laws regulating surveillance tend to be more 
restrictive when a state is collecting on its own soil.
Finally, states should agree to a norm that requires neutral oversight— ex ante, 
ex post, or both— of the executive’s conduct of foreign surveillance. The laws of 
each state I examined provide at least one, and often multiple, forms of oversight. 
Those oversight bodies include courts, parliamentary committees, and inspec-
tors general. States might even accept a norm that allows foreign nationals to 
submit allegations of unlawful surveillance to an adjudicatory body, though this 
is somewhat less common.
Creating international law takes time. one route is via a negotiated multi-
lateral treaty, but it is unlikely that states engaged in the most extensive sur-
veillance (including the United States, United Kingdom, China, and russia) 
would be able to reach agreement on appropriate rules for foreign surveillance. 
It seems more likely that states will develop international norms as a matter of 
customary practice. The actual formation of customary international law is slow 
and requires widespread and consistent state practice followed out of a sense of 
legal obligation. In the shorter term, states could signal their support for these 
types of surveillance- related norms in several ways. a  core group of Western 
states might make a public commitment to a set of foreign surveillance princi-
ples, including through the use of a political memorandum of understanding. 
or they might issue parallel unilateral declarations that a certain set of norms 
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reflects internationally acceptable behavior. For now, the form is less important 
than the fact of a meeting of the minds among high- profile states engaged in for-
eign surveillance.
a final caveat: not all states will be attracted to these norms. one can sort 
states into three basic categories regarding surveillance regulation: Western and 
other democratic states; technologically powerful non- democracies or quasi- 
democracies, such as China and russia; and states that lack robust surveillance 
capabilities. States in the third category have good reasons to push for extensive 
regulations because they will bear limited costs and obtain benefits for them-
selves and their nationals if such regulations are adopted. States in the second 
category seem unlikely to adopt new norms because they face little internal or 
external pressure to do so. States in the first category have stronger incentives to 
adopt international surveillance norms, but also have more at stake than states 
in the third category. Indeed, it seems likely that Western democracies will form 
the core group of states to consider these norms. States such as South Korea, 
Japan, and Israel might also seek to participate in developing these principles. 
and any state that adopts this set of international norms presumably would 
only apply those norms to the citizens of other states that have, correspondingly, 
adopted the norms themselves.
V.  CONCLUSION
The approach set forth in this chapter attempts to navigate between two shoals: a 
deeply cynical approach to foreign surveillance— which submits that states 
will never agree to modify their foreign spying— and an excessively optimistic 
approach that believes that states soon will be able to arrive at a shared interpre-
tation of robust privacy protections. one might think of this chapter’s approach 
as an intermediate step that preserves the possibility of a future substantive con-
sensus about the essence of privacy rights, but provides certain nearer- term pro-
tections to the many private actors exposed to foreign electronic surveillance. 
Government programs that seek and obtain broad access to personal data of a 
large number of foreign citizens should embrace the six procedural constraints 
detailed herein:  doing so would alleviate the sense that states are engaged in 
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Preventing the Police State
International Human Rights Laws Concerning Systematic 
Government Access to Communications Held or Transmitted  
by the Private Sector
S A R A H  S T.V I N C E N T *
The maintenance of … dossiers about citizens who have never been charged 
with any violation of law and who have no means of refuting misinforma-
tion that may have been collected concerning them is an invitation to abuses 
of the gravest sort. Secret dossiers are paraphernalia of a police state. They 
are not proper instruments of a democratic government …
It does not matter that these invasions of what were once deemed inal-
ienable rights have been adopted for the sake of national security … 
Dictatorship always has its origin in the assumption that men supposed to 
be benevolent may be entrusted with arbitrary authority.
alan Barth, critiquing the United States government’s  
Employees Loyalty Program, 19511
* I am grateful to James X. dempsey for inviting me to contribute a chapter to this volume and 
to Lara Ballard, tamir Israel, Maria McFarland Sánchez- Moreno, dinah PoKempner, amie 
Stepanovich, amos toh, and Cynthia Wong for reviewing the draft. The views expressed 
herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of Human rights Watch or the indi-
viduals acknowledged above.
Sections of this chapter closely track, and at times draw directly from, a brief guide I created 
in the early days of my acquaintance with the subject as a fellow at the Center for democracy & 
technology: Sarah St.vincent, International Law and Secret Surveillance: Binding Restrictions 
upon State Monitoring of Telephone and Internet Activity, (September 4, 2014), https:// cdt.org/ 
files/ 2014/ 09/ Cdt- IL- surveillance.pdf.
1.  alan Barth, The Loyalty of Free Men (1951), pp. 129– 30 (quoted in Jay Feldman, 
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Powers of secret surveillance of citizens, characterising as they do the 
police state, are tolerable under the Convention only in so far as strictly nec-
essary for safeguarding the democratic institutions.
European Court of Human Rights2
I.  ABSTR ACT
This chapter is intended as a basic reference guide for lawyers, legislators, and 
advocates approaching the issue of mass surveillance—or surveillance more 
generally—through the lens of international human rights law for the first time. 
It focuses on the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights and the 
human rights treaties that apply in europe and the americas, with a particu-
lar emphasis on the rights to privacy, freedom of expression and opinion, and 
an effective remedy for violations. although the exact parameters of the right 
to privacy are still being decided, it appears increasingly clear that state inter-
ferences with any kind of communications data will generally be subject to a 
standard of strict necessity applied on an individualized basis, and there is pres-
ently a trend toward finding that mass surveillance—including systematic state 
access to data held or transmitted by the private sector—violates the human 
rights treaties. 
II.  INTRODUCTION
In an era when fears of deadly public violence are running high in many parts 
of the world, some political leaders have made little secret of their belief that 
one crucial means of preventing destruction and disorder is the state’s system-
atic access to individuals’ communications and related data— colloquially, mass 
surveillance.3 However, despite the apparent enthusiasm for these practices in a 
number of powerful states, international human rights laws and jurisprudence 
currently suggest that this type of activity is permissible only in a vanishingly 
2.  Klass and others v.  Germany, application no.  5029/ 71, Judgment (Plenary) (September 
6, 1978)  ¶ 42. The same or similar language appears in, for example, Rotaru v.  Romania, 
application no. 28341/ 95, Judgment (Grand Chamber)( May 4, 2000), ¶ 47; Segerstedt- Wiberg 
and others v. Sweden, application no. 62332/ 00, Judgment (June 6, 2006), ¶ 88; Szabó and 
Vissy v. Hungary, application no. 37138/ 14, Judgment (January 12, 2016), ¶ 54.
3.  See, for example, Theresa May, Oral Statement to Parliament:  Publication of Draft 
Investigatory Powers Bill (november 4, 2015), https:// www.gov.uk/ government/ speeches/ 
home- secretary- publication- of- draft- investigatory- powers- bill (asserting that the state 
requires the powers to intercept communications and acquire communications data in bulk 
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small set of circumstances, if at all. Moreover, the case law and commentary 
appear to be evolving toward a conclusion that state interferences with private 
communications and/ or related data on a systematic and indefinite basis will 
always violate the human rights treaties in the absence of a valid derogation4 
from those instruments.
The discussion below is intended as a basic reference guide for lawyers, leg-
islators, and advocates who are approaching the issue of mass surveillance— or 
surveillance more generally— through the lens of international human rights 
law for the first time. It focuses on the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political rights (ICCPr) and the human rights treaties that apply in europe and 
the americas, as the regional courts in those parts of the globe have been the 
most active in addressing surveillance- related matters. The chapter’s concern is 
with legal rather than policy considerations, and it adopts a relatively formal-
ist approach, treating the various human rights instruments (and the jurispru-
dence of the regional courts) as strictly binding only upon the relevant states 
parties, although otherwise constituting persuasive authority. Similarly, it treats 
the views of the Un treaty bodies and Special rapporteurs as persuasive but not 
conclusive. additionally, it assumes that a state’s treaty obligations are binding 
in order to address terrorism and other crimes); “tony abbott national Security Statement 
to Parliament,” Sydney Morning Herald (September 22, 2014), http:// www.smh.com.au/ 
federal- politics/ political- news/ tony- abbott- national- security- statement- to- parliament- 
20140922- 10kccx.html (depicting data- retention mandates as necessary to countering 
terrorism).
although “mass surveillance” remains an informal term rather than a legal one at the 
international level, this chapter uses it as shorthand for state interferences with communica-
tions and related data to which privacy rights attach under the applicable treaties, where those 
interferences are or may be carried out on a large scale without being based on an individual-
ized suspicion of wrongdoing. as there is broad agreement among the human rights courts 
and experts mentioned herein that the retention of data constitutes an interference with the 
right to privacy (see below), this chapter treats blanket data- retention mandates— that is, obli-
gations on Internet or telecommunications companies to retain certain data describing com-
munications, such as the dates, times, senders, and recipients of emails— as one form of mass 
surveillance. others include, for example, the indiscriminate and large- scale interception of 
the content of communications.
4. a derogation is a state’s temporary suspension of one or more of its commitments under 
a treaty. The human rights instruments typically provide that states are only permitted to 
derogate from their obligations under those instruments during an emergency so severe that 
it poses a threat to “the life of the nation.” See, for example, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political rights, 999 U.n.t.S. 171 (1966), art. 4 (hereinafter ICCPr); Convention for the 
Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms, e.t.S. 5 (1950), art. 15 (also known 
as the european Convention on Human rights; hereinafter eCHr); american Convention on 
Human rights, 1144 U.n.t.S. 123 (1969), art. 27 (hereinafter aCHr).
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upon that state’s agents regardless of the purpose of the activity in question 
(e.g., “intelligence” or “law enforcement”).5
In the interest of brevity, this analysis does not address the question of 
whether a  state’s obligations under any of the human rights treaties apply 
extraterritorially.6 It also does not address the human- rights- related respon-
sibilities of the private- sector entities that transmit or store communications, 
although this is an important area of inquiry.7
Section III below examines the right to privacy as it applies to government 
efforts to acquire or monitor indiscriminately, or order the systematic retention 
of, Internet or telephone communications (and/ or related data) that individuals 
have generated or transmitted using the services of corporate entities. Section 
Iv examines the right to freedom of expression and opinion in this context, and 
also touches briefly upon the rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and reli-
gion; freedom of association; and freedom of assembly. Section v discusses the 
right to a remedy for violations of the foregoing rights as well as the right to free-
dom from discrimination in the enjoyment of these rights.
at the time of writing, several major cases concerning the application of 
human rights laws to mass surveillance remained pending before the european 
regional courts. The european Court of Human rights (eCtHr), which is a 
Council of europe8 institution and adjudicates claims that a state has violated 
5.  See, for example, office of the United nations High Commissioner for Human rights, 
The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.n. doc. a/ HrC/ 27/ 37 (June 30, 2014) (hereinafter 
oHCHr report), and G. alex Sinha, “nSa Surveillance since 9/ 11 and the Human right to 
Privacy,” 59 Loy. L. Rev. 861 (2013), both of which assume that the ICCPr applies to state 
intelligence activities. For a presentation of other views, see ashley S. deeks, “Confronting 
and adapting: Intelligence agencies and International Law,” 102 Va. L. Rev. 599 (2016).
6. For a treatment of this issue, see, among many others, Harold Hongju Koh, Memorandum 
Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
(october 19, 2010), https:// www.documentcloud.org/ documents/ 1053853- state- department- 
iccpr- memo.html; Sinha, above note 5, pp. 900– 03; ashley deeks, “an International Legal 
Framework for Surveillance,” 55 Va. J. Int’l L. 291, 307– 12 (2015).
7. See, for example, Human rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Privacy, Joseph A. Cannataci, U.n. doc. a/ HrC/ 31/ 64 (March 8, 2016), ¶ 9; Human rights 
Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression, U.n. doc. a/ HrC/ 32/ 38 (May 11, 2016), ¶¶ 56– 62. See 
also office of the United nations High Commissioner for Human rights, Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights (2011), http:// www.ohchr.org/ documents/ Publications/ 
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHr_ en.pdf.
8. The Council of europe is a regional body with 47 Member States; its purpose is to “pro-
mote democracy and protect human rights and the rule of law in europe.” Council of europe, 
Do Not Get Confused, http:// www.coe.int/ en/ web/ about- us/ do- not- get- confused (last visited 
april 29, 2017). The european Union is a separate economic and political entity to which 28 
Member States belonged at the time of writing; its goals include promoting peace, establishing 
an internal market, and ensuring the free movement of persons among the Member States. 
european Union, The EU in Brief, https:// europa.eu/ european- union/ about- eu/ eu- in- brief_ en 
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its obligations under the european Convention on Human rights (eCHr), was 
considering three challenges to the United Kingdom’s surveillance practices.9 
readers are advised to consult the judgments in these cases when they become 
available, as they are likely to include landmark findings. additionally, just as 
this chapter was being finalized, the Court of Justice of the european Union 
(CJeU)— which, inter alia, answers questions that the domestic courts of the 
eU Member States refer to it regarding how they should interpret and apply 
eU law— handed down its judgment in the joined cases of Tele2 Sverige AB and 
Watson and others, which concern the legality of state data- retention mandates.10
III.  THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE
as the discussion below demonstrates, privacy rights are a common thread that 
runs through the human rights instruments addressed in this chapter— a fact that 
serves as a powerful reminder that these rights are indeed rights and not mere 
considerations to be bartered away easily in the name of state security. Where 
government monitoring of communications is concerned, the gravity with which 
the international human rights bodies view any prospective intrusions on these 
rights is perhaps best captured by the early statement of the Un Human rights 
Committee (HrC)— the body charged with monitoring states’ implementation 
of the ICCPr— in its General Comment on the right to privacy that communi-
cations surveillance in any form “should be prohibited.”11 although the regional 
human rights courts have adopted a more qualified position (and even the HrC 
itself no longer appears to take such an absolutist stance),12 it is clear that the 
(last visited april 29, 2017); Consolidated version of the treaty on european Union, 2010 o.J. 
C 83/ 01, art. 2.
9.  Big Brother Watch and others v.  the United Kingdom, application no.  58170/ 13 (com-
municated January 7, 2014); Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Ross v.  the United 
Kingdom, application no. 62322/ 14 (communicated January 5, 2015); and 10 Human Rights 
Organisations v.  the United Kingdom, application no. 24960/ 15 (communicated november 
24, 2015).
10. Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen (Case C- 203/ 15) and Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v.  Watson and others (Case C- 698/ 15), Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 21 december 2016, http:// curia.europa.eu/ juris/ liste.jsf?num=C- 203/ 15.
11. United nations Human rights Committee, General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right 
to privacy) (april 8, 1988), ¶ 8. regrettably, this currently remains the HrC’s only General 
Comment on the right to privacy, despite the enormous changes that have occurred in com-
munications technology since the time of its publication.
12.  See, for example, Human rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Sixth 
Periodic Report of New Zealand, U.n. doc. CCPr/ C/ nZL/ Co/ 6 (april 28, 2016), ¶ 16 (refer-
ring to the need for adequate judicial safeguards where the “interception of communica-
tions and metadata collection, processing and sharing” are concerned, without suggesting 
that those practices per se constitute violations of the Covenant); Human rights Committee, 
Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of South Africa, U.n. doc. CCPr/ C/ ZaF/ Co/ 1 
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right to privacy reflects a core set of concerns about human dignity and the pos-
ition of the individual vis- à- vis the state. Thus, as the Inter- american Court of 
Human rights (IaCtHr) has stated, the evolution of technology in recent years 
does not mean that individuals should now necessarily find themselves in “a sit-
uation of vulnerability” where the possibility of government monitoring of com-
munications is concerned: instead, “the State must increase its commitment to 
adapt the traditional forms of protecting the right to privacy to current times.”13
although the exact parameters of the right remain the subject of ongoing debate 
before the human rights courts and treaty bodies, a number of aspects of state pri-
vacy obligations as they apply in the digital age appear to be crystallizing (although 
further confirmation remains necessary). one is that virtually any type of data the 
user of modern communications technology may generate will fall within the scope 
of the privacy rights found in the treaties; another is that state interferences with 
this data will generally be subject to a standard of strict necessity applied on an 
individualized basis. For these and other reasons, there is presently a trend toward 
finding that mass surveillance— including systematic state access to data held or 
transmitted by the private sector— violates the treaties.
The focus of the discussion below is on large- scale monitoring; however, the 
same treaty laws and norms will apply to any state interference with privacy 
rights.
A.  The Nature of the Privacy Right(s) Articulated  
in the Human Rights Instruments
although analyses of human rights law often begin with the Universal declaration 
of Human rights (UdHr), that document was in fact preceded by the american 
declaration of the rights and duties of Man (american declaration), a text 
the Inter- american Commission on Human rights (IaCHr) views as bind-
ing upon the members of the organisation of american States even though it 
is not a treaty as such.14 (Thus, as far as the IaCHr is concerned, the american 
(april 27, 2016), ¶ 43 (similarly, referring to a need to “ensure that interception of communi-
cations by law enforcement and security services is carried out only according to the law and 
under judicial supervision” without suggesting that the Covenant prohibits all surveillance).
13. Escher et al. v. Brazil, Judgment, July 6, 2009, ¶ 115.
14.  Universal declaration of Human rights, U.n. doc a/ 810 (1948) (hereinafter UdHr); 
american declaration of the rights and duties of Man (1948) (hereinafter american 
declaration). as per articles 34 et seq. of the aCHr, above note 4, the IaCHr is a body 
charged with promoting and defending human rights, including by receiving and examining 
complaints that a state party to the Convention has violated its obligations under that instru-
ment. In conformity with a process set out in the Convention, the Commission may then 
submit a case to the IaCtHr; see aCHr, art. 61. The IaCHr has found that the american 
declaration is binding upon the members of the organization of american States in res. 
no. 3/ 87, Case 9647, roach and Pinkerton (United States), September 22, 1987, ¶ 48.
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declaration places binding obligations upon the United States of america— a 
state whose surveillance practices have been the subject of particular scrutiny 
since former national Security agency contractor edward Snowden disclosed a 
cache of classified documents in 2013.)15 Meanwhile, scholarly opinions regard-
ing the precise legal status of the UdHr vary, although at least some of the docu-
ment’s provisions are or may be expressive of customary international law (i.e., 
norms that states so commonly follow in practice, and that are supported by such 
a significant body of legal opinion, that they have become binding even upon 
those states that have not formally committed to them).16 In any event, both dec-
larations show that privacy rights are a foundational concern at the international 
level: the american declaration announces that “[e] very person has the right to 
the protection of the law against abusive attacks upon … his private and fam-
ily life” as well as to “the inviolability and transmission of his correspondence,” 
whereas the UdHr states that no one may be “subjected to arbitrary interference 
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence” and that “[e]veryone has the 
right to the protection of the law against such interference.”17
In the years following their finalization, these two declarations gave rise to 
several human rights treaties that also contain rights to privacy. The ICCPr, an 
instrument open to signature by virtually any state, establishes such a right at 
article 17 in terms nearly identical to those of the UdHr, save for the addition 
of “or unlawful” following “arbitrary.”18 The american Convention on Human 
rights (aCHr), which members of the organisation of american States may 
join, broadly echoes these provisions in mandating that “[n] o one may be the 
object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his 
home, or his correspondence” and that individuals must enjoy the protection of 
the law in this regard; it also includes a right to the recognition of one’s “dignity” 
as part of the same article.19
15. See ibid., at ¶¶ 47– 48; for a brief summary of some of the Snowden revelations, see Sinha, 
above note 5, pp.  892– 99. The United States disagrees with the IaCHr’s conclusion that 
the american declaration is binding upon it; see Christina M. Cerna, “reflections on the 
normative Status of the american declaration of the rights and duties of Man anniversary 
Contributions— International Human rights,” 30 J. Int’l L. 1211, 1220 (2009).
16.  See, for example, Hurst Hannum, “The Status of the Universal declaration of Human 
rights in International Law,” 25 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 287, 289 (1995); Jochen von Bernstorff, 
“The Changing Fortunes of the Universal declaration of Human rights: Genesis and Symbolic 
dimensions of the turn to rights in International Law,” 19 Eur. J. Int’l L. 903, 913 (2008). on 
the nature of customary international law, see North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal 
Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment, 
1969 I.C.J. 72, ¶ 38.
17. american declaration, above note 14, arts. 5 and 10; UdHr, above note 14, art. 12.
18. ICCPr, above note 5, arts. 17 and 48(1).
19. aCHr, above note 4, arts. 11 and 74(1); references to “dignity” also appear in articles 5 
and 6 of the instrument.
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Meanwhile, in europe, the eCHr and the Charter of Fundamental rights of 
the european Union (eU Charter) both include privacy rights.20 The eCHr con-
tains the most detailed provision on the right to privacy among all the instru-
ments mentioned herein, establishing first that “[e] veryone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence,” and 
subsequently that a public authority cannot engage in any
interference … with the exercise of this right except such as is in accord-
ance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.21
among the 28 eU Member States, the eU Charter also requires that an indi-
vidual must enjoy a “right to respect for his or her private and family life, home 
and communications” and adds an explicit “right to the protection of personal 
data.”22 The Charter demands that any limitation the state wishes to place upon 
these rights be “provided for by law,” “respect the essence” of the rights, be “nec-
essary,” and “genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the 
Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.”23
as a general matter, the treaty texts quoted above all require the same basic 
inquiry to determine whether a state has committed a violation of the right to 
privacy:
 (1) does the right apply to the information or behavior in question?
 (2) did the state’s action interfere with the right?
 (3) Was this interference done in accordance with the law?
 (4) Was the interference necessary (or, to the extent that there may be a 
genuine difference in meaning between the terms, “non- arbitrary” or 
“non- abusive”)?24
20. eCHr, above note 4, art. 8; Charter of Fundamental rights of the european Union, 2000/ 
C 364/ 01, arts. 7– 8 (hereinafter eU Charter).
21. eCHr, above note 4, art. 8.
22. eU Charter, above note 20, arts. 7– 8. as this chapter is only intended to provide a brief 
introduction to some of the major human rights instruments that apply to communications 
surveillance, it does not address “data protection” laws aside from article 8 of the Charter. 
However, readers may wish to be aware of the Council of europe’s Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to automatic Processing of Personal data, e.t.S. no. 
108 (1981); for an introduction to that instrument, see electronic Privacy Information Center, 
Council of Europe Privacy Convention, https:// epic.org/ privacy/ intl/ coeconvention/ (last vis-
ited april 29, 2017).
23. eU Charter, above note 20, art. 52(1).
24. Cf. Jordan J. Paust, “Can You Hear Me now?: Private Communication, national Security, 
and the Human rights disconnect,” 15 Chi. J. Int’l L. 612, 627 (2015).
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B.  The Scope of the Right to Privacy and the Occurrence  
of an Interference
In the relevant case law and commentary, the questions of whether a particular 
type of data falls within the scope of the right to privacy and whether the state 
has interfered with that right are sometimes conflated.25 However, in light of 
current debates about the sensitivity of various categories of data and whether 
it may be more acceptable for the state to have systematic access to some types 
rather than others, it is useful to begin by identifying those that international 
courts and Special rapporteurs have specifically described as protected by 
the right, as well as state behaviors these entities have found to constitute an 
interference.
1.  The Scope of the Right
as then- Un Special rapporteur on the right of freedom of opinion and expres-
sion Frank La rue has pointed out, the texts of the human rights treaties are 
largely silent about which types of data may fall within the ambit of the right to 
privacy, aside from “correspondence” (which is mentioned in the ICCPr, aCHr, 
and eCHr; the eU Charter refers to “communications”).26 The Un HrC’s lone 
General Comment on the right to privacy, adopted in 1988, fails to clarify 
matters, mentioning only communications and “personal information” of the 
kind that may be susceptible to storage in electronic form.27 Moreover, as La 
rue also highlights, the evolution of information technology in recent decades 
has “irreversibly affected our understandings of the boundaries between pri-
vate and public spheres,” meaning that the question of whether a certain type 
of information— such as a statement on a social media website— falls within the 
scope of the right will often be a contested one.28
La rue’s commentary can be read to suggest that the ICCPr right to privacy 
applies very broadly where data is concerned, attaching to any form of communi-
cation between individuals that is intended to take place without intervention or 
observation by others, as well as to information that other parties hold concerning 
an individual.29 The jurisprudence of the regional courts, as well as recent recom-
mendations of the Un HrC and the IaCHr, indicate that the privacy rights found 
in the treaties attach to telephone and electronic communications, with the juris-
prudence suggesting that location data and biometric data such as fingerprints and 
25. See, for example, Uzun v. Germany, application no. 35623/ 05, Judgment, September 2, 
2010, ¶¶ 43 et seq.
26. Human rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection 
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, U.n. doc. a/ HrC/ 23/ 40 
(april 17, 2013), ¶ 21 (hereinafter La rue report).
27. General Comment No. 16, above note 11, ¶¶ 8 and 10.
28. La rue report, above note 26.
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dna are covered as well.30 according to the eCtHr, the right may also attach to 
at least some extent where an individual interacts with others “in a public context,” 
especially where a “systematic or permanent record” of this interaction is created.31 
This latter finding suggests that the right may apply, for example, to an individual’s 
posts on social media websites even where a casual observer might characterize 
those posts as “public.”
although policymakers and scholars continue to debate the sensitivity of 
metadata (that is, data that describes a communication, such as the date, time, 
sender, and recipient of an email message),32 by now there is little question at 
the international level that the treaty rights to privacy attach to such data. The 
eCtHr and IaCtHr have both explicitly concluded that telephone metadata, 
such as the number a caller has dialed, is subject to the protection of the right; 
the eCtHr has also extended this reasoning to “e- mail and Internet usage,” and 
although the IaCtHr has not yet addressed the matter of Internet- based com-
munications, there is no reason to believe it would decline to follow the eCtHr’s 
lead.33 The CJeU has also concluded that the imposition of a blanket require-
ment that communications service providers retain certain types of metadata 
and subscriber data, as well as the authorities’ ability to gain access to such data, 
implicate the eU Charter rights to private life and the protection of personal 
data; according to the Court, this is true regardless of whether the metadata in 
question is “sensitive.”34 Similarly, the office of the Un High Commissioner for 
30. See, for example, Copland v. the United Kingdom, application no. 62617/ 00, Judgment, april 
3, 2007; Uzun, above note 25; S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, application no. 30562/ 
04, Judgment (Grand Chamber), december 4, 2008; Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources et  al., Case C- 293/ 12, Judgment, april 8, 
2014; Escher, above note 13, ¶ 114; Human rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the 
Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America, U.n. doc. CCPr/ C/ USa/ Co/ 4 (april 
23, 2014), ¶ 22; Inter- american Commission on Human rights, Report on the Situation of 
Human Rights Defenders in the Americas (2006), p. 84 (recommendation 13). although this 
chapter focuses on communications surveillance, biometric data is often of interest to activ-
ists in this area and is therefore mentioned briefly here. The list of types of data found in this 
sentence should not by any means be understood as exhaustive where the forms of “personal 
data” to which treaty privacy rights can attach are concerned.
31. P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom, application no. 44787/ 98, Judgment, September 25, 
2001, ¶¶ 56– 60; Shimovolos v. Russia, application no. 30194/ 09, Judgment, June 21, 2011, ¶ 65.
32.  See electronic Frontier Foundation and article 19, Background and Supporting Inter-
national Legal Analysis for the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to 
Communications Surveillance (May 2014), pp.  10– 14, https:// necessaryandproportionate.org/ 
files/ 2016/ 03/ 29/ background_ and_ supporting_ legal_ analysis_ en.pdf.
33.  Escher, above note 13, ¶ 114; Malone v.  the United Kingdom, application no.  8691/ 79, 
Judgment (Plenary), august 2, 1984, ¶¶ 83– 84; Copland, above note 30, ¶¶ 43– 44.
34.  Digital Rights Ireland, above note 30, ¶¶ 29– 34; see also Schrems v.  Data Protection 
Commissioner, Case C- 362/ 14, Judgment(october 6, 2015), ¶ 87.
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Human rights (oHCHr), the body within the Un Secretariat that takes the lead 
on promoting and protecting human rights, has affirmed that the ICCPr right to 
privacy attaches to metadata, and the HrC has implied its agreement in recom-
mendations to several states.35
Thus, it does not appear that the international courts or bodies are in any way 
inclined to adopt what in the United States is known as the “third- party doc-
trine”: that is, the presumption that individuals do not have an expectation of 
privacy in their metadata, as they have voluntarily conveyed this information to 
the provider of the communications service.36 Indeed, the oHCHr has point-
edly questioned the notion that consumers make such a “conscious compromise” 
when using modern communications technologies.37 Particularly in the era of 
“big data,” the High Commissioner’s assertion that consumers may not in fact be 
“truly aware of what data they are sharing, how and with whom, and to what use 
[the data] will be put” is a compelling one.38
2.  Establishing an Interference
after determining that a particular type of data is protected by the right to 
privacy, the next step is to inquire whether the government action at issue 
interferes with that right. Since its seminal 1978 judgment in Klass and others 
v. Germany, the eCtHr has maintained that even the “mere existence” of leg-
islation permitting secret surveillance measures constitutes an interference.39 
(although the Court’s Grand Chamber finessed this finding to some extent in 
2015 in its combined analyses of victim status and the existence of an interfer-
ence in Zakharov v. Russia, its overall approach appears to remain effectively 
intact at least insofar as legislation may allow mass surveillance, although 
further discussion by the Court will be necessary to clarify this point.)40 
additionally, the Court has previously found that the acquisition, retention, 
use, and dissemination of communications or other personal information all 
35.  oHCHr report, above note 5, ¶¶ 19– 20; Human rights Committee, above note 12 
(new Zealand); Human rights Committee, above note 32 (United States); Human rights 
Committee, Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.n. doc. CCPr/ C/ GBr/ Co/ 7 (august 17, 2015), ¶ 24.
36. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); see also electronic Frontier Foundation and 
article 19, above note 32, pp. 11– 13.
37. oHCHr report, above note 5, ¶ 18.
38. Ibid.
39. Klass and others, above note 2, ¶ 41; Weber and Saravia v. Germany, application no. 54934/ 
00, decision, June 29, 2006, ¶ 78; Liberty and others v.  the United Kingdom, application 
no. 58243/ 00, Judgment, July 1, 2008, ¶ 56.
40. Zakharov v. Russia, application no. 47143/ 06, Judgment (Grand Chamber), december 4, 
2015, ¶¶ 171– 179.
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constitute interferences (with acquisition or retention amounting to inter-
ferences even without subsequent use), and the IaCtHr has reached similar 
results.41 The CJeU, for its part, has indicated that an interference with the 
relevant eU Charter rights may occur even where the individual concerned 
does not suffer any adverse consequences, and it has further established that 
data- retention mandates interfere with these rights.42
Where the Un bodies are concerned, the HrC’s 1988 General Comment on 
the right to privacy states flatly that “[c] orrespondence should be delivered to the 
addressee without interception and without being opened or otherwise read.”43 
drawing upon this conclusion (although evidently taking a more qualified pos-
ition), the oHCHr, like the eCtHr, maintains that “even the mere possibil-
ity of communications information being captured creates an interference with 
privacy.”44 La rue’s 2013 report on state surveillance implies that interception, 
data- retention mandates, access to stored content or metadata, location tracking, 
social media monitoring, the invasion of private devices through hacking, and 
the individualized or mass monitoring of Internet browsing should all be con-
sidered interferences with the ICCPr right, although La rue likely did not intend 
for this list to be exclusive.45 regarding mass surveillance specifically, the current 
Un Special rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism, Ben emmerson, 
has provided a detailed list of some of the means by which states today may gain 
“bulk access” to metadata and/ or content that the private sector holds, conclud-
ing that such activities “amount[] to a systematic interference” with the right to 
privacy as found in the Covenant.46
Thus, as far as the international and regional human rights institutions 
are concerned, there appears to be little doubt that when a state’s acquisition 
of or access to private- sector data— including metadata— is systematic, this 
practice constitutes an interference with the privacy rights established in the 
treaties.
41. Amann v. Switzerland, application no. 27798/ 95, Judgment (Grand Chamber), February 
16, 2000, ¶ 45; Weber and Saravia, above note 39, ¶ 79; Rotaru, above note 2, ¶ 46; Leander 
v. Sweden, application no. 9248/ 81, Judgment, March 26, 1987, ¶ 48; S. and Marper, above 
note 30, ¶ 67 (confirming that the storage of data concerning private life constitutes an inter-
ference even in the absence of use); Escher, above note 13, ¶ 118.
42. Digital Rights Ireland, above note 30, ¶¶ 33– 36; Schrems, above note 34.
43. General Comment No. 16, above note 11, ¶ 8.
44. oHCHr report, above note 5, ¶ 20.
45. La rue report, above note 26, ¶¶ 34 et seq.
46. United nations General assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, U.n. 
doc. a/ 69/ 397 (September 23, 2014), ¶¶ 8– 9 (hereinafter emmerson report).
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C.  The Lawfulness of the Interference
1.  Elements of the Requirement
once a complainant at the international level has established that a state activity 
has interfered with his or her right to privacy, he or she will need to demonstrate 
that the interference was unlawful.
The HrC’s General Comment on the right to privacy interprets the legality 
requirement found in the relevant article of the ICCPr as meaning that “no 
interference [with the right] can take place except in cases envisaged by the 
law”— specifically, the state’s own legislation, “which itself must comply with 
the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant.”47 In other words, the state 
entity concerned must stay within the bounds of domestic law, and that law 
must in turn be consistent with the treaty. The oHCHr has elaborated on this 
interpretation by stating (in language echoing that of the eCtHr jurisprudence 
described below) that “the law must be sufficiently accessible, clear and precise” 
that an individual may, by reading it, “ascertain who is authorised to conduct 
data surveillance and under what circumstances.”48 regarding the ICCPr’s tex-
tually separate requirement that individuals must enjoy “the protection of the 
law” where this right is concerned, the oHCHr has further stated (again draw-
ing upon eCtHr case law) that
[t] he State must ensure that any interference with the right to privacy, fam-
ily, home or correspondence is authorised by laws that (a) are publicly acces-
sible; (b) contain provisions that ensure that collection of, access to and use 
of communications data are tailored to specific legitimate aims; (c) are suf-
ficiently precise, specifying in detail the precise circumstances in which any 
such interference may be permitted, the procedures for authorising, the cat-
egories of persons who may be placed under surveillance, the limits on the 
duration of surveillance, and procedures for the use and storage of the data 
collected; and (d) provide for effective safeguards against abuse.49
additionally, citing HrC observations concerning the United States, the 
oHCHr emphasizes that “secret” rules and legal interpretations— that is, those 
that are not made available to the public— lack “the necessary qualities of ‘law’ ” 
for the purposes of the legality requirement.50
The eCtHr’s jurisprudence is even more specific on this point insofar as the 
legal basis for state surveillance activities is concerned. according to the Court, 
47. General Comment No. 16, above note 11, ¶¶ 2– 3.
48. oHCHr report, above note 5, ¶ 23.
49. Ibid. at ¶ 28; see also Human rights Committee, above note 30 (United States) and note 
35 (United Kingdom).
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surveillance measures must have a “basis in domestic law” and must further 
adhere to public international law as well as “the rule of law” more generally.51 
The domestic law in question must be binding (that is, not simply a statement 
of policy) as well as “sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate 
indication as to the circumstances” in which the surveillance might take place— 
meaning, inter alia, that at least the following elements must be set out by statute:
 (1) the type and scope of the measures;
 (2) limits on how long the measures may last;
 (3) the grounds on which the authorities may order the measures;
 (4) which authorities are entitled to authorize, oversee, or carry out the 
measures;
 (5) the requisite procedures for “examining, using and storing” the data, as 
well as the scheme for ultimately destroying it;
 (6) the safeguards that apply to the sharing of the data with other 
entities; and
 (7) the remedies available for violations of these strictures.52
The IaCtHr agrees that “the general conditions and circumstances” under which 
a state may conduct surveillance must be set out in “a law in the formal and sub-
stantial sense,” and that this law must provide “clear and detailed rules, such as the 
circumstances in which this measure can be adopted, the persons authorised to 
request it, to order it and to carry it out, and the procedure to be followed.”53
additionally, the eCtHr and oHCHr concur that, in the High 
Commissioner’s words, “laws or rules that give the executive authorities, such as 
security and intelligence services, excessive discretion” to conduct surveillance 
will not be sufficient to meet the legality requirement.54
When determining whether state surveillance measures are “done in accord-
ance with the law,” the eCtHr has also grappled with the difficult question of 
whether individuals whose communications have been monitored are entitled to 
be notified of that fact. In its analysis of the matter in the early case of Klass and 
others, the Court adopted a position that was deferential to the state, accepting 
that “[s] ubsequent notification to each individual affected by a suspended meas-
ure might well jeopardise the long- term purpose that originally prompted the 
surveillance,” and concluding that a state’s decision not to provide notification, 
51. See St.vincent, above at *, p. 10, and sources cited therein; Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 
application no. 26839/ 05, Judgment, May 18, 2010, ¶ 151; Zakharov, above note 40, ¶ 228.
52.  St.vincent, above at *, p.  10, and sources cited therein; Malone, above note 33, ¶ 67; 
Zakharov, above note 40, ¶ 231.
53. Escher, above note 13, ¶ 131 (internal citation omitted); cf. Donoso v. Panamá, Judgment, 
January 27, 2009, ¶ 77.
54. oHCHr report, above note 5, ¶ 29; Zakharov, above note 40, ¶ 230; Amann, above note 41, 
¶ 56 (quoting Malone, above note 33, ¶¶ 67– 68).
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even after the fact, “cannot itself be incompatible” with the eCHr.55 However, 
one reason the Court was willing to take this view was that the applicable 
German law in fact required the government to provide notification to moni-
tored persons “as soon as notification [could] be made without jeopardising the 
purpose” of the surveillance.56 In more recent judgments, the Court has shifted 
toward stating that domestic law “should” contain this type of post hoc notifi-
cation requirement and finding violations of the Convention where states have 
failed to provide for notification under any circumstances.57 The Court’s choice 
of the term “should” instead of “must” is likely due to its conclusion in Kennedy 
v. the United Kingdom that the respondent state complied with the Convention 
by providing a tribunal that could examine allegations of unlawful government 
surveillance even where the complainant had not received notification of any 
monitoring— that is, where an individual’s standing was not dependent upon his 
or her possession of evidence that surveillance had in fact taken place.58 It is to 
be hoped that other human rights courts and bodies will address these key issues 
of notice and standing in the near future.59
In any event, several aspects of the jurisprudence and commentary described 
above weigh against the notion that systematic government interferences with 
private- sector data may be “lawful” for the purposes of the human rights trea-
ties. First, a number of the elements that the eCtHr and IaCtHr have iden-
tified as necessary for any surveillance statute— namely, the enumeration of 
grounds upon which the authorities may order the surveillance and the poten-
tial scope and duration of the measures— along with the notification require-
ment (to the extent that it applies under the relevant treaty) would essentially 
be moot if state authorities were entitled to interfere with data concerning any-
one at any time.60
2.  Authorization and Oversight
In addition to complying with domestic law (which must itself meet the crite-
ria described above), state surveillance measures must be subject to adequate 
55. Klass and others, above note 2, ¶ 58.
56. Ibid.; see also Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev 
v. Bulgaria, application no. 62540/ 00, Judgment, June 28, 2007, ¶ 90 (depicting this fact as a 
key element of the Court’s willingness to reach its holding in Klass and others) (hereinafter 
“association for european Integration”).
57.  Szabó and Vissy, above note 2, ¶¶ 86– 87; Association for European Integration, above 
note 56.
58. Kennedy, above note 51, ¶ 167.
59. See oHCHr report, above note 5, ¶ 40 (stating that notice and standing are “critical issues 
in determining access to effective [sic] remedy”).
60.  See FDN et  al. c/ Gouvernement, Conseil d’État, Contentious Section, Third- Party 
Intervention:  Center for democracy & technology and Privacy International, undated, 
¶¶ 32– 34, https:// cdt.org/ files/ 2016/ 02/ LQn- case_ FInaL- 2_ CLean.pdf.
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authorization and oversight regimes. as indicated above, it is arguable that sys-
tematic government access to private- sector data necessarily violates other ele-
ments of the legality requirement— a defect that even an exceptionally strong 
oversight system would not cure. Speaking generally, however, the Un General 
assembly has called upon states to “establish or maintain existing independ-
ent, effective, adequately resourced and impartial judicial, administrative and/ 
or parliamentary domestic oversight mechanisms capable of ensuring transpar-
ency, as appropriate, and accountability for State surveillance of communica-
tions, their interception and the collection of personal data.”61
regarding the initial authorization of communications surveillance meas-
ures, the eCtHr has indicated that although authorization does not necessar-
ily need to be judicial in order for the process to conform to the Convention, 
the entity responsible for granting the authorization must be independent of the 
entities carrying out the monitoring.62 any nonjudicial authorizing body should, 
in turn, ultimately be subject to some form of judicial control, as supervision by 
a judge provides “the best guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper 
procedure.”63 Perhaps due to a reluctance to overturn its holding on this point 
in Klass and others, in which it approved of the nonjudicial German oversight 
scheme, the Court has stopped short of insisting upon judicial review as such (if 
only post hoc) in all circumstances.64 However, it has warned that oversight of 
surveillance measures by “a judge with special expertise[] should be the rule and 
substitutions the exception, warranting close scrutiny”— thus arguably limiting 
Klass and others to its facts and rendering judicial supervision at some stage de 
rigeur for all or nearly all other systems.65 Future judgments will show whether 
the Court indeed intends to take such an approach. Meanwhile, although the 
IaCtHr has ruled on the compliance of a particular judicial authorization sys-
tem with the aCHr, it has not yet addressed the requisite nature of surveillance 
authorization or oversight systems in general.66
While the regional human rights courts continue to wrestle with the form 
that surveillance decision- making bodies must take, the HrC has indicated that 
regardless of who precisely is responsible for authorizing these types of measures, 
the authorization must be done on a case- by- case basis.67 The Committee has yet to 
61. United nations General assembly, The right to privacy in the digital age, U.n. doc. a/ reS/ 
69/ 166 (december 18, 2014), ¶ 4(d).
62. Klass and others, above note 2, ¶ 56; cf. Kennedy, above note 51, ¶¶ 166– 167. The Court’s 
Grand Chamber recently reiterated this point in Zakharov, above note 40, ¶¶ 275 et seq.
63. Szabó and Vissy, above note 2, ¶ 77.
64. Ibid.; Klass and others, above note 2.
65. Szabó and Vissy, above note 2, ¶ 77.
66. Escher, above note 13, ¶¶ 132 et seq.
67. General Comment No. 16, above note 11, ¶ 8.
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clarify precisely what it means by “case- by- case”; however, there appears to be lit-
tle reason to question emmerson’s interpretation, which is that the scrutiny must 
be individualized.68 as emmerson points out, this requirement— insofar as it is 
indeed a requirement under the applicable treaties— effectively forecloses the pos-
sibility that a mass surveillance program could comply with the right to privacy.69
D.  The Necessity or Non- arbitrariness of the Interference
The texts of the human rights instruments vary in their descriptions of the qual-
ities a lawful interference with privacy rights must possess in order to avoid the 
state’s excessive use of what are, after all, capabilities that create an immense 
differential between the government and the governed. at present, none of the 
human rights courts or bodies appear to question the notion that states are enti-
tled to monitor communications and related data in at least some circumstances; 
however, they have demonstrated a deep concern with determining, and thus 
limiting, exactly what those circumstances are.
Both the ICCPr and aCHr require that interferences with privacy must not 
be “arbitrary,” whereas the eCHr opts for “necessary in a democratic society in 
the interest of” certain specified aims, and the eU Charter (as noted above) states 
that limitations on the right must be proportionate as well as “necessary” and 
“genuinely meet[ing] objectives of general interest recognised by the Union.”70 
Meanwhile, the HrC’s General Comment 31, which concerns the overall nature 
of the legal obligations the ICCPr imposes, maintains that any restriction a state 
places on a Covenant right must be necessary as well as “proportionate to the 
pursuance of legitimate aims.”71 Likewise, the IaCtHr has construed the aCHr 
as mandating that any state interference with the right to privacy must “serve a 
legitimate purpose[] and meet the requirements of suitability, necessity, and pro-
portionality which render it necessary in a democratic society.”72 Thus, although 
the language of the treaty provisions concerning restrictions on the right to pri-
vacy are not identical, and although some scholars view them as differing in sub-
stance,73 there is every indication that the texts, jurisprudence, and analyses by 
Un experts are gradually converging around a standard that could be described 
as “necessary and proportionate to the pursuit of a legitimate aim.”74 as the 
68. emmerson report, above note 46, ¶ 51.
69. Ibid., at ¶¶ 18, 51– 52.
70. above notes 18– 23.
71.  Human rights Committee, General Comment No. 31:  The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.n. doc. CCPr/ C/ 21/ rev.1/ add.13 
(May 26, 2004), ¶ 6.
72. donoso, above note 53, ¶ 56.
73. For example, Sinha, above note 5, pp. 905– 08.
74.  Cf. International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications 
Surveillance (2014), https:// necessaryandproportionate.org/ principles; oHCHr report, above 
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human rights courts and bodies rarely have difficulty in determining that a state 
surveillance measure pursues a legitimate aim such as preventing serious crime, 
this discussion will focus on the concepts of necessity and proportionality.75
although these two concepts are unquestionably related, the proper distinc-
tion between the two (and, for that matter, whether they are distinguishable at 
all) has not yet been clearly or consistently articulated by the relevant interna-
tional bodies. Helpfully, the opinion of the advocate General in Tele2 Sverige 
AB and Watson and others has set forth the concept of “proportionality stricto 
sensu,” suggesting that even surveillance that is “necessary” to achieve a legiti-
mate aim can still be disproportionate in the sense of being beyond the bounds 
of what is tolerable in a democratic society.76 Such a theory might indicate, for 
example, that even if the constant video surveillance of a classroom is regarded 
as “necessary” to ensure students’ safety at every moment, such a measure may 
nevertheless be disproportionate in the sense that the harms to fundamental 
rights outweigh the advantages to society.77
In any case, regarding the necessity requirement, eCtHr jurisprudence 
appears to be evolving toward a conclusion that mass surveillance cannot be 
compliant with this criterion. The Court has long maintained that the term “nec-
essary,” as employed in the relevant eCHr provision, means “strictly necessary 
for safeguarding the democratic institutions.”78 Prior to 2015, its findings con-
cerning potentially large- scale surveillance programs were admittedly unclear 
at best. In Klass and others, for example, the Court found that a state surveil-
lance regime did not violate the Convention right to privacy even though the 
authorities had broad powers to monitor postal and telephone communications; 
however, the text of the judgment suggests that legal restrictions on these powers 
made interferences targeted rather than systematic.79 In its later admissibility 
decision in Weber and Saravia, the Court accepted the necessity of a program 
in which the use of “catchwords” during satellite telephone conversations trig-
gered surveillance of those conversations; yet, the use of satellite telephones was 
relatively unusual at the time, and the Court’s treatment of the precise nature 
note 5, ¶¶ 23– 27; Human rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic 
Report of France, U.n. doc. CCPr/ C/ Fra/ Co/ 5, august 17, 2015, ¶ 12.
75. See, for example, Digital Rights Ireland, above note 30, ¶¶ 41– 44; Zakharov, above note 40, 
¶ 237; Kennedy, above note 51, ¶ 155.
76. Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen (Case C- 203/ 15) and Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v. Watson and others (Case C- 698/ 15), opinion of advocate General Øe, 
July 19, 2016, ¶¶ 247– 248.
77. See ibid. for this balancing test. at the time of writing, the compliance of constant video 
surveillance of a classroom with article 8 of the eCHr was at issue in the communicated 
eCtHr case of Antović and Mirković v.  Montenegro, application no.  70838/ 13 (communi-
cated december 3, 2014).
78. above note 2.
79. Klass and others, above note 2, ¶ 17.
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and scope of the interference is brief and opaque.80 Muddying the waters even 
further, the Court’s Grand Chamber found just two years later in S. and Marper 
v. the United Kingdom that the “blanket and indiscriminate” retention of dna 
samples and fingerprints by english and Welsh authorities— a practice argua-
bly analogous to mass surveillance— was an unnecessary and disproportionate 
interference with privacy rights.81
With the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Zakharov, however, the Court seems 
to have sent a clear signal that mass communication surveillance programs do 
not comply with the Convention.82 The Fourth Section’s subsequent judgment in 
Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary further found that the requirement of strict neces-
sity has two mandatory elements:  a state surveillance measure must not only 
be strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions (as indicated 
above) but must also be “strictly necessary, as a particular consideration, for the 
obtaining of vital intelligence in an individual operation.”83 The latter criterion, 
with its references to “vital intelligence” and “individual operation,” suggests— 
as the author has argued elsewhere84— that the Court means to indicate that 
surveillance regimes entailing systematic state access to private data necessarily 
violate the Convention. In this respect, it seems highly significant that the Court 
indicated in Szabó and Vissy that it would not have ruled in favor of the respond-
ent government in Kennedy v. the United Kingdom if the monitoring in that case 
had involved “indiscriminate capturing of vast amounts of communications.”85
The CJeU appeared to reach a similar conclusion in Digital Rights Ireland, 
invalidating eU directive 2006/ 24 (popularly known as the data retention 
directive) in part because that legislation required, within the scope of its appli-
cation, the retention of data concerning all persons in all locations at all times 
for at least six months and up to two years.86 additionally, in its judgment in 
80. See Center for democracy & technology and Privacy International, above note 62, ¶ 36.
81. S. and Marper, above note 32, ¶¶ 125– 126; see also Center for democracy & technology 
and Privacy International, above note 62, ¶ 38.
82. Zakharov, above note 40.
83. Szabó and vissy, above note 2, ¶ 73.
84.  Sarah St.vincent, Did the European Court of Human Rights Just Outlaw ‘Massive 
Monitoring of Communications’ in Europe? (January 13, 2016), https:// cdt.org/ blog/ did- the- 
european- court- of- human- rights- just- outlaw- massive- monitoring- of- communications- in- 
europe/ .
85. Szabó and Vissy, above note 2, ¶ 69 (quoting Kennedy, above note 51, ¶ 160)
86. Digital Rights Ireland, above note 30, ¶¶ 58– 59; directive 2006/ 24/ eC on the retention of 
data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of public communications networks, art. 6. But see Tele2 Sverige 
AB and Watson and others, opinion of the advocate General, above note 76, ¶¶ 116 and 126 
et seq., which interprets the Digital Rights Ireland judgment as permitting eU Member States 
to impose data- retention mandates if other requirements of eU law (including the Charter) 
are met.
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Schrems, the Court found that legislation allowing government authorities to 
enjoy “access on a generalised basis” to electronic communications must, at least 
insofar as this generalized access applies to content, “be regarded as compromis-
ing the essence of the fundamental right to private life.”87
Where the ICCPr is concerned, the relevant Un experts continue to grap-
ple with the question of whether mass surveillance can ever comply with 
the requirement of non- arbitrariness. as noted above, General Comment 16 
rejects altogether the idea that secret communications surveillance of any kind 
may comply with article 17, although the HrC and the oHCHr appear to 
have shifted to a less absolutist position over the years.88 In its 2014 report, 
the oHCHr drew upon the HrC’s 1999 General Comment on the right to 
freedom of movement in maintaining that in order to be necessary and pro-
portionate, state surveillance must adopt the “least intrusive” approach pos-
sible. applying this logic, the High Commissioner concluded that “[m] ass or 
‘bulk’ surveillance programmes may thus be deemed to be arbitrary, even if 
they serve a legitimate aim and have been adopted on the basis of an accessible 
legal regime.”89
Meanwhile, after suggesting that some states are employing data- mining 
techniques to search through vast quantities of electronic communications, thus 
surveilling very large numbers of individuals who are not suspected of having 
engaged in any wrongdoing, emmerson notes that “[t] he hard truth is that the 
use of mass surveillance technology effectively does away with the right to pri-
vacy of communications on the Internet  altogether.” Without directly stating 
that mass surveillance can never be compliant with human rights, emmerson 
goes on to indicate that “[t]he sheer scale of the interference with privacy rights 
calls for a competing public policy justification of analogical magnitude”— a 
statement that is perhaps best read as raising serious doubts as to whether such a 
justification could ever in fact exist.90
IV.  THE FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION, RELIGION, ASSEMBLY, 
AND ASSOCIATION
although assessments of mass surveillance under the international human 
rights framework have tended to focus on the implications for the right to pri-
vacy, the impact of these practices on the freedom of expression (which includes 
the right to receive and impart information); the non- derogable freedoms of 
opinion, thought, conscience, and religion; and the freedoms of association and 
87. Schrems, above note 34, ¶ 94.
88. above notes 11– 12 and accompanying text.
89. oHCHr report, above note 5, ¶ 25.
90. emmerson report, above note 46, ¶¶ 12– 13.
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peaceful assembly may be equally serious.91 each of these rights is found in the 
UdHr, ICCPr, aCHr, eCHr, and eU Charter; the american declaration 
does not contain an explicit freedom of thought but otherwise generally tracks 
the other human rights instruments in these respects.92 While the Un General 
assembly and at least two Un Special rapporteurs have depicted the right to pri-
vacy as a type of gateway for the enjoyment of free- expression (and presumably 
other) rights, these latter entitlements stand on an equal footing with the right 
to privacy and merit far more scrutiny in the surveillance context than they have 
received to date.93
The eCtHr has seldom addressed cases involving both communications 
surveillance— particularly on a large scale— and free- expression rights, although 
two communicated cases against the United Kingdom that remain pending at 
the time of writing raise these issues.94 at present, the Court’s main observa-
tions on this point remain those found in its admissibility decision in Weber and 
Saravia, in which the Third Section (based on the text of the eCHr, in which 
the provision concerning the right to free expression broadly mirrors that con-
cerning the right to respect for private life) effectively proceeded through a com-
pressed version of the four- step analysis outlined above in examining the impact 
of an arguably mass surveillance program on a journalist.95 The Court began 
by referring to “the vital public- watchdog role of the press” and finding that the 
existence of legislation allowing secret surveillance constituted an interference 
with the journalist’s right to free expression, as the threat of surveillance might 
reveal her sources or deter them from speaking with her.96 after finding that the 
interference was lawful and had a legitimate aim, the Court turned to the ques-
tion of whether the surveillance was necessary in a democratic society, noting its 
91. Cf. generally oHCHr report, above note 5, ¶ 14. on the non- derogability of the freedom 
of opinion, see Human rights Committee, General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedoms of 
Opinion and Expression, U.n. doc. CCPr/ C/ GC/ 34, September 12, 2011, ¶ 5.
92. UdHr, above note 14, arts. 18– 20; ICCPr, above note 4, arts. 18– 19, 21– 22; aCHr, above 
note 4, arts. 12– 13, 15– 16; eCHr, above note 4, arts. 9– 11; eU Charter, above note 20, arts. 
10– 12; american declaration, above note 14, arts. 3– 4, 21– 22.
93. General assembly, above note 61, preamble (“recognizing that the exercise of the right to 
privacy is important for the realization of the right to freedom of expression and to hold opin-
ions without interference and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association”); 
United nations General assembly, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.n. doc. a/ reS/ 
68/ 167 (december 18, 2013), preamble (containing similar language concerning the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression); Human rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David 
Kaye, U.n. doc. a/ HrC/ 29/ 32 (May 22, 2015), ¶ 16 (deploying the “gateway” concept; herein-
after Kaye report); La rue report, above note 26, ¶ 24.
94.  10 Human Rights Organisations v.  the United Kingdom and Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism and Ross v. the United Kingdom, above note 9.
95. Weber and Saravia, above note 39, ¶¶ 143 et seq.
96. Ibid., at ¶¶ 143– 146.
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own long- established rule that a state’s interference with a journalist’s exercise 
of free- expression rights will violate the Convention unless the action is “justi-
fied by an overriding requirement in the public interest.”97 In the Court’s view, 
the German regime at issue was subject to strict safeguards; the fact that the 
surveillance was not “aimed at monitoring journalists” was also a deciding fac-
tor for the judges, as they believed this meant that the interference could not be 
characterized as a “particularly serious” one.98 Ultimately, the Court concluded 
that Germany’s surveillance activities had not violated the right.99
aside from Weber (whose persuasiveness, as a single admissibility decision, 
is debatable), international jurisprudence concerning these issues is scant. The 
eCtHr found in a succinct 2013 judgment against Serbia that the state had failed 
to comply with domestic law in refusing to disclose, upon request by a nongov-
ernmental organization, the number of individuals it had subjected to secret 
surveillance; thus, the state violated the right to receive information, which is 
part of the Convention right to free expression (and has been further expli-
cated in non- binding form in the Global Principles on national Security and 
the right to Information, known as the tshwane Principles).100 regrettably, the 
CJeU did not reach the issue of free- expression rights in Digital Rights Ireland 
despite the fact that the referring court had presented it with an opportunity to 
do so.101
notwithstanding this lag on the part of the international courts, the Special 
rapporteurs of the Un and IaCHr who focus on the freedom of expression have 
been addressing electronic surveillance issues proactively since at least 2011.102 
The most recent Un Special rapporteurs in this area have focused on the impor-
tance of online anonymity for facilitating the exercise of the right, especially 
97.  Ibid., at para. 149 (citing Goodwin v.  the United Kingdom, application no.  17488/ 90, 
Judgment (Grand Chamber), March 27, 1996, ¶¶ 39– 40).
98. Ibid., at ¶¶ 147– 152.
99. Ibid., at ¶ 153.
100. Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, application no. 48135/ 06, Judgment, June 25, 
2013, ¶¶ 24– 26; Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information (Tshwane 
Principles) (2013), https:// www.opensocietyfoundations.org/ sites/ default/ files/ global- prin-
ciples- national- security- 10232013.pdf. The tshwane Principles posit, inter alia, that “[n] o 
restriction on the right to information on national security grounds may be imposed unless 
the government can demonstrate that: (1) the restriction (a) is prescribed by law and (b) is 
necessary in a democratic society (c)  to protect a legitimate national security interest; and 
(2) the law provides for adequate safeguards against abuse, including prompt, full, accessible, 
and effective scrutiny of the validity of the restriction by an independent oversight authority 
and full review by the courts” (Principle 3).
101. Digital Rights Ireland, above note 30, ¶¶ 18, 70.
102.  See Human rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, U.n. doc. a/ 
HrC/ 17/ 27 (May 16, 2011), ¶¶ 53 et seq.
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where controversial topics are concerned;103 they have also encouraged state 
respect for individuals’ use of strong encryption technologies, as encryption, 
like anonymity, “create[s] a zone of privacy to protect opinion and belief.”104 as 
current Un Special rapporteur on free expression david Kaye has written: “The 
ability to search the web, develop ideas and communicate securely may be the 
only way in which many can explore basic aspects of identity, such as one’s gen-
der, religion, ethnicity, national origin or sexuality.”105 It is easy to imagine that 
systematic government access to private- sector data, whether through real- time 
interception, data- retention laws, or some other means, may burden the free-
doms of thought, opinion, religion, and/ or expression in a manner that does not 
comply with the treaties. Indeed, shortly after the Snowden disclosures, La rue 
and his IaCHr counterpart Catalina Botero released a joint declaration stating 
that “indiscriminate access to information on communication between persons 
can have a chilling effect on the free expression of thought and the search for 
and distribution of information,” and emphasizing that “the law must authorise 
access to communications and personal information only under the most excep-
tional circumstances defined by legislation.”106
Meanwhile, the effect of mass surveillance on the freedoms of opinion; 
thought, conscience, and religion; assembly; and association appear to remain 
unaddressed in international case law. However, Kaye has pointed out that both 
mass and targeted surveillance “may undermine the right to form an opinion, as 
the fear of unwilling disclosure of online activity, such as search and browsing, 
likely deters individuals from accessing information, particularly where such 
surveillance leads to repressive outcomes.”107 The same observation likely applies 
to the chilling effect on individuals’ ability to explore and form religious views; 
indeed, in europe, systematic government access to private data may necessarily 
entail violations of what the eCtHr has described as an individual’s right “not 
to be obliged to disclose his or her religion or beliefs,”108 as these will often be 
obvious from communications, browsing histories, and so on. Moreover, it is 
easy to imagine that a government’s systematic surveillance of communications 
and/ or related data (such as location information) could have an impermissible 
103. Ibid., at ¶¶ 53 and 55; Kaye report, above note 93, ¶ 12.
104. Kaye report, above note 93; cf. Human rights Council, above note 102, ¶ 55 (implying 
that states should allow individuals to use encryption).
105. Kaye report, above note 93, ¶ 12.
106.  United nations Special rapporteur on the protection and promotion of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression and the Special rapporteur for freedom of expression 
of the Inter- american Commission on Human rights, Joint Declaration on Surveillance 
Programmes and Their Impact on Freedom of Expression (June 21, 2013), http:// www.oas.org/ 
en/ iachr/ expression/ showarticle.asp?artId=926&lId=1.
107. Kaye report, above note 93, ¶ 21.
108. Işik v. Turkey, application no. 21924/ 05, Judgment, February 2, 2010, ¶ 41.
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deterrent effect upon individuals’ right to assemble and associate with others— 
for example, at political protests, union meetings, or religious study groups.
V.  REMEDIES AND FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION  
IN THE ENJOYMENT OF RIGHTS
A.  The Right to a Remedy for Violations of the Foregoing Rights
each of the human rights instruments described herein manifests a concern 
with ensuring that states cannot violate their legal obligations with impunity. In 
the earlier instruments, this concern takes the form of requiring states to provide 
individuals with a remedy for acts violating constitutional or other legal rights.109 
The later- developed ICCPr, aCHr, and eCHr make it clear that the obligation 
to provide a remedy extends to violations of the rights found in these treaties as 
such.110 This requirement is formally distinct from, although closely related to, 
the oversight- and notification- related obligations identified in the case law and 
commentary described above.
The salient provision of the american declaration refers explicitly and exclu-
sively to accountability through the courts, whereas the aCHr refers to the need 
for a “court or tribunal,” the eU Charter uses the term “tribunal,” and the eCHr 
refers to a “national authority.”111 Meanwhile, the ICCPr suggests that redress 
for rights violations may be provided by “judicial, administrative or legislative 
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system 
of the State,” but specifically requires states parties to undertake to “develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy.”112 Thus, whether the redress in question must 
necessarily be judicial will likely depend upon the instrument(s) by which a state 
is bound as well as the case law of the international human rights bodies.
The eCtHr, for its part, has developed a substantial body of findings on this 
subject, thus far declining to find that a remedy must be judicial but emphasizing 
the need for the pertinent body— whatever form it takes— to be independent and 
effective.113 although the Court once adopted the stance that the availability of 
a remedy in the surveillance context is only required after the interference has 
been disclosed, it now appears to demand at least a limited remedy while the 
surveillance (whether confirmed or alleged) remains underway. Such a limited 
remedy might include, for example, “one where the proceedings are secret and 
109. UdHr, above note 14, art. 8; american declaration, above note 14, art. 18.
110. ICCPr, above note 4, art. 2(3); aCHr, above note 4, art. 25; eCHr, above note 4, art. 13.
111. american declaration, above note 14, art. 18; aCHr, above note 4, art. 25; eCHr, above 
note 4, art. 13; eU Charter, above note 20, art. 47.
112. ICCPr, above note 4, art. 2(3)(b).
113. See, for example, Leander, above note 41, ¶¶ 81, 83– 84; P.G. and J.H., above note 31, ¶ 88.
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where no reasons are given, and the persons concerned are not apprised whether 
they have in fact been monitored— even at this stage.”114 The remedial body must 
nevertheless be able to “grant appropriate relief.”115
B.  Discrimination in Respect of Treaty Rights
as a final point where state obligations are concerned, the human rights instru-
ments are uniform in demanding that government authorities uphold the rights 
contained in those instruments in a manner that does not discriminate on the 
basis of, for example, race, color, religion, sex, language, or political or other 
opinion.116 Thus, if a state were to seek access to private- sector data (thus inter-
fering with privacy rights) on a discriminatory basis, or use data- mining tech-
niques to identify individuals who may belong to a certain religion or hold a 
certain opinion (again interfering with privacy and potentially other rights), 
these practices would presumably run afoul of the state’s non- discrimination 
obligations. Where a state is a party to the International Convention on the 
elimination of all Forms of racial discrimination, its commitments under that 
instrument will also be salient.117
although this chapter does not address the question of whether ICCPr or 
other human rights treaty obligations apply extraterritorially, the oHCHr has 
recently taken the novel approach of applying the anti- discrimination principles 
to suggest that a state must respect privacy and other human rights “regard-
less of the nationality or location” of the individual who is being monitored.118 It 
remains to be seen whether the regional human rights courts will follow the Un 
entities’ lead in this respect.
VI.  CONCLUSION
as state demands for systematic access to communications held or transmitted 
by the private sector increase, it is crucial to recall the danger against which the 
eCtHr and other commentators have so bluntly warned:  the creation of legal 
regimes in which fundamental rights are traded away in the name of crime pre-
vention and national security— in other words, police states. The consistency 
with which the international human rights treaties, courts, and experts have 
114.  Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev, above note 
56, ¶ 100.
115. P.G. and J.H., above note 31, ¶ 85.
116. UdHr, above note 14, art. 2; american declaration, above note 14, art. 2; ICCPr, above 
note 4, art. 2(1); aCHr, above note 4, art. 1; eCHr, above note 4, art. 14; eU Charter, above 
note 20, art. 21
117. International Convention on the elimination of all Forms of racial discrimination, 660 
U.n.t.S. 195 (1965).
118. oHCHr report, above note 4, ¶¶ 35– 36.
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identified and interpreted the relevant rights, as well as their increasing criti-
cisms of mass surveillance, should serve as a reminder that state interferences 
with private data are not necessarily legal simply because they may currently be 
ubiquitous. Both states and individuals should take the long view by following 
the apparent trend among the international bodies and concluding that mass 
surveillance violates human rights— and that, for all of us, those rights are too 
valuable to relinquish.
381
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N I C O  VA N   E I J K
I.  ABSTR ACT
The point of departure for this chapter is the decision of the european Court 
of Justice in the Digital Rights Ireland case, which annulled the european data 
retention directive, in part because the use of retained data was not made sub-
ject to independent oversight. next, it examines judgments from the national 
courts of the netherlands and the UK, also focusing on the independent over-
sight issue, declaring invalid the data retention laws of those two countries. From 
the Digital Rights Ireland case and others, seven standards for oversight of intelli-
gence services can be drawn: the oversight should be complete; it should encom-
pass all stages of the intelligence cycle; it should be independent; it should take 
place prior to the imposition of a measure; it should be able to declare a measure 
unlawful and to provide redress; it should incorporate the adversary principle; 
and it should have sufficient resources.
II.  INTRODUCTION
There are many ways to approach the question of government access to private- 
sector data. Much of the recent public debate has focused on access in the con-
text of national security and traditional law enforcement, with respect to both 
targeted and untargeted access (“bulk collection” or “mass surveillance”) to 
data collected and processed by third parties. as more and more data is col-
lected and stored by the private sector (“big data”), the amount of data that can 
be retrieved by governments is steadily increasing. traditional impediments, 
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privately is increasingly used not just for national security and traditional law 
enforcement purposes. a new “third domain” has emerged, where data is used 
for social security and tax surveillance and other types of nontraditional law 
enforcement. For lack of a better term, we call this third category “public task 
surveillance.”1
Government access to private data implies the deployment of government 
power. In a classic rule of law tradition this requires an explicit basis in law and 
a carefully crafted system of checks and balances: special powers require special 
guarantees. Independent oversight is an undeniably crucial element of such a 
system of checks and balances.
The major preconditions for independent oversight can be found in the 
judgment of the european Court of Justice (eCJ) in the Digital Rights Ireland 
case,2 which annulled the european data retention directive.3 Particularly, the 
Court took the view that the directive did not comply with article 7 (Privacy) 
and article 8 (data protection)4 of the Charter of Fundamental rights of the 
european Union (the Charter).
The Digital Rights Ireland case is the point of departure of this chapter.5 next, 
two recent judgments by national courts are described, in which national data 
1. readers of this chapter are encouraged to come up with a better name. access for other 
types of use, such as statistical analysis, fall outside the scope of this essay. However, we note 
that several similar questions are at stake. For example, the collection of statistical data can 
be based on a legal obligation. In such a case, questions arise on the existence of free consent, 
proportionality, function creep, etc.
2.  Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 april 2014 (requests for a prelimi-
nary ruling from the High Court of Ireland (Ireland) and the verfassungsgerichtshof 
(austria))—Digital Rights Ireland Ltd (C- 293/ 12) v Minister for Communications, Marine 
and Natural Resources, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, The Commissioner 
of the Garda Síochána, Ireland and the Attorney General, and Kärntner Landesregierung, 
Michael Seitlinger, Christof Tschohl and Others (C- 594/ 12), (Joined Cases C- 293/ 12 and 
C- 594/ 12.
3. directive 2006/ 24/ eC of the european Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and 
amending directive 2002/ 58/ eC, Pb. L 105/ 54, 13 april 2006.
4. article 7 (respect for private and family life): “everyone has the right to respect for his or her 
private and family life, home and communications.” article 8 (Protection of personal data): “1. 
everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her; 2. Such data 
must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person con-
cerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. everyone has the right of access to data 
which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified; 3. Compliance 
with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.”
5. The data retention decision of the eCJ was an important element in the Safe Harbor deci-
sion, which annulled the agreement between europe and the United States on the transfer of 
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retention rules were tested against the ruling in the Digital Rights Ireland case, 
and the necessity of independent oversight was discussed in further detail.
We draw from a recent study by the Ivir to formulate standards for independent 
oversight.6 These standards are based on a broader analysis of the relevant 
jurisprudence of the european Court of Justice— including the Digital Rights 
Ireland case— and of the european Court of Human rights (eCtHr).7 The anal-
ysis is also based on selected studies, reports, resolutions, and recommendations.
In the Ivir study and in this chapter, we use a broad definition of the term 
“oversight” to include the various ways of holding government agencies account-
able before the public and the government: internal oversight by the responsible 
minister, parliamentary oversight, judicial oversight, and external independent 
oversight. In the surveillance context, oversight can focus on specific instances 
in which surveillance measures are implemented against a particular target, on 
bulk interception of electronic communications, or on the overall functioning of 
a system of secret surveillance and data collection.
III.  THE EUROPEAN DATA RETENTION DIRECTIVE
as a result of the 2004/ 2005 bombings in Madrid and London, the so- called data 
retention directive came into effect in 2006. This directive was based on general 
powers under the eU- treaties to harmonize rules in the european Union. It did 
not concern national security as such, as the european Union does not have any 
powers in this domain. national security is the sole responsibility of the Member 
States. The european Union does have some authority with respect to traditional 
law enforcement, but in this domain, too, the role of the Member States is deci-
sive to a large extent.
data (european Court of Justice (Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner), Case C- 362/ 14, 
6 october 2015).
6. Sarah eskens, ot van daalen & nico van eijk, “10 Standards for oversight and transparency 
of national Intelligence Services,” 8 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y, no. 3, (2016) pp. 553– 594, 
http:// jnslp.com/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2016/ 07/ 10_ Standards_ for_ oversight_ _ transparency.
pdf.
This chapter focuses on the oversight elements of the study.
7. The european Court of Human rights in Strasbourg— applying the european Convention 
on Human rights— has a rich tradition of jurisprudence on surveillance. This jurisprudence 
is also applicable to the european Union. The Charter makes this explicit in article 52, par. 
3:  “In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
european Convention on Human rights, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be 
the same as those laid down by said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law 
providing more extensive protection.” recently, the european Court of Human rights issued 
two important decisions confirming and deepening its earlier jurisprudence on surveil-
lance (Case of Roman Zakharov v. Russia (application no. 47143/ 06, Strasbourg, 4 december 
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Therefore, the directive was intended to harmonize the laws of Member States 
concerning the obligations of the providers of publicly available electronic com-
munications services or of public communications networks with respect to 
the retention of certain data that is generated or processed by them, in order 
to ensure that the data would be available for the purpose of the investigation, 
detection, and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State 
in its national law. The scope of the directive included both location and traffic 
data, but content fell outside the directive. It should be noted that if topics fall 
outside the scope of a directive, they can still be subject to regulation. Member 
States are entirely free to step in (or have regulation in place already).
The directive provided only a framework for national laws, as shown not only 
by its short length but also by the general nature of its provisions on access, reten-
tion duration (between six months and two years), data storage and security, and 
oversight. detailing these aspects was left to the Member States.
A.  European Court of Justice Declares Directive Invalid
as soon as the directive entered into effect, it was challenged on fundamental 
grounds. Consequently, its implementation was blocked completely or partly by 
national courts in several countries, for instance in Bulgaria (2008), romania 
(2009), Germany (2010), and Cyprus (2011).
In the Digital Rights Ireland case, the directive was eventually submitted to 
the european Court of Justice (eCJ).8 In his preceding opinion, the advocate- 
General concluded that the directive was not in compliance with the Charter, 
but that some room should be allowed for repair.9
The Court found no such room and declared the entire directive invalid. Such 
a step is very unusual. declaring a directive invalid is an extreme measure.
as to oversight, the Court based its judgment on article 8 of the Charter, 
in which data protection is guaranteed as a fundamental right. Paragraph 3 of 
article 8 provides that “compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by 
an independent authority.” The paragraph doesn’t allow exceptions. The Court 
stated “In particular, directive 2006/ 24 does not lay down any objective criterion 
by which the number of persons authorised to access and subsequently use the 
data retained is limited to what is strictly necessary in the light of the objective 
pursued. above all, the access by the competent national authorities to the data 
retained is not made dependent on a prior review carried out by a court or by an 
8. In an earlier case, the eCJ had decided that the eU treaty as such provided sufficient ground 
for the directive (Case C- 301/ 06, Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union). However, the eCJ made explicit that it was not looking into the substance: “It must 
also be stated that the action brought by Ireland relates solely to the choice of legal basis and 
not to any possible infringement of fundamental rights arising from interference with the 
exercise of the right to privacy contained in directive 2006/ 24.”
9. opinion 12 december 2013 (eCLI:eU:C:2013:845).
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independent administrative body whose decision seeks to limit access to the data 
and their use to what is strictly necessary for the purpose of attaining the objec-
tive pursued and which intervenes following a reasoned request of those authori-
ties submitted within the framework of procedures of prevention, detection or 
criminal prosecutions. nor does it lay down a specific obligation on Member 
States designed to establish such limits.”10
noting another consideration, the Court completed its reasoning with respect 
to independent oversight by stating: “the directive does not require the data in 
question to be retained within the european Union, with the result that it cannot 
be held that the control, explicitly required by article 8(3) of the Charter, by an 
independent authority of compliance with the requirements of protection and 
security, as referred to in the two previous paragraphs, is fully ensured. Such a 
control, carried out on the basis of eU law, is an essential component of the pro-
tection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.”11
additionally, the Court made one other comment that is relevant to the ques-
tion of oversight when it noted that the directive did not make any distinction 
concerning the collection of data concerning individuals (such as lawyers) who 
are bound by a duty of professional secrecy: “directive 2006/ 24 affects, in a com-
prehensive manner, all persons using electronic communications services (…). 
Furthermore, it does not provide for any exception, with the result that it applies 
even to persons whose communications are subject, according to rules of national 
law, to the obligation of professional secrecy.”12 With this, the Court seemed to 
indicate that independent oversight in the case of ‘professional secrecy’— and 
perhaps with regards to other uniquely sensitive matters as well— requires spe-
cial attention and safeguards.
B.  National Courts Follow ECJ Decision
after the judgment of the european Court of Justice, various national courts have 
had to rule on the consequences of the judgment for national legislation. after 
all, the cancellation of a directive does not automatically mean that the national 
implementation is invalid. a  directive allows Member States some leeway for 
further specification by which the national regulations might be in compliance 
with the preconditions. The countries where the implementation of the judg-
ment of the Court has been tested include the netherlands, Belgium, Slovenia, 
and the United Kingdom. In each of these countries, the national implementa-
tions of the data retention directive were annulled after judicial review. In the 
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1.  The Netherlands
on March 11, 2015, a district court in the netherlands annulled the dutch 
implementation of the directive.13 The netherlands had implemented the 
directive via a special law, the Wbt (act data retention telecommunication 
Services). With respect to oversight, the court concluded that independent over-
sight was not provided for in the dutch implementation: “The foregoing is all 
the more important considering that the Wbt and related regulations do not 
require a prior authorisation by a judicial authority or independent administra-
tive body in order to access the retained data. different from that which is argued 
by the State, the office of public prosecution cannot be considered an independ-
ent administrative body. That the Court14 has considered this as a compelling 
objection can be derived from the words ‘above all’ in consideration 62 of the 
judgment.”15 The decision of the district court was not challenged pending an 
upcoming review of the dutch Intelligence and Security Services act.
In an october 2015 decision, the same court dealt with the lack of restrictions 
on the surveillance of lawyers.16 Because no special eU legislation or regulation 
is applicable to lawyers, the court did not use the eU Charter as a reference but 
relied instead on article 8 of the european Convention on Human rights (the 
Convention), which provides for protecting privacy and has been used in several 
cases dealing with surveillance. The court was of the opinion “that the breaching 
of journalists’ and lawyers’ privilege has serious consequences for the principles 
of a democratic state governed by the rule of law.”17 The court continued: “The 
mere possibility of breaches of lawyers’ privilege affects the confidentiality of 
communications between lawyers and their clients and thus the right to an 
effective defence and the availability of lawyers. So in a sense this breach is also 
irreversible. Having regard to the serious consequences of (possible) breaches of 
lawyers’ privilege and given that in individual cases abuse is potentially easy, the 
judge considers that, in accordance with the reasoning of the eCtHr in para. 
98 of the Telegraaf case,18 it is highly desirable that there should be indepen-
dent oversight of the exercise of special powers, such that the oversight body 
must possess inter alia the power to prevent or to terminate the exercise of 
special powers.”19 The decision forced the dutch government to implement an 
13. eCLI:nL:rBdHa:2015:2498. Unofficial translation: http:// theiii.org/ documents/ 
dutchdataretentionrulinginenglish.pdf
14. The eCJ in the Digital Rights Ireland case.
15. ¶ 3.11.
16. eCLI:nL:rBdHa:2015:7436, no translation available; the Hague court of appeal upheld 
the verdict eCLI:nL:GHdHa:2015:2881. Unofficial translation of the decision by the Hague 
court of appeal: http:// www.advocates.org.uk/ media/ 1912/ dutchspyingruling.pdf.
17. ¶ 4.10.
18. Case of Telegraaf Media Nederland, Landelijke Media bv and others v. The Netherlands 
(application no. 39315/ 06), 22 november 2012.
19. ¶ 4.10.
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exective order introducing a first form of ex ante independent oversight. a special 
independent committee assesses the proposed orders and can block them.20 The 
order only deals with lawyers and the protection of journalists’ sources.
2.  United Kingdom
In response to the data retention directive being declared invalid in the Digital 
Rights Ireland case, the United Kingdom immediately adopted a new act, the 
data retention and Investigatory Powers act 2015 (drIPa), in an effort to 
address the gaps in the directive identified by the eCJ and thus provide an ade-
quate basis for data retention. The act was fast- tracked through Parliament and 
adopted within three days. In a High Court ruling of July 17, 2015, however, 
the act was declared invalid.21 The complainants argued that the act violated 
articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, and the Court agreed. With respect to prior 
independent oversight the Court referred to the considerations noted by the eCJ 
in the Digital Rights Ireland case and tested the UK legislation against them. 
The High Court pointed out that “the provisions of rIPa, as applied by drIPa, 
require (as we have noted above) that an application for access to communication 
data must be considered by a senior person who is independent of the investiga-
tion. There is already a need for there to be a written request for approval. The 
need for that approval to be by a judge or official wholly independent of the force 
or body making the application should not, provided the person responsible is 
properly trained or experienced, be particularly cumbersome […]; but if eU law 
requires independent approval, as we are satisfied it does, that must be put in 
place. It is not for us to devise the appropriate system.”22
It is interesting that the British Court paid close attention to the same subject 
that had been dealt with earlier in the second dutch case, that is, the special 
position of lawyers— but others are added as well— and stated: “However, com-
munications with practising lawyers do need special consideration. The same 
in our view can properly be said to apply to communications with MPs.” as 
far as oversight is concerned, it concludes: “as to the question of what level of 
consideration should be given to applications involving access to data involving 
communications with lawyers, Members of Parliament, or journalists, that too 
is not for us to determine. We only observe that such cases do require special 
consideration.”23
20. The order by the ministers of the Interior and of defence, responsible for national secur-
ity, is named “tijdelijke regeling onafhankelijke toetsing bijzondere bevoegdheden Wiv 2002 
jegens advocaten en journalisten” (no translation available) and was published in the official 
Journal of 23 december 2015 (no. 46477).
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Finally, the High Court emphasized that it was distingusihing in its analysis 
between access and retention: “We add the important proviso that the require-
ment of prior approval relates to access, not to retention. We see no reason why 
the exercise of the power to retain should need prior independent approval, and 
we do not understand the CJeU to have held that it does.”24
IV.  STANDARDS FOR INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT
The Digital Rights Ireland decision of the european Court of Justice forms a 
core element in our Ivir study Ten Standards for Oversight and Transparency 
of National Intelligence Services. In this study, we formulate generally applica-
ble standards for independent oversight. These standards are based on the juris-
prudence of the european Court of Justice and the european Court of Human 
rights, including what can be deduced from that jurisprudence as best practices, 
and our assessment of the direction future case law is likely to take. In order to 
further substantiate the standards, the study draws from a selection of reports 
and soft law measures that have been issued in europe and the United States.
The following list from the study relates to oversight of intelligence services, 
especially in the context of communication interception using the sophisticated 
technologies now associated with untargeted (“mass”) surveillance. The stan-
dards should be read in combination— one would not work without the others. 
For example, independence in oversight will only be effective if oversight is sup-
ported by adequate resources. no references are included but can be found in 
the report.
A.  Intelligence Services Need to Be Subject to Oversight  
That Is Complete
Under this standard, oversight should be complete in three respects: (1) The 
oversight bodies themselves: the government, parliament, the judiciary, and a 
specialized (non- parliamentary, independent) commission should all play a 
role in oversight. (2) The moment of oversight: oversight should include prior 
oversight, ongoing oversight, and oversight after the fact. (3)  Mandate:  the 
oversight bodies’ mandate should encompass review of both lawfulness and 
effectiveness.
disclosures in the media have demonstrated that there is a need for enhanced 
oversight, even in countries where oversight appears to be quite comprehensive. 
The overall blend of oversight mechanisms for national intelligence services 
is important. In the end, oversight encompassing all of the above elements is 
essential to ensure that adequate and effective guarantees against abuse and arbi-
trary use of secret surveillance and data collection powers are in place. Because 
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proportionality test, we deduce from the jurisprudence that courts can address 
both lawfulness and effectiveness.
B.  Oversight Should Encompass All Stages  
of the Intelligence Cycle
Surveillance occurs in stages, including the collection, storage, querying, and 
analysis of data. as each of these stages amounts to an interference with the right 
to privacy, each should be subject to oversight to a certain degree. In practice, 
this means that not only collection and selection stages should be subject to prior 
independent oversight, but also the analysis itself.
C.  Oversight of the Intelligence Services Should Be Independent
Some of the oversight bodies must be independent of the intelligence services 
and the government. For example, public prosecutors in most political systems 
cannot be regarded as independent of the government. Similarly, government 
ministers cannot provide for independent oversight, as they are part of the gov-
ernment that is both the tasking body and the customer of the intelligence serv-
ices. Judicial oversight offers the best guarantees of independence. Therefore, it 
is preferable to entrust oversight of secret surveillance and data collection to a 
judge, as is already the case in certain jurisdictions. However, the independence 
of judicial- like bodies is not a given. However, the fact that some courts in the 
past “rubber- stamped” government requests or took quite long in making their 
decisions is not an argument against judicial oversight as such. rather, such con-
cerns merely underline that adequate resources are essential to guarantee the 
independence and effectiveness of oversight bodies.
The independence of a specialized commission can be guaranteed by hav-
ing its members appointed by parliament using an open and transparent selec-
tion and nomination procedure, where the voting power should not depend on 
parliamentary size, but where, for example, each political party including the 
opposition gets a vote. Furthermore, a standing parliamentary committee spe-
cializing in oversight of the intelligence services can be regarded as independent 
only if its members represent the opposition as well as the ruling parties, and the 
member’s voting power does not depend on its parliamentary size. The proce-
dure for dismissing members of an oversight body should also guarantee inde-
pendence. Preferably, national law or the national constitution should provide 
that specialized commissions and parliamentary committees cannot be subject 
to instructions from the government.
There is some overlap between oversight by parliamentary committees and 
specialized (parliamentary- appointed) commissions, in the sense that both are 
independent and democratically legitimized. nevertheless, there are advantages 
in having both of them. a parliamentary committee is in a better position to 
defend itself vis- à- vis parliament as a whole and the public, whereas a specialized 
commission allows for greater expertise in oversight.
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to summarize:  independence is reflected in several elements, includ-
ing: (1) transparent and objective procedures for the nomination of the mem-
bers of oversight bodies, (2)  no governmental interference with the activities 
and decisions of the institution performing the oversight, (3) effective powers, 
and (4) adequate resources and budgetary independence.
D.  Oversight Should Take Place prior to the Imposition  
of a Measure
In the field of secret surveillance of communications, especially using the 
sophisticated technologies now associated with untargeted surveillance, the risk 
of abuse is high, and abuse can have harmful consequences not only for indi-
vidual rights but also for democratic society as a whole. Therefore, prior judi-
cial oversight of the application of surveillance and collection powers is strongly 
preferred. Furthermore, the transfer of personal data to third countries requires 
prior approval by the competent supervisory authority. as an alternative to prior 
judicial oversight, a system of ministerial orders combined with prior oversight 
by an independent, specialized commission, after- the- fact oversight on the over-
all functioning of the system of surveillance by a parliamentary committee, and 
the possibility for individuals to complain before an independent body could 
also be compliant with human rights standards. regardless of the structure, 
effective oversight will only exist if the body performing prior oversight has ade-
quate powers (see the next Standard).
It should be noted that prior oversight is not at odds with ministerial responsi-
bility: in a system of prior oversight, the minister gives an order for surveillance, 
and the oversight body merely has the power to block this order. Where— due to 
exceptional circumstances— it is not possible to wait for a decision by the over-
sight body because of the urgent nature of the order, the order should be subject 
to oversight as soon as possible. In addition, the oversight body should have suf-
ficient resources to handle orders quickly. Political responsibility and optimizing 
the protection of fundamental rights are different topics.
E.  Oversight Bodies Should Be Able to Declare a Measure 
Unlawful and to Provide for Redress
Bodies providing prior and ongoing oversight for intelligence services should 
have the power to prevent or end a measure imposed by intelligence services, and 
oversight bodies should have the power to declare a measure unlawful after the 
fact. In all cases, the oversight body should have the power to order the purging 
of personal data. obviously, oversight powers will be effective only if combined 
with the power to make legally binding decisions and to provide for redress of 
the unlawfulness of a measure. Given the gravity of the decision to block or end 
use of a particular surveillance measure, the minister should simultaneously 
have the power to appeal such descisions to a court. Initial orders to conduct 
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surveillance should contain sufficient reasoning to allow oversight bodies and 
appellate courts to evaluate the lawfulness of the measure.
F.  Oversight Should Incorporate the Adversary Principle
Where there is no prior judicial oversight, oversight mechanisms have survived 
the eCtHr’s scrutiny under article 8 of the european Convention on Human 
rights only if they included an adequate complaint procedure. In such a pro-
cedure, the individual concerned can challenge the lawfulness of measures of 
secret surveillance and data collection directed against him after the fact. In 
recent case law, the Court also implied that it should be possible to provide some 
form of adversarial proceeding prior to approval of a surveillance measure, albeit 
one where the proceedings are secret. There is some overlap between the Court’s 
interpretation of article 8 in cases about secret surveillance and data collection 
for the purpose of national security and cases about deportation for the purpose 
of national security. In the context of the latter, the Court expressly requires 
“some form of adversarial proceedings.”
This could mean involving a special advocate who defends the public inter-
est (or the interest of affected individuals). This would introduce some form 
of adversarial proceedings without jeopardizing the secrecy of measures to be 
imposed. Where the surveillance is more general in nature, the special advocate 
would rather take on the role of an expert for the court, in order to allow the 
court to be in a better position to weigh the interests of the intelligence services 
against the interests of the public in not being subject to surveillance. Where 
the surveillance is more targeted, the special advocate would defend the rights 
of the individuals affected. In its 2007 report, the venice Commission was crit-
ical of special advocates, but in its 2015 update of the report it argues for the 
involvement of privacy advocates as regards searching data obtained by strategic 
surveillance.25 one of the most important recommendations of the United States 
Privacy and Civil Liberties oversight Board called for the establishment of spe-
cial advocates before the FISa Court.26
25.  report on the democratic oversight of the security services, adopted by the european 
Commission for democracy through Law (venice Commission), venice, 1– 2 June 2007 (CdL 
ad(2007)016); Update of the 2007 report on the democratic oversight of the security serv-
ices and report on the democratic oversight of signals intelligence agencies, adopted by the 
european Commission for democracy through Law (venice Commission), venice, 20– 21 
March 2015 (CdL- ad(2015)006).
26. Privacy and Civil Liberties oversight Board, Report on the Telephone Records Program 
Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, PCLoB 215 report (January 23, 2014), p. 185. In 2015, in the 
USa FreedoM act, Congress in fact authorized the appointment of special advocates in 
cases before the FISa Court, and the Court has since appointed advocates in several cases and 
designated a small pool of advocates who could be drawn upon in future cases.
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G.  Oversight Bodies Should Have Sufficient Resources  
to Perform Effective Oversight
For oversight bodies to function effectively in practice, it is critical that they have 
the resources to obtain the necessary equipment and staff as well as resources in 
terms of information27 and technical expertise. Having adequate resurces will 
ensure that oversight bodies are independent of the intelligence services and the 
government. Without access to sufficient resources, oversight bodies cannot ful-
fil their mandate in a meaningful way. as the technological sophistication of 
intelligence services will only increase, oversight will become more complicated, 
and it is to be expected that a commensurate increase in resources for oversight 
bodies will be necessary.
V.  ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
european courts consider independent oversight a “condition sine qua non” of 
government surveillance. Governments cannot access private data without suffi-
cient guarantees, including independent oversight. recent jurisprudence by the 
european Court of Justice in the Digital Rights Ireland case— annulling the data 
retention directive— confirms this. It should also be noted that the Charter of 
Fundamental rights of the european Union explicitly mentions independent 
oversight in article 8 (on data protection), paragraph 3: “Compliance with these 
rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.” In most european 
countries, data Protection authorities (dPas) are the independent authority. 
However, dPas often have no or only limited authority in the domain of national 
security or law enforcement.
access to data to prevent serious crime or terrorism requires an assessment by 
a judge or an independent body of similar qualifications. This assessment needs 
to be made before access takes place, but it also needs to be really independent 
and effective. to achieve this, several standards have been formulated. not all 
of these standards are based directly on explicit requirements articulated in the 
jurisprudence: this is not possible because courts have not yet been in the posi-
tion to deal with every situation and element. However, for a country that takes 
the rule of law seriously the implementation of these standards is unavoidable.
The constitutional framework as defined in articles 7 and 8 of the Charter 
makes no distinction between the three domains (national security, law enforce-
ment, public tasks). as a consequence, oversight needs to comply with the same 
standards whenever personal data is accessed for (mass) surveillance. The Digital 
Rights Ireland case makes clear that mass surveillance is worse than targeted 
27.  transparency contributes to access to information. In the report, we have three stan-
dards on transparency:  (1)  intelligence services and their oversight bodies should provide 
layered transparency; (2)  oversight bodies, civil society, and individuals should be able to 
receive and access information about surveillance; and (3) companies and other private legal 
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surveillance but sets oversight standards that are at least similar to those appli-
cable to targeted surveillance. This is why these oversight standards also apply to 
the third domain (public tasks). Having the same level of qualified independent 
oversight does not exclude that— by applying subsidiarity and proportionality 
tests— the allowed use of particular methods and practices can differ among the 
three domains.
Because the constitutional framework makes no distinction, independent 
oversight needs to cover not only collection (the acquistion and storage of data 
into government databases) but also querying the data stored in private sys-
tems. Particularly in europe, it is very likely that governments will collect data 
autonomously by accessing data stored by private entities. Furthermore, once 
accessed, data will often move into government- controlled databases. Finally, 
eU Member States used the data retention directive to oblige operators to col-
lect and store data that they would normally not collect or store. There is only a 
thin line between collection and access as well as between “metadata” and con-
tent. In my view, these lines have no real value anymore from a european funda-
mental rights perspective.
The eCJ’s data retention decision gave renewed attention to the special 
position of “persons whose communications are subject, according to rules of 
national law, to the obligation of professional secrecy,”28 requiring special atten-
tion in the context of oversight. The Court did not specify who falls within the 
category of persons subject to the obligations of professional secrecy, leaving it to 
the national legislator, nor did the Court say anything about what the repercus-
sions should be in the oversight system. This issue is part of the first standard 
(“Intelligence services need to be subject to oversight that is complete”), and it 
will be interesting to see how the debate on the position of lawyers, judges, politi-
cians, doctors, and journalists for instance will develop. The question might arise 




Bulk Collection. Fred H. Cate and James X. Dempsey.
© Fred H. Cate and James X. Dempsey 2017. Published 2017 by Oxford University Press.
21
Stakeholders in Reform of the Global  
System for Mutual Legal Assistance
P E T E R  S W I R E  A N D  J U S T I N  H E M M I N G S *
I.  ABSTR ACT
This chapter briefly explains the reasons that Mutual Legal assistance treaties 
(MLats) and other forms of trans- border access to electronic data are vital 
and becoming increasingly more so for law enforcement in this age of global-
ized evidence. It then adds to the previous literature by presenting the goals 
of key stakeholders in MLat reform:  national governments other than the 
United States; the US government, both for law enforcement and other goals; 
technology companies, such as email and social network providers; and civil 
society, seeking goals including privacy, free speech, and democracy. This 
chapter is part of our broader research and law reform project on law enforce-
ment access to electronic evidence held in other nations.1 other parts of our 
ongoing research will delve into the complex procedures and obstacles that 
characterize international mutual legal assistance today. our ultimate goal is 
to propose reforms (or meaningful alternatives) to the Mutual Legal assistance 
* For support of our ongoing MLat research, the authors wish to thank: the Future of Privacy 
Forum, the Georgia tech Institute for Information Security and Privacy, the Georgia tech 
Scheller College of Business, and the Hewlett Foundation. In addition, we thank apple, 
Facebook, Google, and Microsoft for their research support. The views expressed here are 
solely those of the authors.
1. The other initial article in this research project is Peter Swire and Justin d. Hemmings, 
“Mutual Legal assistance in an era of Globalized Communications: The analogy to the visa 
Waiver Programme,” 71 NYU Annual Survey of American Law 687 (2017), http:// ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2728478. one theme of that article is the possibility of enacting a Mutual Legal 
assistance statute, rather than treaty, modeled on the statutory basis for the visa Waiver 
Programme. our discussion thus generally applies to Mutual Legal assistance (MLa) issues, 
and uses the term “MLat” where the treaties are directly implicated.
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(MLa) system.2 any such reforms, however, will have to be built on an accu-
rate understanding of the incentives and perspectives of the major stakehold-
ers. This chapter focuses on that task.
II.  BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO CURRENT MLAT ISSUES
an example illustrates the rising importance of the MLa process. Suppose there 
is a burglary in Germany, and the two suspected burglars are both German 
nationals, living in Germany. The German police learn that the suspects sub-
scribe to an email service and a social networking service, and the police seek 
the content of those communications. Those records, however, are stored in the 
United States, where government access to the content is governed by the Fourth 
amendment to the US Constitution, generally requiring a search warrant signed 
by a neutral judge based on probable cause of a crime.3 The content is also gov-
erned by the electronic Communications Privacy act (eCPa), which makes it 
illegal for the technology company to turn over the content of communications 
unless the statutory provisions are met.4
Under eCPa and other current law, the German police would have an office in 
the German government contact the US department of Justice, whose office of 
International affairs (oIa) processes requests under a Mutual Legal assistance 
treaty. oIa, working with others in the department of Justice, would determine 
whether a legal basis exists for gaining a court order, and then have a prosecutor 
seek the order. once granted, the court order would go to the technology com-
pany, which would produce the records. Those records would then be reviewed 
by oIa for compliance with US law, such as no violation of First amendment 
2. For discussion of current MLat issues, see andrew K. Woods, “data beyond Borders: Mutual 
Legal assistance in the Internet age,” Global Network Initiative (January 2015) 6– 7; richard 
a. Clark and others, Liberty and Security in a Changing World: Report and Recommendations 
of The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies (december 
12, 2013), https:// www.whitehouse.gov/ sites/ default/ files/ docs/ 2013- 12- 12_ rg_ final_ report.
pdf. one part of our research project is to analyze how MLat issues interact with the issues 
about how cross- border personal data will flow between the european Union and the United 
States in the aftermath of the Schrems decision that found the eU/ US Safe Harbor unlawful. 
an interesting aspect of that discussion will be that Schrems focused on instances where the 
european concern has been that data protection rules in the United States are too lax, whereas 
MLats involve instances where the concern is that the rules in the United States are too strict. 
This article, originally written before the Schrems decision, will note the interactions but not 
focus on that complex topic.
3. See United States v Warshak, 631 F 3d 266 (6th Cir, 2010). The holding in Warshak has not 
been adopted by appellate courts outside the Sixth Circuit, nor has it been addressed by the 
Supreme Court, leaving the issue unresolved in the rest of the United States. In practice, how-
ever, all major companies based in the United States insist that government agencies obtain 
a warrant to compel disclosure of content, and it now appears to be the practice of all US law 
enforcement agencies to do so.
4. 18 U.S.C. SS 2702(a), 2703(c) (2012).
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free speech protections. eventually, after a delay averaging roughly 10 months,5 
the records would be provided to German law enforcement.
one can appreciate the frustration the German police might feel in encounter-
ing this cumbersome process. at least two major technology trends contribute to 
the increased prevalence of such MLat requests, even for routine local criminal 
investigations. First, in contrast to traditional paper records, a globalized Internet 
and pervasive use of cloud technologies mean that records far more often are 
stored outside the country conducting an investigation. Second, real- time wire-
taps on email and other Internet communications are increasingly frustrated 
because the data flowing between the user and the cloud is often encrypted 
by default, so a wiretap on the communications link in Germany gathers only 
encrypted zeros and ones.6 In short, the once- unusual MLat request becomes 
the only means of obtaining records that are encrypted in transit and stored on 
a cloud server in another country. The once- obscure MLat process becomes a 
far more prominent part of global law enforcement investigations. even more 
broadly, the impediments that the current MLa system poses to evidence shar-
ing across borders become an argument in favor of localizing evidence, poten-
tially with a large impact on the practice of globalized communications, and 
implicating governance of the Internet itself.
For all these reasons, there is widespread interest in reforming the MLat sys-
tem or developing viable alternatives to it. The following interest analysis should 
inform that process.
III.  THE PERSPECTIVE OF NON- US GOVERNMENTS
We begin by examining the concerns of countries outside of the United States. 
non- US governments, which for ease of exposition we call “foreign” govern-
ments, face particular frustrations with the current MLat process, because a 
great deal of electronic evidence is housed in the United States, which has rela-
tively strict legal requirements for turning over the evidence.
Some steps to address transborder sharing of electronic evidence were taken 
in the Council of europe Cybercrime Convention, often called the “Budapest 
Convention,” issued in 2001. The Budapest Convention sought to facili-
tate international criminal investigations of cybercrimes such as hacking and 
more broadly to facilitate international cooperation in cases involving elec-
tronic evidence.7 to achieve this, the Convention sought to assure that a law-
ful basis would exist to transfer evidence between nations, notably by requiring 
5. Clark et al., “report and recommendations,” above note 2.
6. Peter Swire, “From real- time Intercepts to Stored records: Why encryption drives the 
Government to Seek access to the Cloud,” 2 Intl Data Privacy Law 200 (november 2012), 
http:// idpl.oxfordjournals.org/ content/ 2/ 4/ 200, http:// ssrn.com/ abstract=2038871.
7.  Convention on Cybercrime (entered into force January 7, 2004)  CetS no 185, http:// 
 conventions.coe.int/ treaty/ en/ treaties/ Html/ 185.htm.
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signatories to cooperate with each other in criminal investigations when seeking 
to search and seize computers, compel disclosure of data stored in computers, 
and carry out real- time interceptions in other countries. However, the treaty did 
not address in any detail the more granular question of ensuring that such cross- 
border cooperation occurs in a timely fashion.
The example of the German burglary shows that MLat requests now apply far 
beyond cybercrimes and can include any traditional local crime with digitized 
evidence, often stored on a server in another country. to the extent that foreign 
law enforcement agencies seek to use MLats, they must learn the unfamiliar 
and relatively strict substantive US legal standards, such as what a US magistrate 
will agree is “probable cause” of a crime under the US Fourth amendment. They 
must also learn how to overcome procedural obstacles, including how to send 
a proper request from the correct officials in their own country to the correct 
officials in the United States.
Compared with gaining evidence from local providers under well- understood 
local rules, seeking evidence through the MLat process can thus seem slow, 
confusing, and burdensome to foreign law enforcement. In response, foreign 
governments understandably have reason to seek faster access to evidence held in 
the United States, under procedures that are more streamlined and more trans-
parent to the requesting government. Foreign governments thus would support 
reforms such as greater funding for oIa to respond to requests and a reduction 
in bureaucratic obstacles to obtaining the evidence.
These governments also face incentives to take measures to address the tech-
nological changes mentioned above— the storage of evidence in other countries 
and the increased prevalence of encryption. one way to respond to these trends is 
to enact data localization requirements, such as russia has done and other coun-
tries have considered.8 In the wake of the Snowden revelations, there are a num-
ber of possible motives for such localization requirements, including: (1) concern 
about how records of their citizens will be treated in the United States; (2) pro-
tectionist support for local cloud providers and other technology companies, 
which would reduce the market share of US providers; and (3) use of localiza-
tion proposals as a way to highlight concerns about US intelligence activities 
and to create leverage for possible changes in US policy.9 In this setting, foreign 
8.  natalia Gulyaeva and Maria Sedykh, “russia enacts data Localization requirement; 
new rules restricting online Content Come into effect,” Hogan Lovells Chronicle of Data 
Protection (July 18, 2014), http:// www.hldataprotection.com/ 2014/ 07/ articles/ international- 
eu- privacy/ russia- enacts- new- online- data- laws/ ; Federal Law of 27 Jul. 2006 no 152- FZ 
“on Personal data” (russia); allison Grande, “Brazil nixes data Localization Mandate 
from Internet Bill,” Law360 (March 2014), http:// www.law360.com/ articles/ 520198/ 
brazil- nixes- data- localization- mandate- from- internet- bill.
9. all three of these possible motives are implicated in the aftermath of the european Court 
of Justice decision in Schrems, striking down the Safe Harbor. The Court concluded that per-
sonal data about europeans would not be protected adequately in the United States. at the 
time of writing, there is uncertainty about whether data protection authorities will make 
similar inadequacy findings about other lawful bases for transferring data, such as model 
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frustrations with the MLat process provide an additional rationale for local-
ization initiatives: making the data more readily available to local authorities. 
We believe there are compelling arguments against data localization of this sort, 
as explained for instance by President obama’s review Group on Intelligence 
and Communications technologies.10 nonetheless, any failure to address MLat 
issues can contribute to the incentives that countries have to consider measures 
to localize evidence for law enforcement purposes.
non- US governments also could take measures to reduce the effectiveness of 
encryption used in sending information from their country to servers in the 
United States or elsewhere. UK prime minister Cameron, for instance, has pro-
posed requiring technology companies to design their products and services to 
ensure government access to encrypted communications, which might enable 
wiretaps within the UK rather than requiring access to servers located in other 
countries.11 as with localization proposals, there are numerous and compelling 
reasons to object to such proposals.12 In addition, as discussed below, effective 
MLat reform could provide a useful alternative to mandates against effective 
encryption.
even more broadly, problems with MLat requests could be used as a reason 
to support changes in Internet governance itself. In general, the United States 
has promoted an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable information and 
communication structure. In the debates over Internet governance, to achieve 
these goals, the United States along with allies such as the european Union has 
strongly supported an inclusive multi- stakeholder model of Internet governance. 
as the review Group wrote:
a competing model, favored by russia and a number of other countries, 
would place Internet governance under the auspices of the United nations 
contracts or Binding Corporate rules. to the extent lawful bases do not exist or become more 
difficult to implement, then data localization in the european Union becomes a more impor-
tant option for businesses. In addition, some writing after the Schrems decision, such as by 
europe- based cloud providers, has emphasized the business incentives for companies to hire 
eU- based cloud providers rather than other global providers, which potentially raises issues 
of protectionist effects after the Schrems decision.
10. Clark et al., “report and recommendations” (above note 2) 214– 16.
11.  rob Price, “david Cameron Is Going to try and Ban encryption in Britain,” Business 
Insider (July 1, 2015), http:// www.businessinsider.com/ david- cameron- encryption- back- 
doors- iphone- whatsapp- 2015- 7?r=UK&Ir=t; James temperton, “no U- turn:  david 
Cameron Still Wants to Break encryption,” Wired (July 15, 2015), http:// www.wired.co.uk/ 
news/ archive/ 2015- 07/ 15/ cameron- ban- encryption- u- turn.
12. Going dark:  encryption, technology, and the Balance between Public Safety 
and Privacy:  Hearing Before the S Comm on the Judiciary, 114th Cong (2015) (state-
ment of Peter Swire, Huang Professor of Law and ethics, Scheller College of Business, 
Georgia Institute of technology), http:// www.judiciary.senate.gov/ meetings/ going- dark- 
 encryption- technology- and- the- balance- between- public- safety- and- privacy.
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and the International telecommunications Union (ItU). This model would 
enhance the influence of governments at the expense of other stakeholders 
in Internet governance decisions, and it could legitimize greater state con-
trol over Internet content and communications.13
to the extent non- US governments experience frustrations in obtaining elec-
tronic evidence from the United States through MLats, there is a risk they may 
shift support to approaches that offer “greater state control over Internet content 
and communications.”
IV.  US GOVERNMENT GOALS
as a general matter, with respect to MLa, agencies across the US government 
share the goal of promoting good relations with other countries by respond-
ing quickly and positively where possible to their requests for information. 
Beyond that, our discussion of US government goals distinguishes between the 
law enforcement perspective and other governmental goals. roughly speaking, 
law enforcement agencies such as the doJ and FBI have a stake in making law 
enforcement information sharing more efficient and cost- effective. other parts of 
the US government are more concerned with broader economic and diplomatic 
implications, including reducing other countries’ incentives to mandate localiza-
tion of data. Both sets of goals are shaped by the fact that US- based companies 
currently provide a large share of online services globally, and consequently hold 
an important fraction of the world’s electronic data within the United States and 
therefore governed by US law. at least for the near future, the United States is a 
primary exporter of electronic evidence— many more requests for mutual legal 
assistance for electronic evidence are made of the US government than by the US 
government.14
A.  Law Enforcement Goals
US law enforcement goals concern: (1) export of electronic evidence, (2) import 
of electronic evidence, and (3)  the role of MLa in addressing encryption. For 
export of evidence, the US government has treaty obligations to respond to legit-
imate MLat requests. In 2013, President obama’s review Group on Intelligence 
and Communications technologies recommended substantial funding increases 
for oIa to respond to the rising number of MLat requests. The administration 
has included such funding in its proposed budgets,15 but Congress has not yet 
13. Clark et al., “report and recommendations” (above note 2) 214– 15.
14. Factual statements here, such as the position of the United States as a net evidence exporter, 
are based on the extensive interviews we have conducted to date.
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agreed to the increases.16 Funding increases, reforming the MLat process, or 
both would be a sign that the United States is addressing the MLa problems, and 
could ease relations with foreign law enforcement partners increasingly frus-
trated by the inefficiencies of the current process. ensuring good relations with 
foreign partners is critical not just for maintaining beneficial relationships in 
the present, but also for cooperation when US law enforcement seeks to import 
evidence, as is likely to happen more often as US- based investigations encounter 
evidence held in other nations.
In ways that have not been widely appreciated to date, MLa reform can also 
provide a response to the concerns expressed by FBI director James Comey 
and others about increasingly prevalent encryption by technology compa-
nies.17 director Comey has expressed particular concern about encrypted 
devices such as smartphones. MLa reform would not affect use of that encryp-
tion. However, prompt and effective use of MLa would in many cases provide 
detailed information useful to law enforcement, even if a device is encrypted 
and communications are encrypted in transit between the user and the cloud. 
For instance, many smartphone users retain photos, emails, and a vast array of 
other content to the cloud, where, as of now, service providers can often access 
the plain text of records when served with a court order. In addition, transbor-
der requests can obtain access to the abundant metadata typically associated 
with a smartphone, such as the time and duration of calls and location of the 
phone, which is also available to service providers when served with a court 
order.18
B.  Other US Government Goals
addressing foreign concerns about today’s MLa process implicates other impor-
tant goals of US policy, such as economic growth, the competitiveness of US 
industry, the protection of free speech and other human rights, and governance 
of the Internet itself. Localization laws, such as the recent russian law, affect all 
16. Hr rep no 113- 448 (2015) 43– 44, https:// www.congress.gov/ congressional- report/ 113/ 
house- report/ 448.
17.  Going dark:  encryption, technology, and the Balance between Public Safety and 
Privacy: Hearing Before the S Comm on the Judiciary, 114th Cong (2015) (statement of James 
Comey, director, Fed Bureau of Investigation), http:// www.judiciary.senate.gov/ meetings/ 
going- dark- encryption- technology- and- the- balance- between- public- safety- and- privacy. For 
one response to Comey’s concerns, see Going dark: encryption, technology, and the Balance 
between Public Safety and Privacy:  Hearing Before the S Comm on the Judiciary, 114th 
Cong (2015) (statement of Peter Swire, Huang Professor of Law and ethics, Scheller College 
of Business, Georgia Institute of technology), http:// www.judiciary.senate.gov/ meetings/ 
going- dark- encryption- technology- and- the- balance- between- public- safety- and- privacy.
18. nicholas Weaver, “iPhones, the FBI, and Going dark,” Lawfare (august 4, 2015), https:// 
www.lawfareblog.com/ iphones- fbi- and- going- dark.
 
G o v e r n a n C e  a n d  o v e r S I G H t402
402
of these goals.19 These laws can serve as a protectionist barrier to trade, creating 
an economic burden on technology companies, such as requiring them to spend 
resources to create expensive new server facilities or making it too expensive 
to enter a foreign market. Localization rules create security risks, as company- 
managed flows of data come under the supervision of national authorities who 
may themselves conduct surveillance on those records, or may access records 
and not retain them in a secure fashion. They also can reduce human rights pro-
tections, when the country with the localization laws can access all data, in con-
trast to the screening done by the US department of Justice to ensure protection 
of free speech and other human rights when responding to MLa requests.
For countries that object to strict rules concerning access to data in the United 
States, frustration with the MLa process can also be used as a rationale for shift-
ing power to the International telecommunications Union or some other mech-
anism for legally requiring greater access. The US government has opposed such 
proposals, believing instead that top- down Internet governance by nation- states 
would threaten the “open, interoperable, secure, and reliable information and 
communications infrastructure that supports international trade and commerce, 
strengthens international security, and fosters free expression and innovation.”20
V.  GOALS OF TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES
The companies most involved in current MLa debates are US- based email, 
social network, and other companies that provide online consumer services in 
numerous countries.21 These companies have been driving the two trends affect-
ing the current MLat process: the offering of services in one country with the 
data being stored on cloud servers in another country (often the United States) 
and expanding the use of encryption for communications that previously were 
subject to local wiretaps.
The views of these companies with relation to MLa are complex, because mul-
tiple goals of these companies and their employees are affected. For instance, the 
companies wish to provide high- quality services to customers. While doing so, 
leaders of these companies have a sincere belief in fostering human rights and 
protecting free speech on the Internet; they also have a sincere desire to cooper-
ate with lawful requests for prosecution of dangerous criminals. Based on exten-
sive interviews, we have identified six goals, which we present here in order of 
19. Gulyaeva and Sedykh, “russia” (above note 8); Federal Law of 27 July 2006 no 152- FZ “on 
Personal data” (russia); Grande, “Brazil” (above note 8).
20. White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and openness 
in a networked World (May 2011).
21. as noted in the initial footnote, funding for our ongoing research comes in part from tech-
nology companies as well as foundation funding, all of whom have provided such funding in 
order to advance research and reform on these issues but without overseeing the content of 
our writing. The views expressed here are solely those of the authors.
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expositional clarity, and not from most to least important: (1) avoiding conflict-
ing legal rules, (2) opposing data localization requirements, (3) cooperating with 
appropriate requests from law enforcement, (4) acting consistently with human 
rights goals, (5) retaining access to as many markets as feasible, and (6) develop-
ing practices that enhance the company’s reputation, especially for trustworthy 
stewardship of emails, social networking, and other records.
a first concern is to avoid conflicting legal rules, notably where the United 
States prohibits release of records under the electronic Communications Privacy 
act but another country requires release of those same records. Companies have 
faced credible threats from foreign countries that local employees would be jailed 
or otherwise punished if the company did not comply with local demands for 
evidence. Companies, facing these threats, understandably would like to support 
an MLa system that provides clear rules for when records should be produced, 
in ways that comply with the laws of all relevant countries.
a second understandable concern of global technology companies is to min-
imize the burdens they face from data localization laws. The United nations 
has nearly two hundred Member States.22 By contrast, Google lists 14 data cen-
ters as of September 2015,23 and a single Microsoft data center in virginia cost 
$1 billion.24 The mismatch between number of countries and number of data cen-
ters led the review Group to write: “Global inter- operability has been a funda-
mental technical feature of the Internet; bits flow from one user to the next based 
on technical considerations rather than national boundaries. national efforts to 
tamper with this architecture would require pervasive technical changes and be 
costly in economic terms.”25
Third, companies would like to comply with legitimate law enforcement records 
requests, for reasons including the business benefits of cooperating with govern-
ments as well as a sincere desire to assist in deterring and punishing criminal 
conduct. Major technology companies today employ former prosecutors and law 
enforcement agents, who often have special sympathy for and insight about the law 
enforcement mission.
Fourth, the reasons to assist each nation’s law enforcement, by providing ready 
access to records, can be in tension with the companies’ desire to act consist-
ently with human rights goals such as promotion of privacy, democracy, and free 
speech. Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! were the founding corporate members of 
the Global network Initiative, dedicated to “protecting and advancing freedom 
22. United nations Members States, United nations http:// www.un.org/ en/ members/ .
23. data Center Locations, Google http:// www.google.com/ about/ datacenters/ inside/ locations/ 
index.html.
24.  rich Miller, “Microsoft’s $1 Billion data Center,” Data Center Knowledge (January 31, 
2013), http:// www.datacenterknowledge.com/ archives/ 2013/ 01/ 31/ microsofts- 1- billion- 
roofless- data- center/ .
25. Clark et al., “report and recommendations” (above note 2) 223.
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of expression and privacy in information and communication technologies.”26 
Such companies, and many people employed by them, have strong ties to civil 
society organizations in the digital due Process Coalition, which supports 
stricter rules for US government access to records under eCPa.27
Fifth, the companies for business reasons would like to retain access to as many 
national markets as feasible. The business benefits of expanding to all countries 
are balanced by the risks of doing business in certain markets, such as potential 
punishments of employees if records are not produced from the United States, 
employees’ opposition to support for dictators or violations of human rights, and 
reputational harm resulting from any such support. an improved MLa system 
would clarify which nations are following procedures consistent with a com-
pany’s policies about which national markets to participate in.
Sixth, in the post- Snowden era, major companies wish to assure customers 
that the companies will provide trustworthy stewardship of communications. 
Both within and outside of the United States, the companies have an incentive to 
demonstrate that use of their services is not tantamount to providing access to 
the nSa. Clarity in the MLa process helps the companies show that they comply 
with appropriate requests for government access, but that consumers can funda-
mentally expect careful handling of communication records.
Smaller companies also face negative consequences from localization require-
ments. Such firms lack the economies of scale to construct multiple data centers 
and face obstacles to competing with local companies while paying the costs 
of relying on local data centers. although smaller companies could choose not 
to comply with data localization laws, doing so would require them to hold no 
assets in a territory with a data localization law, and employees traveling to those 
territories could face the risk of arrest.28
In sum, these six goals show the complex considerations that major technol-
ogy companies face with respect to MLat reform. reconciling these consider-
ations will by no means be a simple task, but clarifying the multiple goals will 
assist in crafting a thoughtful and sustainable overall strategy.
VI.  GOALS OF CIVIL SOCIETY
Civil society groups support international institutions, including MLats, that 
protect privacy and free speech, and promote democracy and democratic dissent. 
26.  Core Commitments, Global network Initiative http:// www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/ 
corecommitments/ index.php.
27. About the Issue, digital due Process https:// digitaldueprocess.org/ about- the- issue/ .
28. notably, previous russian data protection legislation has specifically applied only to busi-
nesses with a legal presence in russia and that process personal data on russian soil. It has 
not yet been determined whether the same limits will apply to the data localization law, but 
if they do then smaller companies would only need to comply with the law if they sought to 
open operations within russia. Gulyaeva and Sedykh, “russia” (above note 8).
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The current system already has many positive features from the civil society per-
spective, and reforms might result in an even more positive system. on the other 
hand, civil society groups may differ in the priorities they set on protections that 
apply in the United States, in europe and other democratic countries, and in 
repressive regimes. Failure to update the MLat process also risks data localiza-
tion and other measures that could strengthen the position of non- democratic 
governments in Internet governance.
The positive features of the current MLa system derive from the strong US 
protections for both privacy and free speech. Under current law, foreign gov-
ernments seeking communications stored in the United States generally must 
show probable cause of a crime, as found by a neutral US magistrate, before the 
contents of those communications can be shared to the requesting country. In 
contrast to other areas of privacy law, the United States is often stricter than 
european and other countries when it comes to the standard for law enforce-
ment access to communications data.29 In addition, before sending evidence 
to the requesting country, oIa reviews communications to ensure compliance 
with the First amendment, which is an important protection for free speech and 
democratic dissent. a broad array of civil society groups in general favor these 
sorts of privacy and free speech protections.
Civil society groups may have somewhat different priorities in the MLa reform 
process, depending on the extent to which they focus on the rules that apply in 
the United States, in making disclosures to europe and other democratic coun-
tries, and when information is shared with repressive regimes. US- based groups 
have supported stricter standards for US government access to communica-
tions information, some of which were enacted in 2015 in the USa Freedom 
act, which among other provisions created new privacy protections limiting 
bulk collection for foreign intelligence purposes.30 US- based civil society groups 
hope to achieve comparable reform for law enforcement purposes under eCPa, 
most prominently through the campaign of the digital due Process Coalition. 
In summary, the Coalition seeks:  (1)  communication contents and location 
information only with a probable cause warrant, (2) to/ from and other metadata 
under stricter standards than today, and (3) no bulk collection by subpoena.31 
These reforms would heighten the standards within the United States for law 
enforcement access.
29.  one part of our research project on MLats is to explore how the relatively strict US 
approach to transborder flows for law enforcement intersects with the relatively strict eU 
approach to other transborder data flows, as shown in the 2015 decision striking down the 
eU/ US Safe Harbor. We are researching a forthcoming article for the Emory Law Journal that 
addresses that subject.
30.  Peter Swire, “The USa FreedoM act, the President’s review Group and the Biggest 
Intelligence reform in 40 Years,” IAPP Privacy Perspectives (June 8, 2015), https:// iapp.org/ 
news/ a/ the- usa- freedom- act- the- presidents- review- group- and- the- biggest- intelligence- 
reform- in- 40- years.
31. Our Principles, digital due Process https:// digitaldueprocess.org/ our- principles/ .
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eU civil society groups have reason to place a priority on the protections that 
apply to communications made in or from the eU. For these groups, the MLa 
process presents an opportunity to advocate for stricter rules for access in eU 
countries. For instance, eU groups could favor having the United States stand 
firm on the requirement for a neutral magistrate, as a way to push for a judicial 
role for access requests in the eU.
In considering MLat reform, civil society groups focused on protecting 
human rights in repressive regimes have a similar incentive to favor maintaining 
the current US rules. notably, the free speech protections in current US law gen-
erally bar release of evidence from the United States for “political” crimes that 
constitute protected speech under the US First amendment. These groups would 
be wary of any proposal that reduced the US department of Justice scrutiny of 
evidence under the First amendment.
Possible tensions could exist among these priorities of different civil soci-
ety groups. For instance, consider the example of the German burglary, with 
German suspects, but with evidence in the United States. Some reform proposals 
would apply German law to such requests, so that US companies could provide 
the evidence under German procedural rules, even where eCPa would other-
wise require a probable cause warrant. That approach could be disappointing for 
eU- based civil society groups, because of the lost opportunity for strengthen-
ing eU law. The approach, however, might be more tempting for US- based civil 
society groups if it were part of a package that created other reforms supported 
by the digital due Process Coalition. This example is not given to take a posi-
tion on such a reform proposal; instead, the point is that different civil society 
groups may understandably have different priorities, while generally wishing to 
strengthen civil liberties protections.
as with other reform efforts, civil society groups can face trade- offs among 
multiple goals. one goal is to strengthen the standards for law enforcement, 
such as the digital due Process Coalition proposals would do. another goal 
is to maintain an open Internet, including skepticism about data localization 
and a large role for the International telecommunications Union. eCPa reform 
would enhance privacy by raising the standards for US government access to 
records, as well as the standards that non- US requests would have to meet. eCPa 
reform would also be a model for other nations to follow, and the desire to use 
MLa to gain evidence could create leverage to encourage other nations to level 
up to the US procedural standards. on the other hand, stricter US standards 
for MLa could backfire. If MLa becomes even more unworkable, then non- 
US countries have stronger reasons to consider localization proposals or other 
measures to gain records without recourse to the rule- of- law MLa process. More 
nations could similarly be tempted to look to the ItU or other Internet govern-
ance arrangements that grant greater sovereignty to each nation, if such reforms 
helped nations gain access to the evidence they seek. In short, civil society organ-
izations thus face strategic choices about how to pursue both the US law reform 
agenda as well as measures that will protect privacy, free speech, and democratic 
dissent outside of the United States.
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VII.  CONCLUSION
This chapter, based on extensive interviews to date with relevant stakeholders, 
has sought to articulate the goals of major stakeholders in the MLat proc-
ess. This sort of realistic assessment of the major actors is an essential step, 
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From Real- Time Intercepts  
to Stored Records
Why Encryption Drives the Government to Seek  
Access to the Cloud
P E T E R   S W I R E
I.  ABSTR ACT
This chapter complements the country- by- country chapters for The Privacy 
Project’s initiative on Systematic Government access to Private- Sector data. This 
chapter describes technological changes that shift law enforcement and national 
security attention from traditional wiretap techniques to greater emphasis on 
access to stored records, particularly records stored in the cloud.
The major and growing reliance on surveillance access to stored records results 
from the following changes:
 (1) encryption. adoption of strong encryption is becoming much more 
common for data and voice communications, via virtual private 
networks, encrypted webmail, SSL web sessions, and encrypted voice 
over IP voice communications.
 (2) declining effectiveness of traditional wiretaps. traditional wiretap 
techniques at the ISP or local telephone network increasingly 
encounter these encrypted communications, blocking the 
effectiveness of the traditional techniques.
 (3) new importance of the cloud. Government access to communications 
thus increasingly relies on a new and limited set of methods, notably 
featuring access to stored records in the cloud.
 (4) The “haves” and “have- nots.” The first three changes create a new 
division between the “haves” and “have- nots” when it comes to 
government access to communications. The “have- nots” become 
 
 
G o v e r n a n C e  a n d  o v e r S I G H t410
410
increasingly dependent, for access to communications, on cooperation 
from the “have” jurisdictions.
This chapter explains how changing technology, especially the rising adoption of 
encryption, is shifting law enforcement and national security lawful access to far 
greater emphasis on stored records, notably records stored in the cloud. Section 
II describes the changing technology of wiretaps and government access. Section 
III documents the growing adoption of strong encryption in a wide and growing 
range of settings of interest to government agencies. Section Iv explains how 
these technological trends create a major shift from real- time intercepts to stored 
records, especially in the cloud.
II.  THE CHANGING TECHNOLOGY OF WIRETAPS 
AND GOVERNMENT ACCESS
This section of the chapter provides a brief history of wiretap technology. The 
history reveals two themes: (1) a shift in the place of interception from the local 
to the remote, and (2) a shift from “voice” wiretaps in real time to “data” access 
to stored Internet records. taken together, this history shows a shift in how gov-
ernment accesses records, with a far greater emphasis today on access to records 
stored remotely.
Figure 22.1 shows the traditional wiretap of a copper phone line. In the Figure, 
alice is calling Bob. For a copper wire, the technology of a wiretap is quite 
simple— touch another copper wire to the phone line, and induction makes it 
possible to listen to the call. This wiretap might take place near alice’s (or Bob’s) 
house, such as if a police officer tapped the phone line near the house. It could 
also take place at the telephone company’s central office, where the officer could 
similarly implement a wiretap.
By the early 1990s, however, many phone lines were shifting from copper to 
fiber optics. Copper touching a copper wire is satisfying for the wiretapper— 
the police officer can listen to the call. Glass touching glass is distinctly 
unsatisfying— no current passes from glass to glass, and no sound emerges. 
along with changes in telephone switches, this shift from copper wire to dig-
ital telephony was an important justification for passage in the United States in 
1994 of the Communications assistance for Law enforcement act (CaLea).1 
a core requirement of CaLea was that telecommunications carriers and manu-
facturers of telecommunications equipment design their products and services 
to ensure that they could carry out a lawful order to provide government access 
to communications. The department of Justice and Federal Communications 
Commissioner were given important powers to assess whether products and 
services complied with the CaLea requirements.
1.  Communications assistance for Law enforcement act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001– 1010 (2012) 
(CaLea).
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In Figure 22.2, alice once again calls Bob. even if alice has fiber optic to the 
home, the telephone company is required to design its system so that lawful 
access is available at the switch. For mobile telephone calls, there may be encryp-
tion between alice and the cell tower, but the telephone company has to be able 
to carry out a lawful access order at the cell tower or elsewhere in its network. 
The emphasis on access at the switch or cell tower is a step from the local to the 
remote. The wiretap no longer occurs next to alice’s house; instead, the wiretap 
typically occurs at a switch in a digital network. This change puts the fruits of 
the wiretap closer to the center of the network— an interception at the central 
switch likely can be sent easily to a centralized location for the law enforcement 
or national intelligence agency.
CaLea as enacted in 1994 made an important distinction between “tele-
communication services,” which are covered by the law, and other “informa-
tion services,” which are not.2 CaLea clearly applied to the traditional voice 
calls made over a public switched telephone network. By contrast, CaLea 
did not apply to the nascent use of data sent over the Internet. The first com-
mercial activity over the Internet was permitted only in late 1992.3 Thus, the 
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Figure 22.1 Wiretap of a copper phone line.
2. CaLea, 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).
3. Peter P. Swire, “trustwrap: The Importance of Legal rules to electronic Commerce and 
Internet Privacy,” (2003) 54 Hastings LJ 848, 860 n.33.
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Internet was left unregulated by the CaLea requirements to design products 
and services as wiretap ready. In a 2005 order by the Federal Communications 
Commission, CaLea was interpreted to apply to voice over Internet 
Protocol (voIP) providers who connect calls to the public switched telephone 
network.4
as shown in Figure  22.2, CaLea applied to the traditional phone network, 
which had one or a few dominant telephone companies in most countries. The rise 
of the Internet, however, placed an enormous number of different entities in the 
communication path from alice to Bob. Figure 22.3 shows that, as alice’s pack-
ets go from alice to Bob, a large and unknown set of actors are potentially in the 
position to store those packets and read them. Some of these actors are actually or 
potentially malicious, from amateur hackers through organized crime groups to 
hostile nation- states. The operators of numerous other nodes have weak cybersecu-
rity, so that malicious parties can create “bots” under their remote control, or can 
gain root access to servers and thus send data back to the intruding party.
The fundamental insecurity of the intervening nodes was well known in the 
1990s, and was a key technical reason in favor of strong encryption for Internet 
communications. The “crypto wars” of the 1990s resulted from the tension 
between (1) this technical need for strong communications security, and (2) the 
opposing concern of law enforcement and national security agencies that strong 
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Figure 22.2 Wiretap on a fiber optic network after CaLea.
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encryption would block access to data, a problem that has since become known 
as “going dark.”5 In 1999, the US government shifted its position, and permitted 
the export of strong encryption to most countries and for most purposes.6
III.  THE GROWING ADOPTION OF STRONG ENCRYPTION
although export of strong encryption from the United States became gener-
ally legal in 1999, actual adoption was lower than expected for email and other 
Internet actions. after all, few of us make a conscious decision to use an encryp-
tion program as part of sending and receiving email. despite this previously low 
adoption, a major point of this chapter is that effective encryption is in the midst 
of becoming the default way that many communications occur on the Internet.
Figure 22.4 illustrates the effect of strong encryption on lawful access at an 
Internet Service Provider or in the other nodes of the Internet between alice and 
Bob. In the diagram, alice wraps her message in Bob’s “public key.” This public 
key is a long set of numbers that Bob posts publicly, to enable anyone to send a 
message to him. The message is thus encrypted all the way between alice and 
Bob. at Bob’s end, he deploys his “private key,” known only to him, to return the 













































Figure 22.3 Many intervening nodes in Internet communications.
5. Peter Swire and Kenesa ahmad, “ ‘Going dark’ versus a ‘Golden age of Surveillance,’ ” CDT 
Blog (november 28, 2011), https:// cdt.org/ blog/ %e2%80%98going- dark%e2%80%99- versus- 
a- %e2%80%98golden- age- for- surveillance%e2%80%99/ .
6. The White House announcement of this policy is http:// intellit.muskingum.edu/ cryptog-
raphy_ folder/ encryption2.htm.
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This encryption by alice and Bob limits the usefulness of a lawful access order 
implemented at alice or Bob’s Internet Service Provider (ISP), or at any node in 
the Internet between alice and Bob. The reason is simple— the order may cap-
ture the bits of alice’s message, but those bits are strongly encrypted. The lawful 
order does not give the government agency access to the content of the commu-
nication, unless special circumstances exist (e.g., use of weak encryption or gov-
ernment knowledge of Bob’s private key).
For today’s Internet, one variation is worth noting. Major webmail provid-
ers, including Gmail and Hotmail, now automatically encrypt emails from 
alice to Bob. a lawful order at the ISP level thus sees only encrypted, unread-
able ones and zeros. However, and central to the emerging strategies for lawful 
access, emails saved by alice or Bob on the webmail’s servers are not strongly 
encrypted. Instead, by default the server owner retains the technical ability 
to read the plain text of the emails. a lawful access order to the server owner 
(often referred to as a “cloud provider”) can successfully compel disclosure of 
the email content.
The shift to encryption for major webmail providers, all by itself, substantially 
reduces the effectiveness of a lawful access order to an ISP. This shift occurs in 
the context of other widespread adoption of effective encryption:
• Corporate and government users have widely adopted virtual Private 
networks (vPns) for remote users. vPns are strongly encrypted, thus 
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Figure 22.4 encryption and Internet communications.
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• electronic commerce, including credit card numbers, is 
overwhelmingly conducted today using SSL (Secure Sockets Layer).
• Facebook now supports SSL. If it enables SSL by default, then its social 
networking communications would not be readable at the ISP level.
• research in Motion’s Blackberry products use strong encryption, and rIM 
itself does not have the keys for corporations who manage keys themselves.
• Major web locker services, such as dropbox, use SSL by default.
• Skype, the leading voIP provider, encrypts end- to- end. Many 
international calls are made using Skype. voIP enables voice 
communications to be encrypted at scale.
• Many Internet games and other services use encryption, often with 
accompanying voice and chat channels.
taken together, these changes indicate that widespread encryption adoption is 
well underway for email and voice communications. This shift brings greater 
cybersecurity, greatly reducing the risk that the millions of nodes of the Internet 
can be used to read the content of communications. The shift also means that 
government agencies will be far less likely in the future to be able to intercept the 
content of communications at the local ISP or telephone company.
IV.  WHY THESE TECHNOLOGY TRENDS RESULT  
IN GREATER FOCUS ON CLOUD PROVIDERS
The widespread adoption of encryption for communications affects the choices 
for government agencies seeking lawful access. Logically, there are four ways for 
agencies to access communications:
1. Break encryption in transit.
2. Intercept before or after encryption.
3. assure access in unencrypted form.
4. access after the fact, in stored form, often in the cloud.
a major descriptive conclusion of this chapter is that a wide range of law enforce-
ment and national security agencies will face large or insuperable obstacles to the 
first three methods. These agencies will thus increasingly depend on access to 
stored records, notably those stored in the cloud.
A.  Break Encryption in Transit
By definition, “strong” encryption means that it is extremely difficult for gov-
ernment agencies or others to get the plain text of encrypted communications.7 
7.  For discussion of current technical, legal, and policy issues on encryption, see Peter 
Swire and Kenesa ahmad, “encryption and Globalization,” 13 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev 416 
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For an unbroken encryption algorithm, attackers must use a brute force attack, 
trying each possible key until the plain text is revealed. a  higher key length 
exponentially increases the average number of calculations needed on average 
to decrypt a communication. today, users of encryption can simply increase the 
key length to make brute force attacks ever more difficult.
after the United States permitted export of strong encryption in 1999, routine 
commercial deployment of encryption became unbreakable, as a practical mat-
ter, for most law enforcement and national security agencies. academic cryp-
tographers constantly test for flaws in widely- used cryptosystems, and publish 
known attacks. This constant and public testing of cryptosystems means that 
flaws become widely known.
as with other methods of access, it is possible that there are “haves” when it 
comes to breaking encrypted messages.8 one recent publication claimed that the 
US national Security agency has made a significant breakthrough against the glob-
ally used advanced encryption Standard.9 Without access to classified informa-
tion, it is not possible to assess this claim, or the extent of any such breakthrough. 
This sort of breakthrough, however, is at most available to a tiny subset of all law 
enforcement and national security agencies that may wish to gain lawful access to 
communications. For the rest, breaking modern encryption is not feasible.
B.  Intercept before or after Encryption
If it is too difficult to break an encrypted message, then government agencies may 
try to get access to real- time communications before or after they are encrypted. 
one way to do this is by physically entering a person’s home or business, and 
installing a bug or other surveillance device. Such a physical entry may be used 
in high- priority cases, but it is risky and costly for government agencies to insert 
such devices often.
an approach with less risk of an agent being caught would be for the gov-
ernment agency to hack into the target’s computer remotely. The large size and 
number of “bot farms” and other compromised computers suggests that an 
appreciable fraction of computers may be open to such attacks. according to 
one estimate, at least 6 percent of the world’s 4 billion IP addresses are part of a 
zombie network,10 and another expert estimates that the top four botnets alone 
control over 20 million computers.11
8. My thanks to Chris Soghoian for his insights on the effects on the “haves” and “have nots.”
9.  James Bamford, “Inside the Matrix,” Wired (March 15, 2012), http:// www.wired.com/ 
threatlevel/ 2012/ 03/ ff_ nsadatacenter/ .
10.  Mark Clayton, “Biggest- ever Criminal Botnet Links Computers in More than 172 
Countries,” Christian Science Monitor (June 29, 2011), http:// www.csmonitor.com/ USa/ 2011/ 
0629/ Biggest- ever- criminal- botnet- links- computers- in- more- than- 172- countries.
11. “Major Botnets Have Infected over 20 Million Computers, Says Kaspersky,” Infosecurity 
Magazine (September 27, 2011), http:// www.infosecurity- magazine.com/ view/ 20986/ major- 
botnets- have- infected- over- 20- million- computers- says- kaspersky/ .
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The adoption of strong encryption creates a motive for government agencies 
to break into a target’s computer before or after encryption. The large number of 
vulnerable computers creates an opportunity for such entry. Press reports of an 
FBI “computer and internet protocol address verifier,” placed remotely on a user’s 
computer, provide evidence that these sorts of software break- ins have occurred 
in at least some instances.12 Sophisticated government agencies may thus employ 
this strategy in high- priority cases.
There are nonetheless important reasons to believe that hacking into targets’ 
computers is not and will not be a major strategy for lawful access. First, this sort 
of secret and routine access, into users’ actual computers, is unlikely to remain 
secret over time. Second, the legal infrastructure for this sort of government 
hacking is uncertain or nonexistent in many jurisdictions. Third, the growing 
recognition of the importance of cybersecurity creates strong policy reasons to 
improve computer security, rather than rely on weak security for lawful access.13
C.  Assure Access in Unencrypted Form
another route for lawful access is for the law to mandate a communications 
infrastructure that assists lawful interception. as discussed above, CaLea is a 
prominent example, requiring that telecommunications products and services 
in the United States be wiretap- ready. Similar rules exist under the regulation 
of Investigatory Powers act of 2000 in the United Kingdom, and Canada is now 
considering similar legislation. The analysis here suggests that such laws may 
remain an important source of lawful access in some settings, but are unlikely to 
succeed for many types of communications of interest to government agencies.
For landline telephone calls, CaLea means that telephone calls can be 
accessed “in the clear” (unencrypted) at the switch. For wireless calls, there typ-
ically is encryption from the handset to the tower, and the telephone company 
decrypts the call at the tower or elsewhere so that the wiretap can operate. The 
handsets themselves must comply with CaLea as well. CaLea is thus an exam-
ple of an architectural rule— the telecommunications architecture is created in a 
manner that enables lawful access to the telephone call.
Going forward, a key question is the scope of this architectural rule as com-
munications shift from the traditional telephone network to the Internet. 
telephony has historically covered a small number of large, regulated compa-
nies, and a tiny fraction of telephone equipment has used strong encryption that 
would frustrate a wiretap. Implementation of CaLea even in this environment 
took a number of years and included contentious court suits. Yet it is relatively 
12. Kevin Poulsen, “FBI’s Secret Spyware tracks down teen Who Made Bomb 
Threats,” Wired (July 18, 2007), http:// www.wired.com/ politics/ law/ news/ 2007/ 07/ fbi_ 
spyware?currentPage=all.
13. Swire and ahmad, “encryption and Globalization,” (above note 7)  (discussing relation 
between cybersecurity and encryption).
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easy to enforce CaLea in this setting of a few companies, experienced with 
regulators, and with little encryption.
The Internet, by contrast, features a large and shifting array of (often unreg-
ulated) information services providers, not just for voIP but for a burgeoning 
array of text, audio, and video services. and the computers, game console, and 
other products that use these services are also incredibly diverse. requiring 
“wiretap readiness” for all of these products and services would be considerably 
more difficult than for traditional telephony, given the diversity of products and 
services, the lack of regulatory experience among many of the actors, and the 
widespread use of encryption in many Internet activities.
a popular online video game such as World of Warcraft (WoW) illustrates the 
different perspectives of government agencies and Internet users. to players of 
WoW (such as my sons), WoW is a fun game. They often wear headsets to talk 
with teammates while playing, and keep a chat window scrolling as well. to law 
enforcement, WoW (or any other similar game) can seem instead to be a global 
terrorist communications network. Players can talk and send chat messages, 
internationally, outside of the traditional telephone network and outside of the 
scope of CaLea. The architecture is based on what works for the game, and not 
what facilitates lawful access.
to summarize on this architectural approach, government agencies will face 
a number of practical obstacles in attempts to require “in the clear” commu-
nications over the Internet. The fundamentally insecure nature of the Internet 
(as shown in Figure 22.3, above) means that effective encryption is vastly more 
common and more important for Internet services than for traditional telephone 
services. even when government agencies temporarily learn how to gain access 
to a particular product or service, the rate of innovation on the Internet remains 
high— when a new game or a new version of a game is issued, the access that 
worked previously may no longer succeed. at a minimum, the complexity and 
innovation on the Internet will likely cause further separation between “have” 
and “have not” agencies, with far greater ability to adapt for leading national 
agencies than for local police departments or agencies in poorer countries.
D.  Access after the Fact, in Stored Form, Often in the Cloud
The discussion thus far has highlighted new obstacles in the path of access to 
communications at the local ISP or telephone company. Where strong encryp-
tion is used, then attempts at such access will produce random ones and zeros 
rather than the contents of the communication. The widespread use of encryp-
tion is spreading from vPns to standard webmail, social networks, and voIP 
such as Skype.
When local attempts to access fail, then government agencies have a strong 
incentive to turn to the system owners, such as the operators of webmail or voIP. 
Most emails using Gmail or Hotmail are unencrypted at the server level, so gov-
ernment agencies around the world have reason to seek access from Google and 
Microsoft. Similarly, because Skype interconnects with the traditional telephone 
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network, it is required to be wiretap- ready under the 2005 FCC CaLea order, 
and agencies have reason to come to that company for access.
Beyond webmail and voIP, the widespread use of encryption for e- commerce, 
banking, and other Internet communications means that a vast range of data 
is generally accessible from a party to the communication (such as a bank or e- 
commerce company) but not from wiretaps in transit. The bank or e- commerce 
company generally needs to be able to store and read the information in the clear. 
even if the company encrypts its own databases, it will have the keys, so lawful 
access will not be blocked due to that encryption.
encryption at the cloud may block lawful access in some other settings. For 
instance, a locker or cloud provider might enable storage of email and other con-
tent in encrypted form, with the keys held only by the client of the locker or cloud 
service. In such instances, access to the locker or cloud service will not enable 
the agency to read the content. The prevalence of this sort of encrypted storage 
is unclear, but at least two reasons suggest it is not now, nor will it soon be, a 
general barrier to lawful access. First, there are significant technical challenges 
for efficient search and retrieval of encrypted data.14 There are thus business and 
functional reasons not to store all data in encrypted form. Second, it is extremely 
risky for users to store data in the cloud without having a backup of the keys— 
loss of the keys will irretrievably lose access to the data. For that reason, cloud 
providers (who wish to provide assured access to the data) have a strong business 
reason to provide key backup.
at a practical level, then, cloud providers and commercial parties to a transac-
tion very often have access to the contents of communications and transactions. 
It will thus very often be technically possible for the companies to respond to 
lawful access requests.
This technical possibility to respond to process leads an important, specific 
split between the “haves” and “have nots.” Some jurisdictions will have the 
cloud server in their jurisdiction, with relatively straightforward access to the 
stored records under local law. other jurisdictions will not have such access. 
They will have to use a Mutual Legal assistance treaty (MLat) or other mech-
anism to gain access to the holder of the records. These “have not” jurisdic-
tions may well face added expense and delay in gaining access to the records. 
In some (or perhaps many) cases they will not be able to access records that 
they consider important for law enforcement or national security purposes. 
Conversely, cloud providers and other holders of records are likely to face an 
increasing number of lawful access requests, from a potentially bewildering 
array of jurisdictions.
14. See, for example, Huang Yongfeng, Zhang Jiuling, and Li Xing, “encrypted Storage and 
retrieval in Cloud Storage applications,” [2010] 4 ZTE Communications, http:// wwwen.zte.
com.cn/ endata/ magazine/ ztecommunications/ 2010Year/ no4/ articles/ 201012/ t20101220_ 
197082.html.
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V.  CONCLUSION
The focus of this chapter is to describe the effect of technical changes on likely 
paths for lawful access to communications information. This chapter does 
not propose how best to resolve legal issues, including the complex multi- 
jurisdictional issues that will occur increasingly often. an improved under-
standing of the technology, however, can help clarify what legal and practical 
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Recommendations for Government  
and Industry
J A M E S  X .  D E M P S E Y  A N D  F R E D  H .   C AT E
I.  ABSTR ACT
The chapters in this volume represent a diversity of voices from around the 
world, but they are uniform in their commitment to the proposition that ter-
rorism can be effectively fought and national security interests can be defended 
within a system of oversight and control that protects both corporate interests 
and individual privacy. Moreover, they are remarkable in their consistency in 
describing the components of an effective system of checks and balances. It 
turns out, when it comes to government surveillance, the tools of control and 
accountability are already known. They are just not comprehensively applied. 
This chapter draws on the work of the contributors to this volume and on the 
flood of court opinions, legislative enactments, official reports, academic writ-
ings, corporate developments, and NGO advocacy over the past five years, to 
recommend a coherent framework for the collection of private- sector data. For 
governments, the elements of this framework can be summarized in three key 
concepts:  legality, proportionality, and accountability. For corporations, they 
are based on adoption of internal policies, internal and external accountability, 
and transparency, backed up by a willingness to challenge overbroad or unjus-
tified government demands. The elements of this framework are drawn from 
long- accepted principles of the rule of law, human rights, and democratic gov-
ernance. Some of them have even been applied for decades, in at least some dem-
ocratic countries, to intelligence and national security surveillance. The one new 
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II.  INTRODUCTION
When we began this project in 2011, our initial research identified various exam-
ples of “systematic access” in a wide range of countries, but it also found a general 
lack of transparency about the nature of, and legal basis for, data collection prac-
tices carried out in the name of national security or foreign intelligence.
Beginning in June 2013, unauthorized and authorized disclosures of intelli-
gence programs in the united States, the uK, and some other European coun-
tries partly lifted the shroud of secrecy, at least with respect to some countries. 
“Bulk surveillance” came to be featured prominently in national and interna-
tional debates over governmental power, corporate responsibility and individual 
privacy. Although much of the commentary was exaggerated or misleading, it is 
undeniable that the disclosures confirmed our core concerns about expansive and 
lightly regulated government demands for access to data held (or transmitted) by 
the private sector.
In the ensuing years, there have been a number of remarkable developments:
• The president of the united States issued a directive expressly stating 
that the united States would respect the privacy rights of all persons 
“regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside” and 
placed limits on the retention and use of signals intelligence collected in 
bulk by uS agencies.1
• The uS Congress adopted legislation, signed by the president, that 
ended a domestic program that had compelled telephone companies to 
turn over call detail records in bulk. The legislation amended several 
statutes to make it clear that they could not be used to authorize bulk 
collection in the future.2
• The uS legislation also introduced the possibility of appointing 
independent advocates to participate in the proceedings of the 
secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which had previously 
examined programmatic surveillance demands based on the filings and 
arguments of only the government.3
1. Presidential Policy Directive/ PPD- 28, “Signals Intelligence Activities” (January 17, 2014).
2. uSA FREEDOM Act, Pub. l. 114- 23 (June 2, 2015). In addition to amending Section 215 of 
the PATRIOT Act to prohibit is use for bulk collection, the Act also amended various provi-
sions authorizing issuance of National Security letters, making it clear that they could not be 
used for bulk collection.
3. The FISA Court has since taken advantage of the special advocates role, publicly appoint-
ing an independent advocate in one case dealing with the final stages of the bulk telephone 
records program and designating a pool of five qualified lawyers that can be drawn upon in 
the future.
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• The uS Privacy and Civil liberties Oversight Board developed into  
a fully functioning independent oversight body, issuing detailed  
reports and recommendations on uS surveillance programs.4
• Other countries adopted legislation at least nominally designed  
to increase oversight of their intelligence services.
• The Court of Justice of the European union annulled the Eu  
data retention mandate, which had required communications  
service providers to collect and retain transactional data on all  
the communications of all their customers.5
• Insisting that strong protections were needed lest technological 
developments erode the constitutional right to privacy, the uS Supreme 
Court held that police needed a judicial warrant, issued under the 
Constitution’s highest standard, to conduct prolonged GPS tracking 
or to examine the contents of a mobile phone seized in the course of 
arrest.6
• Internet and telecommunications companies published on a regular 
basis increasingly detailed transparency reports, statistically 
documenting the number and types of government demands for 
disclosure of customer data.
• Device makers and providers of online communications services 
increasingly incorporated encryption into the default settings of their 
products and services, protecting data both at rest and in transit. 
Applications providing strong encryption from one user to another 
(sometimes called “end- to- end,” although that term can be ambiguous) 
proliferated.
• uS- based providers of Internet services became advocates for the 
privacy of their customers worldwide, supporting greater transparency 
of government demands and stronger legislative standards for 
government access, and strongly opposing bulk collection of 
communications data.7
• The Privacy Bridges project, launched by then- chair of the Dutch Data 
Protection Authority Jacob Kohnstamm, identified “Government 
Access to Private Sector Personal Data” as one of 10 critical areas where 
transatlantic cooperation is needed, recommending that companies 
faced with surveillance demands “establish uniform internal practices 
for handling such [government] requests regardless of jurisdiction, 
4. Of the 22 recommendations issued by the Board so far, all have been implemented in whole 
or in part, including in the legislation ending the bulk telephony metadata program.
5.  Digital Rights Ireland EClI:Eu:C:2014:238 (2014). See also S and Marper v.  UK, [2008] 
ECtHR 1581(uK DNA collection/ retention).
6. Riley v. California, 573 u.S. 783 (2014) (mobile phone searches); United States v. Jones, 565 
u.S. 400 (2012) (GPS tracking).
7. See https:// www.reformgovernmentsurveillance.com/ .
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citizenship, and data location,” “report on practices relating to 
government access requests on a regular basis,” and develop “a 
framework for assessing and responding to requests for data  
originating outside national territory.”8
Not all developments, however, have been privacy- friendly. While the united 
States has curtailed some of its programs, other countries have expanded theirs. 
In response both to the revelations of intrusive uS government programs and to 
the changing communications environment and the growing importance of dig-
ital evidence in both criminal and national security matters, a number of coun-
tries have adopted laws expanding government surveillance powers or requiring 
service providers to make data more readily accessible.
III.  THE RECOMMENDATIONS
The chapters in this volume represent a diversity of voices from around the world, 
but they are uniform in their commitment to the proposition that terrorism can 
be effectively fought and national security interests can be defended within a 
system of oversight and control that protects both corporate interests and indi-
vidual privacy. Moreover, they are remarkable in their consistency in describing 
the components of an effective system of checks and balances. It turns out, when 
it comes to government surveillance, the tools of control and accountability are 
already known. They are just not comprehensively applied.
In this chapter, we draw on the work of the contributors to this volume and 
on the flood of court opinions, legislative enactments, official reports, academic 
writings, corporate developments, and NGO advocacy over the past five years, to 
recommend a coherent framework of oversight and accountability.
The elements of the framework are really nothing new. They are drawn from 
long- accepted principles of the rule of law, human rights, and democratic gov-
ernance. Some of them have even been applied for decades, in at least some dem-
ocratic countries, to intelligence and national security surveillance. The one new 
recommendation that emerges from our study, however, is a strong rejection of 
bulk collection.
Before we present the recommendations, it is first necessary to consider briefly 
their scope. When we began this research in 2011, we used the term “system-
atic access” to refer to large- scale government access mainly to data in storage. 
However, we found that it was often difficult to separate concerns over access to 
data at rest from concerns about data in transit. Some of the surveillance pro-
grams that have attracted the largest attention in recent global policy debates 
have involved access to data in transit. Also, given the architecture of cloud 
services, data in storage may move between servers or between the cloud and 
8. “Privacy Bridges:  Eu and uS Privacy Experts in Search of Transatlantic Privacy 
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end users, meaning that it can be accessed in transit. One clear difference that 
exacerbates concerns with data in storage is that it allows retrospective surveil-
lance. Ongoing improvements in storage capacity mean that third- party service 
providers can and do hold data reaching back to the inception of their services. 
In terms of oversight and control, however, the mechanisms and standards are 
in many ways the same. Consequently, our recommendations, and many of the 
chapters in this compilation, address both access to data in transit and access to 
data in storage.
Also, we have found it difficult to separate concerns with bulk or mass 
surveillance— surveillance that sweeps up, for example, data about all individuals 
using a service— from concerns with surveillance that is targeted (that is, focused 
on specific individuals or accounts) but that nevertheless is massive in that it collects 
a large amount of data on a large number of individuals. That said, the distinction 
between mass, bulk, or indiscriminate collection and massive but targeted collec-
tion remains valid and is reflected in our recommendation against bulk collection.
A.  Recommendations for Governments
1.  Three Core Principles: Legality, Proportionately,  
and Accountability
From the various governmental, intergovernmental, corporate, academic, and 
civil society statements and rulings and reports both before and especially after 
the Snowden revelations, three core principles emerge for the conduct of govern-
ment surveillance programs: legality, proportionately, and accountability. These 
three principles can be described and expanded with further elements. Together, 
they form a set of standards that we believe can permit responsible, effective 
government surveillance, while ensuring that it is conducted in a manner that 
protects privacy as fully as possible. In many instances, the same tools that help 
protect privacy also help focus surveillance so that it is more likely to be effective. 
In others, surveillance and privacy may be in tension. But in either case, a grow-
ing consensus has emerged from a rich body of international law and norms on 
the proper conduct of government surveillance. We believe the following princi-
ples reflect that consensus:
Legality. The principle of legality has two components. The first focuses on the 
adoption of the framework defining governmental powers. The authorities and 
standards for government surveillance (data acquisition) should be spelled out in 
a publicly accessible law or regulation in terms precise enough to protect against 
arbitrary application and to inform the public of which entities can conduct sur-
veillance and under what criteria.9
9. Several human rights instruments use the phrases “in accordance with law” and “neces-
sary in a democratic society.” The core principle is that the law authorizing government data 
acquisition “must not only be accessible and foreseeable in its application, it must also ensure 
that secret surveillance measures are applied only when necessary in a democratic society, in 
particular by providing for adequate and effective safeguards against abuse.” Szabó and Vissy 
v. Hungary, ECtHR, App. no. 37138/ 14, Judgment, January 12, 2016, ¶ 59.
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The second component of legality focuses on the specific application of a par-
ticular power, that is, a particular exercise of that power in carrying out a specific 
instance or program of access. More intrusive measures should require authori-
zation by an independent judicial officer (with possible exception for emergency 
circumstances). In all situations, surveillance or data acquisition should require 
approval of a senior official. For national security matters, approval should be 
required of both a senior intelligence official and from a senior official outside 
the security service.
Proportionality. The concept of proportionality has several components. 
One concerns the purpose of the surveillance or data acquisition. As Special 
Rapporteur Frank la Rue stated, “legal frameworks must ensure that commun-
ications surveillance measures … [a] re strictly and demonstrably necessary to 
achieve a legitimate aim.” In the criminal justice context, the purpose of surveil-
lance should be limited to the investigation of specified serious crimes. In the 
national security context, the topics of surveillance should be narrowly defined 
and/ or limited to specified serious threats or subjects.
Proportionality also concerns scope. (The concept of “necessity” is also rele-
vant to scope.) Bulk surveillance should be disfavored. Surveillance should be 
limited to a specifically designated person or account.10 “Strategic” or general-
ized monitoring should be disfavored and, if permitted, should be more closely 
regulated. The government should be required to ensure that irrelevant data is 
not recorded or, if collected, is destroyed or is not searched or used. This is some-
times referred to as “minimization.”
Another element of proportionality is justification. Approval of the initiation 
of surveillance should require a showing of a strong factual basis for believing 
that the target is engaged in criminal conduct or activities of national security 
significance. Approval should require a showing that other less intrusive means 
will not suffice or are unlikely to obtain the needed information. (Again, the con-
cept of “necessity.”) The duration of a surveillance, or the time period covered by 
stored data, should be limited, subject to renewal.
Proportionality also means that the use and disclosure of data should be lim-
ited to the purposes that justified the initial collection. For example, in the crim-
inal investigative context, data collected should be used only for investigation or 
prosecution of crimes at least as serious as those that justified the surveillance.
Finally, proportionality means that there should be a time limit set on how 
long the government can retain information it acquires.
Accountability. Accountability has three components:  transparency, over-
sight, and redress. Transparency is closely tied to the first element of legality: not 
only should the government’s powers be publicly specified, but basic informa-
tion about the interpretation and use of those powers should be published. 
Independent oversight bodies (judicial, executive, legislative) should oversee 
the actual implementation of surveillance procedures to protect against abuse. 
10. This is sometimes referred to as “particularity.”
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Individuals should be able to obtain redress for violations of the established stan-
dards. In order for individuals to claim redress, they must have notice. The target 
of government data collection should be provided notice of the government’s 
action. Such notice may be delayed in order not to frustrate the investigation.
We recognize that no country in the world uniformly applies all of these con-
cepts to all forms of surveillance. There are legitimate differences between sur-
veillance for law enforcement purposes as opposed to surveillance for national 
security purposes, and the administrative purposes of the modern welfare state 
may justify certain data reporting requirements. Different rules may apply to 
the content of communications versus metadata. Nevertheless, recognizing all 
of these caveats, the foregoing factors, discussed in the chapters in this volume 
by Sarah St.Vincent, by Ashley Deeks, and by Ira Rubinstein, Greg Nojeim, and 
Ron lee, provide the source of an effective oversight and accountability system.11
The chapters in this compilation, as well as the research of others, have substan-
tially fleshed out several elements of this framework. We highlight three here.
Independent Oversight: As Nico van Eijk effectively argues, oversight, broadly 
defined, must be comprehensive, independent, and adequately resourced. 
Effective oversight can be achieved only with a web of checks and balances, 
implemented by multiple bodies of varying competencies, reinforcing each other. 
A  lesson of the past four years is that no one body or structure can be relied 
on to provide adequate control of government surveillance. Courts, no matter 
how independent, can approve programs that seem unreasonable in the light 
of day. Parliamentary bodies may grant broad powers. An effective system of 
controls will include the legislature, the judiciary, the executive (through inter-
nal compliance, auditing and inspection), and some form of special commission 
or reviewer. Effective oversight must encompass prior authorization, post hoc 
review, and a meaningful complaint and redress system. It should encompass 
all stages of the intelligence cycle: collection, querying and analysis, retention, 
dissemination, and use. At least somewhere in the process, there should be an 
adversarial function, representing the interests of affected individuals and chal-
lenging the claims of the government.
Transparency: There must be transparency both as to what the authorities of 
the government are and as to how those authorities are exercised. This can be 
done without jeopardizing sources and methods. At the most fundamental level, 
all authorities exercised by the state should be specified in statute. Companies 
should be able to publish statistical reports on the number and types of govern-
ment demands received.
Much of the criticism of the bulk surveillance program of telephone meta-
data, initially disclosed by Edward Snowden, that the united States was con-
ducting under section 215 of the uSA PATRIOT Act reflected the importance 
11. See also D. Korff, “Note on European and International law on Transnational Surveillance 
prepared for the Civil liberties Committee of the European Parliament” (August 23, 2013), 
http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/ meetdocs/ 2009_ 2014/ documents/ libe/ dv/ note_ korff_ / note_ 
korff_ en.pdf.
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of transparency and the impact on public trust when it is absent. The bulk sur-
veillance was based on a series of secret court orders that offered a sweeping new 
interpretation of section 215 that was not in any way suggested by the text of 
the statute. Finally, after unauthorized disclosures, the uS government officially 
acknowledged the interpretation, and Congress moved to amend the statute to 
prohibit its use for bulk collection.
Accountability: Courts, including regional human rights courts, play a cru-
cial role. This has been demonstrated most clearly by the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights and more recently by the Court of Justice of 
the European union. Claims of secrecy should not be used to bar access to the 
courts.
B.  Recommendations for Companies
Although the work TPP has supported on systematic government access to 
private- sector data initially focused on government activities, in its later stages 
it included greater attention to the activities of private- sector targets of govern-
ment surveillance demands. As we explain in our chapter on accountability, the 
responsibility of companies as data stewards extends both to their own proc-
essing of data and to processing by their vendors and partners to whom data is 
disclosed. However, when a government entity demands that a company dis-
close data in its possession or control, that introduces a gap in the accounta-
bility structure if the governmental entity itself is not acting within a structure 
of accountability. This gap— the inability of a company to assure its regulators 
and its customers that information will be disclosed to governments only under 
a system of legality, proportionality, and accountability— is what led to the 
Schrems decision striking down the system for data flows from Europe to the 
united States. A company cannot meet its privacy obligations to its customers if 
it is subject to government demands that are not themselves compliant with core 
human rights norms. In this regard, there is a direct link between human rights 
protections and corporate self- interest.
There is of course a further linkage, which is trust. Even if companies were 
not lawfully obligated to adopt accountable data governance practices, the mar-
ket creates incentives to establish and maintain the trust of their customers. 
Especially with the unprecedented growth of cloud services, as individuals, cor-
porations, and other entities turn over vast amounts of highly sensitive data to 
third parties for storage and processing, it is literally existential that companies 
holding the data can assure their customers that it is secure.
A core group of Internet companies has made progress in addressing this chal-
lenge of accountability and trust, through the Global Network Initiative. under 
the GNI implementation guidelines, it is not sufficient for companies merely to 
say, “We only comply with lawful demands.” The GNI guidelines specify that 
companies should have in place procedures to carefully assess not only whether 
a government demand is lawful but also whether it is overbroad or inconsist-
ent with international human rights standards. The guidelines state that, when 
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required to provide personal information to governmental authorities, partici-
pating companies will:
• Narrowly interpret and implement government demands that 
compromise privacy.
• Seek clarification or modification from authorized officials when 
government demands appear overbroad, unlawful, not required by 
applicable law or inconsistent with international human rights laws and 
standards on privacy.
• Request clear communications, preferably in writing, that explain the 
legal basis for government demands for personal information, including 
the name of the requesting government entity and the name, title and 
signature of the authorized official.
• Require that governments follow established domestic legal processes 
when they are seeking access to personal information.
• Adopt policies and procedures to address how the company will 
respond when government demands do not include a written directive 
or fail to adhere to established legal procedure. These policies and 
procedures shall include a consideration of when to challenge such 
government demands.
• Narrowly interpret the governmental authority’s jurisdiction to access 
personal information, such as limiting compliance to users within that 
country.
• Challenge the government in domestic courts or seek the assistance 
of relevant authorities, international human rights bodies or non- 
governmental organizations when faced with a government demand 
that appears inconsistent with domestic law or procedures or 
international human rights laws and standards on privacy.12
In our chapter on accountability, we also discuss how transparency plays as crit-
ical a role in private- sector responses to government demands for personal data 
as it does with respect to government surveillance activities. Transparency in 
this context concerns both legal authorities and the scope of the government’s 
exercise of those authorities: what types of information are being disclosed to 
government agencies and under what legal authorities and for what purposes; 
and how much data, affecting how many customers, is disclosed? Companies 
are largely at the mercy of national laws and government policy in terms of what 
they can disclose. Companies in the united States and elsewhere have made 
huge strides in developing transparency reports in which they publish statistical 
information about the number of government disclosure demands they receive 
and/ or the number of accounts affected, although they remain constrained by 
some government- imposed limits.
12. http:// globalnetworkinitiative.org/ implementationguidelines/ index.php.
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IV.  CONCLUSION
An increasingly broad consensus is emerging around the key requirements that 
should guide and constrain both government and industry when governments 
seek broad access to personal data held by the private sector. The work supported 
by TPP for more than five years has helped to inform and support that con-
sensus. The country reports in this volume amply demonstrate the prevalence 
of bulk or large- scale surveillance, the importance of the need for ensuring 
that it is conducted subject to appropriate controls, the inadequacy of many of 
the controls already in place, and the growing consistency about the necessary 
components of an effective system of checks and balances. The findings of this 
project and many others have also highlighted the need for action. The tools for 
ensuring accountability when governments engage in systematic surveillance of 
private- sector data, and when industry is confronted with government demands 
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